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Abstract 
 
The aim of this study is to evaluate the implementation of the 
Payment by Results (PbR) policy in mental health in England 
through the identification of the driving factors that have caused 
the delayed implementation of the system. Payment by Results, 
the English version of Diagnosis Related Groups, is a 
prospective payment system under which the nationally-fixed 
prices are set against the clinically-classified groups in which 
patients share similar health care needs. First introduced in 
acute services in 2003/04, PbR was expected to control 
healthcare costs, increase providers’ efficiency and improve the 
quality of service delivery in the market-based healthcare 
system. An expansion of PbR to mental health was initially 
planned to come into effect by 2013, but at the time of writing 
(October 2015) it had yet to become the definitive framework 
of funding for the NHS secondary mental health services.  
 
In light of the debate on the feasibility of implementing this 
policy in mental health, this study has adopted a mixed-
methods approach to conduct a three-stage analysis of the PbR 
policy. Firstly, through the theoretical analysis of the initiation 
of the PbR policy, this study has revealed that the policy was 
poorly initiated due to the mismatches between the market 
theory and public services in the current context. Secondly, 
through the investigation of the design of PbR, this study has 
argued that the policy was poorly formulated due to the 
conceptual and the constructional drawbacks of the Mental 
Health Clustering Tool (MHCT) classification system as well as 
the inappropriateness of applying the “standardisation-to-the-
average” principle to the cost calculation. In the fieldwork stage, 
this study has carried out 12 semi-structured interviews and 
	 4	
online surveys to explore the implementation phase of the 
policy-making process. The divergent, and even conflicting 
perspectives obtained among the three interest groups have 
pointed to the fact that the policy was poorly executed, and it 
suffered from “bad luck” (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984) as a result 
of from the political context of austerity. 
 
Through the comparison of the implementation of PbR in mental 
health with that in acute services this study has highlighted the 
importance of the external context to the success of any policy. 
It has also argued that one size does not fit all systems since 
the PbR payment system may be able to serve the purposes in 
acute services, but it does not fit mental health services. In this 
respect, this study reminds policymakers to consider the 
potential trade-offs between the political objectives and the 
inevitable consequences. As a policy evaluation, based on the 
experiences drawn from the failure of implementing PbR in 
mental health, this study has suggested that policy should be 
consistent, and policy should be tested prior to full 
implementation. 
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1. Introduction   
 
 
1.1 Background of the study  
There have been policies to adopt patient-centred approaches 
into the National Health Service (NHS) over many years and by 
different governments as patients were seen to be expected to 
fit around services rather than vice versa. The Labour 
government used the term “patient-centred care” as part of 
their manifesto in the 1997 general election (Gillespie et al., 
2002; Goodrich, 2009). Although with limited success in 
changing the dominance of the medical model (Appleby and 
Coote, 2002), there has been an escalation of rhetoric and a 
series of policies to expand patient choice following the 1997 
election, (e.g. Delivering the NHS Plan: Next Steps on 
Investment, Next Steps on Reform (Secretary of State for 
Health, 2002), Creating A Patient-led NHS: Delivering the NHS 
Improvement Plan (Department of Health, 2005a)). In Equity 
and Excellence: Liberating the NHS (Secretary of State for 
Health, 2010), the Coalition government reiterated the 
importance of providing patient-centred health care by 
appreciating the patient’s individual needs for care and their 
personal values.  
 
Recently, improving healthcare efficiency has attracted greater 
worldwide attention due to the intense financial pressure facing 
the healthcare industry as a whole (Barton, 2003). Since the 
birth of the National Health Service (NHS), the British 
healthcare system has been funded by taxation in which 
patients have the same access to healthcare services without 
having to pay for them directly (NHS Choices, 2013). In turn, 
universal availability has resulted in concerns regarding over-
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demand – the so called “moral hazard”, due to the empirical 
evidence that indicates an increase in demand and the 
excessive consumption of healthcare resources (Blunt, 2014). 
Consequently, the British healthcare system has been under 
intense financial pressure to improve its efficiency, even though 
it has been consistently rated as the most efficient system in 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) by the Commonwealth Fund (NHS Confederation, 2014).  
 
Developed by Yale University, a prospective payment method 
called Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) represents a new way 
to reimburse providers. Unlike the previous “cost-based” 
payment method, it relates the type of patients treated to the 
costs incurred by providers in managing collective healthcare 
costs (Averill et al., 2003). Underpinned by the case-mix 
principle, DRGs groups patients into categories according to 
their diagnoses and needs for care, in which patients are 
expected to consume the same level of healthcare resources as 
their peers (Fetter and Freeman, 1986). The costs for each 
group are therefore determined as the basis for this prospective 
payment method. In other words, this prospective payment 
system pays providers a predetermined, set rate based on 
patients’ needs in an evidence-based way (Mayes, 2007). Since 
the 1980s, this system has been widely approved and adopted 
due to its comprehensive and accurate disease classification 
system, and therefore, its effectiveness for cost control (Fetter 
et al., 1980). DRGs, or the case-mix based classification 
systems, have been widely implemented in acute settings in 
most of the developed countries throughout the world (Mason 
et al., 2012), as well as in a selection of developing countries 
such as China and Mexico. 
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The case-mix based classification systems and accordingly the 
cost calculation systems were firstly developed for surgical 
services for which the groups with clinical meaning and 
economically homogeneity are easy to derive. However, due to 
the complex nature of mental disorders, only some countries 
have implemented or planned to implement DRG-like systems 
in psychiatry. England is currently in the process of expanding 
this system to mental health. It has been a decade since 
Payment by Results (PbR), the English version of DRGs, was 
implemented in acute services, and the government had 
originally planned to introduce this classification system into 
mental health by 2013. However, at the time of writing (October 
2015), it has yet to come into effect as a payment system. 
Mental health services are still contracted under the Block 
Contract while PbR has only been invoked as a classification 
system with care pathways still under development. Moreover, 
the terms “dangerous” and “unintended outcomes” have been 
employed to describe the rush to implement PbR in this field 
(Lintern, 2013). 
 
As a policy evaluation, this study focuses on investigating the 
fundamental, mechanical and practical problems that have 
caused the delay in implementing PbR in mental health in 
England. Through a case study of the implementation of  PbR in 
mental health in Nottinghamshire, this study aims to present a 
comprehensive overview of the policy-making process and 
therefore, evaluate the gaps between the initial political intents 
and actual frontline outputs. The main thrust of the study is on 
the application of the market theory and the case-mix based 
health resource management instrument in an area 
characterised by complex individualised conditions. Unlike the 
acute services where the groups with clinical meaning and 
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economically homogeneity are easy to derive, the individualised 
needs for care in mental health services highlight the challenges, 
or even inappropriateness of commodifying mental health 
services. This weakens the theoretical validity and feasibility of 
applying the Quasi-market theory to the simplification of the 
management of mental health resources (this will be discussed 
in Chapter 3). In other words, the complex nature of mental 
disorders rejects the fundamental preconditions of PbR, which 
makes the policy itself less valid and thus adversely affects the 
formulation and implementation of PbR in mental health (MH 
PbR). This study further investigates the formulation of the PbR 
policy based on the argument regarding the failure to apply the 
Quasi-market theory at the fundamental level, which indicates 
the difficulties in standardising mental health services. This 
refers to the process of transferring the idea of commodification 
into practice through a clinical classification system called the 
Mental Health Clustering Tool (MHCT). The failure of the MHCT 
to serve its function demonstrates the drawbacks of the policy 
formulation. Additionally, it also points to the difficulties in 
implementing this scheme. This is confirmed by the study 
fieldwork in which semi-structured interviews and online 
surveys were conducted with key players in the commissioning 
cycle. 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the research topic and the 
corresponding research design. Drawing on the importance of 
understanding the policy itself as well as the nature of mental 
health services to evaluating this policy, this chapter begins with 
a brief overview of the birth of PbR and the development of 
mental health services, followed by some a review of available 
evidence regarding its development in acute services and 
mental health services. The background information facilitates 
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serves to inform the significance of this study, which will be 
discussed in Section 1.2. Subject to the research questions and 
aims outlined in Section 1.3, Section 1.4 describes the research 
design and corresponding methods. Section 1.5 presents an 
outline of the structure of the thesis with an emphasis on 
demonstrating the intrinsic logic which has informed it.  
 
 
1.1.1 The birth of DRGs and PbR 
1.1.1.1 Development of DRGs  
DRGs are groups of cases that share similar characteristics and 
health needs with unified payment standards attached to each 
case group to promote a more efficient utilisation of healthcare 
resources (Ranjan et al., 2003). Seen as a solution to the 
challenges with the allocation efficiency that most developed 
countries are currently facing (Busse et al., 2011), the DRGs 
system features four characteristics (Sanderson et al., 1986): 
managing healthcare resources according to patients’ needs;  
the inclusion of comprehensive classification indicators (e.g., 
the International Classification of Diseases (ICD)) applying the 
case-mix principle; categorising the confusingly large number 
of individuals into a manageable number of clinically-meaningful 
and economically homogeneous groups; whilst finally 
connecting treatments to specific prices to formulate a coherent 
evidence-based health resource management system. 
 
Since 1983, when the DRGs system was first introduced as the 
basis for paying hospitals in the United States, DRG-based 
hospital payment systems have been widely adopted in most 
developed countries, albeit with slightly different purposes and 
to different extents (Paris et al., 2010). DRGs are adopted as a 
classification system in some countries, such as Sweden and 
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Finland, whereas in countries such as England, Germany and 
France, DRG-based systems (with different country-specific 
versions) are used as a synonym for payment rates (Geissler et 
al., 2011).  
 
 
1.1.1.2 PbR in England 
With the intentions to meet the large demands for service and 
to continue providing patients quality healthcare services, the 
English government introduced Payment by Results in 2003 
(Secretary of State for Health, 2002). The introduction was 
meant to replace the Block Contract and to establish a new 
financial framework to pay different providers on a fair and 
transparent basis for service delivery. Employing economic 
theories, the rationale for designing PbR is to contain cost, 
increase efficiency and promote quality through a provider-side, 
non-price competition in a mimicked market called the “internal 
market” (Miraldo et al., 2006). 
 
Rather than the previous lump-sum payment under the Block 
Contract, PbR uses a fixed price system that makes a direct link 
between the hospital’s income and the number of the cases 
treated, termed “cost-and-volume” payment system (Farrar et 
al., 2009). In this system, payment is directly related to specific 
cases and treatments regardless of the provider under the 
classification system according to the case-mix principle (Boyle, 
2007). Similar to other DRG systems, the concept of PbR 
consists of two main components: a nationally agreed set of 
prices for healthcare services called “tariffs”, and a classification 
system in which certain cases are categorised into specific 
treatment groups that are similar in intervention design and 
resource consumption (O'Connor and Neumann, 2006).   
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The purchaser/provider split entitles commissioners the right to 
purchase healthcare services offered by a range of providers, 
including public, private or voluntary sectors. Under PbR, 
commissioners pay national tariffs for each patient treated. The 
linear relationship between cost and volume creates incentives 
for providers with lower costs than the national tariffs to 
undertake more activities in order to increase their revenue in 
proportion to their growth in activity (Miraldo et al., 2006). 
Without price competition, providers are expected to be 
motivated to improve quality to attract more patients. 
Conversely, providers also face financial risks when costs 
exceed the national tariffs, which drives providers to control 
costs and improve efficiency (Appleby et al., 2012). 
 
 
1.1.2 Development of mental health service 
management 
Tracing the history of mental health development, the initiative 
of the “mental disorders” was from an opposite standpoint from 
that of physical illnesses. In contrast to the sympathetic 
understanding of people with physical illness who have been 
seen as deserving of effective help to overcome their illness, 
people with mental difficulties have been stigmatised and were 
even the victims of witch-hunts in 18th century Europe 
(Schoeneman, 1977). With the development of social 
understanding and treatment approaches, “mental disorder” is 
no longer viewed as a myth or seen as the result of evil spirits, 
but rather is viewed as a disease similar to physical illness 
(Szasz, 1960). Nevertheless, despite significant developments, 
the structure and function of mental health services are still 
different from that of the services offered by general hospitals. 
The fundamental reason for this difference is largely due to the 
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natural characteristics of mental disorders – intangible 
pathology and unclear aetiology, particularly since mental 
disorders cannot be objectively defined or diagnosed through 
any laboratory test regularly used acute services (Frances, 
2010). Even in organic conditions of neurology, in which the 
damages could be found on a clinical image, there exist some 
cases like dementia for which the brain damage is not always 
detectable in post-mortem (Rogers and Pilgrim, 2010).  
 
Therefore, the ability to distinguish people with mental 
difficulties from the general “healthy” population is closely 
related to professional and social environmental forces. The lack 
of clear markers of diagnosing mental disorders leads to greater 
reliance on the professional judgment of one’s mental condition, 
which is the process of distinguishing the “abnormal” from the 
“normal” group. As Rogers and Pilgrim (2010) illustrate from 
the statistical aspect, under the assumption that characteristics 
in any population follow a bell-shaped normal distribution, the 
frequently occurring behaviours are set as the standards of 
being “normal”, whereas the infrequent behaviours, or the 
deviances in the normal distribution, are regarded as 
“abnormal”. Practically, classification systems have been 
designed to capture the “abnormal” from the “normal” 
phenomena and, hence, identify the “shared characteristics” 
from the “abnormal” phenomena by arranging them into pre-
determined categories to facilitate the provision of targeted 
treatments (Dalal and Sivakumar, 2009).  
 
The ICD is the most popular classification system, and has been 
adopted in a majority of countries, whereas the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is prevalently used 
in mental health in the US. Both systems validate particular 
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behaviours as “normal” and establish privileged signs according 
to the case-mix principle. These categorical models provide a 
“discrete entity” view of “abnormality”: pathology detected 
means “abnormal”, otherwise means “normal” (Jablensky, 
2009). Underpinned by population-level statistical analysis, 
features are isolated, behaviours are labelled, and patterns of 
the abnormal cases are identified (Kraemer, 2007). The 
classification and coding system translate the observed 
behaviours into certain syndromes against specific diagnoses. 
This process reveals the essence of identifying the “abnormal” 
in mental health, which is also the essence of the case-mix 
principle: to reduce variations between patients with similar 
needs by standardising “shared characteristics”. However, given 
the prevalence of individualised conditions, there is a large 
variation in severity and need, even in the same group defined 
by a diagnosis and especially given the absence of a “gold 
standard” of aetiology (Dalal and Sivakumar, 2009). Such 
diversity in conditions leads to the variation in resource 
consumption and cost, which then increases the difficulties in 
accurately measuring costs and calculating the corresponding 
prices. Since PbR in England is used as both a clinical 
classification system and a payment system, the MHCT, a 
classification system based on the severity of symptoms as well 
as the primary diagnosis, has been introduced in mental health 
to guide the calculation of price (Department of Health, 2012a) 
(this will be discussed in Chapter 2).  
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1.1.3 Current status of PbR 
1.1.3.1 Lack of sufficient research on intended 
consequence  
Although it has been two decades since the DRGs system was 
first introduced in the United States and over ten years since 
implementing different versions of the DRGs systems in 
European countries, Brügger (2010) argues that there is still a 
lack of sufficient evidence illustrating the effects of DRG-based 
payment systems on controlling cost, increasing efficiency and 
improving quality. The available studies focusing on PbR comply 
with the findings from other countries by indicating a relative 
lack of sound evidence regarding the achievement of PbR.   
 
The difficulties in measuring the effect of PbR on cost are due 
to the difficulties in isolating its impacts under a wider reform 
programme. The Audit Commission (2005) reports its 
presentence of stronger incentive on cost reduction compared 
to the Block Contract payment system. By contrast, Maynard 
and Bloor (2004) note the inability of PbR to address the 
increase in regulatory costs brought about by the adoption of 
market theory. In light of the external confounding factors such 
as research contracts from both public and private resources, 
the downward pressure on the reference cost has been 
mitigated by the cross-subsidy obtained from these sources of 
income (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2009). 
 
Longitudinal studies concerning the effects of PbR on efficiency 
have failed to confirm its positive impacts. Specifically, 
interviews and observation conducted by the Audit Commission 
(2008) reveal that PbR has not yet significantly increased 
provider capacity due to its unclear effects on capacity in 
general. Farrar et al.’s (2007) study indicates the difficulties in 
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attributing changes in efficiency to the introduction of PbR.  
 
As Or and Häkkinen (2011) argue, the difficulties in observing 
and quantifying the quality of care have led to a lack of 
agreement on how to effectively measure quality. Moreover, 
drawing on the existence of the immeasurable services, such as 
those behind the scene, Levaggi (2005) raised concerns 
regarding the withholding of services by providers that are not 
verifiable, particularly due to the lack of consideration of quality 
in the design of the payment mechanism.  
 
 
1.1.3.2 Delay in implementing PbR 
Besides the lack of sufficient evidence illustrating the practical 
effects of PbR against the political intents in acute services, the 
delay in implementing PbR in mental health has been noted. An 
expansion of PbR into mental health was initially planned to 
come into effect by 2013, it has yet to become the definitive 
framework for funding NHS secondary mental health services. 
In 2013, guidelines were published by Department of Health 
(Lindblom and Woodhouse) which included indicative costs for 
each of twenty-one treatment packages intended for 
implementation in 2013/14. This was delayed until 2014/15 
(Mayden, 2013), and an article in the Health Service Journal 
named “Updated: Monitor Questions Payment by Results for 
Mental Health” (Lintern, 2013) revealed that this too had been 
delayed. Stephen Dalton, chief executive of the Mental Health 
Network also questions the appropriateness of the rush to 
implement this scheme in mental health in the absence of sound 
evidence supporting its impacts in acute services (Lintern, 
2013). By February 2015, the changing political landscape 
appeared to have moved this debate even further, with the focus 
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shifting from PbR as a core feature of competitive tendering to 
an emphasis upon a “system-wide approach” (Keohane, 2015).  
 
PbR has been implemented in the inpatient, outpatient and 
Acute and Emergency (A&E) (Secretary of State for Health, 
2010) areas, which has followed the planned schedule, leaving 
the expansion to mental health services delayed. Therefore, the 
following questions remain: 1) Does the theory of PbR fit into 
mental health services; 2) Is the mismatch between the 
mechanisms of PbR and the complex nature of mental disorders 
responsible for the delayed implementation, and to what extent 
it influenced the process of the implementation of PbR in mental 
health if this is the case; 3) What are the other factors that have 
caused the delay in implementation? These questions await 
further research into the policy itself and mental health services, 
not only as individual components, but also as a whole in the 
specific political context.  
 
 
 
1.2 Study significance 
1.2.1 Significance of the evaluation 
Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS (Secretary of State 
for Health, 2010) reiterates the importance of paying more 
attention to mental health services to facilitate an integrated, 
high-quality service system. Due to the nature of mental 
disorders, the derived factors including intangible pathology, 
individualised conditions, heavy influences from the external 
environment, and the significant variations in service, have 
established a different treatment logic from that seen in acute 
services. 
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Previous studies have evaluated the intended and unintended 
consequences brought about by the internal market, 
particularly in acute services (Allen, 2002a; Baggott, 1997; 
Propper et al., 2008; Propper et al., 2004; Propper et al., 1998). 
However, how and to what extent it influenced the development 
of mental health services still remains unclear, due to the 
dominant position of the Block Contract underpinned by the 
lump-sum payment mechanism. When narrowing down to PbR, 
recent studies have begun a systematic evaluation of the impact 
of PbR on acute services, an area PbR was initially designed for 
(Allen, 2009a; Mannion et al., 2008; Street and Maynard, 2007; 
Street et al., 2011). Nevertheless, the practical impact of those 
intended benefits is still unclear in acute services. Under such 
circumstances, besides the initial problems of PbR that have 
been identified in the currently available research subject to 
acute services, the case of PbR can be especially worth 
investigating in the context of mental health.  
 
Apart from the overall impacts of PbR at the macro level, it is 
also worth exploring the constructional elements, including the 
design of classification system, the cost calculation system and 
the interaction between the two. This is particularly important 
in a field like mental health where the classification criteria are 
often unclear. Recent studies have placed greater emphasis on 
the constructional problems of the MHCT and the Health of the 
Nation Outcome Scale (HoNOS), whereas less attention has 
been paid to the conceptual drawbacks of the MHCT as a needs 
assessment instrument and how these together with other 
external factors influenced the appropriateness of services 
provision. Apart from the lack of analysis at the 
functional/mechanical level, the delayed implementation 
indicates a lack of sufficient empirical evidence regarding the 
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utility of the classification and therefore its influence on the 
frontline clinical practice and even the whole service 
commissioning process as a whole.  
 
The lack of understanding of the problems at different levels 
results in a lack of understanding regarding the collaboration 
between these elements. Therefore, the general picture of how 
this policy comes into effect, as well as the gaps between the 
political intents and the practical outputs is of concern. John 
(2012) points to the existence of significant gaps between policy 
objectives and the actual implementation, which echoes 
Dunsire’s (1978) theory of “the implementation gap”. 
Consequently, more literature has focused on the gaps between 
the two to facilitate a better understanding of the factors that 
have caused the failure to transfer the desired practices into 
reality (Hill and Hupe, 2002). This in turn highlights the 
importance of evaluating public policy: to assess the extent to 
which the outcomes have achieved their initial objectives, to 
improve understandings of the policy itself regarding its validity, 
as well as to facilitate future policy-making (Hogwood and Gunn, 
1984). Regarding this study, the delayed status indicates the 
failure of this policy to deliver the intended outputs. As a 
continuous learning process (Cabinet Office, 1999), it is 
important to understand the factors that have caused the failure 
to make adjustments to the existing policy in order to facilitate 
the development of future policies. 
 
 
1.2.2 Significance of the research design  
In terms of conducting a successful evaluation, emphasis has 
been placed on the political context, the objectives and the 
implementation. As Hogwood and Gunn (1984) illustrate, all 
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public policies are formulated with considerable influence from 
the past, the assumptions and expectations concerning the 
future. Walt et al. (2008) further emphasise the importance of 
contextualising the place and time that the policy occurred in 
order to evaluate policies in health care, taking into account 
external factors, such as professionalism (this will be discussed 
in Chapter 3), financial pressures and political considerations 
(this will be discussed in Chapter 6). The purpose of evaluation 
is to understand the gaps between theory and practice, and it 
is considered difficult to identify and define these gaps without 
an understanding of the initial purpose of the government. 
Serving as the other element of the evaluation, the 
identification of the outputs depends on the investigation of the 
implementation process. By acknowledging the existence of a 
long journey between policy initiation and its realisation, 
Hallsworth et al. (2011) point to the limitation of guidance in 
directing how to execute policies in practice, which indicates the 
existence of unforeseen variables within the process and the 
importance of understanding these variables in the 
implementation process.  
 
In this respect, this study aims to evaluate the policy of 
implementing PbR in mental health through identifying the 
factors that have caused its delayed status. By appreciating the 
importance of contextualising the place and time, this study is 
designed as a case study to investigate the implementation of 
Mental Health PbR (MH PbR) in Nottinghamshire between the 
years 2010 and 2015 (this will be discussed in Chapter 4). As a 
policy evaluation, this study focuses on identifying and 
analysing the mismatches between the political intents and the 
frontline outputs. For the comprehensiveness of the evaluation, 
this study includes a multi-level analysis of the policy 
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considering its context, its political objectives and its 
implementation, whereas greater attention is paid to the 
implementation process. This study appreciates the lack of a 
sharp divide between policy formulation and its implementation, 
which highlights the importance of the policy design (Hogwood 
and Gunn, 1984). The multi-level analysis involves the 
evaluation of the fundamental theories behind PbR, which 
considers the political context and intents behind this particular 
policy; examination of the concept and construction of MH PbR, 
which reflects the issues in the policy formulation stage; and 
the investigation of the frontline practice and its actual 
implementation.  
 
This multi-level investigation considers the major risk factors 
for the failure of implementation. According to Hogwood and 
Gunn’s (1984) research, the failure of a particular policy is 
attributed to three major reasons: bad luck, bad execution or 
bad policy. The investigation into the foundation of PbR might 
enable a deeper understanding of how political intents have 
influenced the idea of health service management by 
investigating the application of the Quasi-market theory to the 
regulation of the provision of mental health services. The initial 
conflicts between the hypotheses of the Quasi-market theory 
and the features of mental health services indicate the weak 
theoretical foundation of PbR, which adversely affects the 
execution of the policy. This conforms to Bardach’s (1977) 
argument that a policy will fail regardless of how good the 
implementation process is as long as the underpinning theory is 
fundamentally flawed. Considering the design of the 
classification system and the cost calculation system as a means 
that transfer the Quasi-market theory into specific programmes, 
the validity and credibility of these two systems partly reflects 
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the execution of this policy. By acknowledging the lack of 
sufficient research on the constructional relationship between 
disease classification and cost calculation, this study examines 
the conceptual and constructional flaws of the classification 
system, followed by an illustration of how these flaws have 
subsequently influenced the cost calculation process. The 
investigation of each element will provide a deeper analysis of 
the internal construction of the MH PbR system. The interaction 
between each element might facilitate a better understanding 
of how and to what extent these mechanical drawbacks have 
created the practical obstacles. Considering that there is limited 
frontline level information regarding implementation, one of the 
aims of this study is to provide readers with up-to-date 
information on the current condition of the early implementation 
of MH PbR. It also facilitates the identification of external factors 
to determine whether the failure of MH PbR should be attributed 
to the external constraints – “bad luck” (Hogwood and Gunn, 
1984). Conflicting perspectives among the key players from 
different interest groups reveal the problems encountered 
during implementation, including the ideological drawbacks of 
the programme design, problems with execution, as well as the 
adverse external factors that have made the implementation 
more difficult.  
 
By triangulating the findings from different levels and different 
angles, this study presents readers with a closer look at the 
policy-making process of the implementation of PbR in mental 
health, a better understanding of the gaps between theory and 
practice by using Nottinghamshire as a case study, and an 
illustration of the reasons for the failure which may facilitate the 
future policy-making. 
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1.3 Research objectives and questions 
Based on the significance of evaluating utility of PbR and its 
impact on mental health, this study aims to enhance our 
understanding of the application of this policy by focusing on an 
exploration of the most recent and important issue: delay in 
implementing MH PbR and its associated factors.  
 
To facilitate a step-by-step investigation, the general aim is 
translated into the following four specific research questions as 
follow: 
 
1) What is the fundamental basis of PbR? Is it theoretically 
feasible to be implemented in healthcare services? 
 
2) To what extent is PbR theoretically valid regarding fulfilling 
the function of a clinical classification system and a payment 
system in mental health? 
 
3) What is the current stage of the implementation of PbR in 
the mental health sector? 
 
4) What are the obstacles that have hindered the 
implementation of PbR in the mental health sector? 
 
To effectively answer these questions, the objectives of this 
study are derived as follows: 
 
1) Review the relevant policy documents to set a specific 
political context for the investigation of this particular project, 
given the impacts of different policies generated within the 
disjointed NHS reforms. 
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2) Review the academic literature to evaluate the MH PbR 
policy regarding the fundamental theories informing the policy 
initiation phase, as well as the concept and construction of MH 
PbR in the policy formulation phase.  
 
3) Conduct semi-structured interviews with participants from 
different interest groups, including commissioners, managers 
and frontline professionals, who engage in the commissioning 
circle to explore their perspectives on both the actual progress 
and the practical obstacles to the implementation of PbR in 
mental health. Accordingly, the research sites are set as 
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust, Nottinghamshire 
County Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCG) and Nottingham 
City CCG. 
 
4) Conduct online surveys with participants from the above 
three organisations and Derbyshire Healthcare NHS Foundation 
Trust to verify the findings from the qualitative data. 
 
5) Synthesise the findings derived from all three stages of 
analysis to elicit a general discussion regarding the validity of 
the implementation of MH PbR and provide implications for 
policy analysis and future policy-making.  
 
 
 
1.4 Research methodology 
1.4.1  Research design 
This study is an analytical case study which addresses the 
research questions described above from both theoretical and 
practical perspectives. Since the liberalisation of the NHS, the 
devolution of power has led to an increase in the geographical 
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variation of service provision and the progress of 
implementation. According to Mental Health Bulletin: Fifth 
Report Mental Health Minimum Dataset (MHMDS) Annual 
Returns (The NHS Information Centre and Mental Health and 
Community Team, 2011), the provision and use of mental 
health services varied across England, which creates difficulties 
in representing the whole picture of PbR implementation across 
England. Disjointed policies released at different stages have 
exerted heavy influences on the implementation of this 
particular project (the political environment and, therefore, 
incentivising factors differ between implementing PbR in acute 
services and mental health services). As discussed earlier, it 
would have been impossible to have a clear understanding of 
the generation, development and implementation without 
considering the context within which it occurred (Baxter and 
Jack, 2008). Under such circumstances, this study set the 
research location and time span to investigate this complex 
issue within a particular context. It conforms to Yin’s (2014) 
suggestion that the use of a case study suits research studies 
that take particular contexts into consideration. According to 
Robson (1993), case studies provide greater detail to facilitate 
an in-depth analysis of a particular subject. Thus, this study 
focuses on an investigation regarding the implementation of MH 
PbR in Nottinghamshire under the Coalition government 
between the years 2010 and 2015.  
 
Figure 1-1 below illustrates the theoretical process of how PbR 
policy comes into effect. Generally speaking, it takes three 
major steps for an idea to translate into political outputs. 
Regarding the process as a whole, it begins with the 
policymakers’ general intents; next it transfers into a sequence 
of programmes that specify the initial intentions; and in the last 
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stage, the frontline staff execute these programmes following 
the targets through which the original intentions are translated 
into everyday practice. Regarding this politico-administrative 
relationship, it originates with one questions: “Who rules?” 
(Potucek and Vass, 2003). As Shaw (1994) demonstrated, the 
actual collaboration between actors is not as smooth as 
expected in theory, which indicates that the central government 
control the process (Aberbach and Rockman, 1988). Lipsky 
(1980) was the first to note the importance of frontline 
administrators in the realisation of a particular policy, which 
challenges the conventional top-down management under 
which policymakers dominated the policy-making process 
(Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). According to Lipsky’s (1980) 
“street-level bureaucracy” theory, in health care, patients’ 
individualised conditions with individualised needs for care 
affect the working context. Given frontline clinicians’ irreducible 
responsibility for providing appropriate responses to each 
client’s personal situation, such responses, by definition, cannot 
strictly follow administrative agency guidelines and result in 
difficulties in rationalising or simplifying the frontline service 
delivery process. It points to the limitation of the forward-
mapping approach to implementation analysis, which is 
formulated with the assumption that policymakers control the 
implementation process (Shaw, 1994). According to Barrett and 
Fudge (1981), the implementation process is not the single 
transmission of policy into consequential actions, rather, it is a 
process of interaction and negotiation between the 
policymakers and those who take action. This highlights the 
importance of the backward-mapping approach which 
appreciates the importance of frontline-level participants in the 
service-delivery process. Indeed, they are the key participants 
who transfer a policy into real outputs by adapting political 
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intents into workable forms. Therefore, understanding their 
situations and perspectives will facilitate a critical judgement of 
the outcomes of the process. In this case, it is worth 
investigating the factors and variables in each stage of the 
policy delivering process. Furthermore, according to Lipsky’s 
(1991) theory, a comprehensive understanding of a particular 
policy should consider the political context, the policymakers’ 
allocation decisions and frontline practice. This perspective also 
conforms to Glennerster et al.’s (1983) theory of “administrative 
anthropology”, which considers multiple angles of the 
implementation process through historical documentary 
analysis, structured interviews and observation of practice.  
 
Figure 1-1 The analytical framework 
 
 
 
By adopting the “administrative anthropology” theory, this 
study aims to understand the policy-making process of the MH 
PbR scheme by analysing the issues at the fundamental level, 
the mechanical level and the practical level through theoretical 
analysis, semi-structured interviews and online surveys. Based 
on the background information regarding the initiation and 
development of the PbR policy under different political 
environments presented in Chapter 2, this study executed out 
a theoretical analysis of the initiation and formulation of this 
policy at the fundamental and mechanical levels, respectively. 
To facilitate an understanding of the political intents behind the 
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policy, this study reviewed the application of the Quasi-market, 
which is the fundamental theory underpinning PbR. Through a 
discussion of the gaps between the preconditions of this 
managed market and the practical realities of health care, 
particularly mental health services, the first preliminary finding 
was acknowledged: applying the Quasi-market in mental health 
services lacks theoretical viability. At the same time, it sheds 
light on the discussion regarding the classification mechanisms 
of MH PbR by pointing to the failure of the commodification of 
mental health services. Based on this argument, the second 
level analysis mainly focused on evaluating the validity and 
reliability of the clinical classification system in mental health, 
due to the incomplete cost calculation system. The initial 
drawbacks of the classification system on the one hand 
indicated a poor formulation that failed to translate political 
intents into detailed policies/targets, whilst on the other hand it 
implied that this would cause a more challenging 
implementation of the policy since it had already been poorly 
initiated and formulated. Regarding the implementation of MH 
PbR, semi-structured interviews and online surveys were 
conducted to explore the actual impacts of the MH PbR policy 
on the daily practice of those healthcare professionals on the 
frontline. Accordingly, the semi-structured interviews and the 
online surveys paid particular attention to the gaps between the 
government’s priorities and the services provided at the 
frontline level, which revealed the “bad execution” and “bad luck” 
of this policy (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984).  
  
Hence, the top-down evaluation of the policy initiation, 
formulation and implementation may help to present a multi-
level and multi-angle perspective to understand the process 
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whereby political intents are translated into clinical outputs 
(Hunter and Wistow, 1987). 
 
Regarding the fieldwork, the subsection below presents an 
overview of the research methodology guiding the semi-
structured interviews and online surveys. 
 
 
1.4.2 Research methods 
The objectives of the study fieldwork were to gather material 
that describes how the MH PbR scheme was designed and 
developed, and to identify the actual outputs of the policy. As 
mentioned earlier, the key participants play a significant role in 
translating political intents into specific outputs. For the 
comprehensiveness of understanding, the study set 
commissioners, hospital managers and frontline clinicians as 
the target subjects. By appreciating the responsibilities of the 
frontline bureaucrats, the semi-structured interviews and the 
online surveys intended to discover frontline staff’s attitudes 
towards the implementation of this policy, with particular 
attention paid to exploring the gaps between the government’s 
priorities and the services provided at the frontline level. The 
adoption of these two approaches aimed to compensate the 
defects of each single method to consider both the depth and 
width of the research findings (this will be discussed in Chapter 
4). The fieldwork findings presented divergent, and even 
conflicting, perspectives among various interest groups, which 
increased the comprehensive understanding of this topic.  
 
Rather than using the within-method triangulation, this study 
adopted the between-method triangulation combining both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches. In recognition of the 
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limited statistical data resulting from the delayed status, the 
qualitative analysis was adopted as the leading approach, 
whereas the quantitative analysis of the online surveys was 
employed mainly for a confirmatory purpose.   
 
The qualitative analysis was mainly employed for the semi-
structured interviews. Based on the top-down theoretical 
analysis examining the fundamental and mechanical validity of 
PbR in mental health, the semi-structured interviews aimed to 
provide up-to-date and on-the-ground information regarding 
the implementation of MH PbR. Therefore, between November 
2013 and April 2014, the semi-structured interviews involved 
12 participants from three interest groups in three organisations 
within Nottinghamshire, including Nottingham NHS Healthcare 
Foundation Trust (NHT), Nottingham City Clinical 
Commissioning Group (CCG) and Nottinghamshire County CCG. 
The principles of Grounded Theory Methodology (GTM) were 
applied to analyse the interview data to facilitate a better 
understanding of the individuals’ perspectives and how these 
perspectives were generated. As the leading approach of this 
study, the qualitative analysis provided up-to-date information 
about the current progress of the implementation of MH PbR, 
examined how, and to what extent, the theoretical flaws 
affected everyday clinical practice and outlined the external 
factors that hindered the progress of implementation at the 
current stage. 
 
However, this study also noted the potential limitation of 
interviews on its representativeness (Mays and Pope, 1995). 
Although this case study focuses on the in-depth information 
regarding the current implementation status within 
Nottinghamshire, it is still of importance to expand the research 
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sample to achieve a more comprehensive understanding. To 
avoid the risk of being biased, this study adopted online surveys 
mainly for a confirmatory purpose. During the semi-structured 
interviews, the interviewees provided reliable informational 
resources of the implementation of MH PbR  in Nottingham. 
They deepened the understanding of mental health services as 
well as how mental health policies have affected clinical practice. 
After gathering and analysing the qualitative data, the online 
surveys were sent to three organisations within 
Nottinghamshire and one Foundation Trust in Derbyshire (to 
enlarge the research sample using data from a comparable 
organisation, which will be discussed in Chapter 4) between 
June 2014 and September 2014. Quantitative analysis was then 
conducted to verify the findings derived from the previous 
qualitative analysis.  
 
As a whole, this study elaborated how, and to what extent, 
political contexts and political direction have affected a 
particular policy from a top-down manner, based on which this 
study further discussed the interactions between policy-making 
and frontline practice using a bottom-up order approach (this 
will be discussed in Chapter 4). 
 
 
1.5  Organisation of the thesis 
Due to the delayed implementation, a practical evaluation of the 
implementation of PbR in mental health is lacking. Despite the 
fact that the government has planned the implementation of 
this project since 2008, MH PbR has only been partially executed. 
Therefore, central to this thesis is a detailed analytical 
examination of the factors that have caused such a delay, 
through which this study attempts to evaluate the MH PbR policy 
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by comparing its intended outcomes underpinned by the 
fundamental theories and considering the actual consequences 
of the implementation. This thesis presents the study from five 
major parts including eight chapters. Chapter 1 presented the 
research significances, research questions and research 
methods based on a brief introduction of the research 
background. This chapter also provided an overview of the 
thesis as a whole by outlining the general structure and 
illustrating the links between the neighbouring chapters. 
 
Through the use of official documents, Chapter 2 presents a 
general picture of the theoretical mechanism of PbR and the 
political context in which the initiation and development of MH 
PbR are discussed. The consideration of the changing political 
contexts sheds light on evaluating the utility of MH PbR and 
therefore, the significance of this policy (e.g., the significance 
of implementing PbR differs between in acute services and 
mental health). This chapter attempts to make an explicit 
interpretation of the role of the political environment and how 
this affects the implementation of the MH PbR policy. It deals 
with the dynamic process of state intervention in healthcare 
policy in England since the early 1990s to contextualise the 
period in which the state started to pursue the marketization of 
the healthcare system; the fundamental idea underpinning PbR 
(this will be discussed in Chapter 3). Thus, the time span 
encompasses two decades, including four major reforms. 
Accordingly, this chapter illustrates the development of PbR in 
acute services and its expansion to mental health within the 
political contexts of these four reforms. Besides contextualising 
the policy to facilitate a better understanding of the 
development of PbR, the NHS reforms outlined in Section 2.3 
pave the way for further discussion about the side-effects 
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brought about by the fast changing policies (this will be 
discussed in Chapter 6) and the importance of a supporting 
external factor to the success of a policy (this will be discussed 
in Chapter 8). The outline of the current progress of the 
implementation of MH PbR then leads to the generation of the 
research aim of the study.  
 
As a policy evaluation, this study evaluates the validity and 
feasibility of implementing PbR in mental health from three 
levels including the fundamental level, the constructional level 
and the practical level, following the idea of “administrative 
anthropology”. Regarding the fundamental theory behind PbR, 
which is the application of the Quasi-market, Chapter 3 looks at 
its theoretical mechanisms and the underpinning preconditions. 
This serves two main purposes: firstly it reveals the political 
intents behind PbR which will be compared with the practical 
outputs uncovered by the fieldwork; secondly, it examines the 
initiation of the PbR policy by focusing on a fundamental 
question: is it feasible to apply the Quasi-market theory in 
health care, and in particular, mental health? By splitting the 
Quasi-market into the market mechanism and government 
regulation, this chapter deals with the theoretical flaws of each 
component according to which a primary finding derives: PbR, 
together with the fundamental theory behind it, is not 
theoretically suitable to the mental health domain. In particular, 
the failure to commodify mental health services revealed in this 
chapter assists in the investigation of the case-mixed based 
clinical classification system, which stands on the hypothesis of 
the standardisation of mental health services (this will be 
discussed in Chapter 5). The argument that the government 
lacks the ability to regulate service delivery serves as mutual 
evidence with the empirical findings regarding the difficulties in 
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involving frontline clinicians in the reform and the occurrence of 
the “gaming” behaviours (this will be discussed in Chapter 6). 
Thus, it helps to formulate the research objectives, which are to 
evaluate the construction of this system and to explore the 
practical experiences regarding its implementation.  
 
Chapter 4 introduces the methodology and methods employed 
by this study to present a multi-level and multi-angle 
perspective regarding the delayed implementation of MH PbR. 
To justify the methods, it illustrates the philosophical 
assumptions that underpin the design of this study before 
introducing the research strategy and the techniques which are 
then supplemented by an outline of the process of how the 
research was conducted. This chapter firstly considers the 
research paradigm, which is the use of mixed methods. By 
acknowledging the debate on its validity, this chapter proposes 
to set qualitative analysis as the primary research method, 
while using quantitative method mainly for a confirmatory 
purpose to reap the benefits of using both qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on 
illustrating the strategy for the leading approach - the adoption 
of GTM principles in analysing the interview data. This chapter 
demonstrates the reasons for not using “pure” GTM by 
contextualising this strategy in the research field where the 
literature review and therefore the preview of the background 
information is required before the research access is granted. 
Following the elaboration of the GTM principles and their 
applications in this study, this chapter ends with an introduction 
of the research design with a particular emphasis on the process 
of conducting the fieldwork, including interviews and online 
surveys. 
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In the fourth part, this thesis spends three chapters discussing 
the issues surrounding the implementation of PbR in mental 
health, in particular, the driving factors for the delayed 
implementation from different levels and angles. Before 
presenting and discussing the findings from the fieldwork, 
Chapter 5 theoretically evaluates the mechanism of MH PbR in 
the policy formulation phase. On the one hand, this second 
stage theoretical analysis, investigates the mechanism of 
standardising mental health services based on the arguments 
established in Chapter 3. On the other hand, the mechanism 
discussed serves as a bridge that translates political intents to 
detailed policies that guide frontline practice. Therefore, given 
its close relationship with the fieldwork, the interview structure 
is derived. In particular, Chapter 5 concerns the literature and 
arguments essential to evaluating the conceptual and 
constructional validity of PbR in mental health with particular 
attention paid to the MHCT classification system and its 
subsystems, including the clustering tool, the HoNOS and the 
care pathways. This chapter considers the “standardisation” of 
conditions and treatments, which is the basic assumption of the 
case-mix theory and the basis for cost calculation. Through 
discussing the theoretical viability of “standardisation-to-the-
average”, the conceptual and constructional drawbacks of the 
classification system and therefore, the weak foundation for 
cost calculation, this chapter reveals the mechanical drawbacks 
of MH PbR, which heralds the subsequent investigation of its 
implementation in daily clinical practice.   
 
Based on the theoretical evaluation conducted in Chapter 5, 
Chapters 6 and 7 present and discuss the findings from the 
semi-structured interviews and online surveys to evaluate the 
policy-making process in its implementation phase. Chapter 6 
	 43	
tests the primary outcomes through the review of practical 
issues, such as the current stage of implementation in different 
sectors and the impacts of the initial drawbacks and external 
factors on daily practice. This chapter outlines the current stage 
of MH PbR implementation, evaluates the core elements of the 
MH PbR system, investigates the driving factors for the delay 
and proposes some suggestions for improvement. Based on the 
primary findings presented in Chapter 6, Chapter 7 presents 
and discusses the findings from quantitatively analysing the 
online surveys mainly for a confirmatory purpose. This chapter 
illustrates the use of specific analytical approaches and 
summarises the achieved results. The outcomes are then 
compared with the corresponding findings from Chapters 5 and 
6.  
 
Chapter 8 reviews the findings and insights gleaned from the 
three-stage analysis, and discusses the relevance and utility of 
its topics. By summarising the previous findings, this chapter 
answers the research questions that the fundamental problems 
of applying the market theory, the conceptual and 
constructional drawbacks of the clinical classification system 
together with the negative external factors that have hindered 
the implementation of PbR in mental health. By triangulating 
the findings from three levels, this chapter then examines its 
insights and contributions to mental health policy evaluation, 
according to which three perspectives are elaborated: policy 
should be evaluated within the context; one size does not fit all 
systems; policymakers should consider trade-offs between 
objectives and the inevitable. Regarding the research design of 
this study, Section 8.4 highlights its contributions to research 
design. The utility of the analytical framework and the GTM 
principles may shed light on the future research design. This 
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chapter also considers the limitations in research design, 
sample selection and generalizability, in an effort to provide 
some implications for future research. Considering that policy-
making should be a learning process (Hogwood and Gunn, 
1984), this chapter provides implication for future policy 
development, including the idea that policy should be consistent 
and should be tested first. The chapter concludes with a review 
of the thesis organisation.  
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2. Background of Payment by Results 
 
 
Introduction 
The imbalance between demand and supply has aroused 
concerns regarding the efficiency of public-service provision, 
which led to the introduction of the  “internal market” in the 
1990s (Randall and Williams, 2006). Since then, the NHS has 
experienced four major reforms from the internal market to the 
Third Way, the NHS Modernisation and the latest Liberalisation. 
Despite the changes in structure and policy during the following 
disjointed reforms, performance improvement and efficiency 
have been seen as key priorities (Shapiro, 2010). 
 
Particularly, Reforming NHS Financial Flows: Introducing 
Payment by Results (Department of Health, 2002b) made 
further efforts to promote cost-efficiency by breaking the 
monopoly, encouraging competition, supporting patient choice 
and promoting quality improvement (Miraldo et al., 2006). In 
the context of the NHS Modernisation, PbR was introduced to 
replace the Block Contract and to establish a new financial 
framework to pay different providers on a fair and transparent 
basis for service delivery. Employing economic theories, the 
rationale for designing PbR was to contain cost, increase 
efficiency and promote quality through provider-side 
competition and patient choice (Miraldo et al., 2006), guided by 
the theory of the Quasi-market generated following the internal 
market reform. 
 
This chapter provides background information surrounding the 
development of PbR as a new payment mechanism replacing 
the previous Block Contract. In the general context of the NHS 
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reforms, the birth and development of PbR was influenced by 
the general political context. Therefore, to facilitate a deeper 
understanding of PbR, this chapter illustrates its generation and 
development in the political context. This chapter is divided into 
five sections. The first two sections illustrate the economic, 
mathematical and working mechanisms of PbR. Drawing on the 
importance of contextualising policy to evaluating its impacts as 
discussed in Chapter 1, Section 2.3 demonstrates the 
fundamental reason for introducing PbR through outlining the 
three reforms between the 1990s and the 2000s. These three 
reforms indicate that policies changed according to the change 
in political context and that the introduction of the Quasi-market 
and therefore, the PbR policy, aimed to serve the purpose of 
controlling costs and, improving healthcare efficiency and 
quality. Section 2.4 introduces the development of PbR during 
the “NHS Modernisation”. Due to the change in the political 
environment, the development of MH PbR is introduced in the 
context of “NHS Liberalisation” in Section 2.5. This chapter ends 
with a revelation of the delayed status of implementing MH PbR, 
which leads to the development of the research aim – to identify 
the driving factors responsible for the delayed implementation.  
 
 
 
2.1 The birth of Payment by Results 
Before 2002, Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) negotiated contracts 
with hospitals, in which both providers and purchasers came to 
an agreement on a total price of service provision without 
specifying the amount of activity (Pate, 2009). The fixed sum of 
money for a broad range of services was calculated largely 
based on historical funding and locally negotiated annual 
increase. Without specifying the amount of activity, the lack of 
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incentives for providers to reduce waiting times and the limited 
participants under the Block Contract had weak incentives for 
quality improvement (Marshall et al., 2014). Moreover, there 
was no specific penalty mechanism for commissioners to 
withdraw funding when providers failed to meet the 
requirements. The recognition of the lack of capacity in health 
care services and the needs for cost-effectiveness led to the 
reform of “Modernisation” (Macintyre, 2000). Accordingly, in 
2003, the government introduced PbR to establish a new 
financial framework to pay different providers on a fair and 
transparent basis for service delivery and to promote quality 
improvement (Miraldo et al., 2006). 
 
Based on the market theories, PbR was developed with the 
assumption that participants’ behaviours follow the demand-
supply interaction in a fully competitive market. The concept of 
PbR consists of two main components: a nationally agreed set 
of prices for healthcare activities called a “tariff”, and a 
classification system in which cases could be categorised into 
specific treatment groups that are similar in healthcare needs 
and resource consumption (O'Connor and Neumann, 2006). 
Instead of the lump sum payment under the Block Contract, PbR 
uses a fixed price system where national tariffs are assigned to 
each classification group according to which commissioners pay 
a fixed tariff for each patient treated in the same group (Boyle, 
2007). This creates a linear relationship between the amount of 
activity the providers undertake and the amount of income they 
receive. On the one hand, it is regarded as a financial incentive 
for providers to increase capacity as the market theory predicts 
(Miraldo et al., 2006), particularly under Money Follows the 
Patient policy (Secretary of State for Health, 2002) that entitles 
commissioners the right to purchase healthcare services from a 
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large range of providers. Without price competition, providers 
are encouraged to improve quality to attract patients. On the 
other hand, the nationally-fixed tariffs make it clear how much 
they will receive as activity increases in advance, according to 
which providers could make adjustments to resource allocation 
(reduce unnecessary services or cross-subside non-profitable 
services with profitable services) to reduce costs when their 
costs exceed the corresponding national tariffs (Appleby et al., 
2012). The following subsections demonstrate the economic 
and mathematical theories behind PbR to illustrate how PbR is 
designed to serve the aforementioned purposes. 
 
 
2.1.1 The economic theory behind PbR 
The demand of patients is the target that PbR is set to meet; 
thus, the demand is pre-assumed to be unlimited in the 
theoretical economics model. According to the 
commissioner/patient relationship that posits commissioners 
make demand-side decisions on behalf of patients, the following 
discussion simplifies the patient-provider-commissioner model 
into a commissioner-provider model to explore the theoretical 
basis for PbR. Therefore, the relationship between a provider’s 
income and their capacities depends on the interaction between 
their costs and the national tariffs. 
 
Figure 2-1 illustrates the economic mechanism of PbR in theory. 
The extent to which this financial arrangement influences a 
provider’s behaviour depends on the relationship between their 
marginal costs and the fixed national tariff. MCA and MCB 
represent the marginal costs for healthcare resource 
consumption of two different providers. Under the Block 
Contract, providers and commissioners negotiate the price and 
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the volume of a certain type of service locally. Thus, Provider A 
could provide service activity at xA0 amount and be paid at the 
price of pA while Provider B could provide xB amount of activity 
at the price of pB (when marginal cost equals marginal price). 
The introduction of the nationally-fixed price p0 calculated from 
the national average unit costs under PbR means the provider 
could not gain extra profit until its marginal cost curve intersects 
the flat marginal revenue curve (MRPbR) under PbR (Baumol and 
Blinder, 2012). For Provider A, the relationship between MCA and 
MRPbR suggests that its profit reaches the highest at the amount 
of xA1. In this case, the financial incentive encourages providers 
like Provider A to increase their capacity and thus improve their 
efficiency. By contrast, Provider B has a marginal curve depicted 
as MCB, with higher marginal costs than MRPbR in every level of 
activity. In other words, it costs more than this provider would 
receive in every case. Therefore, there is no choice but to 
reduce unnecessary costs in order to attain financial balance. In 
other words, the intention to avoid financial risks also stimulates 
cost-saving and efficiency enhancement of providers, as seen 
with Provider B (Mannion et al., 2008). Generally speaking, the 
nationally fixed tariffs are expected to reduce the variation in 
healthcare costs and as a result, the total expenditure. 
Meanwhile, the nationally-fixed tariffs rule out price competition, 
according to which providers can only compete on service 
quality to attract more patients. This facilitates the 
improvement or, at least, the maintenance of service quality. In 
addition, the regulatory agencies exercise the authority on 
behalf of the government to guarantee the quality of service. 
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Figure 2-1 Relationships between marginal costs and the PbR price 
 
 
 
 
2.1.2 The mathematical theory behind PbR 
The above illustration was developed without taking account of 
the restriction of one’s capacity, which is often not the case in 
the real healthcare market. Still, based on the assumption that 
providers pursue the maximisation of profit, the formula below 
illustrates providers’ behaviours regarding the adjustment of 
resource allocation in a context of limited capacity (Scott et al., 
2011).  
 
For this example, assume there are two HRGs/MHCTs, the 
amounts of each HRG/MHCT are x1 and x2; the quality of 
services subject to these two groups are y1 and y2, respectively; 
F represents the indirect costs such as laundry that could not 
be calculated by the individual activity but among a number of 
activities. Thus, the total costs would be:  
 𝐶 = 𝑐$ 𝑥$, 𝑦$ + 𝑐) 𝑥), 𝑦) + 𝐹 
x1 ≤D1 
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x2 ≤D2 
X ≥ x1 + x2 
Where D denotes to the general demand for the particular 
service and X denotes the provider’s capacity 
 
Further, assume the national tariffs for these two groups are p1 
and p2, thus, to maximise the revenue, the formula is: 
 max./.01/10 𝑝$𝑥$ + 𝑝)𝑥) − 𝑐$ 𝑥$, 𝑦$ + 𝑐) 𝑥), 𝑦) + 𝐹  
 
Since there is no link between income and quality, the provider 
would set the minimum quality under the premise of meeting 
the national standards. Therefore, the formula could be 
simplified to: 
 max./.0 𝑝$𝑥$ + 𝑝)𝑥) − 𝑐$ 𝑥$, 𝑦$ + 𝑐) 𝑥), 𝑦) + 𝐹  
X ≥ x1 + x2 
 
Take λ to denote the Lagrange multiplier, the optimisation could 
be either 
p1 – c1x – λ =0 
p2 – c2x – λ =0 
X = x1 + x2 
Or 
p1 – c1x =0 
p2 – c2x =0 
 
In the former case, the formula indicates that the capacity of 
the provider is large enough when the fixed prices would always 
exceed the marginal costs in these two groups. Therefore, the 
provider would expand the activity across both groups. In the 
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latter case, there is a time that the marginal costs would equal, 
or even exceed, the fixed price. To make a profit or, at least, 
avoid budget deficits, the provider will make an effort to meet 
the first condition. When p1 – c1x – λ =0 and p2 – c2x – λ =0 could 
not be met simultaneously, the provider would adjust the 
proportion of x1 and x2 to reach the equation as follows: 
 𝑝$ − 𝑐$.𝑝) − 𝑐). = 1 
 
In other words, in this constrained case, the provider would 
increase those activities in the group with larger differences 
between the fixed price and the marginal cost and reduce those 
with less profit (Farrar et al., 2007). 
 
In summary, the economic theory behind PbR indicates a shift 
of focus to performance management in a context that the 
relationship between the costs of providing a particular service 
and the corresponding nationally fixed tariff influences providers’ 
decision on whether to increase capacity or to reduce excessive 
costs (Conrad and Uslu, 2011).  
 
Besides the impacts on providers’ behaviours, the introduction 
of PbR is also expected to facilitate commissioners’ better 
management of the demand for care since every single 
admission is taken into account. The commissioning process 
may allow the government to gain more knowledge of needs, 
which is underpinned by the transparent information system 
resulted from the clinical classification system.  
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2.2 Working mechanisms of Payment by Results 
Figure 2-2 outlines the working mechanism of PbR, which 
consists of a process of data collection, coding, grouping, cost 
calculation and payment setting. For the sake of clarity, this 
section begins with an overview of the whole information 
system as a whole and then it focuses on the two primary 
elements: the currency design and the payment settlement.  
 
Figure 2-2 Process of PbR data collection (Department of Health, 2012b)  
 
 
 
2.2.1 The process of information flow 
Due to the incomplete information system of PbR in mental 
health and the similar theoretical basis it shares with the one in 
acute services, the latter is used as a theoretical basis to 
illustrate how this system functions. 
 
According to Figure 2-2, when a patient finishes treatment and 
is discharged from a hospital, a clinical coder translates the 
patient’s record into codes that describe the particular 
information about the patient’s diagnosis (ICD) and 
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interventions (Office of Population Censuses and Surveys 
(OPCS)) in a standard format (Department of Health, 2012b). 
The codes, together with non-clinical information such as age 
and date of admission and discharge are stored in the hospital’s 
local system called the Patient Administration System (PAS). 
With the categorised information stored, the hospital submits 
an extract of the PAS to the Secondary Uses Service (SUS) in a 
standard format of Commissioning Datasets. The SUS collects 
and stores the nationwide data and provides patient data for 
different purposes. By taking account of other patients’ records 
cases will be assigned to certain HRGs based on the ICD and 
the OPCS codes using the software called “grouper”. By 
assigning the actual costs into different groups, the SUS 
calculates the national level costs and set the corresponding 
prices using a top-down statistical analysis (Street, 2006). The 
prices are mainly set according to the HRG code and the type of 
admission. Additionally, special adjustments are incorporated 
for unavoidable geographical differences, specialised care, 
quality promotion, etc. (Department of Health, 2002a).  
 
Guidance on the NHS Standard Contract for 2012/13 
(Department of Health, 2011) announces that commissioners 
should use standard contracts to commission healthcare 
services using the PbR tariffs for the services covered by PbR 
and the agreed non-tariff prices (between providers and 
commissioners) where the national PbR tariff does not apply. 
The calculation mechanism of the nationally-fixed tariffs is 
illustrated in the section below. 
 
 
2.2.2 Tariff calculation 
Unlike the Block Contract, PbR is a data-driven system that 
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requires the collection and categorisation of the patient-level 
data. The foundation of PbR is the effectively built blocks of 
currency that group the codes into countable units performed 
by the “grouper”. According to the currencies and their cost-
related information, prices are then calculated and set for each 
currency, which is called a “tariff” (Jones, 2012). This section 
will introduce the currency establishment, the general tariff 
calculation mechanism and the calculation methods to illustrate 
the process of producing national tariffs. 
 
As previously mentioned, the complex nature of mental 
disorders determines the differences in needs assessment and 
service management between acute services and mental health 
services. In other words, although sharing the same structure, 
PbR for acute services and PbR for mental health were designed 
with two separate clinical classification systems. Considering 
the incomplete MH PbR tariff calculation system, the following 
subsections illustrate the tariff calculation mechanism of PbR for 
acute services as a theoretical basis of the subsequent MH PbR 
within which the mental health classification system will be 
discussed later.  
 
 
2.2.2.1 Acute services 
1) The establishment of currency 
As the unit of payment under PbR, currencies are standardised 
groups dependent upon clinical treatments and resource 
consumption. In other words, patients in the same group share 
similar needs/diagnoses and will receive similar clinical 
treatments (Fairbairn, 2007). Four key components illustrate 
the process of currency establishment: ICD-10, OPCS-4, HRG 
and reference costs. Published by the World Health Organisation 
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(WHO), ICD-10 categorises diseases into specific groups based 
on signs, symptoms, and diagnosis (Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2001). The version applied in England contains 
19,000 codes (Foster-McBride, 2012). Developed by the Office 
of Population Censuses and Surveys, OPCS-4 translates 
operations and interventions performed during a treatment spell 
into alphanumeric code. The latest version OPCS-4.6 includes 
over 9,000 codes (Foster-McBride, 2012). HRG is adopted as 
the “grouper” to integrate ICD-10 and OPCS-4 codes into 
numerable groups based on the similarities of diagnosis and 
resource consumption, which enables the associated tariffs to 
be set at a sensible and workable level (Jones, 2009). Adopting 
the case-mix principle, HRG reflects a system where a mix of 
care is provided for a patient and the individually-varied 
treatments are administrable. With the development of the 
classification system, HRG-4, which is the latest version, 
comprises of 1,500 case groups, covering 21 chapters of the 
body system (Department of Health, 2012b). 
 
By assigning cases to different HRGs, information related to 
direct costs, such as drugs, clinical items and equipment 
consumption, could be easily identified in an activity. Further, 
indirect costs and overheads are collected and summarised into 
the corresponding currencies (Pate, 2009). The following 
subsection further illustrates how national tariffs are calculated 
based on the information obtained via the PbR information 
system. 
 
 
2) The tariff calculation mechanism 
The calculation mechanism of PbR is based on the principle of 
“standardise-to-the-average”. Within each HRG, national 
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average unit costs are derived from the mean value of the 
average total costs from all NHS providers, which is the 
“average of the average” (Self et al., 2008a). Generally 
speaking, there are three major steps within the calculation 
process: 1) against any case group of each provider, the unit 
cost is derived from the division of all costs for producing certain 
outputs by the total number of units; 2) dividing the sum of all 
providers’ unit costs by the number of providers becomes the 
national average unit cost for the particular case group (Self et 
al., 2008a); 3) the mean value is regarded as the cost with the 
highest frequency in the bell-shaped curve of the cost 
distribution, based on the statistical assumption that the costs 
from different providers follow a normal distribution. In this 
context, “deviances” are categorised as the extremes of both 
sides of the cost-distribution curve and the process of pursuing 
“standardised cost” is to reduce deviance employing 
“standardisation-to the-average” principle (Department of 
Health, 2012b).  
 
In the latest HRG tariff calculation system: 
HRG group base tariff ≈ latest average unit cost + price inflation 
+ uplift for “safety and quality” – assumed efficiency 
improvement 
 
By taking unavoidable differences into consideration, some 
flexible tariffs have been introduced as the supplement of the 
standard HRG tariffs. The Best Practice Tariffs, the Market Force 
Factor (MFF) and the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation 
(CQUIN) are the main components of the supplement to make 
the system more flexible and thus ensure that PbR is a tool 
rather than a straitjacket (Department of Health, 2012b). Best 
Practice tariffs are set at day case rates for the use of specialised 
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units to encourage patient care with both high quality and cost-
effectiveness (Secretary of State for Health, 2008). To 
compensate the unavoidable cost differences due to geographic 
differences, MFF weights capitation formula to calculate the final 
tariff.  
 
Therefore, in HRG4 tariff calculation system:  
Final tariff ≈ (HRG group base tariff + Best Practice Tariff) * MFF 
index 
 
Given the differences in nature, despite the same logic and a 
similar structure with that in acute services, MH PbR is 
developed based on a classification system following another 
philosophy: classification based on needs. Due to the delayed 
implementation of this clinical classification system, there still 
lacks a tariff calculation system appropriate for MH PbR. 
Therefore, the next subsection illustrates the working 
mechanism of MH PbR by focusing on the clinical aspect. 
 
 
2.2.2.2 Mental Health PbR 
Attempts to predict the resource implications of treating 
individual cases and therefore, to set a tariff in acute settings, 
have focused on defining case groups. These reflect an 
approach based on the assumption that, to some useful degree, 
diagnosis predicts the cost of providing care. In this context, 
physical medicine and surgery, “diagnosis” incorporates an 
understanding of why the patient is distressed, in pain or 
disabled to a level of certainty that a psychiatric “diagnosis” 
cannot. As a result, acute care diagnoses can often provide a 
sufficiently accurate prediction of what appropriate treatment 
might involve, and act as the basis of a tariff system. That is 
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not the case in mental health settings. Rather than basing MH 
PbR tariffs upon “diagnosis”, a different system has evolved, 
which is known as “clustering”. It is a process of classifying 
cases into 21 clusters that are considered to have distinct and 
distinguishable treatment resource implications. This 
classification is supported by a process and an algorithm that 
are together known as the MHCT, and it is intended to form the 
basis of tariff allocations and payments in mental health settings. 
 
The MHCT firstly classifies a patient’s difficulties as “non-
psychotic”, “psychotic” or “organic”. These are generally agreed 
distinctions, although the phenomenological boundary between 
“psychosis” and other forms of disturbed mental state is not 
fixed. The MHCT sub-classifies cases falling into each of these 
“super-clusters” by symptom severity. These sub-classifications 
and the relationships among them are discussed in Figure 2-3. 
Each of the 21 clusters is considered to define a group of 
patients with similar healthcare needs and resource 
requirements (Care Pathways and Packages Project, 2011), and 
therefore,  a group for which a tariff can be derived and applied.  
 
Figure 2-3 Mental Health Clustering Tool Decision Tree 
 
 
	 60	
Sub-classification into one of the seven second order groupings 
is made on the basis of clinical rules of thumb reflecting the 
grouping’s description, but allocation to one of the 21 definitive 
clusters, which are intended to carry resource implications is 
more formally supported by scores on the HoNOS (Wing et al., 
1998) and a Summary Assessment of Risk and Need (SARN) 
(Self et al., 2008a). 
 
The HoNOS is a 12-item scale designed to estimate the severity 
of psychological disturbance. It was developed during the 1990s 
in pursuit of a measure that could be used to quantify changes 
during psychiatric treatment and thus to support expectations 
of verified service efficacy referred to in Health of the Nation 
(Secretary of State for Health, 1992; Thornicroft et al., 1992). 
The Supplementary SARN estimates the degree of disturbance 
across domains that are considered to reflect the most notable 
difficulties that can arise in relation to individuals with mental 
health difficulties. Each of the eighteen items is scored on a 0 – 
4 basis, whereby 0 reflects “no problem” in that domain and 4 
reflects “severe or very severe problem”. On the basis of 
psychometrics derived from some 530 sets of scores, an 
algorithm has been developed which links a profile of scores to 
one or another of the 21 definitive clusters. Figure 2-4 illustrates 
the 18 items, how an imaginary case might have scored and 
what the profile was supposed to be for Cluster 19, effectively 
someone with a significant degree of dementia. 
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Figure 2-4 Colour coded rules of rating grids 
 
 
As treatment proceeds and is reviewed and adjusted, needs for 
treatment can change. Figure 2-5 illustrates the process of 
reassessment and cluster reallocation that is intended to keep 
estimates of resource implications up to date with patients’ 
changing needs (Department of Health, 2012a). Data 
populating these pro forma are generated at specified intervals 
by clinical staff in the course of their work with clients, 
theoretically as a by-product of routine assessments of progress; 
an agreed element of good clinical practice.  
 
Description
Likely diagnosis
Impairment
Risk
Course
No ITEM DESCRIPTION
SCORE
0 1 2 3 4
1 Overactive, aggressive, disruptive or agitated behaviour 
2 Non-accidental self ingury 
3 Problem drinking or drug taking 
4 Cognitive Problems 
5 Physical illness or disability problems 
6 Hallucinations and Delusions 
7 Depressed mood 
8 Other mental and behavioural problems 
9 Relationships 
10 Activities of daily living 
11 Living conditions 
12 Occupation & Activities 
13 Strong Unreasonable Beliefs 
A Agitated behaviour/expansive mood 
B Repeated Self-Harm 
C Safeguarding other children & Vulnerable dependent adults 
D Engagement 
E Vulnerability 
Must score
Expected to score
May score
Unlikely to score
No data available
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Figure 2-5 Cluster and care transition protocol 
 
 
 
Cluster allocation is only half of the PbR process theoretically 
linking clinical conditions to resource implications on a case-by-
case basis. For that to happen, cluster allocation has to imply 
the suitability of a particular, costed package of care. 
Identification of the care packages associated with clusters 
defined in these ways was still under development at the time 
of writing (October 2015). Evans-Lacko et al. (2010) outline two 
core components of care pathways: a) the types of service 
provided in one particular pathway subject to one specific 
cluster; and b) timeline over which this series of services is 
conducted. In theory, care pathways serve as templates to show 
how patients enter health care, standardise how treatments are 
provided in what sequence, and predict when and in what 
condition, patients leave the healthcare settings. The 
standardised care packages are expected to reduce 
inappropriate variations in service provision among patients 
with similar needs categorised by MHCT and to promote multi-
disciplinary teamwork in the clinical aspect (Cabana et al., 
1999). In the financial aspect, care pathways are expected to 
	 63	
facilitate the calculation of clinical costs and therefore the 
corresponding national tariffs (Jones, 2004). 
 
Regarding Marshall et al.’s (2014) insight, the successfulness 
and impact of one system relies not only on itself but also on 
the previous system it is designed to replace, the political 
context and other external factors. In other words, the 
investigation of the general political background helps 
understand the generation of the PbR system. Additionally, the 
changing political environment further facilitates understanding 
of the obstacles to implementing PbR in mental health 
compared with that in acute services. Therefore, the 
subsequent three sub-sections illustrate the generation and 
development of PbR by contextualising it within the NHS 
reforms since the 1990s. 
 
 
 
2.3 The context of PbR: the NHS reforms 
This section provides an overview of the process of NHS reforms 
from the 1990s to the 2000s, during which policies developed 
alongside the changes in the external environment and the 
political power structure. The continued shifts in balance 
between decentralisation and centralisation on the one hand, 
outlines the side effects of each approach to demonstrate the 
origin of reforming the payment system (this will be further 
discussed in Section 2.4), while on the other hand paves the 
way for the following argument regarding the relationship 
between the fast-changing policies and the frontline clinicians’ 
reluctance to engage (this will be discussed in Chapter 6).    
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2.3.1 The Internal market: The birth of the market 
Criticisms of the poor efficiency of public services together with 
the rapid development of the non-governmental sectors, has 
indicated that other sectors may be able to deliver some 
services with higher efficiency. Since the introduction of the New 
Public Management, the “internal market” reform under 
Thatcher and Major decentralised and externalised public 
services from the central government and replaced the 
centralised system with a market that was expected to stimulate 
efficiency through the provider-side competition (Torres and 
Pina, 2002). Central to the Internal Market was the process of 
commissioning led by the purchaser/provider split, in which the 
government participated as both the purchaser and the 
regulator through the use of purchasing power (McCrudden, 
2004). As indicated by Working for Patients (Secretary of State 
for Health and others, 1989), instead of the previous model in 
which District Health Authorities (DHAs) took full responsibility 
for purchasing services as well as managing performance, the 
new contract-based system was established to separate the 
responsibility of purchasing from that of provision (Le Grand and 
Vizard, 1998). It was believed that choosing the most 
appropriate provider from a broad list could result in lower costs 
and greater efficiency of service provision (HM Treasury, 2005).   
 
The main result of the Internal Market reform was the 
establishment of two new organisations including NHS trusts 
and GP fundholders. The purchaser/provider split in addition to 
the establishment of these two organisations, suggested a 
decentralisation of power, as well as an incentive to the 
provider-side competition in a healthcare market (Klein, 1995).  
Despite good intentions to improve efficiency and quality of 
service delivery, it ended with criticisms of the fragmented 
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sectors led by the decentralisation and the purchaser/provider 
split, the opportunistic behaviours led by the short-term 
contract (Kelly, 2007), the high managerial costs on 
procurement and the potential risk of the inequality of service 
brought about by the managed market (Ham, 1996).  
 
 
2.3.2 The “New NHS”:  The third way 
The election of the Labour government under Tony Blair in 1997 
brought an end to the “internal market”. The following reform 
called the “Third Way” was different from both the Internal 
Market and the application of the centralised plan by previous 
Labour governments (Harrison, 2002). Moving away from the 
over-concentration on competition, The New NHS plan 
(Secretary of State for Health, 1997) focused on providing high 
quality services by promoting a stable partnership between 
purchasers and providers. The establishment of the white paper 
highlighted that the emphasis would be placed on public health, 
primary care and evidence-based health care (Nettleton et al., 
2008). During this period, the document set out a broad 
framework for setting national targets and standards for the 
continuous improvement of service quality as well as indicated 
a restructure of the NHS for a higher efficiency of primary care 
(Ham, 2010).  
 
 
2.3.2.1 Targets and standards 
Instead of the fragmented sections in the managed-market, the 
New NHS was devoted to reducing the geographical and 
organisational variations through centralising authorities as well 
as establishing national targets and standards. By bringing an 
end to the Internal Market that had only focused on efficiency, 
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the Blair government highlighted the importance of paying 
attention to health improvement, fair access, effective delivery, 
health outcomes and patient experience (Ham, 1999). The new 
organisation of National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE) was established in 1999 to develop national service 
frameworks, as well as nationally unified targets and standards 
in order to reduce variations in services (Gray and Harrison, 
2004). Based on the idea of “evidence-based health services”, 
NICE was entitled with two responsibilities: 1) to undertake 
evidence-based appraisals including cost-effectiveness and 
clinical effectiveness of clinical interventions; and 2) to grant 
permission to evidence-based clinical guidelines for the 
management of particular conditions (Secretary of State for 
Health, 1998). Combined with the National Electronic Library for 
Health, the information-share function was expected to ensure 
the accessibility of patient information and the related service 
guidelines. 
 
At the same time, the new organisation Commission for Health 
Improvement (CHI) was established in 1999 as a statutory body 
“at arm’s length from government” for inspection and regulation 
(Secretary of State for Health, 1998). Besides the inspection on 
the clinical targets, financial targets were taken into 
consideration through the initiation of the Comprehensive 
Spending Review (CSR) that provided an approach to public 
spending in general and the NHS spending in particular. By 
combining the performance targets for different services, the 
CSR highlighted the cost-efficiency of investment (Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, 1998).  
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2.3.2.2 Service delivery 
Another important issue of the reform was to build up new 
relationships between the Department of Health and the NHS 
organisations for a greater quality of health care delivery (Tailby 
et al., 2004). Since the establishment of CSR resulted in 
education and health receiving substantial increases in their 
budget, the NHS net expenditure increased by £4,900 million 
between 1997/8 and 1999/2000 (over 3.2% annual growth in 
real terms), since when the increase of rate rose (Harker, 2012). 
Funded by large investments, more strategic leadership and 
authorities were further decentralised to the local level to break 
down barriers between agencies and to encourage partnership 
not only within the NHS, but also across a wider range 
(Department of Health, 1999).  
 
Instead of the previous structure in which GP fundholders took 
the responsibilities for providing healthcare services and buying 
part of the secondary services, Primary Care Groups (PCGs) 
were introduced to integrate the healthcare related primary 
resources. The involvement of local authorities freed up health 
authorities to concentrate on the strategic plans for the general 
population. Within the reform, the establishment of PCGs was 
the most important innovation that indicated a clear 
commitment to maintain the primary-care-led NHS and to 
enlarge its coverage (Ham, 2009). As an incentive for a better 
communication and resource transformation between primary 
and secondary care, PCGs were granted the power to control 
resources and unify different elements within the healthcare 
budget (Secretary of State for Health, 1997). Therefore, the 
shift in power to the local level enabled PCGs to be responsible 
for commissioning local healthcare services with higher 
efficiency while freeing up health authorities to assess the 
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health needs of the population they served and thus concentrate 
on the public health agenda. 
 
 
2.3.3 The NHS Modernisation: The Quasi-market  
Published in July 2000, The NHS Plan: A Plan for Investment, A 
Plan for Reform (Secretary of State for Health, 2000) on the one 
hand outlined the failure of the NHS to provide patient-centred 
services due to over-centralisation, while on the other hand 
marked the start of the “Modernisation” (Greenhalgh et al., 
2009). According to  Petsoulas et al. (2011), there were four 
major objectives of the policies established within the NHS 
Modernisation: 1) more investment to expand capacity; 2) more 
emphasis on service quality including establishing targets and 
arm’s-length regulation; 3) more decentralisation through 
granting Foundation Trusts (FT) autonomy and shifting power to 
the front line; and 4) more intense provider-side competition 
stimulated by the introduction of PbR. The theoretical 
foundation of this reform was the use of the Quasi-market: 
while the government can retain the right to plan and regulate 
healthcare services, the devolution and the implementation of 
PbR can promote the provider-side competition to improve 
efficiency and quality. 
 
 
2.3.3.1 Top-down management: Investment and targets 
The government highlighted the principle of providing patient-
led services as a means to improve healthcare performance. 
The NHS Plan (Secretary of State for Health, 2000) was 
established to describe how the resources made available to the 
NHS would be used to deliver services to patients. To better 
serve the reality and expectation, the NHS Plan committed more 
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investment to the NHS to increase staff’s salary, hire more staff, 
place more beds and update facilities to enlarge the capacity of 
healthcare services (Wanless et al., 2002). To support the 
increase in capacity, in the spending review for 2002, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer announced to secure the increasing 
in funding of over 7% per year in terms from 2002/03 to 
2007/08 (Wanless et al., 2002). Accordingly, the budget for the 
expenditure of the NHS in England would reach £90 million in 
the fiscal year of 2007/08. Within the budget, the staff salaries 
and wages would be the largest single item of expenditure 
comprising 2/3 as in total to an additional £2.9 billion per year. 
The national plan also pledged to employ 7500 more 
consultants, 2000 more GPs and 20,000 more nurses 
(Secretary of State for Health, 2000).  
 
Facilitated by the investment, targets were set or adjusted in 
the plan. Among the targets, one of particular importance was 
cutting waiting times for treatment. The target maximum 
waiting times in hospital was reduced to three months for 
outpatient appointments and six months for inpatient treatment 
by 2005 (Wanless et al., 2002). The following The NHS 
Improvement Plan: Putting People at the Heart of Public Service 
(Secretary of State for Health, 2004) made a further 
commitment to limiting the waiting times from GP referral to 
secondary care to no longer than 18 weeks by 2008. Other 
targets were set for a better access to primary care, the 
improvement of patient satisfaction and the reduction in the 
health gap between the best off and worst off (Ham, 2009). To 
ensure the implementation of the new targets and to promote 
greater performance of the NHS organisations, the 
responsibility of CHI was strengthened and connected to a new 
“star rating” system. This external body held a rolling 
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programme of reviews, visiting every trust over a period of 3-4 
years with the clinical guidelines issued by the NICE 
(Department of Health, 2005b). Directly related to this system, 
the “earned autonomy” system rewarded high-score trusts 
(Granted as FTs) with greater operational freedom to manage 
their services with less interference from the central 
organisations, as well as significant investments in local 
communities, staff and other stakeholders (Secretary of State 
for Health, 2002).  
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2.3.3.2 Devolution: Attention to a bottom-up 
management 
In addition to granting the FTs autonomy, the government 
further undertook decentralisation by shifting power to the 
frontline by adjusting the NHS structure. Since 2002, the 
devolution of authority could be categorised into two parts: 
reducing the priority of the central organisations and integrating 
resources and responsibilities at the local level (Department of 
Health, 2001). At the central level, the NHS Executive within the 
Department of Health (Lindblom and Woodhouse) lost its 
separate identity under the leadership of a combined permanent 
secretary and the NHS chief executive. With the establishment 
of Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs), the number of health 
authorities reduced from 95 to 28 (the number of SHAs later 
further reduced to 10 in 2006), and the 8 Regional Offices were 
replaced by 4 directorates of Health and Social Care (Ham, 
2009). At the local level, the small local-based purchasers PCTs 
(later reduced from 303 to 152 in 2006 (Boyce, 2012)) were 
established to take the place of the previous PCGs (Allen, 
2002a). By streamlining the work of the central organisations 
and facilitated by a new payment system PbR, PCTs were 
expected to control over more than 75% of the NHS budget by 
2004;reiterating the slogan “what counts is what works” 
(Rawnsley, 2001; Stevens, 2004). With more resources and 
powers granted to PCTs, they were encouraged to purchase 
secondary services aggressively on behalf of patients and to 
choose hospitals according to quality and cost. Supported by 
Commissioning A Patient-led NHS (Crisp, 2005), the roles of 
PCTs and GPs have been reiterated as that PCTs were expected 
to focus on promoting public health and thus ensure universal 
coverage of “practice-based commissioning” by the end of 2006, 
whilst GPs would take major responsibility for commissioning 
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services.  
 
To be consistent with the prevailing political commitment to 
reduce waiting times and the political consideration regarding 
bringing in the market mechanism, the government designed 
PbR, the activity-based funding system to replace the Block 
Contract, although it has been proved to be effective in 
containing costs (O'Reilly et al., 2012). Regarding capacity as 
one target, the newly established PbR system under which 
hospitals would be funded based on the work undertaken was 
believed to promote greater healthcare performance (Boyle, 
2007).  
 
 
2.3.3.3 The Quasi-market: The provider-side 
competition  
In the Reforming NHS Financial Flows: Introducing Payment by 
Results (Department of Health, 2002b), the government made 
the commitment to move from a monopoly provider of 
healthcare services that ran from Whitehall to providing a larger 
range and greater diversity of services. In addition to the 
provider-side competition, the establishment of nationwide 
standards and transparent inspection bodies were also expected 
to guarantee the quality of healthcare services. The following 
subsections illustrate the working relationships among these 
three interest groups:  
 
 
1) Providers 
Besides the 115 NHS FTs, three main groups of sectors were 
entitled as the providers of primary healthcare services: 
individual private providers consisting of GPs, Dentists, 
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Pharmacists and Opticians; PCT Provider Units and Independent 
Sector Providers. More voluntary sectors became involved to 
provide healthcare services offering patients a wider range of 
choices in this new system, which helped to reduce waiting 
times (Ham, 2009). The independent provider sectors included 
three main groups: 1) not-for-profit providers, 2) for-profit 
providers and 3) the alternative providers for primary care. 
Local voluntary groups, Foundation Trusts, non-profit social 
enterprises and co-operatives were encouraged to engage in the 
service delivery process. Based on the nationally-fixed tariffs, 
the increase in the number of providers was expected to 
intensify the provider-side competition and thus increase quality 
(Department of Health, 2006). 
 
 
2) Commissioners/service users 
On the commissioner side, PCTs and Practice Based 
Commissioners were entitled to buy primary services from 
different providers, including voluntary sectors and individual 
private providers as well as part of the secondary care from 
hospitals. With the help of expertise from private companies, 
various resources were offered to support the commissioning 
programme, which complied with the competition theory of the 
Internal Market. 
 
Regarding secondary care, the Money Follows the Patient policy 
(Secretary of State for Health, 2002) under the PbR system was 
believed to increase purchaser power with a much stronger 
voice from the patient side (Department of Health, 2002a). As 
committed by the government, PCTs were required to provide 
choices among a variety of providers to patients who were 
awaiting referrals to hospitals, one of which must be an 
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independent provider (Dixon et al., 2010). Thus, the patients’ 
own choices for better-performed hospitals acted as a “market 
choice” that incentivised providers to improve their quality and 
efficiency to increase profit or avoid financial risks in this 
payment system (Allen, 2009b).  
 
 
3) Regulators 
In this system, the establishment of the regulators implied a 
shift from a hierarchically managed healthcare system to a 
regulated one carried out by various arm’s-length agencies on 
behalf of the government (Nettleton et al., 2008). Under Health 
and Social Care Act (House of Commons, 2003), a new 
executive non-departmental regulatory body called “Monitor” 
was established to ensure the quality of performance through 
authorising, monitoring and regulating the NHS FTs (more 
duties were granted under Health and Social Care Act 
(Secretary of State for Health, 2012)). Alongside the release of 
Delivering the NHS Plan (Secretary of State for Health, 2002) 
the establishment of the Commission for Healthcare Audit and 
Inspection (CHAI) replaced the CHI with responsibilities for 
overseeing providers including both public and private sectors. 
The establishment of this new organisation (was later replaced 
by the Care Quality Commission (CQC) in 2009) indicated a 
greater attention to regulation (King's Fund, 2008). The 
“bottom-up” mechanism instead of the “top-down” regulatory 
structure placed more emphasis on the front line, which agreed 
with the market theory that let service users’ choices be the 
driver for higher efficiency and quality. Through expanding the 
type of providers, the NHS FTs alongside other third-party 
providers were expected to provide a broader range of choices 
for patients; the non-price competition mechanism was 
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supposed to promote the self-improvement of providers to 
achieve better care services, and the regulation and inspection 
systems were expected to guarantee service quality.  
 
 
2.3.4 The generation of PbR 
Table 2-1 outlines the process of the NHS reforms, from a 
decentralised market to a centrally-controlled system and then 
to the Quasi-market under the Modernisation. This illustrates 
the fundamental idea of the generation of the Quasi-market 
through outlining the different problems of the previous two 
systems. 
 
Since the 1990s, the radical reform has introduced the market 
in the healthcare system. The purchaser/provider split 
promoted the competition among providers and put more 
emphasis on efficiency, which was the basis for the subsequent 
reforms. With the attention paid to the long-term purchaser-
provider partnership and the process-oriented regulation, the 
new Labour initiated a reform advancing to an evidence-based 
healthcare system. By setting national targets and inspection 
sectors, regulation and inspection were expected to be 
evidence-based and therefore, more convincing. This reform 
established the framework of the ten years’ Modernisation.  
 
Table 2-1 The NHS reforms 1990s-2000s 
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By recognising the problems of over-centralisation and the lack 
of incentives for service delivery (capacity and quality), the 
government undertook the reform called “Modernisation”, with 
an expectation to increase patient choice and thus stimulate the 
competition among providers while continue to maintain 
government regulation. Within this reform, the most prominent 
change was the reform of the payment system: using PbR to 
replace the original Block Contract. The radical reform complied 
with the general idea of the Modernisation by applying the 
market mechanism while at the same time ensuring service 
quality using the nationally set care pathways and targets. 
Therefore, the next section illustrates how PbR was initiated and 
developed underpinned by a considerable amount of financial 
investment during the NHS Modernisation.   
 
 
2.4 The development of PbR in acute services 
Since the NHS Modernisation, the past decade has witnessed 
the development of PbR regarding the refining of the 
classification and payment system and enlarging its coverage 
from acute services towards mental health. Given the change in 
political power and policies when expanding to mental health, 
the following subsections first outline the development process 
of PbR before the NHS’s fourth reform in 2010, leaving the 
development of MH PbR to Section 2.5. Within the NHS 
Modernisation, the development process could be divided into 
three main phases, including the preparatory phase from 
2003/04 to 2004/05, the transitional phase from 2005/06 to 
2007/08, and the major change phase from 2008/09 to 
2009/10.  
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2.4.1 The preparatory phase 2003/04-2004/05 
PbR was first implemented in a small range of services in 
2003/04 when the cost-and-volume agreement was introduced 
to six surgical specialities including Ophthalmology, 
Cardiothoracic surgery, ENT, Trauma and Orthopaedics, general 
surgery and urology (Secretary of State for Health, 2002). 
Nevertheless, the prices were still determined locally through 
the discussion between providers and local purchasers rather 
than being based on the nationally-fixed tariffs. National tariffs 
were first introduced in 15 HRGs, which were considered as key 
regions where national standards should be implemented to 
reduce waiting times (Department of Health, 2012b). In the 
fiscal year 2003/04, 15 HRGs against elective admission with 
national tariffs were implemented in all trusts. Only the growth 
activity delivered was funded by the national tariffs, while the 
baseline activity was still funded at a locally negotiated rate 
(Farrar et al., 2010). Besides acting as a payment method, the 
national tariffs were also used as benchmarks to compare local 
prices with the national tariffs, which helped commissioners and 
trusts to assess the accuracy of local reference costs and the 
quality of healthcare performance.  
 
In 2004/05, Finished Consultant Episode (FCE), the activity 
count used for Service Level Agreements, was replaced by Spell. 
To avoid inconsistencies in the interpretation of the FCE 
definition and to integrate the information of treatment-related 
resource consumption, a single Spell period covers all finished 
consultant episodes from admission to discharge (Department 
of Health, 2005b). Thus, in this fiscal year, the principle of 
paying those activities above the baseline with national tariffs 
was maintained, while the coverage was expanded to 48 HRGs. 
Additionally, PbR was implemented within all the FTs and its 
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coverage was enlarged to Non-FTs (Pitches et al., 2007).  
 
From 2003/04, PbR expanded its coverage gradually in England. 
It enlarged its coverage from elective admission to non-elective 
admission, outpatient, A&E and mental health with different 
speeds according to the type of providers. 
 
 
2.4.2 The transitional phase 2005/06-2007/08 
The government had planned to cover all elective and non-
elective inpatient care, outpatients and A&E services within all 
NHS hospitals with the PbR tariffs in the fiscal year 2005/06 
(Department of Health, 2012b). To prevent the increase in short 
stay admission in the HRGs with longer Length of Stay (Olfson 
et al., 2014), the short-stay emergency payment system was 
developed for specific HRGs against A&E services in 2005 
(Department of Health, 2005b).  
 
The original intention to cover all inpatients, outpatients and 
A&E services was proved excessively ambitious, since PbR only 
reached the target of covering elective care, leaving the rest of 
the areas to 2006/07 (Department of Health, 2012b). In the 
fiscal year 2006/07, the coverage expanded across all NHS 
providers for admitted care, outpatients and A&E attendances 
with an increase in the number of HRGs from 48 to 550. 
Nevertheless, the errors of the 2006/07 tariff published by the 
DH in January 2006 raised the overall average tariff much 
higher than expected. Some PCTs reported an increase of 4% 
or more in the cost of service, which was more than double of 
the government’s estimation (1.5% increase) (Boyle, 2007). 
Later on, the tariff was withdrawn and reissued on March 2006 
after the DH recognised the mistake. An independent review 
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proposed a series of recommendations according to the existing 
system, including strengthening governance arrangements and 
promoting the involvement of stakeholders (Lawlor, 2006). The 
DH adjusted the organisational system according to Lawlor’s 
(2006) review by revising the organisational structure and 
introducing the sense-check for tariffs.  
 
During the transition period, the DH noted that some providers 
might receive less income than their actual costs while some 
PCTs may pay higher prices than they previously had when local 
prices moved to national tariffs. The Purchaser Parity 
Adjustment (PPA) was introduced to compare local prices to the 
corresponding national tariffs, which helped reduce the price 
gap while protecting the interests of providers. In the 
meanwhile, the PPA (phased out in 2008/09) protected PCTs 
from the negative impacts resulting from the changes in the 
payment mechanism (Audit Commission, 2008). 
 
The release of the consultation paper Options for the Future of 
Payment by Results: 2008/09 to 2010/11 (Department of 
Health, 2007) marked the end of the transitional period and 
placed the attention on the unbundling services, expanding the 
scope and strengthening the cost-efficiency of PbR. The 
proposal of the new version HRG v4 was set by the major 
revision of its predecessors from HRG v1 to HRG v3.5. As the 
first version to split unbundling services to promote more 
services provided by more providers, it expanded the number 
of groups from 550 under HRG v3.5 to over 1,500, covering 21 
chapters for the whole body system (Department of Health, 
2012b). At this stage, developing specific HRGs and the related 
tariffs for mental health became the priority (Fairbairn, 2007). 
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2.4.3 The major change phase 2008/09-2009/10 
In 2008/09, the coverage of the national tariffs had been 
expanded to all independent organisations that provided 
services under free choice, which met the commitment to 
support patient choice by attracting more providers (Secretary 
of State for Health, 2002). The indicative or non-mandatory 
tariffs, which were set against those services that should have 
been set as an indication of price rather than mandatory prices, 
provided support to encourage appropriate alternatives to the 
traditional hospital bundling care since 2005/06 (Boyle, 2007). 
The unbundling of services allowed treatment procedures to be 
divided into several stages in which different providers take 
responsibility for different elements. Thus, commissioners could 
choose the providers with higher cost-efficiency for a specific 
care service (Maybin, 2007). As a supplement to unbundling 
service in HRG v4, a new MFF payment index was introduced to 
reflect the geographical differences among providers by taking 
into account the differences in costs caused by geographical 
variations (Monitor and NHS England, 2013b). For higher 
service quality, the final report of High Quality for All: NHS Next 
Stage Review (Secretary of State for Health, 2008) introduced 
the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) scheme 
that based on best practice, committing to pay more for best 
practice rather than average cost.  
 
In 2009/10, HRG v4 was officially implemented, including new 
unbundled HRGs for critical care, chemotherapy, radiotherapy 
and specialist palliative care, with the number of tariffs doubling 
from around 550 to over 1,000 (Department of Health, 2012b). 
Besides the expansion of coverage, the classification system 
was further refined to differentiate the special interventions 
from the routine ones, with a more detailed index including 
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comorbidities, complications, age and LOS. The detailed 
categorised index enabled the specialised services to be 
identified and supported with particular specialised supplement, 
which was a certain percentage of the relevant HRG tariff, 
known as “top-up” (Department of Health, 2010b). Starting 
from 2009/10, the CQUIN was implemented to supplement the 
financial incentives, committing to providers an additional 2.5% 
of incomes if they could meet the specified standards in any of 
the four services including two national determined services and 
two locally selected services (Department of Health, 2009a). 
 
 
 
2.5 The implementation of PbR in mental health 
Since 2010, the coverage of the PbR currencies was gradually 
expanded to mental health. However, it was also the time when 
the Coalition Government came into power, which indicated the 
changes in policies and objectives. Under such circumstances, 
various supplementary policies and targets have emerged since 
the implementation of PbR. The following subsections outline 
the political background to facilitate a deeper understanding of 
the development of PbR in mental health. 
 
 
2.5.1 Liberating the NHS 2010-2015: Return to the 
market theory 
The years since 1997 have witnessed a radical change in the 
NHS, which moved from being an organisation based on high-
trust relationships to one operating based on nationally-set 
standards and targets (van Zwanenberg, 2003). Despite the 
attention paid to the bottom-up regulatory mechanism in the 
second phase of the NHS Modernisation, the targets and 
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regulatory policies were adopted as the main approaches for 
performance improvement. This raised concerns about the 
absence of attention paid to the actual outcome of services. 
Moreover, the launch of the QIPP, which set a target to save up 
to £20bn by 2014/15 (National Audit Office, 2011), indicated 
the financial pressure faced by the government. Under such 
circumstances, the election of a Coalition government 
comprised of Conservative and Liberal Democrat politicians in 
2010, heralded an end to the process-oriented targets and top-
down command-and-control style leadership, replacing it with a 
further bottom-up clinician leadership (Ham, 2010). The 
abolition of the miscellaneous arm’s-length sectors was 
expected to save managerial expenditure for the investment in 
clinical issues. To retain the focus on patient choice and the 
provider-side competition, the Coalition government proposed 
a reform mainly focusing on increasing the investment in 
training and empowering clinicians to carry out their roles to 
control budget (Darzi, 2009). Seen as a continuation of the 
revolutionary change under Thatcher and Major, the Coalition 
government proposed a radical reform of a provider market with 
financial incentives to improve quality and regulation rather 
than mainly relying on performance management (Secretary of 
State for Health, 2010). The increase in market forces was 
expected to promote a rise in productivity as well as quality 
rather than simply meeting the targets (Black, 2010). In 2012, 
the Health and Social Care Bill (House of Commons, 2010) was 
passed to guide the reform in five main aspects: 1) devolving 
power to GPs, 2) establishing commissioning sectors,3)  setting 
up the independent NHS board, 4) enhancing economic 
regulation and inspection, and 5) abolishing SHAs, PCTs and a 
number of arm’s-length bodies. 
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As Figure 2-6 shows, PCTs were replaced by 211 Clinical 
Commissioning Groups (CCGs) covering a smaller population. 
Commissioning and regulatory power of PCTs were passed to 
GPs. A new national NHS commissioning board overseeing 4 
Regional Offices and 27 Local Area Teams was established 
(Holloway, 2012). With the involvement of the different types of 
providers, 80% of the total healthcare budget was paid to 
different free-market providers under contract (Reynolds et al., 
2011). The Monitor, along with the CQC took responsibility for 
regulation. Acting as an economic regulator, the Monitor was 
entitled to regulate the prices paid to providers and to apply 
competition law to anti-competitive behaviours to ensure the 
continuity of high quality services. The CQC was established as 
an independent quango to integrate the responsibilities of the 
former three regulatory organisations including the Healthcare 
Commission, Commission for Social Care Inspection and the 
Mental Health Act Commission (Maybin and Harrison, 2008). 
Besides taking over most functions of the former Healthcare 
Commission, the CQC took responsibility to license providers 
including the NHS providers, independent providers and 
foundation trusts and to inspect their services since 2010 
(Secretary of State for Health, 2010).  
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Figure 2-6 The structure of the NHS from 2013-2015 
 
 
 
2.5.2 PbR changes for the future 2010-2015 
Although under financial pressure, Liberating the NHS 
(Secretary of State for Health, 2010) outlined the commitment 
to concentrate on improving the quality of care in addition to 
expanding the coverage of PbR. Besides using patient choice to 
promote quality improvement, some adjustments on tariffs 
were set out to promote greater quality and enhance patient 
outcomes (Department of Health, 2010b). The 2010/11 national 
tariffs were adjusted to meet the commitment to best practice 
tariffs stated in High Quality Care for All (Secretary of State for 
Health, 2008). Accordingly, the best practice tariffs were initially 
implemented in four service areas with high volume and large 
variation in clinical practice including cataracts, cholecystectomy, 
fragility hip fracture and stroke (Department of Health, 2010b).  
 
In Options for the Future of PbR: 2008/09 to 2010/11 
(Department of Health, 2007) the DH committed to setting 
national tariffs for mental health services. The introduction of 
mental health currencies for local use was the first step and also 
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one of the largest steps in the development process of PbR.  
According to the category methodology of the HoNOS, a 
national model for mental health currencies MHCT was adopted 
from the Care Pathways and Packages Project (CPPP) developed 
by Yorkshire and Humber (Whelan et al., 2011). The DH 
published three documents supporting the implementation of 
mental health currencies, which indicated a step towards 
promoting a comprehensive payment system in mental health 
(Department of Health, 2009b). The DH outlined the planned 
milestones of the development of MH PbR (NHS Confederation, 
2011): 
 
2010/11: the clusters and the related reference costs should be 
set based on clusters; 
2011/12: all services, including post-GP and other referrals for 
both working age and older people’s health care should be 
allocated to one of the 21 clusters by the end of 2011. The local 
prices should be agreed upon for use in 2012/13; 
2012/13: the clusters with local prices should be adjusted to be 
mandatory for contracting purpose; 
2013/14: the prototype of national tariffs for mental health 
should be generated. 
 
 
2.5.3 Current implementation of PbR in mental health  
Unlike other areas to which PbR expanded its coverage on time, 
the implementation of PbR in mental health has been delayed. 
A report from the Mental Health Network NHS Confederation in 
December 2012 stated that the local Block Contracts were still 
the dominant payment method, with 75% of the total 
investment spent through block contracts (Mental Health 
Network NHS Confederation, 2012). According to the survey 
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with 14 CCGs, the Block Contract has still been the primary 
payment method in daily commissioning in seven out of nine 
disease groups, within which the amount of investment via 
Block Contract shared over 70% of the total investment within 
the six clusters.  
 
The overwhelming proportion of Block Contracts suggests the 
obstructions during the transmission to PbR in mental health. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the expansion of the PbR payment 
system into mental health was initially planned to begin in 2013. 
However, as Mayden (2013) reveals, it has now been delayed 
until 2014/15. Moreover, an article entitled Updated: Monitor 
Questions Payment by Results for Mental Health (Lintern, 2013) 
indicates that the mandatory rollout of national PbR tariff for 
mental health for 2014/15 has been recently dropped.  
 
Until now, MH PbR has been applied in some trusts in England 
as pilot experiments. Central and North West London Trust has 
been appointed as the pilot trust implementing PbR since 2009. 
Over 500 patients have been clustered through the HoNOS, 
which indicated that 93% of all patients could be clustered into 
one of the 21 groups (Zoha, 2010). However, the lack of long-
term evidence has led to a dearth of practical implications 
regarding the system and the policy. Thus, this indicates the 
significance of undertaking further research as proposed by this 
thesis, which is to examine whether it is feasible to apply PbR 
in mental health and what factors have caused the delay in 
implementing PbR in mental health? 
 
Regarding examining the implementation of PbR in mental 
health, research carried out for this thesis focuses on two 
different levels: the macro-level and the micro-level. By 
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appreciating the importance of understanding political 
intentions behind this policy, the macro-level research aims to 
examine the theory foundations behind PbR regarding its 
theoretical viability, which sheds light on the direction of the 
micro-level researches. Guided by the macro-level findings, the 
micro-level research that combines theoretical analysis, semi-
structured interviews and online surveys aims to investigate the 
formulation and implementation of this policy through exploring 
the ground-level evidence.   
 
 
Summary  
This chapter provided background information surrounding the 
development of PbR as a new payment mechanism replacing 
the previous Block Contract. Referring to Marshall et al.’s (2014) 
perspective that outlines the importance of the political context 
regarding understanding the implementation and value of one 
policy, the chapter discussed the initiation and development of 
PbR by contextualising it within a specific political environment.  
 
To present an overview of PbR and the logic behind it, this 
chapter began by elaborating the general theoretical foundation 
of PbR. In the first section, the economic and mathematical 
theories behind PbR were discussed, which outlined how the 
financial incentives worked to encourage providers to manage 
their resources in a more cost-efficient way while promoting 
improvement in service quality. Accordingly, the second section 
demonstrated the working mechanism of PbR by focusing on 
two core elements: currency establishment and tariff calculation. 
Given the incomplete development of MH PbR and the fact that 
it shares the same development logic with that for acute 
services, Section 2.2 first illustrated the working mechanism of 
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PbR in acute services, followed by an illustration of the 
development of the clinical classification system in mental 
health.  
 
Drawing on the importance of contextualisation to policy 
evaluation, Section 2.3 exploredthree major reforms of the NHS 
between the 1990s and the 2000s in order to understand the 
political intents behind PbR. The over-decentralisation resulting 
from the Internal Market together with the over-centralisation 
and excessively relying on standards under the New NHS, 
contributed to the establishment of the Quasi-market. 
According to its theory, in the Quasi-market, on the one hand, 
the government can reserve the regulatory and inspection 
power, and on the other hand, the introduction of PbR can 
stimulate the provider-side non-price competition and, 
therefore, facilitate an improvement in quality and efficiency. 
Based on the general political context, Section 2.4 described the 
development of PbR within the NHS Modernisation. Drawing on 
the change in the political context in 2010, which also was the 
time the coverage of PbR was expanded to mental health, 
Section 2.5 discussed the implementation of MH PbR in the 
political context of “Liberating the NHS”. The return to the 
healthcare market with a particular attention to service quality 
was expected to be a motivation for the implementation of the 
PbR policy. Nevertheless, rather than following the planned 
schedule, the Block Contract was still the main payment method 
at the time of writing (October 2015). Despite the experiences 
of piloting MH PbR in acute services, there lacked strong 
evidence in terms linking PbR with quality and efficiency 
improvement.  
 
Under such circumstances, this chapter shed light on the 
	 89	
development of the research aim – to investigate the driving 
factors that have caused the delay in implementing PbR in 
mental health and therefore, evaluate the policy-making 
process of MH PbR. The development of the NHS as introduced 
in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, pointed to the changes in the NHS 
political context, which paves the way for the following 
argument indicating that policy should be evaluated within the 
context (this will be discussed in Chapter 8). Simultaneously, 
the fast-changing policies outlined in these two sections will 
verify the fieldwork findings arguing that the intensively 
established policies resulted in frontline clinicians’ reluctance to 
engage in the reform as well as the emergence of the “gaming” 
behaviours (this will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7).  
 
As mentioned in this chapter, PbR was developed based on a 
fundamental theory – the Quasi-market. The next chapter 
evaluates the application of the Quasi-market in health care to 
examine the initiation of the PbR policy. 
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3. The initiation of the PbR policy: The application of 
the Quasi-market 
 
 
Introduction  
As described in Chapter 2, the original aim of introducing PbR 
was to control costs and gradually lead to quality improvement 
through non-price competition among providers. When tracing 
back the idea of competition, it originated from the Quasi-
market, which is a modified form of the fully competitive market 
model that has been introduced into the NHS since the 1990s.  
 
Within the process of the NHS reforms, the introduction of the 
Quasi-market is of great importance to the design and 
implementation of PbR, since the political context and the 
accordingly established Quasi-market demonstrates the political 
intents behind PbR. In other words, the viability of applying the 
Quasi-market theory to health care acts as a crucial 
precondition for PbR to fulfil its functions. Drawing on Hogwood 
and Gunn’s (1984) theory of policy evaluation as discussed in 
Chapter 1, this chapter aims to evaluate the initiation of the PbR 
policy by examining the theoretical viability of applying the 
Quasi-market theory. The first section introduces the definition 
and working mechanism of the Quasi-market by mainly focusing 
on its theoretical basis – the competitive market. The next two 
sections evaluate the viability of the application of PbR, 
considering its dual functions, which are cost control under the 
provider-side competition and quality improvement under 
government regulation. Section 3.4 presents some early 
experiences from implementing PbR in acute services, which 
comply with the previous arguments. By demonstrating the 
fundamental conflicts between the Quasi-market theory and 
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public services, together with the functional problems of 
applying standards, the preliminary findings outlined in Section 
3.5 suggest that the Quasi-market does not fit health care, 
especially mental health, in theory. This indicates that the policy 
has been poorly set and thus sheds light on the research design 
for evaluating the formulation and implementation of the PbR 
policy. 
 
The next section introduces the Quasi-market from three 
aspects: 1) the fully competitive market model, 2) the basic 
assumptions of the fully competitive market and 3) its 
theoretical mechanisms. 
 
 
 
3.1 The Quasi-market 
In light of the features of public services, the government has a 
clear responsibility for monitoring and regulating the system to 
meet public interest. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the 
failure of the “New NHS” reform indicates problems resulted 
from over-centralisation under which the government tried to 
regulate healthcare services through establishing targets that 
lacked attention to service outcome and patient choice. To 
increase cost-efficiency under great financial pressure while 
maintaining government’s regulatory responsibility in 
healthcare services, Le Grand and Bartlett (1993) have 
developed the concept of the Quasi-market. As Kähkönen (2004) 
interprets, the Quasi-market, on the one hand, is a market that 
aims to reap the supposed efficiency gains through replacing 
the monopolistic public provider and thus embracing supply-
side competition; on the other hand, it is “quasi” because it 
differs from the conventional free-market given the abandon on 
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the financial competition. In other words, it serves two purposes: 
the competitive market mechanism encourages competition to 
control cost and drive up efficiency for a better allocation of 
service, whilst the government can keep its regulatory 
responsibility and thus ensure the common good of public 
service. As Marquand (2004) points, central to this concept is 
the insertion of competition and the corresponding 
accountability, which the previous monopolistic system lacked. 
Therefore, this section begins with an introduction of the 
conventional fully-competitive market that illustrates the 
purchaser/provider interaction as well as the provider-side 
competition. This paves the way for the subsequent 
investigation of how the Quasi-market drives up efficiency. 
 
 
3.1.1 The market mechanism 
A market is a mechanism for resource allocation, which reflects 
the preferences of clients on the products offered by providers 
(West, 1998). The market mechanism is an economic term that 
describes the money-product exchange between clients and 
providers within an open and understood system. The 
interaction between these two leads to the equilibrium - the 
balanced price that supply and demand are brought into by the 
market’s “invisible hand” (Exworthy et al., 1999).  
 
Based on the assumptions that providers are profit-driven and 
provide homogeneous products (Nicholson, 2005), Figure 3-1 
and Figure 3-2 present the theoretical basis of the PbR model 
to show how, and to what extent, the “market power” influences 
providers’ behaviours. 
 
Figure 3-1 displays an example of two different conditions 
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(profit and loss) of two different providers A and B. As stated 
above, each participant is a “price-taker” without the ability to 
affect the market price. In other words, the market equilibrium 
price is determined by the interaction between market demand 
and market supply. Therefore, the market price is constant for 
each identical product sold. Moreover, the price is determined 
when the market supply curve encounters the market demand 
curve when the Average Revenue (AR) becomes the Marginal 
Revenue (Baumol and Blinder, 2012). One supplier maximises 
profits when its MC (Marginal Cost) equals its MR (Layard and 
Walters, 1978). As Figure 3-1 shows, when the market supply 
is S0 while the market demand is D0, p0 is the market price. 
Under this condition, Supplier A produces XA0 amount of output 
at an average total cost (C0) when it reaches the highest profit. 
Since p0 is constantly greater than its average total cost, the 
red colour shaded area Profit A0 represents the profit Supplier 
A makes in the short term. Unlike Supplier A, Supplier B has an 
AC curve above p0 at every single point, which indicates that it 
experiences a profit loss at this market price (p0). If Supplier B 
were to produce anything at this price, it would create a loss 
when each single output is made. The shaded area B denotes 
the loss Supplier B makes in the short-term. According to the 
assumption of profit maximisation, Supplier B would not 
produce any output at this price. Therefore, the total industry 
output is xA0. When demand rises to D1, the relevant supply 
curve becomes S1, and the market price rises to p1. In such a 
condition, Supplier B starts to make a profit from producing 
output xB1. At the same time, Supplier A increases its output to 
maximise its profit at xA1 amount as the green colour shaded 
area Profit A1 shows. Hence, the industry output is the sum of 
xA1 + xB1.  
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Figure 3-1 Impacts of the demand-supply interaction on providers with 
different efficiencies 
 
 
 
Based on the relationship between cost, price and profit as 
Figure 3-1 illustrates, Figure 3-2 explains how the supply-
demand curve influences competition, which affects the market 
price in this fully competitive market.  
 
Assume Supplier A is a firm that could represent the efficiency 
of most providers within this market, and there are 30 providers 
offering the same identical output. As the right-hand side graph 
shows, these 30 firms have a supply curve as S30. When the 
market demand is D0, it indicates that the market price is p0. 
However, under such conditions, the average cost of these 30 
firms is also at p0. In this case, there is no economic profit for 
these 30 providers. Therefore, there is a lack of incentives for 
other potential firms to enter this industry. When market 
demand rises to D1, the market price now locates at the crossing 
point of S30 and D1, which is p1. At this time, the existing 30 
firms make an abnormal profit at this price as the shaded area 
shows. Based on the assumptions that providers are profit-
oriented, each supplier produces the same quality products and 
there is no entry barrier for potential providers, new providers 
with the same efficiency will enter the industry until the price 
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falls back to the minimum average cost, which is p0. At this time, 
the supply curve of 60 firms intersects D1 at p0, indicating that 
30 more providers will enter the industry.  
 
Figure 3-2 Impacts of the demand-supply interaction on providers having 
the same efficiency 
 
 
 
In summary, in a perfectly competitive market, the market price 
is determined by the interaction between supply and demand. 
Profit varies according to the change in the demand and the 
supplier’s costs. Competitions among providers lead to lower 
price and lower profit. Therefore, a supplier could only survive 
and make a profit when it minimises its cost, maximises its 
efficiency and at the same time keeps the same quality as other 
providers in the industry. In the end, the market price will be 
driven down until each firm in the industry only earns a normal 
profit and when the economic profit is zero. 
 
 
3.1.2 Basic assumptions of the Quasi-market 
As described earlier, the Quasi-market is developed based on 
the theoretical basis of the fully competitive market. In other 
words, the Quasi-market inherits some basic assumptions from 
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the fully-competitive market from which it develops its working 
mechanism by taking into account the essence of public services, 
specifically equity (this will be discussed in the next section). 
The five assumptions are as follows: 
 
Large number participants: A large number of clients are willing 
and able to buy products at a certain price. There are a large 
number of providers with the willingness and ability to sell 
output at this price. Each participant is too small to the entire 
market to influence the price – each one in the market is 
considered a price-taker (Aumann, 1964).  
 
Homogeneous product: Each supplier provides identical outputs 
that are perfect substitutes for others. 
 
Elastic demand curve: The change in price will bring about a 
large change in demand. Therefore, the final market price is 
determined by the interaction between both demand and supply. 
 
Transparent information and rational participants: All 
participants are assumed to have the same perfect knowledge 
of price, quality, utility of products and the nature of the market. 
Both clients and providers can make rational decisions 
according to the relevant information (Nicholson, 2005). 
 
Free entry of the market: There are no entry or exit barriers for 
providers. Therefore, if the profit of a particular output is 
abnormally high in the short-term, potential providers will enter 
the market until the price falls to an equilibrium point. On the 
contrary, providers can exit the market when they are not able 
to make a profit in the long-term. The interaction between 
clients and providers does not affect third parties. Therefore, 
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there is no collateral social cost or benefit caused by the trade-
off. 
 
 
3.1.3 Working mechanisms of the Quasi-market 
By taking into account the features of health care and the 
government’s regulatory power, the Quasi-market develops its 
working mechanism by expanding the purchase/provider 
interaction to an interaction among clients, purchasers and 
providers. The subsequent subsections introduce the interaction 
relationship under the Quasi-market and thus the working 
mechanism of PbR.  
 
Besides the above assumptions inherited from the fully 
competitive market, the Quasi-market further develops three 
features subject to the provider-side competition, as introduced 
below: 
 
Provider/purchaser relationship: As previously discussed, the 
state becomes primarily a funder, leaving provider’s 
responsibility to providers including private, voluntary and 
public organisations. Funded by general taxation, the state buys 
healthcare services on behalf of patients who receive the 
services. To further encourage competition, patients are granted 
the power to choose from at least four elective care providers 
for acute services, among which at least one is private (Brereton 
and Vasoodaven, 2010).  
 
Non-profit-maximisation based competition: Unlike the fully-
competitive market in which all providers are profit-
maximisation oriented, publicly funded social service provision 
involves different types of providers, including for profit, 
	 98	
voluntary and public organisations. Providers, such as voluntary 
and public institutions, are not driven by profit. By taking equity 
and quality of service into consideration, the Quasi-market 
encourages a non-price competition. With the tariffs fixed, the 
competition system in the Quasi-market is based on quality 
rather than on price-cost relationships (Brereton and 
Vasoodaven, 2010). 
 
Consumer/purchaser split: Unlike the conventional market in 
which clients pay for outputs as a precondition of consuming 
them, in health care, patients consume the services while the 
government acts as the purchaser.  
 
Besides the above provider-side competition mechanism, the 
Quasi-market, and therefore PbR, employs government 
regulation to ensure the quality and equity of public services. 
Drawing on the features of public services, agencies such as 
Healthcare Commissioning Groups and Monitor have a broad 
range of responsibilities including contracting with providers and 
inspecting service provision (Allen and Hommel, 2006). 
According to the theoretical mechanism of PbR as discussed in 
Chapter 2, the information system under PbR will enable the 
regulatory organisations to compare service quality using the 
derived benchmarks. It also allows the price setter – DH, to gain 
more knowledge regarding the real demand for services and 
adjust prices to serve the purpose of increasing efficiency (Pate, 
2009). In this respect, the government’s inspection and 
regulation are expected to be an assurance that patients from 
different areas of the country receive the same quality services. 
 
To examine to what extent the Quasi-market could fulfil its 
function in healthcare services, the following two sections 
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provide a theoretical evaluation of the viability of applying 
Quasi-market into healthcare services from two aspects: the 
market mechanism and the government’s ability to regulate. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Hogwood and Gunn (1984) attribute 
the failure of a particular policy to three major reasons: bad 
luck, bad execution and bad policy. Regarding the 
implementation of PbR in mental health, the system can only 
achieve the political intents when the fundamental theory, which 
is the application of the Quasi-market, is solid and feasible.  
Considering the dual-function of the Quasi-market, its validity 
and viability are determined by the application of the market 
theory and governmental regulation, which will be discussed in 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3, respectively.  
 
 
 
3.2  Theoretical evaluation of the market mechanism 
The feasibility of applying the market theory depends on 
whether the fundamental requirements can be met as well as 
whether the trade-offs made by the implementation of this 
policy are rational. The following subsections evaluate its 
feasibility from two major aspects: the fundamental problems 
brought by the market mechanism principles and the 
corresponding functional problems of cost settlement. 
 
 
3.2.1 Fundamental drawbacks of the market  
The following four parts examine four basic assumptions that 
enable the competition principle to serve its function, including 
the homogeneity of products, the supply-side competition, 
clients’ rational choice and the zero externality (Le Grand and 
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Bartlett, 1993).  
 
 
3.2.1.1 Services vs. products  
The homogeneity of output is the fundamental assumption of 
market theory: only when products in the industry are identical 
can clients make the choice among different providers simply 
based on the price and thus encourage supply-side competition. 
Although providers are not competing on prices in the Quasi-
market, the idea behind the price settlement rests on the 
hypothesis that services can be standardised to be identical, 
and the adoption of the average value of the costs standardises 
the costs (this will be discussed in Section 3.2.2). This is a 
process to commoditise healthcare services. However, in health 
care, providers do not provide healthcare products, rather, they 
offer services. One obvious difference between “service” and 
“product” is that products could be produced according to 
certain standardised processes, while it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to standardise services given the individuality of 
recipients (Pratt et al., 2007). To distinguish services from 
products, Normann (2001) uses the word “offering” to describe 
the process for which service is delivered: offering is a process 
that is optimised regarding relevant actors, rather than a 
physical object. Services, such as health care, require a degree 
of collaboration between clients and providers, such as both 
psychotherapists and patients working together to reveal and 
make use of their personal experiences for treatment. This is 
particularly the case in mental health, due to its intangible 
aetiology, as well as the lack of reliable laboratory and other 
objective measures available in acute services. These factors, 
on the one hand, increase the difficulties in defining patients’ 
needs for care and therefore, the corresponding interventions 
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(Jones, 2004) while on the other hand, devaluate the 
application of “standardisation-to-the-average” principle (this 
will be discussed in Chapter 5). Determined by the complex 
nature of mental disorders, besides the patient’s medical needs, 
clinicians also consider their social needs. In this respect, the 
treatment relies more on doctor-patient interactions rather than 
the laboratory indicators that are able to guide interventions for 
acute services. The process of mental health treatments 
normally involves building up a relationship of trust and intimacy, 
which requires clinicians to interact with patients and be flexible 
to the specific individual patient (Jones, 2004; Perry, 2000). In 
other words, these services are highly individualised and could 
not be completely substituted by others.  
 
 
3.2.1.2 The provider-side competition  
Another precondition of the provider-side competition is that 
there should be a large number of providers involved in the 
market, whereas the exit of one supplier would not affect the 
price or the operation of the market. If there are too few 
providers, the effects of market mechanism would be hindered 
by oligarch (Struyven and Steurs, 2005). However, in health 
care, due to its nature, it is not possible to break down 
monopolies for a variety of reasons (Lowery, 1998). Hospitals 
in the UK are largely founded based on the concept of District 
General Hospital. According to this concept, hospitals are 
founded on an expectation to provide a comprehensive range of 
services to the population within their district (Ministry of Health, 
1962). Therefore, these organisations would have some extent 
of monopolistic power (Propper et al., 1998). However, unlike 
other industries in which monopoly and oligarchy are of more 
potential damage than the advantages they can bring, it is of 
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great importance to have some extent of monopoly in 
healthcare services. According to the nature of medical 
treatment, one specialty cannot be delivered without support 
from another (West, 1998). This is especially the case for 
mental health and A&E settings. If a provider is to offer a 
comprehensive range of services, it requires a broad variety of 
specialists to maintain a normal working order. Accordingly, it 
must have the capacity to serve a wide catchment area to have 
a sufficient caseload to keep these specialised teams working. 
In this case, the size of the supplier, and the range of service it 
provides, are essential to ensure the comprehensive service, 
which explains the necessity of developing one large general 
supplier rather than many small providers. Purchasing from 
distant providers is also seen as unattractive to both clients and 
purchasers due to the problems created by potential transport 
and communication issues, which further reduces the intensity 
of provider-side competition. The lack of a sufficient number of 
providers thus influences the contracting relationship between 
commissioners and providers: commissioners must develop a 
dependent relationship with the existing providers given the 
limited number of alternatives. (Petsoulas et al., 2011). 
 
This subsection explained why it is not possible to break down 
monopolies in practice, which indicates the difficulties in 
establishing provider-side competition. Furthermore, clients’ 
ability to make rational decisions has been questioned (Clarke, 
2005), and is discussed in the subsequent subsection.  
 
 
3.2.1.3 Clients’ choices 
In light of the consumer/purchaser split, consumers/clients who 
receive healthcare services are not the ones who pay for them. 
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Then, who chooses providers and how to make rational choice 
affect the degree of competition in the Quasi-market. Regarding 
the first question of who makes the choice, it is whether 
commissioners or patients are responsible for making the choice 
that matters. The fundamental social problem is seen as finite 
resources versus infinite human demands. When considering 
this issue at a general level, maximising the utility of resources 
is the goal of the commissioners (Bradby, 2012). By contrast, 
receiving best-individualised services is the goal of the patient 
when it comes to an individual level. Services that meet patients’ 
demand, also known as patient satisfaction, may not always be 
efficient or even necessary, which echoes the potential conflicts 
between the “expressed need” and the “defined need” (Pilgrim, 
2012) (this will be discussed in Chapter 5). The notion of “client” 
is even more complex in mental health since “consumer” and 
“client” are not interchangeable in this field. As Rogers and 
Pilgrim (2001) point out, besides patients themselves, under 
some circumstances, their relatives or even the police and the 
complaining public can be the clients when patienthood is 
imposed on a person. Agency theory suggests it is difficult to 
align these two mutually conflicting goals (Allen, 2002b). 
Studies undertaken by Fotaki (1999) and Dixon et al. (2011) 
support the idea that agents acting on behalf of patients have 
not been effective. Some trade-offs between efficiency and 
patients’ preferences have occured alongside the establishment 
of policies, such as encouraging patient choice (West, 1998).  
 
Additionally, whether patients can make rational choices if they 
are willing to, or whether commissioners can make the right 
choices for patients, are crucial to the market mechanism. As 
previously discussed, health care is an area with complexity and 
high asset specificity, and patients do not always understand 
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what is the best or the most efficient treatment for them. 
Furthermore, in mental health it is common that patients with 
mental disorders do not ask for interventions themselves, rather 
the treatments are imposed on them against their will (Pilgrim, 
2012). This leads to a lack of ability to make rational choices for 
themselves. Commissioners, as the agents for patients, also 
suffer from information asymmetry and power imbalance due 
to the existence of highly specialised professional groups 
(Croxson, 1999). West (1998) attributes the reason to the 
commissioners’ lack of ability to accurately collect and analyse 
the relevant information (Vanstraelen and Cottrell, 1994). 
Furthermore, providers have doubts about the commissioners’ 
ability to rigorously assess such highly professionalised services, 
since even the role of GP commissioners is considered 
“generalist” rather than “specialist”, let alone other non-clinical 
commissioners. This is also supported by the research 
undertaken by Lewis et al. (2009).  
 
Therefore, neither clients nor purchasers are considered able to 
obtain sufficient information and thus make rational choices 
based on efficiency/quality as the economic theory predicts. 
Moreover, some researchers even doubt the freedom of 
demand-side to choose services between providers due to 
externalities, such as political considerations. 
 
  
3.2.1.4 Externalities  
By using the defence department as an example, West (1998) 
illustrates the dilemma between pursuing cost-efficiency and 
considering national political pressure on public services. The 
defence department is the major sponsor of the national 
weapon industry. Thus, it is considered as responsible for 
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protecting domestic jobs by ensuring contracts with existing 
domestic providers. It can buy products from foreign providers 
when the products are not available from domestic 
manufacturers. Nevertheless, the defence department is under 
pressure to choose domestic providers when there are both 
domestic and foreign providers with the ability to provide 
products.  
 
According to the competition mechanism brought about by the 
Quasi-market, providers with higher costs than the nationally -
fixed prices will suffer from deficits. Under such conditions, they 
have no other choice but to reduce unnecessary costs and 
adjust administrative expenses, which may lead to job loss for 
the staff in those organisations. The entry of private providers 
is believed to intensify the provider-side competition, which 
may result in a less stable situation. Similar to the condition of 
the defence department, the DH is under the public pressure to 
protect jobs of the existing public organisations – the NHS 
hospitals when establishing any policy for reforms. Since health 
care remains a key general election issue, and the proposers 
who suppose employing market mechanism to promote 
competition and reduce costs will be easily labelled as 
“privatising” or “dismantling” the NHS (Greener, 
2002),substantial reforms of the healthcare system, such as 
“bringing competition” and “reducing costs/budget”, are difficult 
to implement.  
 
The above arguments demonstrate the gaps between the 
preconditions of market theory and the features of health care, 
which in turn devaluate the feasibility of applying market theory 
to manipulate provider-side behaviours. Besides the 
fundamental drawbacks, problems occur when considering it 
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from a functional perspective, among which the most obvious 
one is the cost settlement principle.  
 
 
3.2.2 Functional drawbacks of the market theory 
In addition to the initial drawbacks of the commodification of 
services as previously discussed, the use of nationally-fixed 
tariffs becomes less valid when taking account of the x-
efficiency. The diversity of providers, especially the non-profit 
public organisations, determines that the demand-supply 
relationship in health care is different from that in a fully-
competitive market, which in turn indicates that economic 
consideration (profit) is no longer sufficient for cost control and 
efficiency promotion. Considering the equity and quality, price 
competition has been ruled out, replaced by the fixed prices at 
the average level (West, 1998). Regarding the price settlement, 
critics have focused on two major aspects: the increase of x-
inefficiency caused by the cost-based fixed tariffs and the 
financial risks brought about by the nationally-standardised 
prices.  
 
According to the microeconomic theory, prices and price 
flexibility lie at the heart of the market mechanism. The price 
adjustment mechanism according to the demand-supply 
interaction, promotes the increase in efficiency and allocative 
efficiency (Le Grand, 1991). Without this price flexibility, the 
justification for employing the market mechanism begins to fall 
away (West, 1998). Moreover, the settlement of price may 
cause other difficulties. As Allen (2009a) reveals, on the one 
hand, if the fixed price is settled too high, there is a lack of 
incentives for providers to reduce cost and become efficient. 
While, on the other hand, if the price is too low, it will bring 
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financial risks to providers, and they may start to skimp on 
quality as a reaction.  
 
In fact, the price-settlement mechanism, which is based on 
average costs, has been questioned regarding the potential 
risks of financial instability and quality decline. Using elective 
services in acute services as an example, elective services 
consist of two elements: inpatient care and day cases. Therefore, 
the price for elective care is calculated in the following process:  
 
1) Calculate the average reference costs for inpatient care and 
day cases as cI and cD, respectively.  
2) Calculate the proportion of each type of service on a national 
basis, as pI and pD (pD = 1- pI). 
 3) In the end, total average reference cost for the elective care 
is C = cI * pI + cD * pD.   
 
Since the reference cost of the day case is significantly lower 
than that of the inpatient care, as Figure 3-3 shows, the 
nationally-fixed price covers less of the costs of inpatient 
treatment (Street and Maynard, 2007). Therefore, financial 
risks increase for those providers with a higher proportion of 
inpatient care services than the national average level. As NHS 
Institute for Innovation and Improvement (2006) notes, wide 
variations in service provision exist among providers, which 
indicates that the mandated price is unable to cover all common 
conditions. For other countries, average-based price calculation 
is rarely employed in healthcare services, rather for countries, 
such as Australia (Jackson, 2001) and Norway (Kjerstad, 2003) 
in particular, price settlement is deliberately separated from cost 
calculation. 
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Figure 3-3 Variations in costs among services (2005/06) 
 
 
Beyond cost control, quality improvement is another goal for 
introducing the Quasi-market. This non-price competition 
system may allow providers to reduce their costs. Nevertheless, 
this may pose potential risks by undermining the quality of 
service delivery (Burgess et al., 2005). Moreover, Lipsky’s (1980) 
research points to the conflicts between finite resources and 
infinite demand: the demand for services tends to increase 
alongside supply. In other words, if additional services are 
available, demand will increase to consume them, and the 
surplus demand still wait to be met. In other words, there is a 
lack of motivation for competition as long as demand is 
oversupplied, which explains the fact that the market 
mechanism lacks the ability to drive up the quality of healthcare 
services (Lipsky, 1980). 
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3.3 Theoretical evaluation of the government’s 
regulation 
The success of the Quasi-market also relies on the government’s 
ability to regulate the quality of service delivery. The 
subsequent subsections theoretically evaluate this issue from 
two main aspects, including the appropriateness to regulate and 
the government’s capability to regulate the market. 
 
 
3.3.1 The appropriateness of standardisation 
PbR employs clinical care pathways alongside other targets to 
standardise clinical behaviours. The theoretical effects of the 
standardised protocols are expected to enable different 
providers to deliver their agreed upon set of services, and 
therefore, money could follow patients across various types of 
providers (Greenhalgh et al., 2009). The following sections 
discuss the fundamental appropriateness of standardising 
healthcare services, which not only sheds light upon the 
subsequent arguments against the government’s ability to 
regulate, but also paves the way for the evaluation of the 
working mechanism of PbR, which will be discussed in Chapter 
5.   
 
As discussed earlier, one prominent feature that distinguishes 
public services from another production industry is output, 
which requires frontline staff to continuously interact with 
clients and behave according to a particular context. Especially 
for healthcare services, the characteristics of individuals are 
more complex than bureaucratically relevant ones in other 
areas (Lipsky, 1980). Some of those could only be obtained 
through deep interaction with clients, which indicates that 
personal care services are highly individualised, and the co-
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production plays a much important role in personal care 
services than in other impersonal services (Lipsky, 1980). As a 
result, the daily work frontline staff do is called “street-level 
bureaucracy” while frontline staff are called “street-level 
bureaucrats”. 
 
According to this feature, there are two major reasons to 
explain why it is difficult, or even inappropriate, to standardise 
frontline clinical activities. In one sense, individualised services 
could not be fully standardised. The essence of street-level 
bureaucracies is such that during the daily interaction with 
clients, street-level bureaucrats are responsible for making 
decisions about people based on individuals’ characteristics and 
their personal situations (Lipsky, 1980). It is seen as 
inappropriate to rationalise or simplify these conditions. In 
contrast to the idea that standards represent fairness and equity, 
in healthcare services, and particularly mental health, treating 
individuals according to the predetermined standards but 
neglecting the actual differences, such as age, sex and income 
level is not seen as fair. These variations disable street-level 
bureaucrats’ performances from fitting into a metric of correct 
responses according to the pre-determined guidelines. This 
complies with the ethos of the NHS regarding good practice. 
Regarding the term “patient-centred care” that has been 
highlighted by different governments since 1997. The Royal 
College of General Practitioners (2014) defines patient-centred 
care, or in another name “person-centred care”, as a process in 
which professionals collaborate with patients and accordingly 
provide tailored services based upon their individual needs for 
care, personal priorities and individually defined outcomes. 
Therefore, the unique and fully appropriate responses could 
only be made by street-level bureaucrats’ discretion rather than 
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being programmed by a simulation mechanism. In another 
sense, clients prefer individualised treatments. As Pratt et al. 
(2007) explain, patients want to be treated as an individual 
rather than a statistic, number or case. Receiving individualised 
treatment is the patients’ demand and thus should be the core 
code for professionals. Therefore, the centrality of co-
production in health care goes against the theory of care 
pathways, which is to standardise clinical treatments to provide 
standardised services to each patient according to their disease 
categories (will be discussed in Chapter 5).  
 
This leads to a further question: to what extent is the 
government able to regulate such an area that is highly 
professionally-dominated even if services can be standardised 
to some extent? Therefore, the following section discusses the 
power balance between the government’s regulation and 
professional autonomy. 
 
 
3.3.2 The government’s ability to regulate 
Despite the political power of the government as the Quasi-
market theory predicts, Propper et al. (1998) argue that the 
regulatory rules are not strictly followed by providers. Findings 
show the widespread trend of breaking regulatory rules, which 
indicates the weak influence of the regulatory rules. Besides the 
above arguments regarding the initial drawbacks of the price 
calculation mechanism, the imbalanced relationship between 
regulators and professionals is seen as another causal reason 
for the government’s weak regulatory power. 
 
The following sections demonstrate the government’s weak 
regulatory power on cost and quality from three aspects: 1) cost 
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regulation versus professional codes, 2) quality regulation 
versus “real” quality, and 3) the government’s regulation versus 
the professional hierarchy.  
 
 
3.3.2.1 Cost regulation vs. professional codes 
In Professionalism – Dilemmas and Lapses (National Clinical 
Assessment Service, 2009), professionalism is defined as a 
broad concept covering competence, ethics, integrity, reliability 
and commitment to patients. As one feature of public services, 
providers are accountable for not only patients who receive 
services but also the public who pay for these services. 
Therefore, professionalism covers aspects within the service 
delivery process to meet patients’ and the public’s expectation 
– high standard healthcare services (Bradby, 2012). As Taylor 
(1996) indicates, maintaining and improving standards of 
services lies at the heart of professionalism in healthcare 
services. “Saving cost” does not appear as one of the criteria 
for “professionalism”. As previously outlined, conflicts between 
patients’ demands and the limited budget are evident and it is 
questionable whether doctors will still be professional enough to 
maintain patients’ best interests as their top priority when they 
are under pressure to control costs.  
 
The economic principle indicates that competition leads to 
innovation, information transparency, efficiency and incentives 
(Jay, 2001). However, these effects are built upon a 
depersonalised product market rather than public services in 
which outputs are subject to individuals. If “people” is added in, 
it tends to become “people choose to innovate”, “people receive 
and analyse information”, “people choose to allocate resources 
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in exchange for services”, and “people’s demands (demand side) 
encourage providers”. The findings of Iles’s report (2011) 
suggest that the economic regulation is not able to produce 
these features.  This is also the reason for British Medical 
Association’s strong opposition to the Health and Social Care Act 
2012 regarding Monitor’s role, which was originally set to 
promote competition (Ham et al., 2015). 
 
If the market theory fails to ensure service quality within the 
provider-side competition (Propper et al., 2008), will the other 
arm of the Quasi-market, which is government regulation, be 
able to promote high-quality standardised services and thus 
improve patient outcomes? The next section examines the 
relationship between quality regulation and “real” quality. 
 
3.3.2.2 Quality regulation vs. “real” quality 
As Iles (2011) illustrates, one can access information that is 
known or knowable to the public by searching the internet, 
whereas in complex situations that require professional 
knowledge, one needs to seek help from people with deeply held 
knowledge and expertise – the professionals. In the UK 
healthcare system, only the best-qualified young people can 
obtain access to medicine and receive comprehensive training 
before they devote themselves to this career. Seeing their 
established seniors as figures of moral authority, they are well-
trained with professional codes, especially ethical standards, to 
provide services according to the best interest of patients (Iles, 
2011). The establishment of quality regulation/measurement 
may risk breaking the trust between patients and doctors.  
 
Apart from this ethical issue, from a practical aspect, the 
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viability to measure the quality of healthcare services is also 
questionable. The NHS has witnessed the process where the 
balance of power progressively shifted from clinicians towards 
regulatory agencies (Taylor, 1996). Key regulatory functions are 
carried out by agencies, such as the CQC and the Monitor (Lewis 
et al., 2009). In such circumstances, these non-clinical 
managers’ abilities to accurately measure and regulate service 
quality have been questioned. The situation gets worse due to 
the reorganisation and high turnover of the managerial staff 
who generally lack clinical knowledge and skills on accurately 
analysing data (House of Commons Health Committee, 2010).It 
has already been reported that CQC makes errors in the use of 
data to assess performance (Ham et al., 2015). Moreover, in 
addition to the impersonal interventions, such as drugs that can 
be effectively assessed using a randomised control trial (RCT), 
there are interventions in mental health that involve complex 
personal processes, such as talking treatments (Rogers and 
Pilgrim, 2001). It is the complex nature of mental disorders that 
determines the difficulties in specifying and quantifying every 
move in individualised treatments and only activities that can 
be measured are enclosed into the measurement system. It is 
these measurable “facts” and activities that form the 
“performance” (Iles, 2011), which indicates that targets related 
to the measurable aspects do not encompass the whole picture 
of quality. According to the concept of professionalism, 
providing appropriate behaviours according to specific contexts 
is the essential skill that distinguishes professionals from others. 
However, these behaviours are usually difficult to capture. In 
such case, the most measurable, but not most representable, 
aspects get captured, leaving those essences missed out (Iles, 
2011). The other risk created by quality measurement is the 
misleading of performance. When performance is measured 
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against objectives, the objectives are required to be specified in 
advance. In this respect, providers could simply focus on the 
targets in order to achieve “quality performance” in an easier 
and quicker way. The outcome-oriented system may easily lead 
to “gaming” behaviours (this will be discussed in Chapter 6). As 
Lipsky (1980) stresses, the actual performance of frontline 
activities is virtually impossible to measure. Therefore, the 
quality measurement system acts more like a means that 
policymakers respond to the public dissatisfaction, rather than 
a clinical instrument (Lees, 2013). Critics of healthcare quality 
measurement have questioned the extent to which patients 
benefit from these various forms of audit, data monitoring and 
quality initiatives (Taylor, 1996). Furthermore, parts of this 
administrative work have been decentralised to GP 
commissioners, with the possibility of distracting them from 
taking care of other patients (Smith, 2010). 
 
The previous two sections, which investigated the initial 
problems of cost control and quality regulation, were based on 
the one assumption that the government is able to implement 
these regulatory rules. Therefore, the last part of this section 
explores the extent of the government regulatory power in 
health care. 
 
3.3.2.3 Regulation vs. professionalism hierarchy 
Strathern (2000) refers to audit as a power relationship 
between regulators and the observed. The balance of power is 
determined by the dependency relationship between the two 
parties. This part discusses how the imbalance of dependency 
leads to the government’s lack of power and results in its failure 
to control costs and, in the end, regulate quality. 
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As described at the beginning of this section, health authorities 
set the nationally-mandated rules, but they are not strictly 
followed by providers. As Enthoven (1985) notes, it is common 
for health authorities to have a heavy dependency on providers. 
Two main reasons contribute to this dependency: 
commissioners’ lack of choice due to the geographic monopoly 
and the professional hierarchy due to the granted power of 
professionalism. According to economics theory, the former 
determines that commissioners lose their market power of price 
settlement in such a geographic monopolistic market. The 
second dependency relationship is determined by the degree of 
professional autonomy.  
 
In health care, a highly professionalised area, the dominant 
power does not belong to the government, but to the 
professional bodies, such as medical and surgical Royal Colleges 
(West, 1998). Issues, including hospital planning at the macro 
level, and department establishment at the micro level are 
managed by the professional bodies. As discussed in the 
definition of professionalism, it is this professionalism that gives 
great autonomy power to the medical professionals. Especially 
the confidential relationship between doctors and patients 
brings unavoidable information asymmetry between regulators 
and providers. Thus, thus inversely influences the accuracy of 
performance measurement (Greener, 2002). As a result of the 
information asymmetry, professionals’ actions in diagnosis, 
treatment and referral become the policy of the system (Lipsky, 
1980). As Exworthy et al. (1999) conclude, the NHS is centrally 
financed, since the politicians set the size of the budget, while 
it is run by professionals who also decide how to spend the 
budget.  
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3.4 Early experiences from acute services 
As outlined in Chapter 2, the last decade has witnessed the 
development of PbR in acute services. The early experiences 
regarding the limited impacts of market theory show agreement 
with the above argument regarding the failure of the Quasi-
market to reduce costs and to improve efficiency, as well as 
quality. Drawing on the fact that case-mix theory is more 
suitable to acute services than mental health services (this will 
be discussed in Chapter 5), the following unsatisfactory 
outcomes facilitate a better understanding of the delayed 
implementation of PbR in mental health. 
 
 
1) Cost 
The findings of Farrar et al.’s (2007) “difference-in-difference” 
comparative study suggested that PbR presented a stronger 
incentive for cost reduction compared to that of the Block 
Contract. The results of the Audit Commission’s (2005) 
investigation indicated that the gap between trusts with higher 
and lower references costs narrowed after the implementation 
of PbR. However, the increase in managerial costs was largely 
ignored by these studies. The report of Mannion and Street 
(2006) listed four main driving factors for the increase in 
administrative expenses under PbR: negotiation, data collection, 
monitoring and enforcement. This indicated that the 
implementation of PbR in mental health would increase 
transaction costs that should not be ignored. The downward 
pressure has also been found to be mitigated by cross-subsidies 
from other sources of income (Appleby et al., 2012). 
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2) Capacity 
Unlike cost, the findings regarding capacity were not strong 
enough to support economic theory. In Farrar et al.’s (2007) 
research, little evidence was found to support the capacity 
enhancement plan. The findings of the Audit Commission’s 
(2008) intervention and observation study stated that PbR had 
not yet significantly driven up providers’ capacity due to the 
effects caused by other policies, particularly the unprecedented 
level of governmental investment (this will be discussed in 
Chapter 8) and the waiting-time targets. These targets made it 
difficult to evaluate the impacts of PbR since direct causal 
relationships were difficult to determine. Moreover, unintended 
consequences were noted: the attempts for LOS (Olfson et al., 
2014) reduction raised concerns about the premature discharge 
and the subsequent increase in readmissions (Audit 
Commission, 2008).  
 
 
3) Quality 
The evidence for the relationship between the implementation 
and quality improvement of PbR was even weaker since the 
definition of quality in health care is complex and hard to 
quantify (Farrar et al., 2007). In Farrar et al.’s (2007) study, no 
significant differences were found between different groups in 
terms of the introduction of PbR.  
 
Moreover, information asymmetry indicated the difficulties in 
detecting “real” quality through judging whether the provider 
undertook the proper intervention (Miraldo et al., 2006). In this 
situation, concerns were raised about the potential risks of the 
quality of care when the providers knew the way of “gaming”, 
including over-codding and cream-skim (this will be discussed 
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in Chapters 6 and 7) (Cots et al., 2011). Specifically, the 
reduction in quality would occur in the providers who were 
considered better than average since they had to cut some 
additional, albeit effective, resources to meet the national 
financial requirement (Boyle, 2007).   
 
 
 
3.5 Preliminary outcomes 
In summary, the fundamental conflicts between market theory 
and healthcare services demonstrated the incapability of the 
competition mechanism to guide/manage providers’ behaviours. 
Moreover, the conflicts between “professionalism” and the 
government’s regulatory power resulted in a prediction that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to standardise and therefore 
accurately monitor service quality. This corresponds with 
Struyven and Steurs’s (2004) research indicating that the 
Quasi-market has delivered little benefit that met politicians’ 
original expectations. The above discussions contribute to four 
preliminary outcomes as described below: 
 
 
1) The market competition principle does not fit healthcare 
services 
As Allen (2013) reveals, the reason public services are delivered 
through more hierarchical institutional structures rather than 
the market-like ones is that the fundamental principles of the 
market theory do not apply to public services, especially to 
healthcare services. On the one hand, the essential goal of the 
market mechanism is to reach the maximisation of resource 
allocation and utility through encouraging provider-side 
competition. Under such circumstances, equity is not 
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considered, whereas it is the crucial part of healthcare services. 
On the other hand, the requirement of co-operation between 
departments determines the range of services and the size of 
hospitals. Thus, this illustrates the necessity for a geographic 
monopoly and, at the same time, explains the reason it is 
unlikely to have intense competition (Wonderling et al., 2011).  
 
 
2) Non-price competition’s effects are limited  
Rather than perfect competition under the market’s “invisible 
hand”, the Quasi-market brings non-price competition under the 
government’s regulation. As Stigler (1968) argues, price 
competition is more effective in promoting efficiency and 
controlling costs than non-price competition. The possibility of 
efficiency driven up by non-price competition is likely to 
decrease when the nationally-fixed tariffs are inappropriately 
set. Additionally, the effectiveness of increasing the number of 
providers is overestimated, given the concerns about 
undesirable consequences (Allen, 2009b). The large 
organisational reform may destabilise the system and drive up 
transition cost. The increase in the number of providers requires 
higher transaction costs and other administrative costs (such as 
those incurred in information analysis, price calculation and 
quality monitoring), which will inevitably offset the savings 
achieved by the PbR mechanism. 
 
 
3) The government lacks the capacity to contract and regulate 
Policymakers expected a more sophisticated contract system to 
achieve higher efficiency and quality. However, the conflicts 
between individualised and standardised services, as well as 
between cost regulation and professional code, remain 
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questionable. These conflicts, together with information 
asymmetry, reject the precondition of the commissioners’ ability 
to regulate costs and services, which is their ability to 
comprehensively acquire the relevant information (Greener, 
2002). The finding corresponds with the report from the House 
of Commons Health Committee (2010) illustrating the 
commissioners’ lack of ability to negotiate and analyse data. 
Moreover, the government’s dependency on professional bodies 
reveals the gaps between theory and practice regarding 
government’s ability to guide and regulate healthcare services. 
 
 
4) Monopolistic managerial model is more effective on cost 
control  
It is important to note that perfect competition is only the 
sufficient condition for allocation and productive efficiency, 
rather than the necessary one. As West (1998) illustrates, at 
the administrative level, prices for each component is not that 
important, rather, it is the total cost spent by the purchaser that 
matters. Compared to the Quasi-market, the monopolistic 
regulatory structure is seen as more capable of cost control, due 
to its ability to hold down wages through more effective 
bargaining with professional bodies (Le Grand, 1991). Since 40% 
of the NHS budget is spent on staff (King's Fund, 2010), the 
monopolistic administrative model is believed to be able to 
promote more savings, although at a price of cutting out local 
competition. 
 
According to the initial problems of market theory and the 
government’s regulation, Kähkönen (2004) points out that the 
Quasi-market is never a solution. In public services that require 
public regulation, control and financial support, emphasis 
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should be placed on government support and professional 
bodies’ regulation, rather than simulating a market mechanism 
that is under the assumption of a profit-oriented motive. 
 
These four preliminary outcomes at the macro level also lead to 
some further questions at the micro level: 1) since the market 
principle is considered not suitable for healthcare services in 
theory, how does it actually apply to daily activities regarding 
implementing PbR in mental health at the micro-level; 2) are 
the driving factors partly to blame for the delayed 
implementation; 3) besides the fundamental problems of the 
Quasi-market, what are other obstacles that have hindered its 
implementation; 4) what is the overall impact of PbR in mental 
health? To answer these research questions, this project 
conducted a three-step research design including theoretical 
analysis, semi-structured interviews and online surveys. The 
next chapter presents the methodology adopted in this research.  
 
 
Summary 
Based on the process of NHS’s reforms presented in Chapter 2, 
this chapter has served as a bridge connecting the general 
background of the NHS’s reforms and the implementation of 
PbR by focusing on investigating the theoretical foundation of 
PbR – the Quasi-market. Whether the idea of combining 
financial incentives and political regulation is viable to control 
costs and drive up quality in health care plays a significant role 
in evaluating the policy of implementing PbR in health care, 
specifically mental health. Therefore, this chapter took four 
main steps to evaluate the formulation of the PbR policy by 
examining the impact of the Quasi-market on cost control and 
quality improvement.  
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This chapter departed from presenting the forerunner of the 
Quasi-market: the fully competitive market model. This 
simplified model was employed to illustrate one core element of 
the Quasi-market as well as PbR - the idea of profit-driven 
competition. It then discussed how this theoretical basis was 
used and modified in the Quasi-market by outlining two core 
elements - the provider-side competition and governmental 
regulation.  Subject to the theoretical functions, Sections 3.2 
and 3.3 respectively conducted a theoretical evaluation of the 
validity and feasibility of the application of the Quasi-market 
through evaluating market theory and the government’s ability 
to regulate. Section 3.2 argued that market theory does not fit 
with healthcare services by rejecting four fundamental 
preconditions: 1) high variation in healthcare services; 2) the 
existence and its necessity of geographic monopoly; 3) conflicts 
between the collective management; and 4) individualised 
services and externalities. Section 3.3 explored the feasibility of 
government regulation. Apart from the problems brought about 
by the variations in service delivery, it further investigated the 
government’s ability to regulate healthcare services by 
discussing the relationship between the government’s 
regulation and professional autonomy. The concept and the core 
characteristics of the professionalism explained the fact that 
strong professional autonomy exists in health care, which has 
led critical discussions regarding the government’s lack of ability 
to control costs and regulate quality. The conflicts between 
measurable quality and “real” quality, together with the 
government’s dependency on powerful professional bodies, 
demonstrated the difficulties in accurately regulating healthcare 
services. These fundamental and functional problems indicated 
the failure of the Quasi-market mechanism to serve its purposes 
in healthcare services, which complies with the experiences of 
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implementing PbR in acute services presented in Section 3.4. 
 
Section 3.5 summarised all of the previous discussions into four 
main preliminary findings indicating that the policy was poorly 
designed. The initial problems of the fundamental theories 
behind PbR guided the research direction to explore the 
obstacles at the micro level, which are the formulation and 
implementation stages of this policy: how MH PbR is constructed 
and functions in theory and how it is implemented in practice. 
Therefore, the next chapter will illustrate the methods adopted 
by this study to investigate the issues surrounding the delayed 
implementation of PbR in this less explored mental health 
domain. 
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4. Methodology and methods: The use of mixed 
methods 
 
 
Introduction 
Under the general analytical framework discussed in Chapter 1, 
this chapter justifies the research design and presents the 
process of conducting fieldwork, through which this study 
further evaluates the formulation and implementation of the 
PbR policy based on the earlier evaluation of its initiation. 
Guided by the two-level theoretical analysis which outlines the 
fundamental and functional drawbacks of implementing PbR in 
mental health, the fieldwork discovered the frontline concerns 
regarding how the policy affected clinical everyday practice and 
how key players reacted to the policy. By appreciating the 
important role frontline staff play in policy implementation and 
their influence on the success of one policy, it makes this thesis 
different from a piece of desk research. Regarding the research 
methodology, the underpinning philosophical assumptions 
emerged from the development of the third paradigm mixed 
methods, which was developed based on the recognition of the 
drawbacks of using one single research paradigm. This implies 
a new epistemology in which qualitative and quantitative 
research compensate each other (Jick, 1979), and the 
integration of the two contributes to an in-depth and broad 
understanding of research phenomenon (Hussein, 2009). 
Accordingly, theoretical analysis and semi-structured interviews 
were adopted as the qualitative approaches while the online 
surveys were employed as the quantitative approach. 
 
Regarding the investigation of the formulation of the policy, the 
theoretical analysis based on previous studies not only 
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evaluated the validity and reliability of the classification system 
of MH PbR (due to the absence of the tariff calculation system), 
but also shed light on the conduction of the fieldwork that 
involved semi-structured interviews and online surveys (this will 
be discussed in Chapter 5). Based on the theoretical evaluation 
at the fundamental and mechanical level, the semi-structured 
interviews are able to capture a relatively comprehensive 
understanding of the research objectives, while the online 
surveys mainly aimed to verify the findings derived from the 
qualitative research. To maximise the validity of the semi-
structured interviews, the principles of GTM (this will be 
discussed in Section 4.2) were employed to collect and analyse 
data in a bottom-up order in order to capture useful information.  
 
To elaborate on the reasons for employing the mixed methods 
(triangulation) and the GTM principles together with their 
applications as the methods for the fieldwork, this chapter is 
divided into three main parts: the mix-methods, the GTM 
principle and the fieldwork conduction. The first section provides 
reasons for choosing the mixed methods paradigm by 
presenting an overview of triangulation and its key components, 
discussing the potential risks of employing triangulation and 
illustrating how triangulation was applied in this study. Similar 
to the first section, the second section explains why and how 
the GTM principles were applied to the process of conducting 
the semi-structured interviews. Based on the justification of the 
methodology and methods presented in the previous two 
sections, the last section presents detailed information 
regarding how the empirical research was conducted, including 
a discussion on the interviews and online surveys used.  
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4.1 Mixed methods 
By considering the analytical framework as discussed in Chapter 
1, the combination of both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches was employed in the study to present a multi-level 
and multi-perspective understanding of the policy-making 
process. Qualitative analysis was employed in the theoretical 
analysis and semi-structured interviews to explore the 
formulation of MH PbR as well as the current stage of the 
implementation of MH PbR, investigate different perspectives 
towards the implementation from various angles. As the leading 
approach of the fieldwork, the semi-structured interviews aimed 
to capture the key driving factors for the delayed 
implementation through a small sample and, therefore, help 
construct the online surveys for quantitative analysis. 
Quantitative analysis was adopted to help verify and generalise 
the findings derived from the qualitative analysis. This section 
will explain the reasons for adopting mixed methods by 
presenting an overview of the mixed methods, illustrating the 
key elements, discussing the challenges and the corresponding 
solutions and outlining its applications for the research design. 
 
 
4.1.1 Overview of mixed methods 
The complementary characteristics of qualitative and 
quantitative strategies create the dilemma that when designing 
a single piece of research one always has to make a compromise: 
either to be intensive (in-depth study led by qualitative methods) 
or extensive (conducting a study using quantitative methods 
which allows for a larger sample) (Sayer, 1992). The generation 
of a new hybrid research strategy that combines qualitative and 
quantitative was believed to be an ideal solution to this dilemma. 
By concerning the aim to compensate the defects of each single 
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method, the combination strategy has been extensively 
employed in the social science area, with different names 
assigned to this growing research position. Names such as 
“triangulation” (Denzin, 1978), “multi-methods” (Brannen and 
Coram, 1992), “mixed methodology” (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 
1998), “mixed-methods” (O'Cathain et al., 2007) and “multi-
strategy” (Bryman, 2001) have been employed to describe this 
research strategy as to combine qualitative and quantitative 
methods in studying the same research phenomenon. In this 
chapter, “triangulation” was chosen as the name of this strategy 
since this metaphor precisely describes the process of 
conducting research. As an overview of the triangulation 
strategy, the following parts introduce the definition of 
“triangulation” and outline the values of triangulation. 
 
 
4.1.1.1 Definition 
The term “triangulation” originated from the navigation and 
military strategy, referring to the action of locating an object’s 
exact position from multiple referent points (Smith, 1975). 
According to geometry principles, the action of “triangulation” 
improves the accuracy of the location. Broadly defined by 
Denzin (1978), “triangulation” refers to “the combination of 
methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon” (p.291) 
in the research area. Similar to its original purpose, the 
employment of multiple methods aims to better investigate the 
research objectives. Therefore, the word “triangulation” 
precisely presents the kernel of strategy, which is to reveal the 
convergence, complementarity and discordance of the findings 
through considering multiple viewpoints, perspectives and 
positions for a better understanding of research objectives 
(Erzberger and Prein, 1997). 
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In the area of social science, the application of triangulation 
could be traced back to the introduction of the idea “multiple 
operationism” (Campbell and Fiske, 1959). According to this 
theory, more than one method should be applied as part of the 
validation process to ensure the credibility of research design 
and the validity of the findings. In addition to this validation 
purpose, with the development of triangulation paradigm, the 
denotation of its purpose has expanded: for the completeness 
of understanding. Based on Campbell and Fiske’s theory, Denzin 
(1978) further distinguishes four forms of triangulation serving 
different purposes: data triangulation, investigator triangulation, 
theory triangulation and the methodological triangulation (this 
will be discussed in Section 4.1.2). Since then, it has been 
recognised as the third major strategy alongside the qualitative 
and quantitative paradigms (Johnson et al., 2007). 
 
 
4.1.1.2 The significance of applying triangulation 
Historically, quantitative methodology has been the dominant 
method for research in health care (Moffatt et al., 2006). 
Through statistical data analysis, quantitative research 
identifies the statistical relationship between variables, thus 
exploring the determining factors and the way they influence 
variables (Fossey et al., 2002). This linear model clarifies the 
relationships between variables by formula and data, which is 
generalizable and replicable. However, irrespective of the broad 
impact, transmitting the “macro” population-oriented issues to 
the “micro” everyday practice to guide individuals’ behaviours 
remains an issue. In the case of health care, people live their 
illness with their characteristics and within social contexts, 
which could not be seen as the components on the assembly 
line (Stimson and Webb, 1978). This is the reason that some 
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researchers doubt the validity of findings obtained from merely 
conducting statistical analysis in the social area: the potential 
risks of oversimplification due to its impersonal nature (Bhopal, 
2000; Ryen, 2000). Thus, Yeasmin and Rahman (2012) remind 
us of the importance of taking into account the multi-
dimensional social experiences and realities when conducting 
research in health policy.  
 
The key benefit of qualitative research is its ability to depict the 
full picture (Barbour, 2008). Rather than pre-assuming 
relationships and pre-defining variables as done in quantitative 
approaches, the qualitative approach absorbs perspectives from 
different respondents to identify which factors influence their 
daily lives (Baum, 1995). As Shaw (1994) points out, in the 
social policy analysis process, both “macro” and “micro” aspects 
should be considered and reflected. It is through in-depth 
interviews that the “micro” picture of policy implementation is 
unveiled. However, as Silverman (2014) argues, individual’s 
understanding of particular objects is based on their subjective 
lens of perception, and therefore, there is no way to pursue 
objectivity in qualitative research. Moreover, the validity of 
qualitative research also suffers from the limited amount of 
sample, which may lead to a situation that the findings 
generated from the study are remote from the “normality” of 
society. Subject to the risk of losing generalizability, Harding 
(2001) posits that the balance between subjectivity and 
objectivity could be approached through employing social 
statistics for extensiveness while interpreting them from a more 
critical and reflexive standpoint. In return, findings from 
qualitative approaches could facilitate the interpretation of 
statistical findings regarding validating the results and clarifying 
the puzzling findings (Sieber, 1973). Hence, by combining both 
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qualitative and quantitative approaches, the defects of each 
single method could be compensated by the counter-balancing 
strength of the other (Jick, 1979). 
 
As Shih (1998) identifies, the values of triangulation are 
reflected from two main aspects: confirmatory and 
completeness purpose. However, splitting perspectives towards 
this issue are noted: some advocate this strategy by pointing 
out its effects on enhancing the study accuracy (Creswell and 
Miller, 2000; Golafshani, 2003). By contrast, some challenge its 
credibility and validity through questioning how two separate 
paradigms with different epistemological assumptions 
collaborate against convergence (Brannen and Coram, 1992). 
Aiming to illustrate to the reason for adopting this strategy and 
how to apply it, the following three parts provide further 
investigation by elaborating the key elements of triangulation, 
discussing the challenges and the corresponding solutions, and 
illustrating its application to the research. 
 
 
4.1.2 Key types of triangulation 
Identified by Denzin (1978), there are four main types of 
triangulation: data triangulation, investigator triangulation, 
theory triangulation and methodological triangulation.  
 
Data triangulation refers to the action that retrieves data from 
different sources, namely, time, person and space (Denzin, 
1978). It rests on the idea that data quality might vary 
according to the time of collection, the site of collection and the 
individual who is involved in the process of data collection.  
 
Investigator triangulation refers to more than one researcher 
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with different backgrounds and working experiences 
collaborating on the same study. The different areas of expertise 
compensate each other and therefore, provide a broader and 
deeper understanding of the research objectives (Banik, 1993).   
 
Theory triangulation refers to the action that interprets data by 
employing more than one theoretical scheme. It rests on the 
idea that involving different theories interpreting the same data 
improves the validity of the results: if theories interpret the 
outcomes in the same way and thus draw the same conclusion, 
it indicates that the result is valid and credible (Guion, 2002). 
 
Methodological triangulation refers to the use of more than one 
method in one study, which is seen as the type of triangulation 
that has been most widely employed in the are of social science 
(Kopinak, 1999). It is believed that the employment of multiple 
methods in one study provides more detailed and multi-layered 
information about realities (Meijer et al., 2002). Regarding 
whether different methods come from the same paradigm, two 
types of methodological triangulation have been distinguished 
as within-method and between-methods triangulation (Denzin, 
1978). Within-method triangulation refers to the use of different 
methods within either a qualitative or quantitative paradigm, 
whereas between-methods triangulation refers to collaborating 
both qualitative and quantitative approaches in one study 
(Thurmond, 2001). The adoption of within-method triangulation 
aims to test the internal consistency of the study. Between-
methods triangulation closely parallels the meaning of the 
original “multi-methods” since it reaps the benefits of two 
different paradigms and complements the drawbacks of each 
paradigm to a large extent, rather than the previous one that 
fails to overcome the inherent weaknesses of one particular 
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paradigm (Denzin, 1978).  
 
To reap the advantages of both qualitative and quantitative 
research, a combination of semi-structured interviews and 
online surveys were adopted as the research methods for 
fieldwork (this will be discussed in Section 4.1.4). Regarding the 
evaluation of the impacts of PbR on mental health services, it is 
a relatively less-explored area due to the delayed 
implementation. The complex nature of mental disorders 
together with the incomplete process, increases the complexity 
of the study. On the other hand, PbR has been implemented in 
acute services since 2003/04, which indicates that the studies 
on the impacts of PbR on acute services could contribute to the 
design of this study as presented in Chapter 3. Additionally, the 
theoretical analysis of the mechanism of the classification 
system of MH PbR, which will be discussed in Chapter 5, also 
contributes to the understanding of its practical impacts on 
everyday clinical practice. Therefore, qualitative methods, 
including theoretical analysis and interviews, were able to 
reveal relatively comprehensive perspectives on the research 
objectives from different levels and angles. Rather than 
employing another qualitative approach, such as focus groups, 
online survey research was seen as more appropriate to validate 
the qualitative findings by verifying them to a larger extent. For 
instance, in the social sciences, quantitative approaches are 
usually employed to validate the qualitative results (Flick et al., 
2004). In addition, the statistical analysis may identify 
variations in perspective and attitude amongst stakeholders, 
which could facilitate further understanding of the conflicts 
between political considerations and mental healthcare delivery. 
Therefore, between-methods triangulation involving literature 
review, semi-structured interviews and online surveys was used 
	 134	
in this research to present a multi-level and multi-angle 
perspective regarding the policy-making process. 
 
 
4.1.3 Challenges  
Despite the strengths of this study, the theory of utilising 
triangulation indeed has its challenges. Concerns about the 
validity of triangulation could be categorised into two main 
aspects: the fundamental issues and the practical matters. 
Regarding the fundamental issues, the viability of combining 
qualitative and quantitative paradigms is questioned. In terms 
of the practical issues, the occurrence of divergent findings from 
different methods is seen as a risk that might compromise the 
effectiveness of triangulation. Therefore, the following two 
subsections illustrate the challenges and outline the 
corresponding solutions. 
 
 
4.1.3.1 “The paradigm war” 
As Hirschheim (1992) describes, epistemology is the foundation 
of true knowledge since it defines what knowledge is and how 
knowledge is obtained. The qualitative and quantitative 
paradigms represent two different types of ontology and 
epistemology. As a result, the process of combining these two 
paradigms has been challenged for its viability and validity 
(Hunt, 1991). However, the main utility of triangulation is to 
validate one instrument by adopting the other one. Therefore, 
whether or not triangulation itself is theoretically valid has a 
heavy influence on its effectiveness.  
 
Some support has been found regarding this debate. As 
Reichardt and Cook (1979) argue, the paradigm should be 
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employed to facilitate the research rather than being a 
straitjacket that constrains the design and the conduction of 
study. The adoption of research methods and techniques should 
be process-oriented and outcome-oriented for either an 
exploratory or a confirmatory purpose. Particular for the 
evaluation study, Houts et al. (1986) indicate that it is a field of 
rapid development that requires joint analysis for multiple 
sources of evidence in order to make a comprehensive 
judgement. With the development of theory, Schwandt (2000) 
advocates triangulation by questioning the necessity and 
meaning of sticking to “paradigm”. From his perspective, all 
studies are about interpretation. Indeed, different research 
methods are suitable for different understandings. Nevertheless, 
they are not necessarily in conflict with each other. Therefore, 
there is no point in questioning the validity of mix-methods just 
because of the existence of different paradigms.  
 
 
4.1.3.2 “Divergent outcomes” 
Triangulation enables researchers to validate qualitative results 
by conducting statistical analysis and comparing the results 
from both qualitative and quantitative approaches. If the 
outcomes are convergent, it is confirmed that the instruments 
adopted in the qualitative analysis are appropriate, and 
therefore, the results are valid. Nevertheless, it is noted that 
there may be outcomes other than corroboration emerging 
when applying different methods in one study (Hammersley, 
2002): complementarity means that the findings from the 
qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis are divergent but 
complementing each other; while contradiction means that the 
findings from the different methods are not simply inconsistent 
but contradictory with each other.   
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These two possible outcomes raise questions regarding the 
triangulation strategy on how to deal with divergent findings. In 
this respect, assigning different weights to components is seen 
as an effective solution. However, the determination could be 
subjective since there is a lack of evidence-based guidelines to 
suggest how to weight the elements of a multi-method 
approach (Jick, 1979). The idea of Reichardt and Cook (1979) 
could be applied to addressing this challenge: research 
approaches should be used to facilitate the research itself. 
Therefore, the prioritisation of certain components could be 
subjectively based on researchers’ understanding of the main 
epistemological position of research objectives (Foss and 
Ellefsen, 2002).  
 
Practically speaking, the sequencing of the approaches is crucial 
to the determination of the leading method and the main 
findings (Kanbur, 2002). According to Kanbur (2002), there are 
two possibilities of the sequence arrangement: 1) the 
quantitative methods come after in-depth qualitative inquiry; or 
2) the quantitative analysis is given the priority. Regarding the 
first possibility, quantitative methods, such as questionnaires, 
are devised based upon in-depth qualitative inquiries, such as 
literature reviews, focus groups and interviews (Marsh and 
Elliott, 2008). With the possible impact factors found and the 
general categories settled at the qualitative analysis stage, the 
questionnaire data could provide an extensive view of a broad 
range of cases to generalise the findings. Regarding the second 
possibility, findings concluded from the patterns of qualitative 
methods, such as interview and literature review, are used to 
exemplify them. Regarding selecting sequence and priority, on 
the one hand, as previously discussed, the validity of using the 
findings from statistical analysis to explain social reality might 
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suffer from its over-simplification since “correlation” could not 
represent the “causal relationship” (Dow, 2002). On the other 
hand, the first possibility is more suitable for the confirmatory 
purpose since the generalising process can confirm or 
complement the findings derived from the in-depth qualitative 
analysis.  
 
Therefore, after considering the adoption of triangulation 
methods and the solutions of the possible divergent outcomes, 
the strategies of this study are: 1) adopt triangulation mainly 
for a confirmatory purpose; 2) choose the between-methods 
triangulation; 3) prioritise qualitative methods in a sequence of 
“qualitative + quantitative”; and 4) give more weight to the 
findings from interview. Regarding how to apply triangulation 
into the research, the following section provides a general 
introduction of the research design and then illustrates each 
approach adopted in the study.  
 
 
4.1.4 The application of triangulation 
With a triangulation principle applied in this research, three 
main approaches were employed at different stages of the 
research, including literature review and semi-structured 
interviews as the qualitative approaches and online 
questionnaire as the quantitative approach. As Figure 4-1 shows, 
these three approaches were respectively introduced as 
progress developed. The top-down analysis of PbR in mental 
health began by evaluating the fundamental theories 
underpinning PbR, which led to the following evaluation of the 
constructional problems of the system. The latter identified the 
research objectives and the key issues surrounding MH PbR, 
which facilitated the design of the fieldwork. Next, the fieldwork 
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data collection and analysis followed the bottom-up principle. In 
the second stage, the face-to-face semi-structured interviews 
were undertaken to capture different perspectives towards MH 
PbR, including the effectiveness of key components, perceived 
problems, potential risks and the corresponding solutions. The 
preliminary findings derived from the interviews facilitated the 
design of the online questionnaires. In the third stage, the 
online questionnaires mainly verified the preliminary findings. 
In the end, all findings were gathered and analysed as a whole.  
 
Regarding the fieldwork, the characteristics of the main 
approaches, including interviews and online surveys, are 
critically analysed, and the reasons for adoption are stated 
below. 
 
Figure 4-1 Research design 
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4.1.4.1 Semi-structured interviews 
The one-to-one interview is regarded as one of the most 
commonly adopted approaches in the qualitative “toolbox” 
(Barbour, 2003). Compared to the telephone interview, the 
participants in face-to-face interviews tend to be more 
cooperative and thus provide a deeper understanding of the 
research topics (Parahoo, 2006). Among face-to-face interview 
approaches, semi-structured interview research is the most 
popular and often favoured by qualitative researchers, due to 
the freedom given to interviewees and, at the same time, the 
ability to maintain order of the structure (Barbour, 2008). 
Rather than structured interviews, semi-structured interviews 
elicit data according to the salient perspectives of participants 
without strictly dictating the direction of the encounter. During 
the process of conducting the semi-structured interviews, 
Grounded Theory Methodology (GTM) was employed to 
construct theories and therefore, develop the structure for the 
online surveys. 
 
In this study, the snowball principle was employed for the 
sampling, since professional individuals are difficult to access 
and whether or not the individual is suitable is hard to justify 
only if evaluated by other professionals (Rice and Ezzy, 1999). 
Additionally, snowball sampling is also considered optimal in this 
field since some degree of trust is required to initiate contact 
(Atkinson and Flint, 2001). In Saunders’s (1979) research, the 
snowball sampling method was adopted to reach urban 
politicians, who were considered to be a group of people “hard 
to reach”. This suggests the appropriateness and feasibility of 
applying the snowball sampling method in this study. By 
adopting the snowball principle, the sample started from a small 
group of individuals who are the key personnel of 
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commissioners, hospital managers or frontline staff. Through 
their social networks, potential participants who meet the 
eligibility criteria were nominated to enlarge the sample size 
(Atkinson and Flint, 2001). 
 
Nevertheless, the drawbacks of interviews were noted. Firstly, 
the depth of the findings limits the amount of sample and thus 
hinders the representatives of the study, since the sample of 
the interview has to be small otherwise analysis could turn out 
to be cumbersome, especially with snowball sampling principle 
(Ellis, 2010). Secondly, interviewed individuals are easier to be 
identified given their professional positions (this will be 
discussed in Section 4.3.1.1).  
 
 
4.1.4.2 Online surveys 
Regarding online survey research, its merits and drawbacks are 
almost a mirror image of the interview approach (Williams, 
2003). Firstly, online questionnaires could be sent to a larger 
range of subjects. However, the “chain referral” is considered as 
one of the potential risks that may generate under snowball 
sampling (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). Given that referrals largely 
depend on the subjective perceptions of initial respondents, it 
may be biased towards the inclusion of individuals with 
interrelationships, especially when variations in social traits 
exist among individuals and the selected sample is not 
representative (Griffiths et al., 1993). In this respect, the 
increase in sample size can address this selection bias by 
expanding the coverage and representativeness using online 
surveys even though the response rate could be lower. Secondly, 
the potential risk regarding the confidentiality is much lower 
than for interviews. Therefore, the responses to sensitive topics 
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are more likely to be true and much less likely to cause 
respondents’ stress (De Vaus, 2014). Therefore, using the 
results of a few interviews as the structure of online 
questionnaire could take both the depth of understanding and 
the representativeness into account while reducing ethical risks 
as much as possible.  
 
To address the limitation in sampling stratified sampling was 
employed in this study (Williams, 2003). Unlike the randomised 
sampling method that might lead to under-representation of 
particular groups while over-representation of others, stratified 
sampling could better select objectives with appropriateness 
and adequacy (Morse and Field, 1995). Given the currently 
delayed status of PbR with a lack of an accurate information 
system, the study failed to employ statistical analysis to analyse 
medical records or financial data. Therefore, data from the 
questionnaires were used as the only resource for quantitative 
analysis. Microsoft Excel and IBM SPSS 20 were employed as 
the devices for quantitative analysis. 
 
As previously discussed, the semi-structure interview was set 
as the primary strategy for this study. As a result, the process 
of conducting interviews and analysing the data has a heavy 
influence on the quality of the entire study. In order to efficiently 
undertake and analyse interviews, the principle of Grounded 
Theory Methodology (GTM) was employed. The next section 
presents the essential background of GTM and its applications 
in this research. 
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4.2 Employing GTM principles 
The bottom-up research GTM was first introduced in the 1960s 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). In contrast to the conventional 
methodologies that depart from a literature review, GTM 
formulates new theories firstly, largely relying on systematically 
analysed data, which is seen as able to develop deeper 
understandings of individuals’ perspectives, particularly within 
a new research domain. However, due to the constraints of 
reality, the procedures could only be met partially in this study 
according to the ideas of Glaser (1998). This study thereby 
employed the principles of GTM to generate themes in a bottom-
up order. This section provides an opportunity to elaborate how 
the GTM principle was employed in the process of conducting 
the semi-structured interviews by introducing the principles and 
core elements of the GTM, explaining why this study did not 
employ the “pure” GTM while presenting the correspondent 
strategies. 
 
 
4.2.1 The Grounded Theory Methodology 
Seen as a response to the predominately top-down qualitative 
research, Glaser and Strauss (1967) make it clear that the GTM 
aims to generate new theories from deeply investigating data 
and categorising interrelated themes rather than testing 
existing theories. In contrast to the pursuit of statistical 
generalizability, GTM focuses on exploring different perceptions 
of various individuals and explaining specific phenomenon 
regarding a particular subject area. Therefore, what GTM 
indicates and prioritises is the sequence of conducting research: 
data collection comes prior to the literature review. To ensure 
the theory generation process remains uncontaminated from 
the preconceived theories from the literature review, data 
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should be collected and analysed first to seek what the data 
truly indicates rather than shoehorning information into the pre-
determined categories (Urquhart, 2012). Then, the ideas from 
existing literature could be referred to the theories built upon 
interviews. Bottom-up theory generation will be presented in 
the following data collection part. The following four sections 
outline the core elements of the GTM, including data collection, 
coding process, data analysis, and memo writing.    
 
 
4.2.1.1 Data collection  
As previously described, a successful GTM study relies largely 
on data collection and analysis. Figure 4-2 outlines the skeleton 
of conducting interview and data analysis, which could be 
described as an iterative cycle of both induction and deduction 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Different from conventional 
methods of performing data analysis, the identification and 
categorisation of data are the key elements of the data 
collection process. As Figure 11 shows, coding, the process of 
identifying and preliminary categorising data, occurs 
immediately following the interview. Without any preconceived 
categories, identifying variable starts with line-by-line open 
coding. Through the following selective and theoretical coding, 
information segments are summarised and categorised into 
meaningful theme groups. The theme clusters are further 
extracted to develop new theories and to facilitate the sampling 
and interviews which follow. Without guidance from previous 
studies, the quality of information identification and analysis has 
a heavy influence on the quality of the study as a whole. 
Therefore, a constant comparison between results and new 
findings intra- and inter- interviews is employed alongside the 
memo writing strategy to ensure the quality of data and theory 
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(Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
 
Figure 4-2 Induction and deduction process of data collection 
  
 
4.2.1.2 Coding process 
The coding process is seen as a process of capturing the 
interview data, grouping them into meaningful clusters and 
linking them together. Despite the splitting perspectives in 
terms of the specific steps (Glaser, 1992; Strauss and Corbin, 
1990), three stages are widely accepted as the core procedures: 
open coding, selective coding and theoretical coding. Given that 
this study only involved the general principle of GTM rather than 
the “pure” GTM, the following section provides a brief overview 
of the general principle this study adopted informed by Glaser’s 
(1992) theory as shown in Figure 4-3.  
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Figure 4-3 Bottom-up coding process 
 
 
 
According to Glaser (1992), the process of coding is a process 
of building up theory from the ground: material selection, 
structure construction and theory extraction. As the first step, 
open coding indicates the process of attaching codes to data 
through line-by-line reading of the transcripts. As Glaser (1978) 
points out, open coding with “free minds” calls for a theoretical 
sensitivity to capture all of the potential meaningful information. 
The outcomes of open coding are rough information about 
phenomena, such as events, objects and actions. Open codes 
are further grouped in the selective coding phase. The links 
between codes are then identified and these codes are then 
merged into different categories that are not mutually exclusive. 
Since different themes could be extracted from one sentence, 
different categories could share same properties (codes). As the 
last phase of the coding process, relationships and links 
between different categories are explored in the theoretical 
coding phase. In this stage, theories are extracted by 
investigating the relationships between categories. 
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4.2.1.3 Data analysis 
Within the induction-deduction cycle, a constant comparison is 
seen as the key component of the data coding and analysing 
process. A constant comparison enables the coded data to 
accurately represent interviewees’ initial ideas and the inducted 
categories to deduct reliable theories by constantly comparing 
the information segments and the whole context of the 
transcripts, the labelled data within and between categories, the 
ideas extracted from various interviews, and the data being 
coded now and the ones already coded (Urquhart, 2012).  
 
As Charmaz (2006) suggests, multi-stage sampling and data 
collection enhance the effects of constant comparison through 
the reaction of emerging concepts and findings in the 
subsequent interviews and therefore, guiding the upcoming 
data collection. There is no specific rule regarding sample size 
in qualitative research. However, according to the principle of 
gathering information under GTM, sampling is suggested to end 
when data saturation is reached, in other words, there is no new 
concept or category to extract, and the results begin to appear 
redundant (Josselson and Lieblich, 2003).  
 
 
4.2.1.4 Memo writing 
Referring to Glaser’s description of memo writing, it is 
considered the “bedrock of theory generation” (Glaser, 1978). 
The constant breaking of data collection, coding or analysis 
progress to write down fragments of thoughts allows ideas to 
be recorded (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007). The memos recorded 
from non-linear timing enable creative sparks to be captured 
and aids the process of abstraction. Constant comparing memos 
with the labelled data, the categorised clusters and the 
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emerging concepts reminds researchers of new ideas which may 
be reflected in the subsequent data collection and analysis.  
 
 
4.2.2 The application of GTM principles 
Referring to Glaser (1978), the concept of “theoretical 
sensitivity” explains the relationship between the literature 
review and data collection: literature review should only be 
employed as the guidance to understand how the theories are 
constructed if it is conducted before data collection and it is 
important to keep “an open mind” throughout data collection 
(Dey, 1993). As Urquhart (2012) indicates, whether or not using 
the concepts from the literature review determines whether or 
not the research method is “pure” GTM. As previously discussed, 
the literature review was conducted prior to the interviews, 
which indicates that the research method could not be called 
“pure” GTM. However, the general principles of GTM were 
employed during the interview phase. The following section 
explain the reasons for not using “pure” GTM”, present the 
reasons for applying GTM principles and present how they were 
applied in the interview phase.  
 
 
4.2.2.1 Why not apply “pure” GTM? 
As Rennie (1998) illustrates, besides the “open mind” without 
the “contamination” of literature, researchers should avoid 
using questions that are categorised for coding when designing 
an interview structure. However, the “open mind” is regarded 
as a strict criterion for studies, particularly for the ones in health 
care. 
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1) The potential risk of “pure” GTM 
Purely relying on interviews could possibly lead to a result in 
which the theory generated and the researchers’ own versions 
of reality presented within the study are too remote from the 
“normality” of society (Heath, 2006). Additionally, when 
dividing data into individual words, the focus of the study and 
the meaningful concepts may become lost within the minutia of 
data (Allan, 2003). In other words, a comprehensive 
acknowledgement of background and context is crucial to the 
process of understanding and interpreting data (Patton, 2002). 
As Powell and DiMaggio (1991) argue, the research design 
should be examined within the research context regarding 
research problems and data collection strategy to prevent 
potential risks from occurring.  
 
 
2) Structure overlay 
This study attempts to evaluate the implementation of PbR in 
mental health, which is part of the government’s wider reform 
agenda and, therefore, is inevitably influenced by external 
factors. To objectively and comprehensively reflect the reality, 
codes from previous studies, which are the preconceived 
categories, should be considered before collecting additional 
data. Particularly, for the terms such as “Gaming”, “up-coding” 
and “cream-skim” and the abbreviations such as “HoNOS”, 
“MHCT” and “RiO”, the relevant information should be 
previewed prior to conducting the interviews in order to follow 
the conversation.   
 
 
3) Ethical considerations 
The study was conducted in health care, which is considered to 
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be a sensitive area. Any research subjected to the NHS will be 
carefully scrutinised before clearance is granted. The detailed 
research proposal specifying research problems, research 
design, methods adoption and sample obtainment, together 
with other relevant documents had been submitted to University 
Ethics Committee and NHS Research and Development before 
the interviews were conducted (this will be discussed in Section 
4.3.1.1). Therefore, the literature review was performed to 
understand the research context, develop research questions, 
identify research objectives and subjects, and formulate 
research design to satisfy the requirements for the ethics 
clearance.   
 
 
4) Difficulties for non-focused interviews  
Regarding the “no preconceived idea” during the data collection, 
the researchers are expected to have no particular research 
schedules and be led by the participants in interviews (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967). However, regarding the research subjects - 
commissioners, hospital managers and frontline clinicians, who 
are busy people in the commissioning circle, the non-focused 
investigation is difficult to carry out due to time constraints. As 
a result, the interview structure was included in the invitation 
email sent to target participants in order to attract their interest 
in participation.  
 
 
4.2.2.2 The application to the research design 
Regarding the research context, the application of PbR is not a 
new topic as PbR has been introduced in acute services since 
2003/04 and indicates available studies on the impacts of PbR 
in this filed. Within such studies, some outcomes could indicate 
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the influential factors for implementing PbR in mental health, 
such as the validity of the classification system, derived targets 
and frontline involvement. This is the reason for performing the 
literature review before conducting interviews. Additionally, 
since PbR has not been fully implemented in mental health yet, 
the inductive approaches could be adopted to explore the 
current stage of PbR implementation and the driving factors of 
its delay from the frontline. In the interview phase, focus was 
placed on participants’ experiences and views towards the 
implementation of PbR in mental health and the emergent 
obstacles. Given the lack of existing primary studies regarding 
the implementation of PbR in mental health, under the super-
categories settled by the previous literature, concepts could still 
generate from the ground, which was the reason for applying 
GTM principles in the interview phase. The following paragraphs 
explain how to apply these principles in the data collection and 
data analysis process: specifically, interview structure design, 
data collection, induction and deduction, and memo writing. 
 
 
1) Interview structure design 
Besides adopting the literature review to facilitate the 
formulation of the interview structure, the interview process 
could still have some generative components. Although pre-
conceived categories were applied to some questions, such as: 
“What is your perspective on “gaming” behaviours?”; the 
concepts could still emerge from the open-ended questions such 
as: “What is your broad understanding of MH PbR?” The open-
ended questions allowed participants to recall their experience 
regarding MH PbR and express their opinions freely. Semi-
structured interviews also encouraged the interactions between 
the researcher and the participants while leaving the scope for 
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the participants to lead the interview (Bryman, 2001). The 
interviews were conducted as progressive repetitive cycles (this 
will be discussed in Section 4.3.1.3). The relevant information 
was extracted from the participant’s responses, and then guided 
the next questions. The progressive repetitive cycle of flexible 
questions enabled the participants to express their perspectives 
to a larger extent under a broadly pre-outlined structure.  
 
 
2) Data collection  
As Urquhart (2012) elaborates, bottom-up concept generation 
can still happen to some extent under pre-defined categories, 
which is called the “thematic framework”. In addition to being 
constructed from the literature review, the thematic framework 
was also underpinned by the concepts emerging from the 
interview data itself. Through constant comparison, the 
framework was tested and refined by being applied to the 
phenomenon. The transcripts were analysed in two ways: 
disassembled and reassembled following GTM principles. At the 
first stage, each transcript was reviewed, and any meaningful 
information related to the research questions and objectives 
was captured and coded. Next, the transcript was disassembled 
into small units by different codes that represented certain 
phenomenon. According to the codes, the interrelated 
information across all transcripts was sorted and shifted into the 
corresponding groups. The broader clusters of similar concepts 
were formed. Finally, all clusters were deduced into theories 
according to the research questions and objectives.  
 
 
3) Induction and deduction 
Against the potential risk that the integration of philosophy 
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expressed by participants could be destroyed by the 
disassembling codes (Spradley, 1979), a constant comparison 
was conducted between individual concepts, and the individual 
codes and the transcript as a whole, respectively. The generated 
themes were tested in the subsequent interviews guided by the 
theoretical sampling principle: at the end of an interview, one 
participant was asked to recommend key personnel in a 
particular group according to the content of the interview. For 
instance, a hospital manager was invited to recommend a 
colleague since the content of the interview had been mainly 
about managerial-level perspectives, while another manager 
was requested to recommend frontline clinicians since some 
judgements made on frontline clinicians’ performance had been 
observed during the interview. The sampling process ended 
when there was no new information extracted from the 
interview, which is when the categories become “saturated” 
(Glaser, 1978).  
 
 
4) Memo writing 
During data collection and analysis, memos were kept in both 
handwritten and electronic form. Anything thought to be 
relevant, such as the name of code, relationship between codes, 
induction process or the modification of interview structure, was 
recorded throughout the entire process. Memos were used to 
outline the relationship between codes and the corresponding 
clusters, to constantly check the consistency between individual 
codes and the entire transcript and to help sort ideas to build 
themes.  
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4.3 Research design 
As presented earlier, this study was conducted in three stages. 
The theoretical analysis of the fundamental theories and the 
construction of MH PbR determined the research subjects for 
the subsequent empirical studies involving commissioners, 
hospital managers and frontline clinicians. This section presents 
the detailed process of conducting the empirical study: the 
semi-structured interviews and the online surveys.   
 
 
4.3.1 Qualitative study: Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews have the capacity to ensure the 
comprehensiveness of interview coverage by predetermined 
thoughtfully-worded questions while leaving some flexibility to 
explore certain subjects in greater depth (Patton, 2002). The 
process of conducting the semi-structured interviews is 
presented from five aspects: 1) gaining access, 2) sampling and 
ethical consideration, 3) conducting interviews, 4) transcribing 
and data importing, and 5) coding and developing theories. 
 
 
4.3.1.1 Gaining access  
Given that this research is a case study of Nottingham, in order 
to present a multi-angle perspective on the implementation of 
PbR in mental health in Nottingham, the research sites were set 
as Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust, 
Nottinghamshire County CCG and Nottingham City CCG. 
According to The Ethics Code of the University of Nottingham, 
approvals from the Research and Development (R&D) office of 
each NHS Trust and CCG involved are required prior to the 
commencement of empirical studies. Acting as the research 
sponsor, the University Sponsorship Office reviewed all 
	 154	
documents relevant to the research in order to issue the 
sponsorship before the submission of R&D applications. 
Therefore, by considering the ethics issues, the following 
documents were provided as required: the Ethics Checklist 
signed by the School of Sociology and Social Policy, the 
Research Protocol  that illustrated the research significance and 
presented the research design, the Integrated Research 
Application System (IRAS) form that provided detailed 
information related to the studies to be carried out, the Site-
Specific Information (SSI) form that provided detailed 
information related to the organisations where the interviews 
were to be carried out, the Participant Information Sheet that 
provided interview-related information to help potential 
participants consider their participation in full detail, the 
Consent Form to be signed by the participants, the interview 
structure that provided a general structure of the interview 
(please see Appendix 1), Personal CV, Research Passport and 
Evidence of Insurance signed by the University.   
 
Figure 4-4 illustrates the process of obtaining access to these 
organisations. After the School Ethics Committee approved the 
research proposal, the above documents were submitted to the 
University Sponsorship Office for review. After obtaining 
consent from the Sponsorship Office, the Research Passport was 
signed by the Graduate school. Next, the reviewed documents 
together with the signed Research Passport were submitted to 
the University Ethics Committee. Following its review of all 
relevant documents, the University Ethics Committee issued the 
Sponsorship Reference Number that was to be attached to the 
IRAS form, Sponsorship Statement, Sponsorship Agreement, 
Non-commercial Agreement and Insurance Agreement. The 
IRAS Form and the SSI form with the reference number 
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attached were submitted online, and other approved documents 
were submitted in hardcopy to the NHS R&D departments of 
each participating organisation. Lastly, access to these 
organisations was granted.  
 
 
Figure 4-4 Flowchart of ethics-related document preparation and approval 
application 
 
 
 
 
4.3.1.2 Sampling and ethical considerations 
As previously justified, the small population of professionals in 
health care, together with the absence of access to the contact 
list, constrained not only the sample size, but also the methods 
available for sampling. Accordingly, snowball sampling was 
adopted in accessing “hard-to-reach” professionals in the 
healthcare commissioning cycle. This study followed Saunders’s 
	 156	
(1979) and Farquharson’s (2005) strategy to use a “reputational 
method” to identify potential candidates by peer-nomination. 
The interviews began with the chief investigators’ personal 
contact. The high-level managers from the three research sites 
(Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust, 
Nottinghamshire County CCG and Nottingham City CCG) 
showed their willingness to engage. According to their referrals, 
the potential participants who met the eligibility criteria were 
nominated. The snowball sampling process followed a repetitive 
learning cycle (this will be discussed in 4.3.1.3), according to 
which the interviewee was asked to nominate colleagues in 
relation to the key points derived from the interview. For 
instance, a hospital manager was requested to nominate a 
frontline colleague when their perspectives on daily clinical 
practice or frontline clinicians’ involvement had been observed 
during the interview. 
 
However, this study noted the potential risk created by the 
snowball sampling as it might compromise the confidentiality of 
key personnel (Faugier and Sargeant, 1997). Taking privacy into 
account, key personnel were informed about the study in great 
detail before obtaining their consents to participate. Potential 
participants were initially approached through a formal email 
introducing the research aims and objectives and explaining the 
reasons for inviting them. At the same time, the information 
sheet and interview structure were attached to each invitation 
email. The information sheet reminded the potential 
participants of their right to refuse to participate and, therefore, 
withdraw from the study at any time without consequence. 
Anonymity and confidentiality related issues were explained in 
the information sheet. The attached interview structure outlined 
the structure to attract their interests and to ensure them that 
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there would be no identifiable information asked in the interview. 
After obtaining their approval, interviews were arranged in their 
offices or seminar rooms at their location. To further protect 
participants’ privacy, they were asked to read the information 
sheet again at the beginning of interview in case they had not 
done so previously. The recording issue was mentioned again 
and reiterated for their consent. They were then asked to sign 
three copies of the consent form before the interview officially 
started.   
 
As explained earlier, qualitative research is more apt to increase 
the scope of data through purposive or theoretical sampling. 
Therefore, there is no exact sample size set (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985). The interview process stopped after the 13th interview 
(including a follow-up with two participants) since no new 
information was found in the transcript.  
 
 
4.3.1.3 Conducting interviews 
As Rudestam and Newton (2007) state, despite ensuring that 
interviews should be loosely designed and flexible to allow 
participants to express their opinions freely, they should be 
conducted under a general framework constructed by the pre-
conceived categories. In light of the differences in professional 
roles, the contents of interview structures shared the same 
general constructor but differed on the focal points subject to 
the three interest groups, including commissioners, hospital 
managers and frontline clinicians. For commissioners, questions 
were set relating to their current collaboration with providers 
and their understandings of contract negotiation and quality 
monitoring. Questions for managers aimed to obtain their 
understandings at the strategic level, while questions for 
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frontline staff sought to explore the practical implications of MH 
PbR and how it affected their daily clinical activities.  
 
To encourage participants to recall their experiences and 
express their perspectives on the implementation of MH PbR as 
much as possible, the interview was designed in a four-stage 
structure. The interviews started with general questions, such 
as their current roles and responsibilities regarding MH PbR 
commissioning, in an effort to get participants think about the 
topic. Next, the open-ended question “What is your 
understanding of MH PbR?” was asked to allow participants to 
express their perspectives about MH PbR freely without any 
“contaminant” from the pre-determined categories. 
Subsequently, to help participants sort out their thoughts, 
questions about more detailed information were proposed from 
two aspects: the objective information about the current stage 
of the implementation of MH PbR and the subjective information 
about their understandings towards key elements (such as the 
MHCT, the HoNOS, quality measurements and training sessions) 
within the commissioning cycle. At this point, pro forma 
questions, or additional new questions, were adopted according 
to the participant’s response. The pre-determined categories 
were employed to help the participants sort out their ideas and 
promote their emanative thinking. In the third stage, the focal 
point moved back to the general issues subject to the factors 
that caused the delayed implementation and the corresponding 
solutions. The previous questions subject to the key elements 
within the commissioning cycle were expected to help 
participants better summarise the driving factors and thus 
propose the corresponding solutions.  
 
By applying GTM principles, the interviews were conducted 
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following progressive repetitive cycles, particularly in the 
second and third stage of the process. As Figure 4-5 presents, 
questions were proposed following an induction-deduction 
sequence. Firstly, the starting question was proposed, and then 
the relevant information was extracted from the participant’s 
response, at which time the interview structure might be 
adjusted according to the specific information the participant 
provided, leading to questions designed for further exploration 
of the specific perspective of the participant. 
 
Figure 4-5 Interview conduction 
 
  
 
4.3.1.4 Transcribing and coding 
The interviews were recorded with a digital audio recorder for 
fidelity. Meanwhile, written field notes were taken to capture the 
key points during the interview and help extract themes during 
the coding process.  
 
After importing the recorded voice file to the PC, Microsoft Word 
was used for transcribing. When transcribing interviews, each 
participant was numbered and coded according to their posts: 
the commissioners were coded as “C”, the hospital managers 
were coded as “M” and the frontline staff were coded as “S”. 
Against the potential risk that the totality of philosophy 
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expressed by participants would be damaged by the 
disassembling codes (Spradley, 1979), transcripts were 
analysed in two ways: disassembled and reassembled following 
GTM principles, and reviewed entirely. After importing all 
transcripts to NVivo, each transcript was reviewed first and 
conceptual labels were attached to any information relevant to 
the research objectives within the theoretical framework 
following GTM principles. Since the Dialogue Analysis was not 
adopted as the analytic method, the sentences, such as “Do you 
know what I mean?” asked by the participants for a double-
check were not coded. The codes were not strictly devised at 
the microscopic level, rather, more abstract concepts emerged 
at this stage: some labels consisted of the actual words of the 
conversation (e.g. “complicated system”), while other labels, 
such as “inconsistent training”, were summarised from content.  
 
While keeping the objectives and the theoretical framework in 
mind, as many interpretations as possible were made from the 
data (Charmaz, 2006) by asking myself: “What does this 
mean?”, “What is its contribution to the research objectives?” 
and “What is the relationship between this and the pre-
determined categories?”. Since the pre-determined categories 
were not mutually exclusive and more than one concept could 
be extracted from one section of text, the same section of text 
could be assigned to more than one code and thus contribute to 
more than one theme.  
 
 
4.3.1.5 Developing theory  
After the transcripts were disassembled into small units, the 
process of theory development began, including organising and 
re-arranging codes, merging concepts and extracting theory. 
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Within the theoretical framework, the pre-determined 
categories were set as MH PbR overview, current stage 
implementation, the MHCT, the HoNOS, the MHCT care 
pathways, outcome measurement, “Gaming” behaviours, 
driving factors and solutions according to the theoretical 
analysis. According to the codes, the interrelated information 
was sorted and allocated into certain segments. Then, the 
broader groups of similar concepts were formed in one of two 
ways: from summarising similar concepts, and from examining 
the coded transcripts. At the same time, to ensure the accuracy 
of the emerging concept process, when forming the broader 
groups, the meanings of the specific concepts were examined 
by constantly comparing the individual codes with the transcript 
context. Facilitated by the memos, similar concepts were 
arranged in the corresponding, pre-determined categories. For 
those that could not be linked to the pre-determined categories, 
they formed new categories rather than being shoehorned into 
the pre-determined ones.  
 
At last, all categories were concluded to themes according to 
research questions and objectives. Therefore, the themes were 
extracted as “moving from the Block Contract”, “current stage 
of implementing MH PbR”, “intra-system evaluation”, “driving 
factors for the delay” and “suggestions for future improvement”. 
Within the process as a whole, the accuracy of the data was 
confirmed by reviewing the entire set of individual transcripts 
before coding, categorising and concluding.   
 
 
4.3.2 Quantitative study: Online surveys 
As Patton (2002) indicates, quantitative measurements are 
adopted as the conventional means to minimise the subjectivity 
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in qualitative research and to maintain objectivity. Given that 
the semi-structured interviews have discovered what was 
happening, it is important to examine to what extent the 
preliminary outcomes fit into the general reality (Patton, 2002). 
However, the difficulties in obtaining research permission and 
approaching to sample population confined the generalizability 
of this study. The following sections elaborate how confirmation 
for the preliminary outcomes in a constrained situation were 
sought during the four main stages: 1) questionnaire design, 2) 
pilot testing, 3) gaining access and disseminating 
questionnaires, and 4) data collection.  
 
 
4.3.2.1 Questionnaire design 
As Bulmer and Warwick (1993) indicate, an in-depth qualitative 
enquiry of a research area is the foundation of a high-quality 
questionnaire. Therefore, the questionnaires were formulated 
based upon the preliminary outcomes derived from the semi-
structured interviews. Questions, and the corresponding options, 
were primarily based upon the pre-categorised sections derived 
from the interview analysis. According to De Vaus’s (2014) 
suggestions regarding the order of questions, one section of 
general questions about respondents’ current posts and major 
responsibilities was added as to put respondents at ease. Given 
the different professions, three versions of the questionnaire 
were designed targeting commissioners, managers and 
frontline clinicians, respectively (please see Appendix 2). 
Regarding the contents of the three versions of the 
questionnaire, they shared the same structure comprising four 
main parts: “General questions”, “Current stage of 
implementation”, “Driving factors for the delay” and “General 
attitude”. Regarding the content, for commissioners, questions 
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were set subject to the general issues surrounding the contract 
and political targets, such as the percentage of patients 
clustered and C1-C3 discharged. For managers, questions were 
set targeting both administrative level and clinical level. For 
frontline clinicians, more emphasis was placed on the daily 
workload and their perspectives of the feasibility of the sub-
systems according to their experiences. Regarding the 
profession, details relating to the classification system, such as 
the validity of each instrument, were subject to managers and 
frontline clinicians, whereas commissioners were expected to 
express their broad understanding of it. 
 
The majority of questions were set as forced-choice questions 
in consideration of viability and credibility. As De Vaus (2014) 
illustrates, forced-choice questions are quick to answer and thus 
useful when people’s motivations to answer are not very high. 
This is particularly the case for the NHS staff who have tight 
schedules. Additionally, open-ended questions present potential 
risks for interpretation: researchers may misclassify the 
responses due to their misinterpretation of the answers. Force-
choice questions remind respondents of different possibilities 
towards the asked issues and provide a range of options for 
respondents to choose the one closest to their answers. 
However, as Robson (1993) argues, a questionnaire that is 
mainly formulated by forced-choice questions is not able to 
provide respondents sufficient space to express their opinions 
and thoughts. To avoid providing respondents with a feeling that 
their answers are shoehorned into pre-determined options, 
much thought was put into the questionnaire design process 
and pilot testing was employed to further refine the questions. 
 
Regarding the types of responses, numerical rating scales were 
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used to explore respondents’ opinions towards the design of MH 
PbR and the driving factors that caused the delayed 
implementation. Other types of questions, such as multiple 
choice, checklists and ranking, were used to enable the 
application of a wide range of statistical methods. Given the 
possibility that the questionnaires came across some issues that 
respondents had not thought about or felt difficult to give an 
answer, “not known” was added as the last choice in some 
questions. To allow respondents to express their thoughts 
without being completely restrained by the closed-choice 
questions, “other (please specify)” was provided subject to 
some questions that sought respondents’ attitudes. 
  
 
4.3.2.2 Pilot testing 
As Blaikie (2000) suggests, questionnaires should go through 
pilot tests before being officially disseminated. Pilot tests were 
undertaken to identify any ambiguous or misleading question 
and to refine response options to ensure that they provide a 
sufficient range of answer choices to cover all responses. Since 
the research subjects are highly professional, the sample 
population is very limited, which limited the number of pilot 
tests as well as responses. For the pilot tests, three 
questionnaires were sent to three people among whom, each 
represented one interest group. They were requested to 
complete the questionnaire and provide comments regarding 
content and length.  
 
During the pilot tests, the feasibility and its compliance with the 
research objectives were verified while some changes were 
made to the questions and the order of the answer choices. For 
instance, Question 4: “Service quality should and can be 
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properly measured” was amended as two different statements: 
“Service quality should be properly measured” and “Service 
quality can be properly measured”. The reason for this change 
was that the previous statement comprises two different 
meanings in one sentence, which may lead to respondents’ 
confusion when they agree that service quality should be 
properly measured but disagree that service quality can be 
properly measured, or vice versa. Regarding Question 7: 
“Overall, do you think PbR should be implemented in mental 
health?”, the previous answer choices were in an order of “yes”, 
“no”, and “hard to say”. The order was adjusted to “yes”, “hard 
to say” and “no” to better reflect the display logic of the answer 
choices.  
 
 
4.3.2.3 Gaining access and disseminating questionnaires 
The process of obtaining permission for conducting the online 
surveys was the same as that for the semi-structured interviews. 
The application for expanding research activity was sent to the 
University Research Governance Office. After obtaining the 
approval, the amended SSI form and the IRAS form were 
submitted online, and other relevant documents were sent to 
the corresponding organisations in hardcopy. Given the possible 
low-response rate in researches involving NHS staff, Derbyshire 
NHS Foundation Trust was selected as a fourth research site. As 
Figure 4-6 shows, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire share 
similar geographic characteristics regarding the health 
conditions, risk factors and level of mental health and illness of 
the population. The treatment and the corresponding outcomes 
provided by the trusts within these two areas are also similar. 
Therefore, no perceivable bias was expected to occur by adding 
Derbyshire NHS Foundation Trust into the survey sample, 
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although this research was conducted as a case study of the 
implementation of MH PbR in Nottingham. 
 
Figure 4-6 Basic mental health information in Nottinghamshire and 
Derbyshire compared to the average level of England (Public Health England, 
2013)  
 
 
 
Due to the sensitivity of the NHS, the access to a contact list 
was not granted together at the time of research permission. 
Without access to a sample population, randomised sampling 
was not an option. Therefore, the stratified snowball sampling 
method was used to approach potential respondents. 
Participants who had taken part in the semi-structured 
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interviews were regarded as the starting point of the snowball 
sampling. The sampling process shared the same process with 
that adopted in the interviews. Regarding the study with 
Derbyshire NHS Foundation Trust, due to the constraints of 
ethical clearance, no access to the contact list of the medical 
professionals was granted. In this respect, the officers in the 
R&D office were contacted with a requisition to circulate the 
invitation email among their colleagues.  
 
As stated in the research protocol that had been used to apply 
for research permission, the deadline for the online surveys was 
set as September 30th, 2014. Under such circumstances, any 
response after the deadline was considered invalid. To increase 
the number of responses, the second stage of invitations were 
sent to the interview participants and the R&D officers at 
Derbyshire NHS Foundation Trust as a reminder in the middle of 
August. By the end of September 30th, 2014, a total of 51 
responses were received and subject to data analysis as 
discussed below: 
 
 
4.3.2.4 Data analysis 
MS Excel was adopted to screen the data prior to the statistical 
analysis. During the screening process, different standards were 
set according to the participants’ positions. The hospital 
managers and the clinical staff were assumed to have a deep 
understanding of the technical issues regarding the 
classification system and the driving factors for the delayed 
implementation. Therefore, any case with incomplete responses 
for these two parts was regarded as not valid. The nurses were 
assumed to know more about the daily frontline practice than 
the technical issues. As such, cases with responses regarding 
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workload were kept regardless of their answers to the intra-
system evaluation and driving factors. After screening the 
responses, 38 were seen as valid and subject to data analysis. 
To accurately and comprehensively capture all of the 
information, a codebook was developed to define each variable 
and assign numbers to all responses. Given the different 
questions for the three interest groups, the missing values were 
coded in one of two ways: 99 represented values that should 
have been valid but were missing and 1000 represented those 
not applicable to the particular group. 
 
IBM SPSS 20 was used to analyse the quantitative data 
screened and coded in MS Excel. Given the fact that most of the 
variables were either categorical or dimensional rather than 
continuous, descriptive statistics, such as frequencies, were 
used to explore the background information regarding the 
current posts of the participants, the collaboration between the 
managers and commissioners, managers and frontline clinicians, 
respectively. Cross-tabulations were adopted to explore the 
associations between variables based on interest groups. Chi-
square tests further explored statistical differences in the 
distribution of variables based on contingency tables (Pallant, 
2010). Regarding the ordinal variables that were used to test 
the importance of driving factors, considering the sample 
population and distribution, The Mann-Whitney test was used to 
explore the differences in perspectives between interest groups. 
P<0.05 was adopted to detect the statistical significance 
(Bryman, 2001).  
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Summary  
This chapter introduced and discussed the choice of the 
research design, with particular attention paid to the methods 
adopted for the fieldwork. The introduction of the types as well 
as the major benefits of triangulation, criticisms of the paradigm 
and the potential risks facilitated the research regarding the 
adoption of between-methods triangulation. The interview 
research was set as the primary approach, whereas the 
questionnaire research was adopted to verify the findings 
derived from the previous qualitative research. 
 
Drawing on the importance of the semi-structured interviews, 
the second section explained how the quality of data collection 
and analysis at the interview stage would be insured: by 
employing GTM principles. Given the constraints of the study, 
only the bottom-up analysis principles of GTM were applied 
rather than “pure” GTM. This helped to formulate an iterative 
cycle in different stages of the interview research including 
structure design, data collection, induction and deduction, and 
memo writing.  
 
Based on the design of research and the adoption of the leading 
strategy, the third section provided detailed information about 
the process of conducting the fieldwork. For a better 
understanding of the data collection and analysis in the 
interview stage, the first part described the process in a time-
ordering sequence: gaining access, sampling and ethics 
consideration, conducting the interviews, transcribing and 
coding and developing a theory with a particular illustration of 
the application of GTM principles in practice. The second part 
discussed the key steps of conducting the online surveys, 
including questionnaire design, pilot testing, gaining access and 
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disseminating questionnaire, and data analysis with attention to 
the data analysis.  
 
Based on the methodology and methods discussed in this 
chapter, the following three chapters present the findings from 
this three-step investigation. Chapter 5 firstly investigates 
issues surrounding the concept and construction of MH PbR to 
evaluate the validity and credibility from both the clinical and 
financial aspects, given its close relationship with the fieldwork. 
This chapter not only examines the formulation of the MH PbR 
policy, which is the process that transits the political intents to 
the detailed policies and targets, but also provides the 
knowledge basis and implications for the design of the interview 
structure. Chapters 6 and 7 analyse and discuss the findings 
from the semi-structured interviews and the online surveys, 
respectively, based upon the theoretical analysis in Chapters 3 
and 5. Chapter 6 presents multi-level (managerial-level vs. 
frontline-level) and multi-angle (provider side vs. purchaser 
side) perspectives derived from the semi-structured interviews; 
and Chapter 7 presents and discusses the findings from the 
questionnaires to verify the findings from the previous 
qualitative analysis. 
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5. The formulation of the MH PbR policy: The 
application of standardisation 
 
 
Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 3, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
contract healthcare services in a standardised way. Not only is 
this a challenge in the price calculation aspect, but also in the 
clinical service management aspect. Based upon the evaluation 
of the fundamental theories, this chapter investigates the 
construction of MH PbR: specifically, in terms of 
commodification. By illustrating how MH PbR applies the 
“standardisation” principle to designing the classification system 
and the price calculation system, this chapter reveals the 
essence of the theoretical mechanism of MH PbR, through which 
MH PbR realises the political intents to commodify mental health 
services (this has been discussed in Chapter 3) into daily clinical 
practice in a form of categorising patients’ needs for care to 
inform the management of healthcare resources. Based upon 
the previous argument against the initiation of the policy, this 
chapter further identifies the functional drawbacks emerging in 
the formulation stage that have contributed to the delay. These 
identified drawbacks shed light upon the conduction of the 
subsequent fieldwork that focuses on the implementation of the 
MH PbR policy.   
 
This chapter begins with a review of the development of PbR in 
mental health, with particular attention paid to the difficulties in 
classifying mental disorders with the same reliable laboratory 
measures used in acute services. This highlights the central 
importance of being able to distinguish illness type and the 
corresponding services, which depends upon a process of 
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“standardisation”. This also indicates that whether the MH PbR 
policy is well formulated depends upon the extent to which the 
classification system can accurately standardise mental health 
services and therefore the costs. The second section illustrates 
how this principle of “standardisation” is being applied in the MH 
PbR system. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 consider the mechanical 
shortcomings of the implementation of “standardisation” from 
the clinical and financial aspects, respectively. In Section 5.3, 
the MHCT classification system as a whole is evaluated in three 
steps: 1) is the identification of the ideal function of a quality 
needs assessment; 2) the investigation of the extent to which 
the MHCT/HoNOS achieves its goal; 3) an exploration of the 
problems caused by its shortcomings. The fourth section 
investigates the feasibility of applying the standardisation 
principle in the financial aspect, in which standardising a 
nationally-fixed tariff based upon average cost per need and 
treatment, together with the “gaming” behaviours derived from 
current financial pressures are also discussed. This chapter 
concludes with the perspective that the MH PbR policy is poorly 
formulated due to the failure to apply standardisation to the 
diagnostic classification system and thus the cost calculation 
system, which sheds light on the design of the following 
interviews and online surveys. 
 
 
 
5.1 Mental health “diagnoses”: Processes requiring 
standardisation 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the lack of clear diagnostic markers 
for mental disorders leads to greater reliance on professional 
judgement when appraising a patient’s mental condition, which 
is essentially a process of distinguishing “abnormality”. As 
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Rogers and Pilgrim (2010) illustrate, under the assumption that 
characteristics of any population conform to a normal 
distribution, frequently occurring behaviours are set as the 
standards of being “normal”, whereas the unusual behaviours, 
represented as extreme values in a the normal distribution, are 
regarded as “abnormal”. Practically, classification systems are 
designed as an attempt to capture “abnormal” phenomena from 
“normal” ones and thus identify the “shared characteristics” of 
the “abnormal” phenomena by arranging them into pre-
determined categories to facilitate the provision of targeted 
treatments (Dalal and Sivakumar, 2009).  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the ICD and DSM, two similar 
diagnosis-based classification systems, validate particular 
behaviours as abnormal and establish the privileged meaning 
for particular signs by a classification system (Foucault, 1977). 
This categorical model provides a “discrete entity” view of 
“abnormality”: pathology detected means “abnormal”, 
otherwise “normality exists” (Jablensky, 2009). This approach 
assumes that mental disorders can be meaningfully represented 
as distinct phenomena, and that variations among patients with 
similar needs can be reduced through standardising “shared 
characteristics” (symptoms). In other words, the development 
of the MH PbR policy is based upon the assumption that 
psychiatric disorders and their needs for treatment can be 
sufficiently described by a standardised framework reflecting 
“averaged” intensities and needs for treatment, and that the 
cost of providing such treatment can be appropriately estimated 
as the arithmetic mean of the current costs of providing 
comparable treatments incurred by comparable providers. The 
next section provides additional detail regarding how these 
related processes of standardisation have been operationalised.  
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5.2 PbR: Twofold standardisation 
As discussed in Chapter 2, PbR uses a fixed price system that 
creates a direct link between the costs (calculated based on 
average unit costs) and the number of cases treated in any 
particular case group, called the “cost-and-volume” payment 
system (Farrar et al., 2009). Within it, payment is made towards 
a particular case and treatment (care package) regardless of 
provider. This is conducted under the classification systems of 
HRG in acute services and MHCT in mental health services, 
respectively (Whelan et al., 2011). As already outlined, the 
concept of PbR consists of two main components: a series of 
fixed prices mainly based on national average cost and a 
classification system in which cases would be categorised into 
corresponding treatment groups with associated costs.  
 
 
5.2.1 National average cost: Tariffs 
To act as a quality improvement mechanism, rather than 
encouraging competition based on price, PbR requires a national 
average unit cost for each condition and treatment. To 
accomplish this, for each category of cases seeking treatment a 
national average unit cost of providing treatment, is derived 
from the mean value of the average total costs from all NHS 
providers, which is the “average of average” (Self et al., 2008a). 
This assumes that the costs of treating a particular category of 
cases incurred by different providers follow a normal 
distribution so that the arithmetic mean is a meaningful average. 
It also suggests that “deviances” can be categorised as the 
extremes of both sides of the cost distribution curve and an 
effect of pursuing “standardised cost” would be to reduce 
deviance employing “standardisation-to-the-average” principle 
(Department of Health, 2012b).  
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This approach to establishing a national tariff depends upon 
reliable ways of categorising cases for treatment that will allow 
costs to be apportioned to them in the same way across 
providers. In acute services, the HRGs reflect a system whereby 
the diagnosis is linked to the cost of care provided to a patient. 
Coded in ICD, HRG distinguishes “disorder” by diagnosing 
physical problems and categorises patients into certain groups 
in which the members share similar diagnoses, medical 
interventions and resource consumptions. National tariffs can 
then be mainly based upon this classification system and the 
average unit cost against each group, formulating one fixed 
tariff to that particular group. Various adjustment tariffs are 
added to the reference costs to compensate for such things as 
local differences in costs, aiming to bring in incentive 
mechanisms for high-quality services (Farrar et al., 2007).  
 
This approach is only valid if cases seeking treatment can be 
categorised in such a way that is both reliable and reflects 
relatively predictable resource implications. The implementation 
of PbR in mental health has hinged upon the development of a 
scheme of classification intended to achieve this, which has 
become known as the MHCT.  
 
 
5.2.2 The MHCT classification system 
Supported by the general information presented in Chapter 2, 
the following section illustrates the general process of 
classification, which is the process of applying the 
standardisation principle to clinical service management.  
 
According to Mental Health Clustering Booklet (2012/13) 
(Department of Health, 2012a), the standard process of 
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classifying a patient follows a standardised three-step 
assessment:  
 
1. Based on the information gathered through routine 
assessment, rate the patient’s needs using the MHCT. 
 
2. Referring to the Decision Tree, allocate the case into one 
super-cluster amongst “non-psychotic”, “psychotic” and 
“organic” based on its origin of disorder. Then, narrow it down 
to one of seven secondary clusters attached to these super-
clusters.  
 
3. Identify the specific cluster guided by the MHCT rating grids 
(designed majorly based on the HoNOS). The rating grids with 
colour coded rules according to which different colours indicate 
how likely the certain symptom is expected to be scored subject 
to the specific cluster help to exclude prohibited clusters from 
the remainders under the same secondary cluster. 
 
In terms of converting MHCT scores to a particular cluster, a 
series of mathematical calculations calculate the Discriminant 
Fischer Scores indicating the best-fit cluster based on MHCT 
scores and consequently determining eligible clusters supported 
by the percentage fit for each one (Monitor and NHS England, 
2013a).  
 
Acting as the process of attaching payments to clinical activities, 
the pre-determined standardised care packages decreases 
“inappropriate” variations in service provision between patients 
with similar needs categorised by the MHCT, promote multi-
disciplinary teamwork thus improving the quality and outcomes 
of healthcare interventions (Cabana et al., 1999). In the 
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financial aspect, care pathways facilitate an efficient use of 
healthcare resources and therefore, an accurate calculation of 
costs for commissioning (Jones, 2004). 
 
In this respect, the validity of care pathways is crucial for the 
feasibility of a cost calculation. At the same time, since the care 
pathways are attached to specific clusters, their validity is partly 
determined by the accuracy of the classification system. Unlike 
the MHCT and the HoNOS that have already been applied in 
everyday clinical practice, the care pathway system as a 
separate element is still under development. This situation 
reflects two major problems: the conceptual flaws of the MHCT 
as a needs assessment instrument and, on the contrary, the 
difficulties in effectively managing needs and treatments in a 
standardised way, which complies with the findings in Chapter 
3. Drawing upon the importance of standardising needs and 
interventions in reference to the payment system, the next 
section assesses why the attempt to standardise mental health 
services in this way fails to serve the purpose by answering 
three essential questions: 1) is it valid to classify mental 
disorders and their corresponding treatments according to 
predetermined standards; 2) does the collaboration between 
the HoNOS and the MHCT fulfil the function of a quality 
classification system; 3) if it does not, what are the initial 
problems of the MHCT classification system? 
 
 
 
5.3 The principles of standardisation in the clinical 
aspect 
According to the findings in Chapter 3, significant variations in 
mental disorders among individual patients are widely 
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recognised and make standardising needs and their 
corresponding interventions difficult. However, it is still possible 
to measure patients’ needs and predict interventions in a 
relatively valid, reliable and standardised way. This was first 
established in the form of the MRC Needs for Care Assessment 
Schedule (NFCAS) (Brewin et al., 1987). However, due to its 
complexity and dependence upon specific training if it is to be 
used reliably, it has not been widely used in everyday clinical 
practice. The MHCT was designed and employed as an 
alternative instrument that is simpler and easier to use. 
Nevertheless, its simplicity and explicitness come at the price of 
losing validity and reliability in the accurate assessment of 
patients’ needs. In particular, as an alternative, the conceptual 
flaws and accordingly, the constructional flaws of the MHCT 
classification system caused the failure to apply the 
standardisation principle to mental health service management. 
Therefore, this section elaborates this issue in four steps in a 
top-down order: outlining the complex nature of mental 
disorders, evaluating the theoretical viability of managing 
mental health services in a standardised way by evaluating the 
NFCAS, and examining the conceptual flaws and the 
corresponding constructional shortcomings of the MHCT 
classification system.          
 
   
5.3.1 Complex nature of mental disorders 
In contrast to acute services (facilitated by easily quantified 
indicators in largely known diagnostic and treatment systems), 
mental health is an area with significant variations among 
individuals, a lack of objective tests and a wide range of other 
uncertainties. The absence of biological markers that might 
otherwise explain aetiology and the heavy reliance on 
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symptoms rather than signs undermine the validity of mental 
diagnosis, which has led some to argue that a mental illness 
itself is a myth (Nesse and Stein, 2012; Szasz, 1961). As Rogers 
and Pilgrim (2010) state, the judgement as to whether one 
person is mentally ill relies mainly upon the person’s 
communication. Additionally, given that mental disorders are 
mostly chronic and easily affected by external social factors, 
clinicians are no longer treating diseases; rather, they are 
treating human beings as a whole closely connected with other 
social situations (Emmerson et al., 2004). Seen as a highly 
individualised problem involving different external uncertainties, 
diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders largely rests upon 
the point of view of the clinician (Jones, 2004). These singular 
characteristics of mental disorders indicate the difficulties in 
measuring the type and degree of needs and in turn, questions 
the validity of a classification system intended to define any one 
resulting care pathway (Jones, 2004). 
 
The lack of medical or clinical markers makes classification 
difficult and leads to large variations in judgement among 
clinicians, even when considering the same symptom of the 
same patient (Houts, 2001). Sarrami-Foroushani’s (2009) 
research findings echo this, specifically, the existence of 
variation in clinicians’ perceptions and their preferences of 
approach in treating adults with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder. Even the “gold standards” in mental health 
classification, the ICD and the DSM, are based upon the 
assumption of “normality-as-absence of pathology” and largely 
rely on the professional’s authoritative judgement (Houts, 
2001). Critiques focus on whether the experiences and 
perspectives of frontline clinicians are sufficient to identify 
illness correctly without any support from objective tests, let 
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alone the more complex dimensional scale adopted by the MHCT 
regarding within-group homogeneity and between-group 
heterogeneity (this will be discussed in Section 5.3.4). There 
are issues regarding how to unify the standards of different 
disorders with subjective benchmarks (Crowe, 2000). As 
Wakefield (1997) argues, only when the conceptual validity of 
definition and criteria is achieved, will the classification system 
be fully feasible.  
 
In addition to the initial complex nature of mental disorders, the 
following subsection reconsiders the needs assessment in 
greater conceptual detail, in which the technical viability of 
standardising mental health services to a certain extent is 
discussed with the recognition of the inappropriateness of 
rigidly standardising every activity (this has been discussed in 
Chapter 3). 
 
According to The NHS Plan (Secretary of State for Health, 2002), 
the NHS would shape services according to patient needs and 
preferences and thus establish a needs-centred service 
provision system. Rooted in the NHS’s value system, general 
health care and social service reforms require a needs 
assessment system for people with mental disorders. The 
underlying theory is that each patient should have individualised 
care service based upon the assessment of one’s needs 
(Marshall, 1994). Therefore, the first question could be 
interpreted as whether there is a valid way to classify mental 
disorders based upon needs and to provide the corresponding 
target interventions, which has been set as one fundamental 
aim of the NHS Modernisation. In relation to this question, the 
essential element is a definition of needs. 
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5.3.1.1 Needs assessment: Definition of “need” 
The foregoing discussion draws attention to the fact that it is 
more difficult to standardise clients’ needs for treatment and 
therefore, their resource implications in mental health than 
what tends to be the case amongst acute care patients. The 
NHS is committed to shaping services according to patients’ 
needs and preferences (Secretary of State for Health, 2000). 
This implies that each client should have an individualised care 
plan based upon an individualised assessment of needs 
(Marshall, 1994). Considered realistically, this has to be 
predicated by an acceptable understanding of “need” as it 
applies in this context. From a wider perspective, the definition 
of “need” is problematic. There is no broad consensus in 
reference to the concept of “need” in health and sociology 
literature (Asadi-Lari et al., 2004). In Taxonomy of Social Need 
(Bradshaw, 1972), Bradshaw categorises “needs” into four 
major clusters: felt need, expressed need, comparative need 
and normative need. In the context of mental health, Wing et 
al. (1992) suggest that “need” should be defined alongside 
potentially available “state-of-the-art” solutions. A healthcare 
“need” only exists when there could be a “treatment”. In parallel, 
the NHS defines “need” as the capacity to benefit from services 
(Asadi-Lari et al., 2004); the “need” for treatment and its 
resource implications cannot be separated from judgements 
concerning the type and amount of health care that clinical 
expertise believes to be beneficial in a particular situation (Magi 
and Allander, 1981). This definition builds a direct relationship 
between services and needs, consequently making it viable to 
provide services according to patients’ needs. Hence, an ideal 
needs assessment instrument should be able to: 1) detect the 
particular deviations (compared to standards or population); 
and 2) target the potentially appropriate health care services.  
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If the resource implications of providing for an individual are to 
be predicted, then the process of doing so must include, quite 
directly, the decisions made by clinicians about which course of 
action might be the most appropriate. In acute care settings, 
these are often implicit: providing for someone with an 
osteoarthritic hip could involve pain relief, physiotherapy, 
mobility support, rest or hip replacement. The course followed 
may well be determined by a detailed “diagnosis”, including 
information about the state of the hip joint in question, the 
patient’s degree of mobility, muscular tone and living conditions 
that would predict the course to be followed with little error. The 
nature of mental health difficulties is such that there is much 
broader scope for variations in “needs for care”, even amongst 
those with the same diagnosis (Wing et al., 1992). In this case, 
diagnosis-related groups cannot indicate the corresponding 
target services. In other words, the ICD/DSM is not sufficient 
enough to be used in isolation to determine mental health needs. 
Brewin et al. (1987) also illustrate the limitation of a diagnosis-
based classification system by highlighting the fundamental 
mismatch between needs and diagnoses: needs are defined 
around problems in individual functioning rather than around 
diagnostic labels. Indeed, sometimes diagnoses indicate needs 
for certain kinds of intervention, but they do not necessarily 
always lead to a particular type of intervention. They elaborate 
this argument by providing an example of severely depressed 
patients with delusions and psychomotor retardation. The 
patient may have at least three separate problems in 
functioning, against which at least three target interventions 
should have been specified. Nevertheless, the ICD/DSM could 
only provide one diagnosis. Therefore, the ideal needs 
assessment should be designed against functioning problems 
and be able to link them to the corresponding interventions. 
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5.3.1.2 The MRC Needs for Care Assessment 
Attempts to standardise and quantify the care of mental health 
service clients antedate attempts to implement PbR by several 
decades. A significant step was the development of the NFCAS 
(Brewin et al., 1987). The NFCAS has not been routinely use 
because in its original form, it is detailed and dependent upon 
specialised training if it is to be used reliably. Nevertheless, 
those qualities can also be considered virtues, and conceptually 
it addresses many of the shortcomings already identified with 
the MHCT. In particular, it sets out to capture clinical 
judgements concerning the propriety or otherwise of different 
courses of action, and therefore, generates an assessment of 
needs that more closely reflects what is deemed to be the 
appropriate care pathway. As a result, it is worth considering as 
an approach that could still have a useful application. 
 
The NFCAS was originally designed to measure the needs and 
provide structure to the provision of services for those with 
long-term mental health difficulties living in the community as 
large-scale mental institutions being phased out (Brewin et al., 
1987). In essence, it determines the presence or otherwise of 
difficulties across nine domains of psychiatric symptomatology, 
such as positive psychotic symptoms, dangerous or destructive 
behaviour, or distress, and twelve domains of essential 
everyday living skills, such as the ability to use public transport, 
maintain personal hygiene or manage a weekly budget. Based 
upon explicit criteria, a judgement about the presence or 
absence of difficulties (Problem Status) is made in relation to 
each of these twenty-one domains; for each of the nine areas 
of symptomatology, “Problem Status” is classified as "None or 
Mild", "Recent or Threatened", "Current and significant" or 
"Unknown", and for each of the eleven areas of essential living 
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skills Problem Status is classified in the same way as 
"Competence plus performance", "Recent or Threatened 
Problem", "Lack of competence", "Lack of performance" or 
"Unknown". 
 
Where there is evidence of threatened, recent or current 
symptomatology or a skill deficit, the potentially relevant 
treatments or interventions are evaluated accordingly. The 
interventions considered conceivably appropriate for each area 
of symptomatology and living skills are specified, which have 
been pre-determined by consensus from discussion with a 
broad range of mental health professionals. Therefore, where 
positive psychotic symptoms are or might be present, enquiries 
are made into whether or not any intervention such as 
medication, domiciliary visits, coping advice to the patient 
and/or relatives which might include alternative strategies, a 
family intervention or a sheltered environment might be 
appropriate and if so, whether or not they are being provided 
(Brewin et al., 1987). If any one of the relevant interventions is 
considered appropriate, but is not being provided, then a further 
enquiry is made into whether this is due to the fact that it has 
yet to be provided, has been offered and not taken up or has 
been tried and found to be ineffective. Where there is a problem 
with communication skills, for instance, similar judgements 
would be made concerning social skills training, practice in 
realistic settings or a sheltered daytime environment. Overall 
the NFCAS results in a detailed catalogue of clients’ difficulties 
and a statement of their “needs” couched in terms of clinically-
determined judgements concerning the suitability of 
consensually agreed interventions for each of them. This is 
clearly a more bespoke approach to identifying the resource 
implications of providing for a client and it incorporates the 
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outcome of clinical judgements. During the 1980s and 1990s, a 
number of studies confirmed both the reliability and validity of 
this approach (Brewin and Wing, 1993; Brewin et al., 1988; 
Marshall, 1994). This indicates that the NFCAS is a valid and 
reliable instrument to measure patients’ needs and accordingly 
indicate resource allocation to facilitate cost calculation. 
However, the very detail that endows the NFCAS with these 
qualities also makes it cumbersome to use. To ensure reliability, 
judgements concerning the presence or otherwise of difficulties 
in each of the twenty-one domains and judgements about the 
applicability of numerous treatment options all have to be made 
based on explicit criteria. Although many of these judgements 
are also, implicitly, the same judgements that might be made 
by a competent clinician, the NFCAS imposes a structure upon 
clinical assessment that could only be applied after rigorous 
training. As a result, it has not found a place in routine practice. 
Attempts to popularise a shortened and simplified derivative 
were made (Phelan et al., 1995) but needs assessment in this 
form has remained a research exercise. Despite its conceptual 
and metric superiority over the MHCT (this will be discussed in 
Section 5.3.3.2), its reputation and the demands of training 
have hindered its adoption as a basis for PbR in mental health 
service settings.  
 
In conclusion, the high validity and reliability of the NFCAS 
indicate that it is possible, although difficult, to measure 
patients’ needs and consequently manage mental health 
services in a standardised way to a certain extent. This leads to 
the second question: To what extent does the collaboration 
between the MHCT and the HoNOS fulfil the function of a quality 
classification system? 
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5.3.2 The conceptual function of the MHCT 
classification system 
The most obvious advantage of the MHCT and the application of 
the HoNOS are their suitability for incorporation into routine 
clinical practice. It only takes clinicians some 5-15 minutes to 
complete a HoNOS form (Jacobs, 2009) and it is reasonable to 
assume that most of the related judgements will have been 
made in the course of routine clinical activity. Mainly relying on 
the HoNOS scores, the MHCT serves as an instrument to assess 
the needs of patients who receive secondary mental health 
services and therefore collectively manages clinical resources 
accordingly (Monitor and NHS England, 2013a). Ergo, this 
section explores the effectiveness of the HoNOS and the 
conceptual function of the MHCT.  
 
 
5.3.2.1 The effectiveness of the HoNOS 
The HoNOS assesses general health and social functioning of 
people suffering from mental disorders and detects the severity 
of problems. Various studies have led to controversial results 
regarding the validity and reliability of HoNOS as an outcome 
measure (Lovaglio and Monzani, 2011). 
 
Regarding the validity of the HoNOS, Wing et al. (1998) 
concluded that the HoNOS has moderate validity regarding its 
construction, content and criteria. McClelland et al. (2000) 
conducted a series of studies to test the sensitivity and 
criterion-related validity of the HoNOS. Their outcome indicated 
that the HoNOS had comparable dynamic properties as well as 
high sensitivity. Lovaglio and Monzani’s (2011) study also 
investigated the internal structure validity of the HoNOS 
according to which the outcome of their research showed a 
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considerable acceptable internal consistency of the HoNOS. 
However, Brooks’s (2000) study derived an opposite conclusion. 
The HoNOS scores (including those rated at admission and 
discharge) were compared with Symptom Checklist 90 Revised 
and the Short-From 36. The outcome showed no correlation in 
the change of scores between the HoNOS and these two 
instruments, which questioned the validity of the HoNOS by 
highlighting the mismatches between the scores of the HoNOS 
and the existing widely used measures of mental health 
symptoms or health status. Regarding its reliability as an 
outcome measure, Orrell et al. (1999) and Wing et al. (1998) 
investigated its test-retest and item reliability. The results 
showed a moderate degree of reliability. Shergill et al. (1999) 
and Idaiani (2011) also tested the inter-rater reliability of the 
HoNOS. Their results indicated a good or adequate inter-rater 
reliability. In terms of its acceptability to the everyday clinical 
practice, McClelland et al.’s (2000) findings outlined its 
advantages, such as being “good for quantifying illness and 
change”, to “indicate the level of risk and improvement” and 
“useful for monitoring purpose”, however, they also noted the 
risks of misinterpretation and the inability to accurately reflect 
patient outcomes.  
 
 
5.3.2.2 The conceptual flaws of the MHCT classification 
system 
Gaps have been found between the theoretical function of the 
MHCT regarding assessing patients’ needs and the actual 
process of classification under the MHCT. Referring to the 
definition of need as previously discussed, “need” is defined by 
the alternative interventions. However, the standard process of 
categorising a patient (this has been introduced in Chapter 2) 
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indicates that the clusters are derived from evaluating the 
severity of problems before potential interventions are taken 
into consideration. In other words, although the HoNOS serves 
as a valid instrument to measure patients’ outcomes, the scores 
do not provide information regarding specific areas of patients’ 
needs at an individual level (Teesson et al., 2000). Unlike the 
NFCAS, which enables decisions to be made concerning needs 
based on interventions, the MHCT categorises medical cases 
first and then attaches corresponding interventions to each 
cluster. The reversed order reveals one conceptual flaw: rather 
than providing a structured way of considering and cataloguing 
the difficulties and needs for treatment, each client presents in 
a bespoken manner, it “forces” classification of cases into one 
of the 21 clusters based upon their presenting difficulties, and 
assumes that this in itself is a sufficient measure of resource 
implications. Moreover, without taking the availability of 
intervention into consideration, on the one hand, there may be 
patients who are categorised into a particular cluster, but there 
is no potential effective intervention subject to their problems. 
On the other hand, there may be multiple interventions 
available to patients suffering the same problem in the same 
cluster, which leads to difficulties in unifying a standardised care 
pathway. 
 
Furthermore, the content validity of the HoNOS when employed 
to guide classification is under question. In relation to the 
general level function of the MHCT in terms of managing medical 
cases and the corresponding resources collectively, limitations 
have also been found due to the applications of the HoNOS. As 
the core element of the classification system, the HoNOS was 
designed to be a brief assessment of functioning that measures 
clinical outcome changes, but not a classification instrument. 
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Collectively evaluating patients’ needs and thus horizontally 
managing interventions is different from assessing changes in 
one patient’s conditions at an individual level vertically. 
According to the content, the HoNOS is a multi-dimensional 
instrument to detect problems from different aspects. However, 
using only 12 items to detect one’s physical condition and social 
functioning results in an inevitable loss of detail. For instance, 
item 3 “problem drinking or drug taking”, may comprise four 
types of substance misuse, including alcohol only, one drug only, 
two substances and poly-substance. This would inevitably lead 
to a loss of information in rating and therefore, result in 
difficulties in making horizontal comparisons. Speak and Hay 
(2012) describe the difficulties in making a horizontal 
comparison on an item-by-item basis since certain items appear 
more sensitive to change within a particular population than 
others, which is one obvious shortcoming compared to the 
NFCAS that has been proved consistency in the score. As 
previously discussed, the scores obtained with the HoNOS do 
not comply with the existing wide-used instruments, which 
again brings its ability to comprehensively and appropriately 
evaluate patients’ health conditions into question.  
 
In conclusion, although the MHCT (mainly underpinned by the 
HoNOS) is a simpler measure with some advantages, such as 
being explicit and less time consuming, it suffers from the 
conceptual flaws of not taking account of potential interventions 
when making classifications. This in turn results in its failure to 
fulfil the function of an ideal needs assessment tool. The original 
purpose of the HoNOS limits its potential of facilitating 
classification. This also leads to scope for discordance between 
the HoNOS scores and the MHCT clusters. 
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5.3.3 The constructional drawbacks of the MHCT 
classification system 
The constructional problems which have originated from these 
conceptual flaws further confirm the lack of validity and 
reliability of the MHCT facilitating the provision of 
accurate/appropriate treatments to patients in a standardised 
way, not to mention connecting interventions to payment. The 
subsequent subsections explore the constructional problems of 
each segment in managing clinical services in a standardised 
way and the inconsistencies among them, which lead to 
difficulties in incorporating the individual segments into a whole 
standardised management instrument. 
 
 
5.3.3.1 The Mental Health Clustering Tool: Drawbacks of 
the classification mechanism 
Advantages of the MHCT approach to classifying cases are the 
ease of use and its applicability to the contemporary information 
systems. The fact that PbR is proving difficult to implement in 
mental health service contexts suggests that the loss of detail 
(21 clusters compared to over 1,500 HRGs in acute services) 
and operational validity accompanying these conveniences are 
proving problematic. Furthermore, clinicians regularly complain 
that the clusters do not fit an individual’s condition and this 
creates confusion for clinicians asked to ascribe people to 
“boxes” with no clinical sense behind them (Community Care, 
2013). For instance, Cluster 11 may contain patients with stable 
schizophrenia or stable bipolar. The condition of “stable” does 
not necessarily predict details concerning patients’ needs for 
care. In this case, one cluster may relate to more than one NICE 
guidance. Indeed, a diagnosis alone does not predict cost or 
prognosis for patients who suffer from problems such as 
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schizophrenia, but it is of value to guide clinical interventions 
for patients with problems such as dementia, OCD, phobic 
disorder, etc. (Solomka, 2011). Kingdon et al. (2012) stress that 
the abandonment of a diagnosis-based system makes it difficult 
to understand how clusters can work in MH PbR. Finally, with no 
prior consideration of services, the classification system MHCT 
itself has been criticised as a “labelling process” (Callard et al., 
2013; Middleton, 2013) which may result in its adverse 
consequences. As Yeomans (2012) argues, the credibility of the 
MHCT and its validity regarding accurate and proper 
classification are still to be tested and to do so properly would 
take years. By contrast, the NFCAS, cumbersome though it may 
be, is conceptually more appropriate, clinically grounded and 
robustly tested. The decision rules, acquiring which makes up 
NFCAS training can be operationalized and it is possible that 
these could be formatted as an automated algorithm. There is 
some evidence suggesting that this approach can be applied in 
everyday practice (Middleton et al., 1996), and so it could be 
adapted for this purpose. 
 
 
5.3.3.2 The HoNOS: Drawbacks of dimensional scales 
The HoNOS attempts to introduce quantitatively graded 
transitions between the “normal” and the “abnormal”. In fact, a 
reliable classification system should be subject to a wider 
spectrum of symptoms in mental health and it is important to 
accurately situate the cut-off points (Patel et al., 2014). 
However, mental health care is such a complex area in which 
even the categorical approach with simple “cut-off” groups is 
under the attack due to the blurring of boundaries (Maser and 
Patterson, 2002). As Aboraya (2012) argues, most of the time 
the boundaries between minimal and mild symptoms are not of 
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clinical significance enough to result in a different clinical 
decision. At the moment, there is a lack of general agreement 
on the number of dimensions and empirical studies for 
evaluating the validity and credibility of this system (Busko, 
2007). Hence, the lack of universal standards on dimensions 
requires more reliance on the clinicians’ ability. Therefore, 
blurred boundaries make the dimensional scale more complex, 
which in turn compromises the between-group heterogeneity.  
As discussed earlier, the HoNOS was originally devised and 
adopted to measure clinical outcomes rather than assessing 
needs or grouping patients and there is scope for discordance 
between the HoNOS scores and the MHCT clusters. In practice, 
the degree of severity and the condition of stability are not 
mutually exclusive. A patient with prominent auditory 
hallucinations could be in a stable condition for a long period of 
time. According to the MHCT decision tree, this patient should 
be clustered into Cluster 11 (with an expectation of hallucination 
to be rated as “0-1”). However, the HoNOS rating for 
“Hallucinations and Delusions” could be 3, indicating that this 
patient should be clustered differently. The initial scope of 
application of the HoNOS could partly explain its shortcomings. 
The HoNOS ratings only test the general health and social 
functioning rather than measuring specific healthcare outcomes 
or clinical effectiveness (Harrison et al., 2004). Neither does it 
take account of one’s culture, poverty, risk, bereavement, etc. 
Other specific scales, such as the Hamilton Rating Scale for 
Depression work more effectively than the more general HoNOS. 
As discussed earlier, the idea of “standardisation-to the-
average”, which identifies a range of phenomena with one 
representative standard may not be appropriate in such a highly 
individualised area. Merely relying on the HoNOS as the 
standardised outcome assessment attached to MHCT clusters 
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may not be a sufficiently reliable approach. More condition-
specific outcome data are necessary if patients’ needs, severity 
and responses to treatment are to be assessed with sufficient 
accuracy. For reasons such as these, critical organisations, such 
as the Royal College of Psychiatrists (2013), have questioned 
the validity of the MHCT, and these criticisms are also applicable 
to the notion of standardised care pathways.  
 
 
5.3.3.3 The MHCT Care pathways: Difficulties in 
standardisation 
As the basis of PbR tariff cost calculations, care pathways link 
clinical activity to payment. However, this connection remains 
aspirational. To date, there is no formal association between 
“cluster” and care pathway, and besides the conceptual flaws of 
the MHCT, reasons for this delay include the nature of patient-
centred care and the coexistence of multiple treatments. 
 
Conventional mental health services involve wide variations in 
the services provided, even in relation to very comparable cases. 
As the Royal College of Psychiatrists (2013) states, in 
consideration of the large variations in individual conditions, 
minimum standards are published but wide interpretation and 
different treatments are allowed. The complex nature of mental 
disorders determines that the focal point of mental health 
services should be the process of knowing patients and their 
needs (Jones, 2004). 
 
Due to the personalised treatment in mental health, different 
therapeutic approaches and other types of treatment such as 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) and counselling can be 
offered to patients with similar needs (Cheshire and Pilgrim, 
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2004). It may be easier to standardise drug protocols and some 
biological approaches but it is difficult to identify a standardised 
procedure for developing a relationship with patients in 
treatments such as CBT. Furthermore, clear evidence of efficacy 
among a range of psychiatric treatments is hard to find, and so 
it is common for clinicians to provide psychiatric care according 
to their own value systems, which may be inconsistent with 
their fellow members (Jones, 2004). This conforms to Lipsky’s 
(1980) “street-level bureaucracy” theory as discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
 
In summary, patient-centred care and the coexistence of 
multiple treatments reveal the difficulties in standardising 
mental health services into one care pathway subject to a 
specific cluster. To make it viable, it requires a sophisticated and 
complex classification system that can accurately categorise 
patients into groups according to their needs. In this case, the 
alternative MHCT classification system is more a managerial 
strategy than a “real” clinical instrument that helps to identify 
the “root problem” and therefore, predict the corresponding 
treatment. 
 
 
 
5.4 The principles of standardisation in the financial 
aspect 
Alongside the difficulties in standardising clinical treatment 
under the MHCT, the feasibility of using “standardisation-to the-
average” principle to calculate a national tariff has also been 
questioned due to its mechanical drawbacks and corresponding 
risks. 
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5.4.1 Drawbacks of the “standardisation-to the-average” 
Even if cases can be catalogued in such a way that meaningfully 
predicts resource implications, there is still work to be done 
before tariffs can be established and used as the basis of 
remunerating NHS provider organisations. The direct costs and 
other resources needed to support each of a broad range of 
activities must be defined. To act as a quality improvement 
mechanism, rather than encouraging competition on price, PbR 
requires a national average unit cost for each healthcare activity. 
Thus, for each set of treatment activities, a national average 
unit cost has to be estimated (Self et al., 2008b) and this 
depends on the availability of data that identifies costs of 
particular activities across a wide range of provider 
organisations. This in turn, assumes that the costs of treating a 
particular category of cases incurred by different providers 
follow a roughly normal distribution so that their arithmetic 
mean is a meaningful average. It also implies that “deviances” 
can be categorised as the extremes of both sides of the cost 
distribution curve and an effect of pursuing “standardised cost” 
will be to reduce deviance employing a “standardisation-to the-
average” principle (Department of Health, 2012b). 
 
However, the study by the PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2012) 
indicates that even for the same service, the unit costs reported 
by providers largely differ from each other. The causal reasons 
for this are attributed to the variations in costing methods and 
missing key information such as age and morbidity. The very 
nature of mental health difficulties means that the focal point of 
treatment should be the process of knowing patients and their 
needs (Jones, 2004). Insofar, as this has been the approach 
adopted by mental health services to date, there is very little 
quality data to draw upon which is able to identify the costs of 
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providing for this, that or a third category of client. Thus, there 
is little to draw upon in pursuit of unit costs that might be 
averaged to compute a national tariff. Therefore, from a 
statistical point of view, variations in the cost that providers 
attribute to each group results in a large standard error of the 
mean value in contrast to the assumption of “standardisation-
to the-average”, which assumes that all providers have similar 
cost structures. As a consequence, the employment of national 
tariffs derived in this way risks the financial stability of the 
outlying providers, something that is seen as a risk for the long-
term implementation of MH PbR (Appleby et al., 2012). It is the 
consideration of these financial risks that encouraged Australian 
and New Zealand governments to deliberately separate their 
payment system from their classification system (Mason and 
Goddard, 2009). 
 
It has also been argued that a consequence of the 
“standardisation-to the-average” principle is that it encourages 
providers to become “average” rather than improving their 
performance (Llewellyn and Northcott, 2005). This payment 
system hinders innovation: providers are required to conduct 
practice in standardised pathways and get paid at the national 
average level unless they can provide persuasive evidence for a 
new service and its impact on cost reduction, capacity 
enhancement or quality improvement. However, the process of 
proving the effectiveness of a new product is often difficult, 
especially in this rigid system (Appleby et al., 2012). 
 
 
5.4.2 Side effects: Financial pressure 
Financial pressures brought about by limited resources result in 
tensions between the greater good of society and the 
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individual’s needs, especially in the context of the “ethical duty” 
on doctors to reduce NHS waste (National Health Executive, 
2014). Given that MH PbR brings resource management/cost 
control approaches into clinical services, some concerns have 
been placed on the potential risk, that it may undermine 
clinicians’ obligation to put individual patient’s interests first 
when these two interests do not overlap (Rosenbaum and 
Lamas, 2012). In such a circumstance, concerns have been 
raised that the fixed price payment system might compromise 
the quality of care when providers “game the system” through 
“up-coding” and “cream-skim” (Boyle, 2007) (this will be 
discussed in Chapter 6). Oyebode (2007) argues that MH PbR 
may impose heavier incentives to “cherry-pick” since non-
statutory organisations tend to pick patients with lower costs 
than the average and leave the more severe to the statutory 
hospitals. Therefore, statutory hospitals are likely to face more 
financial risks, which lead to higher risks of compromising 
quality, such as early discharge (Sainsbury Centre for Mental 
Health, 2004). 
 
The complexity of the clustering system also results in errors in 
the clustering process with a classification system that has 
already suffered from constructional drawbacks. One chief 
executive of the consultancy on Health Strategies revealed that 
40% of MH PbR clusters had been found incorrect in one large 
mental health trust (Lintern, 2012). The same study also 
revealed low confidence in the quality of cluster data and, 
therefore, a low state of readiness for implementing MH PbR 
care packages. In this respect, the insufficient and low-quality 
data in turn increases the risk of financial instability if payments 
are based upon them. 
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Summary 
For a better understanding of how political intents are 
transformed into detailed policies/targets that influence 
everyday frontline practice, this chapter explored the 
formulation of the MH PbR policy by focusing on the construction 
of the MH PbR, including its clinical classification system and 
price calculation system. On the basis of the arguments in 
Chapter 3 that attributed the commodification as the essence of 
the design of MH PbR, this chapter explored the functional 
problems by analysing the conceptual and therefore, 
constructional flaws: the difficulties in applying the 
“standardisation-to-the-average” principle to managing mental 
health services and thus calculating nationally-fixed prices. As 
previously outlined, MH PbR is partly invoked as a classification 
system with the absence of a price calculation system in mental 
health. This on the one hand, implies the initial drawbacks of 
the classification system given its role as the foundation of the 
cost calculation, and on the other hand, indicates more 
attention being paid to discussing the construction of the MHCT 
classification system in this chapter. In this respect, this chapter 
analysed the construction of the MHCT system by answering 
three questions from a fundamental to a practical level: 1) is it 
feasible to manage mental health services in a comparatively 
standardised way; 2) is the underpinning concept of the MHCT 
valid in terms of predicting standardised treatment subject to 
the clusters; and 3) if not, what are the constructional 
drawbacks of the MHCT classification system?  
 
This chapter began with contextualising the MH PbR policy by 
reiterating the importance of the norm “normality/abnormality” 
and thus suggesting the development of mental health services 
as a process of seeking “standardisation”. The introduction of 
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the NFCAS indicated that although difficult, clinical needs can 
be assessed in a standardised way and thus care/interventions 
can also be predicted and provided in a standardised, valid and 
reliable way. By comparing it to the NFCAS, this chapter 
demonstrated that the MHCT classification system suffers from, 
not only the conceptual flaws regarding the accurately and 
comprehensively assessing patients’ needs, but also the 
constructional difficulties in standardising each segment and 
therefore, incorporating them as a whole. In comparison with 
the NFCAS, the MHCT has to be recognised as an expedient 
shortcut, and given the shortcomings that have been considered 
here, is perhaps too premature to serve its intended purpose. 
Based on the argument against the constructional flaws of the 
MHCT classification as a whole, Section 5.4 further discussed 
the potential risks of applying the “standardisation-to-the-
average” principle in calculating nationally-fixed prices, 
including its lack of validity and side effects. This chapter did 
not intend to argue that it is not applicable to establish financial 
incentives for providing mental health services, given the cost 
control in acute service settings, but to point to the difficulties 
in fulfilling political intents given the poor quality data derived 
from such an incomplete classification system. In other words, 
this chapter attempted to argue that the implementation of MH 
PbR as a payment system becomes contentious since it is 
conducted in a hurried and inaccurate manner. 
 
All of the criticisms from the theoretical evaluation described 
above, including the conceptual flaws and therefore, the 
constructional problems behind MH PbR, have contributed to its 
“low state of readiness”. Hence, this sheds light on the empirical 
study, on its implementation in mental health and the 
corresponding problems in practice by outlining areas worth 
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particular attention, including the complex nature of mental 
disorders, the constructional drawbacks of the classification 
system, the mechanical problems of average-based cost 
calculation and “gaming” behaviours. The subsequent two 
chapters will present and discuss the findings from the semi-
structured interviews and the online surveys. As previously 
elaborated in Chapter 4, the interview research was set as the 
primary approach while the online surveys were conducted 
mainly for a confirmatory purpose. In this respect, Chapter 6 
will present the findings from the semi-structured interviews 
conducted with the key players in the commissioning circle, and 
in Chapter 7, the questionnaire data will be triangulated with 
the corresponding data derived from the previous qualitative 
analysis. 
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6. The implementation of the MH PbR policy: Interview 
results and findings 
 
 
Introduction  
Based upon the theoretical evaluation conducted in Chapters 3 
and 5, this chapter aims to evaluate the MH PbR policy by 
investigating its implementation at the frontline, including 
current progress (by April 2014) and the perceived problems 
created by the implementation. To answer the research 
questions outlined in Chapter 1, the interviews involved 12 
participants from three interest groups: two commissioners 
(coded as C); seven from the hospital managerial level (coded 
as M), including financial managers, clinical managers, interim 
managers and MH PbR trainers; and three frontline clinicians 
(coded as S). The participants revealed how the MH PbR system 
actually worked in practice, in particular, how the policies and 
targets derived from the MH PbR project influenced their routine 
work. They also expressed their attitudes towards the 
implementation of the MH PbR policy in mental health and 
elaborated reasons to support their arguments. The problems 
they perceived include some initial problems of the MH PbR 
classification system as well as external factors, such as the 
derived policies and side effects. These problems demonstrate 
the “bad execution” and “bad luck” of the MH PbR policy, and 
additionally reveal the gaps between theory and practice.   
 
As illustrated in Chapter 4, the semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with key elements derived from the theoretical 
analysis, including MH PbR overview, current stage 
implementation, the MHCT, the HoNOS, the MHCT care 
pathways, outcome measurements, “gaming” behaviours, 
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driving factors and corresponding solutions. During the coding 
process, codes and groups emerged from the transcripts. By 
comparing codes with-in the transcript and between transcripts, 
the relationships between codes were identified (e.g., frontline 
clinicians’ reluctancy was attributed to the complex nature of 
mental disorders, the constructional flaws of the classification 
system and intensively established policies). The analysis 
process benefited from both top-down induction informed by 
previous literature and bottom-up induction guided by the GTM 
principles. This process, in turn, faciliated the establishment of 
the logic of this chapter, which investigates the implementation 
stage of the MH PbR policy in four steps: 1) explain the reasons 
for the reform; 2) present the current stage of  the 
implementation of MH PbR; 3) analyse the factors that have 
caused the delay by evaluating the core elements of the MH PbR 
system and investigating the gaps between theory and practice; 
and 4) propose suggestions for further improvement. In this 
chapter, attention has been given to the different or even 
conflicting perspectives among participants from different 
subgroups or even within the same group. These perspectives 
are presented and organised to discuss the driving factors 
leading to the reform, factors that have caused the delay and 
corresponding suggestions.  
 
Beginning with a summary of the mechanism of the Block 
Contract, the first section outlines the major drawbacks of the 
Block Contract and the trend of reform. Section 6.2 further 
elaborates upon the payment system reform by illustrating the 
major benefit brought about by MH PbR: the transparent 
information system. Section 6.3 outlines the current stage of 
the implementation of MH PbR from three aspects: clinical 
strategy design, contract negotiation and frontline practice. 
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Section 6.4 evaluates the core elements of the MH PbR system. 
The drawbacks of each element, together with the lack of 
coordination between them, are discussed, leading to further 
exploration of the driving factors behind the delay. Section 6.5 
focuses on investigating the driving factors based on the 
previous two sections. This chapter concludes with some 
suggestions for future improvement. 
 
 
 
6.1 Move from the Block Contract 
In recognition of the initial problems of the Block Contract and 
the financial disadvantages for not being paid by MH PbR, it has 
become a political and a realistic trend to replace the Block 
Contract with PbR in mental health in a context where PbR has 
already been implemented in acute services for a decade. As 
the starting point of the payment reform, this section introduces 
the working mechanism of the Block Contract and explains its 
major drawbacks.  
 
 
6.1.1 Working mechanisms of the Block Contract 
At the time the interviews were undertaken, the Block Contract 
was still a dominant payment mechanism in mental health. It 
was considered suitable for mental health services due to its 
straightforward payment mechanism, which protects financial 
stability for both commissioners and providers in such an area 
with uncertainties and unknowns (due to the lack of a payment 
cap).  
 
That (the Block Contract) is just very straightforward. The 
providers know what income they will be getting. We know what 
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we are paying for. So there is a lot less work in terms of time 
span on the provider-side and the commissioner-side in terms 
of the actual transaction of money. (C2) 
 
Under the Block Contract, commissioners pay a lump sum of 
money for a whole bunch of services, employing general targets 
to measure work, such as Occupied Bed Days (OBDs) for 
inpatient services and face-to-face contacts for community 
services. As an activity-focused payment system, payments 
differ between the specified types of contact rather than 
different patients’ diagnoses/needs. Regarding this system, the 
lump-sum payment reflects the purchase/provider relationship 
since the reached agreement ensures the trade between the 
amount of work and the amount of money. From the 
managerial-level perspective, the straightforward payment 
mechanism ensures provider-side financial stability, which is the 
mechanical drawback of the cost-calculation system under MH 
PbR as discussed in Chapters 3 and 5. Moreover, both the 
commissioners and managers noted the significant amount of 
collateral transaction costs that will come along with MH PbR 
payment: in order to make the money cost-effective, there 
would inevitably generate some ex ante costs, including 
information searching and cost calculation, and some ex post 
facto costs, including monitoring and enforcement (in the case 
of contractual disputes). 
 
 
6.1.2 Major drawbacks of the Block Contract 
However, concerns have been raised about this system due to 
the absence of a clear link between clinical services and 
payment. Due to the lack of detailed information about services, 
neither side has sufficient knowledge regarding the actual 
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quality of services or the outcomes in relation to the 
interventions.  
 
Whether the Trust was delivering quality, good outcomes or not, 
it did not matter. They still got that amount of money. (M4) 
 
The commissioners and providers both expressed their 
discontent about the payment mechanism, but from different 
perspectives. The tight budget has raised the commissioners’ 
attention to maximising the utility of the limited amount of 
money. From the commissioners’ perspective, the Block 
Contract is an income insurance for providers under which they 
get more reimbursements than what they have actually 
provided.  
 
It means that we are paying more than we think it should be. 
(C2) 
 
By contrast, the managers argued that they have provided more 
and higher-quality work than what the contract had required. 
From their perspective, the current payment calculation 
mechanism could accurately measure neither clinical input nor 
output.  
 
One of the problems is that people do a lot of stuff and the state 
sectors do not always see that it costs money to do everything. 
(M5) 
One of my problems in terms of the provision of mental health 
services is that there is such a mismatch between demand and 
supply. Because we’ve got no mechanism of measuring either 
demand or supply. (M3) 
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According to the contract mechanism, no other necessary work, 
such as preparation and phone calls, is counted except face-to-
face contacts. Additionally, the frontline clinicians revealed that 
contacts are not counted unless the patient physically comes to 
the clinic or opens the door for the clinicians who provide home-
consults regardless of the behind-the-scene preparatory work. 
Moreover, the targets were regarded as a burden for the 
frontline clinicians since they were made to accomplish the 
tasks rather than conducting practice for patients’ interests (this 
will be discussed in Sections 6.5.3 and 6.5.4). As a result, 8 out 
of the 12 participants from different posts attributed the 
underlying reason to a lack of a transparent information system.  
 
I think there is a problem with the Block Contract. In that, the 
commissioners cannot fully use their responsibilities for their 
commissioning because they are giving a whole money and do 
not know where it is going to. In fact, nobody knows where the 
money goes to. There needs to be a transparent system where 
it is clear how much money is for one particular thing and then 
there can be a system of feedbacks and audits to the 
commissioners about what is actually happening. (S3) 
 
 
6.1.3 The trend to move to MH PbR 
Mental health care has long been underfunded: mental health 
problems account for 23% of the total impact of ill in the UK 
while mental health services receive only 13% of the NHS 
budget (with over 67% of CCGs stating that they spend less 
than 10% of their budget on mental health) (All Party 
Parliamentary Group on Mental Health, 2015; Campbell, 2014). 
When compared with the funding invested in acute services, the 
commissioners and providers recognised the second-order 
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effect: the funding for mental health services has been diverted 
away to acute services since PbR is invoked in that field.  
 
Our mental health services have been massively disadvantaged 
by not being under PbR. So in the context of everything else 
being in PbR, we need to be in PbR as well, because what is 
happening is that the acute trusts have their costs all being paid 
in PbR and we have to manage under block contracts. 
Sometimes the squeeze has been on us. It is not our 
overspending, but the commissioners have a finite pot of money. 
(M6) 
 
Moreover, it has been noted that the “cost-and-volume” 
payment system encourages hospitals to admit more patients 
into acute services, among whom, some should have been 
treated in community care or by secondary mental health 
services. In recognising the disadvantages of not being under 
PbR, the participants from both the commissioner and manager 
sides believed it necessary to introduce MH PbR to obtain 
enough funding from the limited budget. In other words, both 
the managers and commissioners considered moving to MH PbR 
as an approach to reach the equivalence of the care budget. 
 
In the ideal world, it would be in a way to get a much fairer 
distribution of funding for mental health. (M6) 
 
In consideration of the two obvious problems described above, 
all participants from both the commissioner and manager sides 
noted the necessity of replacing the Bock Contract and regarded 
moving to MH PbR as a step in the right direction. The next 
section outlines the essential theoretical benefit of introducing 
MH PbR, which is the transparent information system. 
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6.2 The major advantage of MH PbR: The transparent 
information system 
Regarding the broad understanding of MH PbR, the 
commissioners and managers considered MH PbR a 
breakthrough from the Block Contract at the strategic level by 
appraising the changes created by the market mechanism and 
the transparent information system facilitated by the attached 
subsystems, as the following subsections illustrate.  
 
 
6.2.1 Changes created by the market mechanism 
Chapter 2 elaborated the rationale behind PbR as it encourages 
non-price competition among different types of providers. As 
one manager illustrated, under PbR, the process of linking 
payments to healthcare services was expected to encourage 
providers and commissioners to develop an accurate evidence-
based information system in an effort to avoid financial risks.   
 
In terms of the clarity, they will know what they are buying, 
because in communicating not only the commissioners, but also 
to the frontline staff and service users and carers, if you fit 
Cluster 10, you can expect A, B, C, D… That’s what the 
commissioners will be expecting us to provide them. (M7) 
 
Both the commissioners and managers appreciated the 
economic mechanism of PbR that encourages providers to pay 
attention to costs and efficiency and thus allocate resources 
more strategically, which is particularly important in a context 
of austerity.  
 
PbR would force providers to look at their costs. … Now 
obviously you are being paid by activity. It should make things 
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more efficient in terms of the costs. (C2) 
 
One consequence of the provider-side competition is to 
encourage providers to focus on patients’ outcome to attract 
more patients, which was regarded as a step in the right 
direction by both the managers and commissioners. 
 
I really like it because we will actually be looking at the quality 
of outcomes and money will follow that. (C1) 
 
 
6.2.2 The specific benefit: Transparent IT system 
Besides the drawbacks of the Block Contract and the 
disadvantages of not being under PbR, the core reasons for 
moving to MH PbR were attributed to the transparent 
information system and the corresponding theoretical benefits, 
which will be discussed from two aspects: the clinical aspect and 
the financial aspect. 
 
 
6.2.2.1 The clinical aspect 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the MHCT categorises a patient into 
one of the 21 clusters according to their symptoms using the 
HoNOS. Consequently, by applying the scales to classify 
patients, the categorising mechanism indicates that providers 
would develop better knowledge of patients’ problems and 
corresponding treatments, according to the participants from 
the managerial level.  
 
PbR itself and the whole thing are providing us with lots of 
information. So we know how many people in certain clusters, 
therefore we know the levels of need. … So it is helping the 
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Trust to look more strategically at what it is doing. (M2) 
 
Additionally, as the first time introducing the outcome 
measurement, it enables both commissioners and providers to 
focus on service quality. From a managerial perspective, the 
outcome measurement adopted to re-assess the patient at the 
end of a treatment period was seen as an effective approach to 
help frontline clinicians make decisions for next-stage 
interventions according to their needs for care. It was also 
regarded as able to help commissioners and providers dig down 
to specific cases to check whether the patient has been provided 
effective interventions or why the patient has not received 
appropriate treatments at the administrative level.  
 
Within the cluster transitions, which is after the end of period 
care, you can discharge someone back to primary care, or you 
can move them to a different PbR cluster. I would say that we 
will be able to see who is doing well and who is not doing so 
well. We could see which service is effective and which service 
is less effective and we can ask questions. (M3) 
 
The managerial level participants also regarded the provider-
side competition as another collateral theoretical benefit 
brought about by transparency. They appreciated the 
transparent information system by outlining the prospects for 
commissioners and patients: commissioners would be able to 
compare different providers based upon outcomes and quality, 
whereas patients would be able to choose the providers with 
higher quality as described by the Money Follows the Patient 
(Secretary of State for Health, 2002). 
 
Trusts would be compared with each other. So the outcomes 
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and the quality at some points would be transparent. We will be 
able to see which trusts are performing well, which trusts are 
not. For the public and service users, they will be able to choose 
now. (M4) 
 
 
6.2.2.2 The financial aspect               
From the financial side, the managers and commissioners 
appreciated the fair payment system under MH PbR, which is 
facilitated by the predetermined care pathways as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Compared to the Block Contract, the “payment 
against care pathways” model outlines the type and amount of 
services providers will be expected to deliver and the amount of 
payment they will receive from commissioners.  
 
At the same time, MH PbR provides a chance for providers to 
evaluate the services they deliver but have not been included in 
the contract. Providers would be able to look into these 
interventions and make decisions on whether to stop providing 
them or to negotiate with commissioners by taking account of 
both necessity and efficiency. From the manager side, the 
evidence-based negotiation was considered beneficial since it 
would offer providers a chance to pay more attention to patients’ 
needs. 
 
When we look into the things, we are actually delivering some 
elementary cares that we are not commissioned to. We need 
those conversations with the commissioners “Do you want these 
services?” (M1) 
 
Nevertheless, potential risks derived from the financial 
incentives have been noted by the managerial-level participants. 
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They were aware that providers may be encouraged to attract 
more patients and do more work, which will make it harder to 
realise the strategic plan regarding transferring patients to 
primary care. In this respect, it has become a potential risk or 
even an inevitable outcome that MH PbR would become a 
finance-led system that it was not supposed to be. As the quote 
below indicates, the managerial-level participants have 
recognised the potential risk that this finance-led system may 
eventually compromise patient-centred care in a context where 
financial issues attract more attention.  
 
I think the bad thing about it is that it seems like a finance-led 
project and probably shouldn’t be, cause actually it is about 
patient outcomes and patients’ needs. (M1) 
 
This reveals that the managers and commissioners were aware 
of the potential risks brought about by MH PbR besides 
appreciating its theoretical benefits. This also paves the way for 
the subsequent comparison of the splitting perspectives 
between the managerial-level and frontline-level participants 
(this will be discussed in Chapter 7). The next section describes 
the progress of the implementation of MH PbR at the time the 
interviews were conducted from three aspects including clinical 
strategy, contract negotiation and frontline practice. 
 
 
 
6.3 Current stage of implementation 
At the time when the interviews were undertaken, 
commissioners and providers had set up a transitional process 
leading to the MH PbR system. To ensure a smooth transition, a 
series of new projects such as the MHCT, the MHCT care 
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pathways and the RiO information system were either under 
development or being undertaken as the preparatory work. 
Drawing upon the importance of the clinical structure design to 
the cost calculation system as discussed in Chapter 2, as well 
as the importance of the policy formulation to the 
implementation as discussed in Chapter 1, this section 
illustrates the current progress in an order of clinical strategy, 
contract negotiation and frontline practice. 
 
 
6.3.1 Clinical strategy design 
By acknowledging that there would be no new money coming 
into the system, the managers considered both patients’ needs 
and the resources at their disposal to maximise resource 
utilisation. Financial issues were discussed horizontally between 
financial managers and clinical managers without vertically 
going down to the frontline level. By noting that 
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust (NHT) was 
underperforming, financial managers worked closely with 
clinical managers to develop more cost-effective clinical 
strategies to minimise any possible financial risk. The fortnightly 
meetings involving the financial team, clinical directors and the 
senior general management team went through service design 
and service transformation at the strategic level. Regarding 
specific responsibilities at the current stage, clinical managers 
were responsible for reducing inpatient beds, building up care 
pathways, training frontline clinicians and sharing information, 
whilst financial managers started to cost up the pathways and 
negotiate with commissioners. 
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6.3.1.1 Efficiency 
As both the managers and commissioners noted, the NHT 
currently had low efficiency of service delivery, which reminded 
the managers to pay attention to costs and efficiency in an effort 
to avoid financial risks, as the quote below describes:  
 
They are starting to realise that if certainly there is a national 
price coming along that they would be really out of pocket 
because they have too much inpatient care. (C2) 
 
At the moment, the long OBDs were seen as the major reason 
for the NHT’s high costs and low efficiency. Both the financial 
and clinical managers were aware of the financial risks brought 
about by the high percentage of inpatient services, especially 
by those provided to the patients with lower-level needs.  
 
We have got lots of patients we are treating actually should 
probably be treated in primary care by GPs because they have 
got minor depression and in Clusters 1, 2 and 3. (M1)  
 
Regarding the policy to close secondary beds, the managerial-
level participants (managers and commissioners) advocated the 
policy by regarding it as a good way to improve efficiency as 
long as the services between divisions were integrated to ensure 
patients proper treatments, although they had noted the news 
reports regarding the adverse consequences (this will be 
discussed in Chapter 8).  
 
I would support beds being closed as long as those patients 
could be safely and well managed in the community. (C1) 
 
Therefore, the managers were looking at integrating resources 
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between primary and secondary services based on care 
pathways. As the managers were aware, the clinical strategies, 
such as discharging patients out of secondary care, are not new, 
but MH PbR reminds providers of the importance of efficiency, 
thus encouraging multi-disciplinary collaboration involving 
different mental health professionals for higher efficiency. To 
accurately distinguish the patients whom could be discharged, 
the managers noted the importance of clustering. Therefore, 
priority has been placed on getting every patient accurately 
clustered and coded. At the moment, frontline clinicians were 
required to cluster every patient whilst discharging patients in 
Clusters 1-3, Cluster 7 and Cluster 11, or re-assigning them to 
a higher cluster.  
 
 
6.3.1.2 Training 
Meanwhile, the managers realised the importance of training to 
the accuracy of classification and the establishment of an 
integrated information system. In this respect, the NHT has 
launched a series of training sessions since 2013 to help 
frontline clinicians better understand how the subsystems work 
and how to use them properly in this integrated system. By the 
time the interviews were conducted, training sessions had been 
provided to nearly 400 out of 800 frontline staff who are the 
priority ones responsible for clustering patients. 
 
For the frontline clinical staff, they are going to be clustering 
the patients. So they need to know that they are going through 
the right process and also to make sure that they understand 
why they are doing it and the changes are happening. (M4) 
 
In the training sessions, specific scenarios were provided to 
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show frontline clinicians how to detect patients’ needs, when to 
cluster patients and how to use the information to cluster them. 
To facilitate decision-making for frontline clinicians, the RiO 
information system was being developed to record patient 
medical information and the treatments provided by frontline 
clinicians. The algorithm provides suggested interventions in a 
drop-down menu after frontline clinicians input the patient’s 
assessment results. The managers and commissioners expected 
the RiO to provide frontline clinicians a clear sense of quality 
and efficiency by comparing what they are delivering with what 
they should deliver.   
 
Regarding this new system, participants from all interest groups 
realised the necessity and the importance of training by 
acknowledging the fact that frontline clinicians generally lacked 
understanding of the new project, as well as the large variations 
in clinical skills among frontline clinicians. 
 
You just realise how many frontline people just did not 
understand. They did not understand the general understanding 
of the clustering, although there were different opinions. They 
(the trainers) gave some scenarios, and people had to cluster 
based on the information. Everyone from the table went out 
slightly different, which was worrying. (C1) 
That is very evident from my personal experience that the Trust 
and the staff themselves are completely inconsistent. (S2) 
 
In recognition of the frontline clinicians’ lack of understanding 
of the system, in particular, their reactive working patterns, the 
managers expected the clustering system to improve service 
efficiency by promoting a change in their way of thinking.  
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It is getting people to think about the clustering as part of their 
daily practice. For the review periods at the moment, our staff 
are working on a reactive basis rather than a preactive basis. … 
But actually if they start thinking on the lines, if they meet 
somebody they look and see when the next review period is, 
and base their appointments on that, it would be more 
streamlined, wouldn’t it? (M4) 
 
 
6.3.1.3 The MHCT care pathways 
Due to the uncertainties of mental health conditions and the 
existence of different alternative treatments, the MHCT care 
pathways were in the piloting stage. In recognition of the value 
the care pathways in terms of making sense of the classification 
system, the managers regarded it as a priority to establish the 
MHCT care pathways.  
 
We are trying to develop the care pathways reaching clusters 
so they (frontline clinicians) can get a sense of who fits where 
as well as what they are doing. (M6) 
 
At the moment, the NHT was also developing quality outcome 
measurements to facilitate the MHCT care pathways. During the 
pilot of the MHCT are pathways, the NHT conducted two clinical 
audits in April 2013 and October 2013. During these two audits, 
the managers assessed the effectiveness of the care pathways 
using the newly developed outcome indicators, such as patient 
transition, the frequency of review, the trim point of review and 
review outcomes. Besides these rough indicators, the 
commissioners expressed their expectations for more 
measurements to quantify and qualify clinical services.  
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Alongside the information gathering process, the managers also 
paid attention to sharing information with participants within 
the service delivery circle. The NHT was providing information 
on three levels according to the level of needs. For carers and 
service users, the NHT kept information concise and 
approachable. Detailed clinical information was provided to staff 
but no longer to carers or service users. The information behind 
the scene, such as financial issues was only available to 
commissioners and managers and not to frontline clinicians.  
 
 
6.3.1.4 Linking service to payment 
In order to better facilitate attaching tariffs to clinical activities, 
financial managers were cooperating with clinical managers to 
ensure the efficiency of clinical strategies. From a strategic point 
of view, financial managers emphasised more on the productive 
efficiency of the organisation. By working closely with clinical 
managers, the financial managers’ responsibility was to prevent 
the NHT from experiencing any financial instability under the 
newly established payment system. Meanwhile, the managers 
of different divisions met twice a month to work through 
financial and clinical issues relating to MH PbR. By 
communicating with the clinical managers on a regular basis, 
the financial managers considered themselves able to obtain 
frontline-level information in order to ensure that the frontline 
clinicians were conducting practice according to the clinical 
strategy.  
 
 
6.3.2 The contract negotiation 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the MHCT and the corresponding care 
pathways are the foundation of the cost calculation system. As 
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this stage, the care pathways had just been developed and were 
being piloted. Without a fully established information system, 
both the commissioners and providers expressed their 
willingness to remain temporarily under the Block Contract. 
During the transition period, commissioners set a double-
running system: on the one hand, they kept contracting based 
on OBDs for inpatient services and face-to-face contacts for 
outpatient services, on the other hand, they began to monitor 
clinical services using MH PbR targets. 
 
 
6.3.2.1 The current progress 
The awareness of the trend of implementing MH PbR was seen 
as a driving factor for providers to have a closer collaboration 
with commissioners and to establish a joint plan to minimise 
financial risks. Meanwhile, commissioners and providers have 
initiated a different conversation about the contract, one that 
focused on outcomes and quality. Commissioners and managers 
held weekly meetings from December 2013 to March 2014 to 
negotiate the contract for the financing year of 2014/15. In the 
meetings, the managers and commissioners discussed a range 
of strategic topics such as how the contract was going, how 
services were delivered, what currency they were going to set 
up and how to make the payment. From a managerial 
perspective, the collaboration with commissioners enabled them 
to better develop strategies by considering both internal factors 
and the commissioners’ requirements. 
 
We have been developing our clinical strategy internally but also 
trying to bring that in line with what commissioners would want 
and get everybody in line with the national policy. (M6) 
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Regarding 2014/15 as a transitional year, both the 
commissioners and managers felt pressure regarding the 
upcoming MH PbR system that is filled with uncertainties. The 
managers admitted their lack of confidence about the new 
“payment-by-cluster” method and attributed the reason to the 
absence of credible data. One financial manager pointed to the 
importance of exempting the NHT from financial risks during the 
contract negotiation, given the potential risks of destabilising 
the financial system led by MH PbR. Under such circumstances, 
the commissioners and providers reached an agreement to 
share financial risks using a financial envelope in the financing 
year of 2014/15. Therefore, although the Monitor has set up the 
rules on contracting between commissioners and providers, the 
price would still be set locally in 2015.  
 
Although the Monitor have been so step-up for the 
implementation of PbR, what has gone quite is talking about like 
the national prices. So if it is always on local price, I suppose 
that is less risky. (C1) 
 
 
6.3.2.2 The double running system  
Both the commissioners and managers recognised the lack of 
accurate frontline data in relation to clinical services at the NHT 
(this will be discussed in Section 6.5.6), which led to the low 
readiness for payment-by-volume implementation.  
 
I do not think we have got any assurance of our own data, and 
that is making the commissioners quite uncomfortable. They 
need the assurance because they need it to provide to their 
parties as well. (M1) 
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Given the series of clinical reforms that were being undertaken 
simultaneously, it was considered difficult to accurately cost up 
clinical inputs for each cluster without these fundamental 
subsystems established to ensure a bottom-up collection of the 
frontline clinical data. Therefore, the commissioners questioned 
the credibility of paying against clusters based upon the current 
incomplete information system, particularly in the absence of 
the MHCT care pathways. Under such circumstances, the 
commissioners and the providers preferred to stay in the Block 
Contract.  
 
During this transitional period, the implementation of MH PbR 
began with establishing new indicators to monitor providers’ 
performance. Meanwhile, providers were required to set action 
plans and submit reports according to the CQUIN indicators to 
facilitate commissioners’ strategic plans although with no 
financial incentive attached. As a result, after the demand-
supply side negotiation, commissioners and managers came to 
an agreement that the NHT was to submit quarterly dual-
reports, including the information in relation to OBDs and 
contacts subject to the Block Contract and other indicators 
following the new action plan. In other words, the NHT had their 
services monitored by clusters, but were bought in the old way, 
which was called a “double-running” system.  
 
We are running almost a “double-running system”. So we have 
got the Block Contract and then we are also running a kind of 
“shadow PbR” contracting system. (M2) 
 
To facilitate further quality measurement, the NHT has 
developed some approaches, such as cluster movement but 
they were not even at a testing stage. Regarding 2014/15 as a 
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transition year, the commissioners expected the new system to 
further improve quality by developing more quality related 
measurements to assess clinical performance using “cluster” as 
the unit.  
 
They are going to report on the recommended requirement, 
which is probably some part of the Mental Health Minimum 
Dataset, and then they are not nationally mandated. A lot of 
them are quality related, like the number of people seen within 
their review period, the number of people on CPA or clustered. 
So these are quite a few quality indicators that we are getting 
them broken down by each cluster. (C1) 
 
After reaching this broad agreement, the commissioners 
focused on getting GPs to understand the new contract system 
while the managers paid more attention to refining the service 
delivery process, costing up the clusters and submitting the 
quarterly dual-reports. 
 
 
6.3.3 The frontline practice 
As frontline clinicians, their daily practice is affected by both 
clinical and financial strategies. In other words, in this double-
running system they were asked not only to meet contact 
targets set under the Block Contract and implement clinical 
strategies, such as clustering/re-clustering patients, but also to 
change their working patterns in order to adapt to MH PbR 
following the NHT’s new action plan.  
 
According to the targets set under the Block Contract, frontline 
clinicians revealed that since 2013, they had been required to 
have four successful face-to-face contacts with patients each 
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day regardless of the severity of the patient. Both the managers 
and frontline clinicians were concerned about the fairness of the 
contract unit since only the contacts that last over 20 minutes 
are regarded as successful ones. Clinical work and other 
supplementary work, such as blood tests that contribute to the 
contacts, was not counted. In addition, the types of contact with 
different payments attached are roughly set as inpatient serves 
and outpatient services, first contact and follow-up contact, 
without taking account of other external factors, such as time 
span and patient severity.  
 
They are looking at the activity, so the face-to-face contacts. 
They do not count the clinical work as the work counted. There 
is also a lot of work we do but not counted. (M7) 
 
At the time of writing, frontline clinicians were required to use 
the HoNOS to cluster every patient. Another target for the 
frontline clinicians was to review patients in Clusters 1-3, 
Cluster 7 and Cluster 11 to decide whether to re-assign them or 
discharge them back to primary care as the NHT would no 
longer receive money for patients in these clusters under the 
MH PbR system. However, some managers and frontline 
clinicians questioned the appropriateness of these targets by 
pointing to the lack of within-group homogeneity of the 
classification system (this will be discussed in Section 6.4.1). 
The findings from interviewing frontline clinicians revealed the 
fact that when the political intents come to the forefront, they 
become detailed policies/targets, but these targets do not 
always fit into the frontline reality. In this respect, the 
implementation of MH PbR at this stage was seen as a top-down 
dictation that lacked viability (this will be discussed in Section 
6.4). Consequently, it has been noted that managers were 
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struggling to get frontline clinicians involved in this payment 
system reform at this stage. 
 
We have to cluster all the patients and the time taken to do that 
takes us away from caring for the patients and looking after 
them. The main thing is that we get emails sent to ask why we 
have not clustered everybody. That is all. We get emails asking 
why we only have 96%. (S3) 
 
 
6.4 Intra-system evaluation 
Regarding the subsystems that are involved in the MH PbR 
scheme (the HoNOS scoring system, the MHCT clustering 
system, the MHCT care pathways and the quality measurement 
system) all but the HoNOS were newly developed for the MH 
PbR system. Whether or not these core elements fully perform 
their functions, and whether or not they effectively coordinate 
with each other, heavily influences the viability of the project as 
a whole. Therefore, this section evaluates these elements to 
facilitate the investigation of the driving factors for the delayed 
implementation in the next section. To provide better readability, 
the findings subject to the internal elements are summarised in 
Tables 6-1 and 6-2. These two tables show the similarities and 
differences in perspective between the managerial-level and the 
frontline-level participants, which indicate two obvious 
problems of MH PbR at that stage: the conflicts between a top-
down management style and a bottom-up health service 
provision as well as the gaps between theory and practice. The 
subsections will analyse the findings in the following order: the 
MHCT, the HoNOS rating scales, the MHCT care pathways, the 
HoNOS outcome measurement and the patient-rated outcome 
measurements. 
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Table 6-1 Summary of perspectives on the MHCT, the HoNOS and the MHCT 
care pathways 
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Table 6-2 Summary of perspectives on the HoNOS outcome measurement 
and the patient rated measurements 
 
 
 
6.4.1 The classification system: The MHCT & the HoNOS 
Drawing on the importance of the MHCT classification system to 
the project as a whole, the following section evaluates the MHCT 
by comparing it with the diagnosis-based ICD/DSM classification 
system. Together with the detected problems of the HoNOS, this 
section explains the initial drawbacks of the MHCT classification 
which devaluates its validity and feasibility.  
 
 
6.4.1.1 The MHCT vs. the ICD/DSM 
Serving as a reference, the ICD/DSM sheds light upon the 
advantages and disadvantages of the MHCT. It has been noted 
that when compared with the long-established ICD/DSM, the 
effectiveness of the MHCT depends on the standpoints chosen 
by the participants.  
 
In comparison with the diagnosis-based ICD/DSM, the 
symptom-based clustering mechanism was seen to have higher 
predictive validity from a strategic level perspective. As 
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introduced in Chapter 2, the MHCT works as a hub gathering 
information from different angles and distributing patients into 
one of the 21 clusters, which is simpler than the ICD/DSM 
considering a large amount of groups. In this respect, six out of 
seven managerial participants appreciated its theoretical 
benefits created by the transparent information system. From a 
managerial perspective, the series of standardised treatments 
attached to the clusters would make it possible to predict the 
treatment process at the practical level and to monitor the 
activity in a transparent way at the strategic level, which may 
in turn facilitate the calculation of unit costs. By contrast, 
neither the ICD nor the DSM is able to predict costs of delivering 
mental health services. From the perspective of the managerial-
level participants, this is the reason they regarded the MHCT 
with higher validity than the DSM in terms of serving as a basis 
for the payment system, as the quote below demonstrates: 
 
I think it is much better than using the DSM or the ICD cause 
diagnosis does not really predict the costs or needs. Then the 
clustering tool is simpler than using ICD-10 or DSM diagnostic 
criteria, cause there is a much more limited number of clusters. 
It is a so much simpler thing. (M6) 
    
Regarding clinical practice, the managers pointed to the fact 
that frontline clinicians sometimes cannot make an “accurate” 
diagnosis the first time they meet the patient due to the 
complex nature of mental disorders. From a managerial 
perspective, another benefit of the MHCT is that this symptom-
based classification system allows interventions to be provided 
without being firstly informed by a detailed diagnosis.  
 
It allows you to categorise patients into groups when you have 
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not got infinitive diagnoses, which is often very appropriate. (M5) 
 
However, the outcome of this comparison is different when 
evaluating the effectiveness from the perspective of providing 
individualised interventions rather than collectively managing 
resources. From a clinical perspective, frontline clinicians have 
established their working patterns based on diagnosis. Rather 
than providing interventions based on symptoms, the ICD/DSM 
encourages an incremental process of understanding the 
fundamental problems of a patient, and provides flexible 
adjustments to interventions according to the individual’s 
disease progress, which was considered essential in mental 
health by the frontline clinicians. 
 
If you treat somebody as depression and later on they have a 
manic episode, so the diagnosis is bipolar disorder. It is not 
necessarily that you get things wrong by not getting the full 
picture immediately. It needs time for things to evolve or 
become clear. (S3) 
 
By contrast, if psychiatrists only deal with one’s symptoms, help 
them overcome crisis and then discharge, patients are more 
likely to experience a relapse. Nevertheless, the frontline 
clinicians admitted that when the diagnosis is not clear at the 
first time meeting with a patient, they have to make decisions 
based on clinical presentations. In this situation, they regarded 
the MHCT clustering system more helpful.  
 
If somebody is a new patient and the diagnosis is not clear, then 
certainly you have to go on with the clinical presentation. In 
that sense, generally it can be very helpful. (S2) 
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However, it has been noted that the idea of separating a 
treatment that should have been an individualised/personalised 
process into several stages goes against the frontline clinicians’ 
understanding of patient-centred care. In this case, the frontline 
clinicians did not agree with the idea to break a coherent 
progress down into several stages that share the same core 
pathogen and similar interventions.  
 
There is a difference in the clusters drawing between depression 
and psychosis, but in nature there is no difference there. People 
are often progressing through severe depression to psychotic 
depression. So why then they have to jump into a different 
cluster? That does not make any sense for them. The 
management is still about the depression. So there is a problem 
there for me about cutting across that natural problem. (S3) 
 
Besides the ideological drawback, the MHCT was criticised for 
its blurred boundaries that lead to low within-group 
homogeneity and low between-group heterogeneity. Regarding 
the within-group homogeneity, the frontline clinicians perceived 
difficulties in defining “stable”, which is the criterion of Cluster 
11. Some patients stay in a high level of auditory hallucination 
or other variances in mood for a long period of time whereas 
the variations for them are normal and stable. The frontline 
clinicians questioned whether they are in the same “stable” 
condition as what is expected in Cluster 11. Under such 
circumstances, the variations lead to a low level of within-group 
homogeneity. Regarding the between-group heterogeneity, the 
frontline clinicians pointed to the fact that comorbidities make 
cases difficult to fit precisely into one particular cluster. Facing 
a patient with two possible diagnoses, such as bipolar disorder 
and organic dementia, the frontline clinicians perceived 
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difficulties in making the decision between Cluster 12 for bipolar 
and Cluster 18 for organic dementia. The managers also noted 
some grey areas between the neighbouring clusters, such as 
Cluster 3 and Cluster 4. These issues could be attributed to a 
lack of accuracy of the HoNOS scales, which will be discussed in 
the following section.    
 
Is it easy to say Cluster 3 is the one and Cluster 4 is the other 
or are there some grey areas between the two? We do need to 
be more sophisticated to look at the differences between 
Clusters 3 and 4. (M7) 
 
The ideology of classification and the initial problems of the 
MHCT raised the frontline clinicians’ concern about the reliability 
and viability of this new classification system. The managers 
expressed their understanding of frontline clinicians’ lack of 
confidence when the diagnosis-based system the ICD/DSM, 
which has been invoked in the sophisticated NICE guidance, was 
replaced by an entirely new system. However, one manager 
questioned the validity of the latest version of DSM by referring 
to the interferences from pharmaceutical companies. As one 
manager concluded, there is no absolute black or white in this 
area, therefore, merely comparing these two systems and 
picking one from the other is not seen as appropriate.  
 
There is nothing totally not credible or totally credible. There 
are scales and shades of credibility and I think one is always 
working with a compromise. (M5) 
 
The managerial-level participants also highlighted the 
collaboration between the symptom-based classification and the 
diagnosis-based classification under the MHCT. This complies 
	 231	
with the theoretical process of clustering under the MHCT 
classification system as discussed in Chapter 2. According to the 
standard process of clustering, clinicians should firstly allocate 
a patient into one of the three super-clusters, including “non-
psychotic”, “psychotic” or “organic”, which are set based upon 
preliminary diagnoses. Based upon the preliminary classification, 
frontline clinicians are expected to further allocate the patient 
by their symptom severity. In addition, the managers revealed 
that frontline clinicians were encouraged to use the NICE 
guidelines as a reference in the clustering process in order to 
improve the accuracy of clustering.  
 
Besides the design of clusters, whether the clustering system 
can fully perform its function also depends upon the 
coordination with the HoNOS rating scales, as discussed below. 
 
 
6.4.1.2 The HoNOS rating scales 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the HoNOS was not designed for the 
classification system, and this would inevitably generate some 
discordance. Both managers and frontline clinicians indicated 
that the initial drawbacks of the HoNOS rating tool impede it 
from being able to capture symptoms and to help make an 
accurate classification. Similar to the findings in Chapter 5, all 
frontline clinicians and two out of four clinical managers pointed 
to the drawback of being subjective, which hinders its validity 
to a large extent. It has been noted that the results may vary 
by factors, such as the patient’s mood and conditions at the 
time meeting clinicians.  
 
I think there is quite a lot of subjectivity in the rating tools and 
they vary by patients’ mood, what type of diet potentially, their 
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situation, what’s going on the ward, what they have been told 
about and their home situations. (M5) 
 
Therefore, concerns have been raised about its ability to 
accurately reflect the severity and patients’ needs and thus 
accurately assign them to the corresponding clusters. Hence, 
this rating scale was regarded flawed for only considering the 
severity of symptom rather than measuring patients’ needs. 
Furthermore, participants from both the manager and frontline 
groups stressed that the HoNOS rating tool only tests the 
general health and social functioning of patients rather than 
measuring the specific health care outcomes or clinical 
effectiveness of treatments. Frontline clinicians considered 
other specific scales, such as the Hamilton Rating Scale for 
Depression, more effective and accurate against a particular 
disorder field than the HoNOS, which echoes the findings in 
Chapter 5. Therefore, it was considered insufficient to connect 
symptoms to clusters and the corresponding interventions by 
merely relying upon the HoNOS.  
 
The only question is that does it really make sense to use the 
HoNOS for everybody as an outcome scale? Should we not be 
using Depression Outcome Scale for people with depression or 
Bipolar Scale for people with bipolar? (S3) 
 
As a measurement, the HoNOS has also been criticised for only 
focusing on the patients’ symptom history for two weeks prior. 
Against chronic diseases, such as mental illness, the frontline 
clinicians regarded it as inappropriate and dangerous to only 
look at symptoms over a two-week period.  
 
The HoNOS is a way for what is going on in the last two weeks. 
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We think it a joke that if you killed somebody 15 days ago, it 
would not show. (S1)  
 
Despite the improvement made by adding the historical 
indicators, it has been noted that frontline clinicians had 
established their own working patterns before the adjustments 
were made. Moreover, as both the managers and frontline 
clinicians were aware, there existed large variations in working 
patterns among frontline clinicians, which indicates that the 
outcomes could further vary among clinicians, particularly in the 
absence of support from clinical laboratory tests.  
 
What we are finding is people clustered very wrongly just using 
it, cause they are just looking at the last two weeks and the 
historical scores do not necessarily reflect the long-term 
difficulties. (M6) 
There is no clinical item. There is no blood test, is it? There is 
no blood test for schizophrenia. I cannot go “His Schizophrenia 
rating is 6 because where he goes is blood sugar is 8”. (S1) 
 
When linking the HoNOS scores to the MHCT clusters, the RiO 
algorithm was criticised for the discordances between the two 
and a lack of flexibility. Regarding the discordances, one 
manager illustrated the conflicts between the actual HoNOS 
score and the expected the HoNOS score in a particular cluster 
(Cluster 13/14). The example given involved patients with a 
bipolar diagnosis but in a low level of hallucination and delusion 
(the must score is expected to be 4). One frontline clinician 
provided an example of one patient with severe hallucination in 
a stable condition to explain the conflict between the MHCT 
cluster (Cluster 11 in which the must score for hallucination is 
expected to be less than 3) and the HoNOS must score 
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(hallucination score 3). These discordances made the frontline 
clinicians prefer to choose the attached interventions as the 
determining factors for clustering when conflicts emerged. 
Objectivity was noted as another conflict between the MHCT and 
the HoNOS: the MHCT is about to categorise patients into 
specific clusters and provide target treatments, which is 
supposed to be objective, whereas the HoNOS was seen as a 
subjective tool. In this respect, the managers were aware of the 
difficulties frontline clinicians met in categorising patients into 
clusters based upon the HoNOS scores, since no one could 
perfectly fit into a particular cluster. This shows agreement with 
Lipsky (1980) who argues that the individualised needs require 
individualised services.  
 
All they have been doing is basically allocating somebody into a 
number that does not mean anything and trying to fit them into 
boxes. So as far as they are concerned, they are just being 
asked to fill someone into that box and in reality nobody fits into 
the box. (M4) 
 
As the managers realised, the poor validity of the HoNOS brings 
its feasibility and viability into question. In recognition of the 
fact that frontline clinicians were clustering patients based upon 
the possible treatments attached to each cluster rather than the 
HoNOS scores, the managers were concerned about the 
potential risk that such backwards classification would cause the 
HoNOS to become a separate task. Therefore, the lack of 
accuracy of the HoNOS and its direct adverse results, such as 
the difficulties in getting accurate clustering data, were seen as 
the two major casual reasons for the current 
situation.Specifically, frontline clinicians clustered patients 
somehow arbitrarily according to the workload, which in turn 
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further reduced participants’ confidence in the accuracy of data 
(this will be discussed in Section 6.5.5).  
 
To begin with, we just put everybody in Clusters 11 and 12 if 
they are in psychotic clusters cause we only need to review 
them once a year. (S1) 
 
 
6.4.2 The MHCT Care pathways 
Similar to the investigation of the classification system, this 
section discusses the validity of the MHCT care pathway system 
by depicting its theoretical benefits and comparing it to the 
existing NICE guidelines based upon the diagnosis-based 
classification system. 
 
 
6.4.2.1 The theoretical benefits 
The managers attributed the ability to facilitate effective 
classification and predict the corresponding interventions as the 
two most obvious advantages of the MHCT care pathway system. 
Regarding its influence on resource management, the 
managerial-level participants appreciated its ability to facilitate 
providers and frontline clinicians in foreseeing the whole process 
of service provision from a perspective of a multi-disciplinary 
collaboration with social care.  
 
If someone is allocated to a particular cluster, there will be a 
particular pathway attached to each cluster and that pathway 
will outline all of the interventions that could be offered to that 
person as part of that pathway. (M4) 
If you are looking at delivering a care pathway, along that care 
pathway is inevitably social care which deals with people’s social 
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care needs. (M2) 
 
At an administrative level, the detailed information in relation 
to resource consumption would help providers gain better 
knowledge of patients’ needs and the corresponding health 
resources needed, which would facilitate the contract 
negotiation with commissioners.  
 
Prescribing an activity and prescribing the care, you are actually 
ultimately prescribing how much entitlement you have. (M6) 
 
Regarding its influences on clinical practice, by predicting all 
relevant resources needed for the treatment process, clinicians 
and providers were expected to change the way they operated 
and no longer merely focus on their own responsibilities. The 
managerial-level participants also appreciated its ability to 
provide frontline clinicians with the suggested interventions 
when they were not sure of the most effective intervention. 
Serving as benchmarks, the standards were expected to help 
frontline clinicians improve their skills, particularly in mental 
health where professional skills vary greatly among clinicians.  
 
They are offering the same service. But depending on where 
you live what you may get varies. But hopefully, the pathways 
will reduce that as well because wherever somebody lives in the 
division, they should be offered the similar pathways of care as 
well. (M4) 
 
The information was also considered beneficial to patients in 
terms of providing them a clear picture of the services they 
could expect to receive. 
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I think the fact that we have got the care pathways now written 
down and something we can give to the patient. They are not 
sitting down and thinking about how the next, what’s the next 
thing to happen. (M1) 
 
However, despite the fact that the NHT was still piloting the 
MHCT care pathways, some concerns were already raised in 
relation to its discordances with the NICE guidelines, which will 
be discussed in the subsequent subsection. 
 
 
6.4.2.2 The MHCT Care pathways vs. the NICE guidance 
Since the NICE guidance was developed based on ICD codes, 
the discordance between MHCT care pathways and the NICE 
guidelines is similar to that between the MHCT and the ICD/DSM. 
From a clinical perspective, separating the treatment process 
into several stages (clusters) and connecting them with 
standardised review periods is more of a managerial strategy 
than a “real” clinical mechanism that helps improve clinical 
quality. From the frontline clinicians’ understanding, treatment 
should be a process of seeking the root problems and solving 
the emerging problems by trial and error. In other words, 
frontline clinicians considered it clearer and more reasonable by 
appreciating that it outlines the whole process of an integrated 
treatment according to the development of the patient’s 
condition.  
 
Care pathway should be based on the core problem. As far as I 
understand, the care pathway for the depression and the care 
pathway for the Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) should 
manage the evolution of that process and the recovery from 
that process, rather than somebody jumping from Cluster 6 to 
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Cluster 12 and then back. (S3) 
 
As previously discussed, the managerial-level participants 
advocated the adoption of the MHCT care pathways by 
appreciating its theoretical mechanism of predicting costs. From 
their perspective, care pathways should take account of 
resource allocation, particularly in an area with limited 
resources. Similar to the comparison between the MHCT and the 
ICD/DSM, the NICE guidance does not provide information in 
relation to costs. 
 
The cluster care pathways need to incorporate some of the 
economic reality. (M3) 
 
Additionally, the managers also pointed to some limitations of 
the NICE guidance such as its lack of evidence base other than 
Clozapine for Schizophrenia. After all, in recognition of the gaps 
between the MHCT care pathways and the NICE guidance, 
managers were trying to incorporate NICE guidelines into the 
MHCT care pathways to further improve their validity.  
 
We are trying to align the potential diagnoses within the clusters 
to the NICE guidance and to any other guidance that relates to 
what we should do to certain groups of patients in symptom 
clusters. (M5) 
 
 
6.4.3 Quality measurements 
The improvement of quality was regarded as another important 
theoretical benefit by both the managers and commissioners. 
One manager illustrated the definition of “quality” by referring 
to the NHS standard matrix: “quality” could be broadly defined 
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from three aspects.  
 
Quality is easy to define if you use the NHS standard matrix, 
which is: quality is about the patient safety, clinical outcome 
and effectiveness, and patient experience. (M5) 
 
Regarding their personal definitions of “quality”, seven out of 
nine managerial-level participants independently referred to 
“how much people get”, which echoes the idea of providing 
patient-centred services from the strategic level. Therefore, the 
implementation of measurements subject to patient outcomes 
was also seen as a highlight.  
 
I think it is good because its whole emphasis is on outcomes, 
the outcome improvement and the outcome for the patients. So 
that is the right emphasis. (C2) 
 
However, the managers also realised the difficulties in 
measuring the effectiveness and the validity of these quality 
measurements. One manager pointed out that only when the 
whole range of impacts regarding one specific intervention is 
known could the corresponding scales be accurately set, which 
affects the validity of the measurement. Nevertheless, it has 
been noted that such research is lacking in mental health.  
 
We have to understand more about to what extension do the 
interventions we put in place affect outcomes as supposed to 
the natural history of the condition… A lot of development work 
is needed there because I do not think that we have any idea 
at all outside the randomised control trials. (M5) 
 
Drawing upon the difficulties in measuring the qualitative 
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outcomes and the incapability of one single measurement to 
reflect the whole picture of service quality, providers were in 
the process of developing a series of measurement instruments 
and trying to form a single, integrated measurement system.  
 
One isolated is not enough. It has to be a number of things 
putting together. (M2) 
 
Therefore, the following sections mainly examine the newly 
developed clinical quality measurements. Besides the CQUIN 
targets, the HoNOS was adopted as an outcome measure to 
support the clustering process. Other approaches such as the 
Patient-Reported Outcome Measurement (PROM), the Patient-
Reported Experience Measurement (PREM) and cluster 
movement adopted to measure service quality were tested 
during the pilot. However, due to the lack of tangible laboratory 
tests, measurements for mental health services were 
subjectively completed by either clinicians or patients, which 
brings its effectiveness into question. 
 
In this respect, the participants were asked about their opinions 
concerning whether these measurements can accurately reflect 
“real” quality, including: a) can outcome measurement reflect 
the full picture of the effectiveness; and b) are patient-rated 
measurements reliable? 
 
 
6.4.3.1 The HoNOS outcome measurement  
Both the commissioners and managers regarded the HoNOS 
outcome measurement as a step in the right direction by 
pointing out that it was the first time that both providers and 
commissioners refocused on service quality, in particular, 
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patient outcomes rather than clinical input. The managers 
regarded the outcome measurement as evidence for cluster 
transition, which reflects the effectiveness and quality of clinical 
interventions. 
 
According to the managerial-level participants, patient 
outcomes could present the quality and effectiveness of mental 
health services following the patient-centred principle. The 
newly developed 4-factor model summarises and describes the 
original HoNOS items in a more meaningful way, which helped 
to better evaluate patients’ outcomes in four aspects including 
personal wellbeing, emotional wellbeing, social wellbeing and 
severe disturbance. The movement between clusters was seen 
as a valid indicator to facilitate managing performance 
collectively.  
 
We are expecting to see a certain percentage of people moving 
down from the high intensive clusters. We have never measured 
the quality like that before. We have never really been able to 
measure on a contract base where the interventions that we 
pay for actually made people better. (C1) 
 
Nevertheless, a conflicting perspective regarding the validity of 
the HoNOS has been noted at the frontline level. From their 
perspective of view, the “narrowed-down” definition of “quality” 
was not seen as sufficient or even appropriate when considering 
the complex nature of mental disorders. Due to the complexity 
of mental disorders, sometimes patients do not improve after 
efforts have been put in place, but this is not equal to no input 
or the wrong input. Therefore, the frontline clinicians expressed 
their concern about adopting patient outcomes without 
considering clinical input, especially recognising efforts behind 
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the scene.  
 
The problem is that there is no way of testing the quality of my 
interaction with the patients outside this building. Actually, how 
well you are does not bear on how much work put on you to get 
you that well. (S1) 
 
 
6.4.3.2 The patient-rated measures 
Regarding the patient-rated measures, they were seen as valid 
from both the managerial and frontline perspectives, since the 
PREM and the PROM would provide a chance for patients to 
express their needs and feedbacks for the clinical services they 
have received. By realising the insufficiency of the 
understanding of patients’ feelings under the previous system, 
frontline clinicians considered patient-rated measurements 
necessary and beneficial to facilitate a better interpersonal 
relationship, which is essential for mental health services. 
Regarding financial effectiveness, the PREM was believed to be 
able to provide evidence when negotiating with commissioners 
by outlining the gaps between the services patients want and 
the ones currently paid for.  
 
I would welcome their feedbacks, cause if we are not providing 
the service, if you get ended up with a number of patients 
saying the same thing that we are not providing, then we will 
turn back to the commissioners and say “Your patients want this 
and you are not actually paying us to do it. If they want it and 
you want to provide a complete service, then you got to listen 
to your patients the same as we got to listen to your patients.” 
(S2) 
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Despite their advocacy of the idea of considering patient 
feedback, the clinicians were aware of the initial drawbacks of 
the questionnaire design. Some clinicians did not agree with 
some questions such as “Do you feel optimistic about the future” 
(in Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Wellbeing Scale) by questioning 
the appropriateness of asking a patient with dementia in their 
early 40s about their attitudes towards the future. Additionally, 
both the managers and frontline clinicians were concerned 
about biases resulting from patients’ subjective attitudes. Unlike 
acute services where patients are keen to cooperate with 
interventions, frontline clinicians sometimes have to serve 
people who do not want to be treated in mental health services. 
Additionally, frontline clinicians have to deal with patients’ 
excessive demands, which sometimes cause their 
dissatisfaction when clinicians are not able to meet these 
excessive demands. Consequently, some clinicians doubted the 
accuracy of patients’ subjective opinions regarding reflecting 
the “real” quality of service.  
 
That (the quality measurement) becomes a subjective report 
from the party. So it is very difficult to actually measure that 
level of effectiveness. (M7) 
 
In recognition of the biases within the patient-rated 
measurements, the managers suggested treating them as the 
representation of one specific part of quality.  
 
However, one manager explained a potential risk of establishing 
a series of different quality measurements is the excessive 
attention paid to checking the system. In theory, the system is 
supposed to be efficient and effective enough to not require 
constantly checking for fraud. In this case, the excessive effort 
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put into checking for fraudulent activity was seen as a waste of 
resources that could have been used in patient care. 
 
My biggest worry is that the both the commissioners and the 
providers will put effort, management resources and time into 
checking that while that is wasted essentially. (M5) 
 
In light of the theoretical benefit of driving up quality, the 
managerial level participants were keen on the establishment of 
quality measurements, even though they were aware of the 
potential risks.  
 
I think we should just be careful about the evaluation of the 
guidelines that put in place. I think it is important to have a mix 
of qualitative and quantitative information, so we can not only 
display the trends but also to put a good narrative on that as 
well. (M7) 
 
Based upon the above discussion about the subsystems, the 
problems captured in this section facilitate the exploration of 
the factors that have caused the delayed implementation in the 
following section.  
 
 
 
6.5 Driving factors for the delay 
The interview findings indicated that the commissioners and 
managers supported MH PbR by considering its prospects whilst 
the frontline clinicians were more concerned about its feasibility. 
In turn, when it comes to the driving factors for the delay, the 
commissioners and managers attributed part of the reasons to 
the difficulties in getting frontline clinicians involved. The factors 
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that made frontline clinicians reluctant to engage and how these 
factors led to the delayed implementation will be discussed in 
this section. The factors are primarily categorised into seven 
interlinked parts: 1) the complex nature of mental disorders; 2) 
the constructional flaws; 3) the intensively established policies; 
4) frontline clinicians’ involvement; 5) the “gaming” behaviours; 
6) the information system; and 7) the negative attitude towards 
change.   
 
 
6.5.1 Complex nature of mental disorders 
In the interviews, eight out of twelve participants attributed the 
major reason for the delay to the complex nature of mental 
disorders, given the individualised conditions and the lack of 
tangible tests that cause difficulties in categorising patients. 
According to their perspectives, in mental health, clinicians are 
no longer treating diseases, rather, they are treating human 
beings as a whole under the influence of social conditions. 
Consequently, patients with the same diagnosis could end up 
with completely different outcomes, as the quote below 
indicates:  
 
This is a difficult area in mental health. There are so many 
macro and micro issues that affect people in mental health 
services apart from what you are doing for them. (M5) 
 
These unpredictable external factors made all frontline clinicians 
aware of the difficulties in predicting patients’ behaviours and 
thus concerned about the large variations in the outcomes, even 
among patients with the same diagnosis. In this respect, 
frontline clinicians expressed their concern about the 
uncertainties that may compromise the effectiveness of 
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managing medical interventions in a standardised way in this 
largely under-explored area.  
 
I think Payment by Results is a difficult thing in physical health 
care, and it is almost impossible in psychiatric health, because 
how can you possibly know what a human being is going to do? 
(S1) 
 
 
6.5.2 Constructional flaws 
The constructional drawbacks were noted at both the frontline 
and managerial levels. From a clinical perspective, the 
drawbacks were contributed to the complexity of mental 
disorders. The frontline clinicians pointed to the problems they 
met when categorising highly-individualised patients. As both 
the managers and frontline clinicians were aware, the vague 
distinctions between the neighbouring clusters, the variations 
within one cluster, the mismatches among the subsystems and 
the lack of a comprehensive quality measurement system 
required more sophisticated adjustments to the structure. As 
the managers realised, trying to streamline different practices 
and thus map them into care pathways was the most difficult 
target at that stage.  
 
We have got different practices within the Trust. So trying 
aligning our practices with other trusts is difficult. I think the 
implementation of the care pathways is going to be the hardest 
thing that we can set up. (M1) 
 
As previously discussed, the NHT was still piloting the MHCT 
care pathways. Nevertheless, the mismatches between the 
designed pathways and the practical realities had already been 
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noted.  
 
We are piloting care pathways in one area at the moment. … 
The care pathways that we have set at the moment are quite 
aspirational. It is not necessarily what is happening in practice. 
(M1) 
 
The limited suggestions provided after clinicians entered the 
assessment results raised clinicians’ concern about the flexibility 
of the RiO system as the limited suggestions could not cover all 
possible conditions. Therefore, the process of inputting 
information into the RiO was described as a process of “feeding 
the machine”.  
 
You can click a button and you can put what you have rated 
somebody as and then it will tell you which cluster. Usually, it 
comes up 83% this one of whatever and left 17% this one. So 
you have got two choices really. But it has to be a menu of 
options. (S1) 
We are doing it now because we are expected and we have to 
do it. So again, I am keeping using the phrase “still like feeding 
the machine”. (S2) 
 
Regarding the payment calculation mechanism, the payments 
subject to severity failed to reflect the real frontline workload. 
According to frontline experiences, what they can do for the 
patients in higher clusters, such as Clusters 15 and 16, is very 
limited, whereas they need to make a significant amount of 
behind the scene effort to keep the patients in Cluster 11 in a 
stable condition. Thus, it gave the frontline clinicians an 
impression that the idea of “higher clusters with higher costs” 
only came from the calculation of the costs of medication, 
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whereas other types of clinical inputs were largely ignored due 
to the difficulties in quantification, which was seen as unfair to 
them.  
 
I do not think the cluster reflects the costs. How well you are is 
got nothing to do with how much time (it takes). I can only 
demonstrate it with the medication, and I am sure that is the 
same thing goes on with my talking therapy. But it is almost 
impossible to prove the services on an individual basis. (S1) 
 
 
6.5.3 Intensively established policies 
In the meantime, the government has established a series of 
policies with different emphases ranging from improving quality 
by measuring outcomes to establishing performance-based 
payment and incentivising the provider-side competition in the 
market within a very short period. When these top-down 
policies come to the frontline, they come in a form of different 
targets and paperwork, particularly in such a scenario where all 
sub-systems are being established at the same time. This 
inevitably resulted in the frontline clinicians’ lack of 
understanding of the policies and the MH PbR policy as a whole. 
This became more evident when some targets were not 
considered as properly set due to the lack of rigorous tests prior 
to implementation, as the quote below indicates: 
 
They did not say “Let us assess what each service does”. 
Instead, they said “Let us make four contacts each day”. There 
is no “Let us measure where we are” or “Let us have a think 
about it”. (S1) 
 
Since 2013, one policy has come into effect that requires 
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frontline clinicians to have four successful face-to-face contacts 
with patients each day regardless of the severity of disorders. 
Drawing upon the high variations in the time span for 
community contacts, frontline clinicians regarded the policy as 
set without a careful consideration of the realities of their work. 
This is due to the lack of consideration of the time and effort 
required for a successful contact, which varies in across patients’ 
conditions, doctor-patient relationships and the type of service. 
To support this argument, one frontline clinician elaborated the 
heavy workload by giving an example: it may take up to four 
hours to see four new patients and it may take another three 
hours on traffic for home-visits. Even if they can manage to 
make all contacts within one community, it would still take five 
hours of fieldwork. Regarding the workload, all frontline 
clinicians expressed their discontents about the target-driven 
policy due to a lack of rigorous calculation of clinical inputs. 
Moreover, one clinician pointed to a potential consequence that 
the unnecessary contacts driven by the target may make 
patients overestimate the medical severity of their condition.  
 
You feel like that the pressure has been put on you to create 
opportunities to see people you do not actually need to see 
them. If you need to do four contacts a day, you see them a bit 
extra, more than they actually need. Possibly more than that is 
good for them. It is actually damaging because they start to 
think why should I turn up more? Does she think that I am ill? 
Does she think that I am not coping? (S1) 
 
Besides the inappropriately set policies in this double-running 
system, conflicts were observed between policies and clinical 
realities regarding the MH PbR payment system. From a 
strategic perspective, moving patients back to primary care is 
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necessary and helpful regarding improving efficiency through a 
better utilisation of resources. Nevertheless, this policy has 
brought a sudden dramatic change in the long-term doctor-
patient relationship. This is particularly the case for the patients 
who have become dependent upon the staff. The conflict 
between the clinical strategy and the practical human feelings 
put frontline staff into a dilemma, let alone the potential risks 
that have resulted from the gaps between secondary and 
primary care. 
 
When they (the patients) were brought into the service, they 
would have been told “You have support for life” back to the 60s 
and 70s, possibly in the 80s. When we are bringing people out 
of the hospital to the community, we could not imagine that we 
could never ever come to at a time, where these people are 
managed without the Trust. (S1) 
 
The feasibility of another policy that requires all patients in 
Clusters 7 and 11 to be discharged to primary care has been 
questioned by the frontline clinicians, particularly given the 
gaps between secondary care and primary care. In contrast to 
the assumption that patients in Cluster 11 are stable enough to 
not require secondary care, both the managers and frontline 
clinicians were aware of the fact that the NHT has to accept 
some patients in Cluster 11 because GPs have no authority to 
prescribe Clozapine or perform blood tests. This leads to the 
condition that the NHT is made to offer services that are not 
counted in the end. In this respect, the extra, but unpaid, 
workload exacerbates their level of discontents. Discharging 
patients in Cluster 7 also raised the managers’ concern about 
the appropriateness of this policy, given their complicated 
conditions and particularly the gaps between primary and 
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secondary care. In this respect, the managers pointed to the 
existence of the political elements of this reform as well as the 
fact that sometimes there are mismatches between political 
intents and clinical realities. 
 
There is a political element for all of it as well. It is about the 
politicians want us to be seen safe, effective and efficient 
service, and sometimes there can be a little bit mismatch 
between the politician’s objectives and the very immediate 
objectives for the service users. (M7) 
 
The potential damage to service quality has been noted as the 
main side effect caused by this target-driven policy. From the 
frontline perspective, the poorly set targets took away time that 
could have been spent in treating patients and improving skills. 
Moreover, to prevent fraud/lie, one policy requires two clinicians 
to see one patient together, which was not seen with much 
clinical utility except the financial benefit resulting from double 
counting the clinical work. Therefore, frontline clinicians 
considered these target-driven, but not clinically meaningful, 
policies a political imposition with the potentials to undermine 
good clinical services   
 
How do you improve the quality? You can improve the quality 
by training staff or by giving them opportunities to explore and 
have good supervision. All these things go if you said “We have 
got to see four people a day”, because they have not got time 
to think. If every minute of every day they are being monitored, 
that does not create a thinking, does it? (S1) 
 
Additionally, as one manager argued, the changing political 
environment made whether MH PbR would be implemented an 
	 252	
open question, which further reduced clinicians’ willingness to 
engage, as the quote below demonstrates: 
 
One of the problems with the government initiatives is that half 
of them fail or disappear when the political colour changes or 
you get a new manager in the Department of Health. They are 
a waste of time, and I have wasted many hours on paperwork 
that has been no use at all because of the national dictation. 
The frontline clinicians are even less incline to do that because 
they cannot see the patients. (M5) 
	
	
6.5.4 Frontline clinicians’ involvement 
Similar to what managers were aware of, all frontline clinicians 
expressed their unwillingness to engage by arguing that what 
they saw were targets and changes to their long-formed 
patterns of daily practice but with no clinical benefit attached.  
 
 
6.5.4.1 Increasing workload 
Regarding the increasing workload to the frontline, managers 
noted the inevitable increase in workload given the effort 
required to understand the new system and to facilitate quality 
assessment. In fact, they highlighted a number of 
disadvantages as described in the following subsections. 
 
At the moment, I probably would guess that they (frontline 
clinicians) would say they prefer the Block Contract because it 
(quality monitoring) is part of the new PbR. It requires more 
work to look at it. In the initial stage, I think there will be more 
work. So as to the staff, they will think it as a negative thing. 
(M4) 
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However, this extra workload and constant checking for fraud 
raised some managers’ concern about the validity of MH PbR 
since one of the original intents is to ensure quality by 
competition. The experiences from frontline clinicians echoed 
managers’ concern: some checklists were considered long and 
redundant, or even inappropriate. The dictatorial clauses made 
the frontline clinicians feel uncomfortable.  
 
I got forms to go “Have you discussed this and this with the 
service user? Have you discussed this and this with the service 
user’s partner?” and you think “Oh my god, this is just like a 
baby”. (S1) 
 
The requirement of detailed evidence was regarded as heavy 
burden for the experts, and at the same time it failed to promote 
those less skilful clinicians to improve service quality, since the 
skilful clinicians would provide high-quality treatment without 
such redundant guidelines, whereas those clinicians who are not 
good at clinical treatment would go through the checklist 
perfunctorily.  Moreover, the heavy workload took away their 
time that could have been used to truly improve their skills, thus 
confusing them by the dilemma between the idea of increasing 
efficiency and the policy of increasing paperwork. Particularly, 
in such a context where subsystems together with the 
supporting policies were being intensively established, the 
inappropriately set policies triggered their resentments, 
although they understood the ultimate goals as efficiency and 
transparency.  
 
They (the commissioners) just pick some targets at their way 
not aware of that they are not achievable. They are not 
doable. … I am not saying that we should not try and look ways 
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for public services and reduce the spending. I am sure that we 
are wasting money. But it comes too quickly. (S1) 
 
 
6.5.4.2 Unfair payment 
As previously stated, the current payment mechanism was not 
seen as appropriate by frontline clinicians. It is common for 
patients not to show up for appointments while clinicians have 
already put a lot of effort into preparation, or alternatively, 
patients do not open the door when clinicians have travelled a 
long time to their homes. Due to the idea of focusing on clinical 
output rather than clinical input, effort was neither rewarded by 
the contact-based system nor the patient outcome-based 
system. The frontline clinicians revealed that the work behind 
the scene, which should also have been measured as part of 
service quality, is often neglected.  
 
I think the word of “Result” is ambiguous. “Payment by Results”, 
it should be “Payment by Effort”. I do not feel that the 
commissioners appear to be aware of the amount of effort it 
takes. (S2) 
 
By realising the unfairness of the payment system, managers 
were negotiating with commissioners to improve this 
mechanism by adding the behind-scene activity into the paid 
work.  
 
 
6.5.4.3 Training 
As discussed earlier, the sequence of developing the key 
subsystems indicates that frontline clinicians had established 
their working patterns before they were offered the 
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standardised training sessions, let alone the initial problems of 
the MHCT algorithm as previously examined. In contrast to 
expectations, the training sessions have not turned out to be 
effective. On manager attributed part of the reasons for this to 
the lack of continuity by pointing to the several years’ gap 
before the re-launch of the training sessions. One of the 
problems created by the inconsistent training programme is the 
absence of opportunities to deliver up-to-date information to 
the frontline in a direct and accurate way: the same message 
delivered by different managers became different versions 
when it arrived at the front line. One manager admitted that 
training sessions would provide frontline clinicians another new 
version of information, which would result in more confusion.  
 
In meetings with senior managers, they would be given 
messages that probably go down the chain. But by the time they 
get to the frontline, they are probably not the accurate 
messages, or there might be the panicking messages. So the 
staff have been given lots of mixed messages. So they feel very 
confused about it. When we first started to do the training, there 
were all sorts of bizarre mixed messages out there about how 
they should be doing things. Obviously, they will be coming to 
my session and then I will be telling them something different 
again. (M4) 
 
Moreover, the frontline clinicians also criticised the initial 
drawbacks of the RiO and the trainers’ failure to solve the 
practical problems that further compromised the effectiveness 
of the training. 
 
In conclusion, the intensively established policies, the heavy but 
unhelpful workload and the unsuccessful training sessions 
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provided negative information rather than incentives to frontline 
clinicians. Therefore, at that stage, it is not surprising that the 
frontline clinicians and even some managers were not willing to 
embrace MH PbR. 
 
The staff managers and medical staff have not embraced this 
as a good thing. (M2) 
 
 
6.5.5 The “gaming” behaviours 
Regarding the potential risks of “gaming” behaviours emerging 
in the implementation process, the commissioners and some 
financial managers showed their concern by referring to the 
experiences of implementing PbR in acute services.  
 
“Gaming” is a worrying. You see how many (“gaming” 
behaviours) in the acute trusts and you see a real distrust 
between commissioners and providers. (C1) 
 
However, rather than the “game for money” behaviours as the 
economic theory predicts, the frontline clinicians referred to 
their “gaming” behaviours as a means to deal with the heavy, 
but clinically unhelpful, workload. Drawing upon the lack of 
national guidelines to evaluate the accuracy of the previous 
clustering outcomes, the managers pointed to the 
inappropriateness of attributing all up-code decisions to 
“gaming” behaviours in the current situation.    
 
 
6.5.5.1 “Game for money” 
Seven out of twelve participants (among whom five were 
managers) made it clear that “gaming” is completely 
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unprofessional and there should not be any “gaming” behaviour. 
According to the economic mechanism as discussed in Chapter 
2, profit is determined by the comparison between the actual 
costs and the corresponding national tariffs. As one manager 
indicated, it was more difficult to game at that stage, given the 
lack of accurate information about the actual costs of each 
cluster. Even if providers have identified the more profitable 
clusters by comparing the average value of the actual costs and 
the national tariffs, they could turn out to be unprofitable once 
the patients with high costs were allocated in those clusters, 
especially since the current information system could not 
accurately predict possible costs at an individual level.  
Furthermore, the commissioners argued that the “up-coding” 
behaviours it would not necessarily lead to more income since 
“higher cluster” does not equal “more profit” when taking 
account of clinical input. 
 
Besides the technical infeasibility to “game”, the majority of 
managers did not think the financial environment would 
necessarily affect frontline clinicians’ daily practice in terms of 
developing “game for money” behaviours since their salaries are 
separate from their activities. They believed that frontline 
clinicians do not have a sense of earning money for providers, 
especially by putting someone into a cluster where they do not 
belong, as this goes against their professional values. From their 
perspectives, as long as the financial issues can stay at the 
managerial level as it was at the moment, frontline clinicians 
would not “game” for financial reasons, as the quote below 
indicates:  
 
They do not really have a sense of earning money for putting 
someone into different clusters because they are not bothered 
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by that amount of money. The problems with the medication in 
the Medicare, the American insurances, are that their incomes 
which go up depending on the work they are doing. Our salaries 
are set separately. (M3) 
 
In terms of the managers’ understanding of frontline clinicians’ 
value systems, this complies with the concept of 
“professionalism” as discussed in Chapter 3. One commissioner 
supported this viewpoint by pointing to the fact that the 
frontline clinicians were more likely to score patients into lower 
clusters than they should have been due to their sympathy 
about patients’ feelings. 
 
 
6.5.5.2 “Game for workload” 
Nonetheless, rather than “game for money”, the frontline 
clinicians admitted that they had participated in “game for 
workload” behaviours. Due to the development sequence of MH 
PbR, frontline clinicians had been clustering patients without 
care pathways underpinning the decision-making process. This 
not only points to the lack of accuracy of the clustering process, 
but also indicates the situation where frontline clinicians were 
allocating people into boxes with no clinical meaning attached. 
Therefore, it resulted in a situation where some frontline 
clinicians clustered patients arbitrarily for less workload, 
especially within a context of heavy, but clinically meaningless 
workload and information asymmetry between regulators and 
the observed. 
 
To begin with, we just put everybody in Cluster 11 and 12 if 
they were in psychotic clusters cause we only needed to review 
them once a year. (S1) 
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Drawing upon the inappropriately set targets, the managers 
also noted the mismatches between the politicians’ objectives 
and the very immediate objective for the service users. In this 
regard, all frontline participants admitted that they regarded 
“gaming for workload” as a means of dealing with some targets, 
which are government dictations without much clinical benefit.  
 
I would not call that “gaming” and I would say that is a way of 
trying to cope within and trying to bend the orbit within the 
constraints of this system that sounds imposed on you. (S3) 
 
Besides those movements that have been attributed to “game 
for workload” behaviours by the frontline clinicians, the 
managers regarded some movements such as some “up-coding” 
behaviours, as a correction of the wrong decisions that were 
previously made. For instance, the managers noted a huge shift 
from Cluster 3 to Cluster 4 and from Cluster 11 to Cluster 12. 
In recognition of the lack of national guidelines at the beginning 
and the grey areas between the neighbouring clusters, the 
managers considered it impossible to distinguish “gaming” 
behaviours from a correction of previous decisions. 
 
 
6.5.5.3 “Gaming”: Still a risk 
Despite the dispute regarding the actual motive for the “up-
coding” behaviours, it is not surprising for five out of twelve 
participants to regard it as a potential risk and another three 
even considered it as something about to happen under the 
marketised healthcare system. From a commissioning 
perspective, the financial risks put on providers and the poorly 
set targets made “gaming” an expected result.  
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At the minute, you take away the confines of the Block 
Contracts, and then you are opening up both sides to potentially 
“game”. (C1) 
 
Referring to the situation in acute services, the managers noted 
the ambiguity between “up-coding” and “cluster correction” in 
the situations where acute hospitals developed computer 
programmes to spot codes and help managers to double check 
the accuracy of the codes. Unlike the natural inclination of 
frontline clinicians, managers were considered more likely to 
use this mechanism to “game” in the current context of austerity.  
 
Whether it is considered to be “gaming” or just double-checking 
for accuracy is a moving point. I guess you could say the same 
about the clusters, but I think the natural inclination of the 
clinicians is not to game, and the natural inclination of the 
managers is to balance the bucks. (M5) 
 
 
6.5.6 The delay in establishing an accurate IT system 
According to the above arguments, the initial drawbacks of the 
classification system including the constructional problems of 
the MHCT, the limitations of the HoNOS, the mismatches 
between the two and the lack of care pathways devaluated the 
classification results. Moreover, the possible “gaming” 
behaviours resulted from both clinicians’ “game for workload” 
and managers’ “game for money” further reduced the accuracy 
of the frontline data. The constructional drawbacks of MH PbR 
and the practical obstacles as a result of the target-driven 
policies reveal a low accuracy of the current information system. 
These factors raised concerns from both the providers and 
commissioners about the accuracy of the clinical data.  
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Moreover, the commissioners were aware of the lack of 
sufficient investment in IT and data collection. Drawing upon 
the theoretical mechanism of PbR as discussed in Chapter 2, 
without an accurate information system established, it is 
impossible to cost up services for each cluster/care package 
accurately. As the quote below indicates, the commissioners 
considered the lack of investment an impact factor that caused 
the delayed implementation of MH PbR. 
 
There hasn’t been the same level of investment in the data 
collection. … I think we cannot go to PbR system until mental 
health trusts invest enough money on their IT. (C1) 
 
This complies with the current situation where both 
commissioners and managers preferred to stay under the Block 
Contract temporarily to avoid financial risks due to their lack of 
confidence in data quality.  
 
 
6.5.7 Negative attitudes towards change 
Apart from the above objective factors, subjective factors such 
as the natural objection against change, have been noted. Five 
out of twelve participants regarded the naturally tendency for 
people to not want to change (on both the provider and the 
commissioner sides) as one of the factors that have caused the 
delay.  
 
They now have to change the way they are doing things. For a 
lot of people, they do not like to change, do they? (M4) 
In some cases, the trusts has been a lot more willingness to 
implement PbR while the commissioners have not been so keen. 
(C1) 
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With respect to unwillingness to change, participants provided 
two types of examples. For the providers, the frontline clinicians 
were unwilling to implement the new policy, such as discharging 
patients who had developed a dependency on secondary care. 
One manager attributed this to people’s fear of change in the 
culture and the ways they have been conducting services. On 
the commissioner side, the managers attributed the 
commissioners’ unwillingness to change to their lack of 
understanding of the new payment mechanism, given a large 
number of commissioners who were still thinking in the old way 
of contracting. 
 
I think what I want the commissioners to try to move towards 
is thinking about they are commissioning in a care pathway for 
a cluster. At the moment, they are still thinking in terms of 
services. (M6) 
 
In conclusion, as Figure 6-1 illustrates, the complex nature of 
mental disorders increased the difficulties in accurately 
classifying patients and therefore calculating costs. The current 
double-running system focused more on targets than the 
establishment of a fair payment system. The fast changing 
policies resulted in uncertainties that reduced frontline clinicians’ 
confidence in this project. All of the above factors contributed 
to frontline clinicians’ reluctance to engage, which therefore 
resulted in the “gaming” behaviours. A lack of accurate bottom-
up data together with the government’s insufficient investment, 
caused the delay in building up an accurate information system, 
which is the foundation of MH PbR. Together with people’s 
natural objection against change, these factors hindered the 
process of implementing PbR in mental health. 
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Figure 6-1 Interrelations among the driving factors 
 
 
 
 
6.6 Suggestions 
As some participants indicated, it is difficult to predict the risks 
before actually putting money attached to the system and 
having it officially implemented. It was considered still early to 
disclose how and to what extent this policy would affect people. 
In this case, one manager suggested implementing the whole 
system as postponing the project until everything is ready 
would be inappropriate.  
  
You could probably say that we will never be ready, and I think 
that in the system you just get them on that. We have always 
got to make changes, haven’t we? (M4) 
 
Only when this system gets fully implemented for a period of 
time can participants obtain a better idea of its value and 
drawbacks. In other words, only a limited number of potential 
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suggestions for the problems that had already emerged were 
available in this early stage of implementation. These 
preliminary suggestions for the process improvements are 
categorised as refining the clinical system, developing closer 
collaboration among participants, adjusting the focal points and 
seeking more support from the government. 
 
 
6.6.1 Refine the system 
Nine out of twelve participants suggested refining the clinical 
system, including refining the classification algorithm, 
prioritising the care pathways and investing the IT system, as 
potential solutions to the previously discussed problems. 
 
 
6.6.1.1 Refine the classification algorithm  
Regarding the MHCT classification system, the credibility and 
validity of the care pathways and the tariffs would be largely 
compromised when the validity of the clustering mechanism is 
brought into question. According to the previous findings, the 
appropriateness of adopting the HoNOS as the outcome 
measurement for clustering and re-clustering has been raised. 
Both the frontline clinicians and managers were aware of the 
potential risks of compromising the within-group homogeneity 
by merely relying upon the HoNOS scores. Hence, both the 
managers and frontline clinicians suggested adopting more 
elements/supplementary means to make an accurate clustering 
decision.  
 
If you just use the clustering tool you get a lot of people in the 
wrong clusters. We encourage people to use clustering tool but 
also use the clinical descriptor. We also encourage people to use 
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the care pathways. (M6) 
 
The managers also admitted that the lead clinician at the NHT 
did not agree with the current algorithm, whereas the members 
of the benchmarking group also had concerns over its validity. 
Under such circumstances, managers have set the schedule to 
revisit the algorithm. 
 
Our lead clinician for PbR does not like the algorithm. He does 
not actually think that it gives the outcome that we should have 
given as the feedback. Now I have asked it to be revisited 
actually. (M1) 
 
 
6.6.1.2 Prioritise Care Pathways 
One of the reasons why the frontline clinicians felt it difficult, or 
were even unwilling, to cluster patients has been attributed to 
the absence of the officially established care pathways. At the 
financial level, the commissioners noted that in the absence of 
the care pathways, providers could not accurately calculate the 
costs for each cluster. However, the managers were also aware 
of the difficulties in standardising care pathways and the fact 
that the currently designed care pathways did not represent 
what was happening in practice.  
 
The care pathways that we have set at the moment are quite 
aspirational. It is not necessarily what is happening in practice. 
We put things in the care pathways that we think should be 
done, but we are not necessarily doing. (M1) 
 
The managers also noted the lacked of sufficient resources for 
the development of the care pathways, despite its evident 
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importance to the implementation of the entire project. In this 
respect, it is important and urgent to prioritise the development 
of the care pathways.  
 
 
6.6.1.3 Test the clinical system  
When comparing the MHCT with the ICD/DSM, the frontline 
clinicians expressed their preference for the ICD/DSM partly due 
to the long existence of the diagnosis-based system and the 
support from the NICE guidelines. The initial shortcomings of 
the clustering algorithm have also been noted. Additionally, 
concerns were raised regarding the content of the quality 
measurements during the pilot. As one manager indicated, 
letting problems occur is the purpose of conducting a pilot test, 
which provides opportunities for refinement. However, despite 
the series of pilot tests that were launched, the frontline 
clinicians still considered the system lacking viability due to the 
lack of rigorous tests, as the quote below describes: 
 
It all comes too quick. They did not say “Well, all right, let us 
assess what each service does first”. No one asked me at any 
point “Can you do this? Is this doable? What do you do now?” 
So whom did they ask? I do not know. But I have been here 20 
years, no one asked me. (S1) 
 
As for the construction of MH PbR, the validity of each element 
within the clinical system are the preconditions for high-quality 
data, which in turn ensures the accuracy of the payment 
settlement. Therefore, the frontline clinicians suggested that 
each element should be refined, and the whole system should 
be tested at a local or national level first before the official 
implementation of the entire project.  
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6.6.2 Build closer collaborative relationships 
As previously discussed, although managers were conducting 
pilot tests, the frontline clinicians still felt the new system 
lacking viability. Together with the inconsistent training sessions, 
the gaps between the administrative strategy and the frontline 
understanding indicated a lack of collaboration between the two. 
In the financial aspect, the current status of the commissioners’ 
lack of willingness to adopt the new payment mechanism, 
together with experiences of lack of trust between providers and 
commissioners in acute services, called for closer collaboration.     
 
 
6.6.2.1 Manager-frontline collaboration 
To solve the frontline clinicians’ reluctance to engage, the 
managers were aware of the importance of building a closer 
collaborative relationship, particularly from three aspects: prove 
MH PbR effective, further develop training sessions and involve 
frontline clinicians in the decision-making process.  
 
Meanwhile, the frontline clinicians complained about the target-
led practice that took away too much time that could have been 
used to provide treatment to patients. However, from a 
managerial perspective, the routine activities are meaningful 
regarding collecting the frontline information to facilitate the 
resource management and thus the price calculation at the 
strategic level. In this case, the managers and commissioners 
attributed one of the reasons for the frontline clinicians’ 
complaints to a lack of opportunity to obtain a broader picture 
of the system. As some managers admitted, the administrative 
targets are necessary and useful, but it is managers’ 
responsibility to make them as explicit as possible for the 
frontline clinicians.  
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I think it (the manager-frontline collaboration) gives them 
(providers) a greater understanding of the project, and makes 
them easier to be part of it rather than they are told to do 
something. (M7)  
 
Participants from all groups were aware of the importance of 
training, due to the variations in clinical skills to cope with the 
MHCT. As discussed earlier, the managers attributed one of the 
factors that adversely affected the validity of the training 
sessions to the mixed messages coming from either different 
training sessions or different middle managers. The mixed 
messages devaluated the training sessions by confusing 
frontline clinicians about the accuracy of information provided 
during the sessions. By noting the side effects of the disjointed 
training sessions, the commissioners suggested a consistent 
and high-quality, up-to-date training to ensure that frontline 
clinicians understand what to do and how to do it. 
 
Although noting the difficulties in implementing collaboration, 
the managers acknowledged the insufficiency of the current 
top-down dictation, which indicated the necessity and 
importance in having a different relationship with frontline 
clinicians. In this respect, the managers appreciated the 
importance of establishing a collaboration process where 
frontline clinicians could share the information in greater detail 
and even engage in the decision-making process in order to 
encourage their participation. 
 
By engaging them in the process, they will understand it and 
become more a part of it and they become part of the potential 
solution as well because it is a process we have looked up them 
at the moment. (M7) 
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6.6.2.2 Provider-commissioner collaboration 
Regarding the current situation where GPs were new to 
commissioning and many commissioners were still thinking 
about commissioning in service rather than in cluster/care 
pathway, ways to help GP commissioners understand the new 
payment mechanism were also considered important. Drawing 
upon the importance of getting signatories to understand the 
new mechanism, the participants from the commissioner side 
attributed one of the reasons for requiring the dual-report to 
helping signatories comprehend the differences between 
commissioning in service and commissioning in clusters.  
 
They (providers) did not want to do the dual-reporting. They 
wanted to stop reporting on OBDs and contacts, and they only 
wanted to give us PbR data based on the PbR plan. So we 
argued “No, we have to have the report on contacts and 
(Occupied) Bed Days because we need to get signatories 
understand the differences between the two.” (C1) 
 
Besides getting commissioners on board, the managers realised 
their working relationship with commissioners was, and should 
be, collaborative rather than conflicting. The current 
collaboration progress highlighted the areas where the 
providers had been ineffective, which may in turn bring more 
financial risks under the MH PbR system. Similarly, on the 
commissioner side, the commissioners were inclined to 
collaborate with more directors besides the senior managers in 
order to obtain more detailed information regarding the actual 
frontline practice.  
 
I think what we need to do is actually talking about the 
implementation of PbR a lot more at those higher-level contract 
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meetings, and also at the contract set board which is attended 
by the directors because I think we need to have a really honest 
dialogue of where we are. (C1) 
 
In light of the side effects caused by the target-driven policies, 
the managers pointed to the importance of keeping the routine 
clinical practice in a stable condition and not to be destabilised 
by the potential increase in workload resulting from the 
establishment of the collaborative relationship.  
 
I suppose the other thing is to make they called “collaborative 
relationship with commissioners” not producing huge clinical 
instability in the mental health system, which clinicians do not 
want either. (M6) 
 
 
6.6.3 Adjust the focal point 
Additionally, the frontline clinicians argued that the information 
they received was all about money and targets. Simultaneously, 
the managers and commissioners were also aware of the 
potential risks or the fact that it was already happening: indeed, 
MH PbR became a finance-led system while it should not have 
been. In this case, the participants suggested an adjustment to 
the focal point from two aspects, including moving the attention 
from controlling costs to improving clinical services, and 
focusing on establishing an integrated mental healthcare 
system. 
 
 
6.6.3.1 Reduce the emphasis on targets and costs 
As both the managers and commissioners noted, the emphasis 
of MH PbR should be placed on “leading a better quality service”. 
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In other words, the standardisation of mental health services, 
the integration of service delivery and the quality of mental 
health services should be the priorities whilst less attention 
should be paid to the payment mechanism. However, at that 
moment, the change in the payment mechanism together with 
the establishment of supporting sub-systems attracted more 
emphases. This raised participants’ concern over the current 
condition, where MH PbR became a finance-led system that it 
should not have been. 
 
I think the bad thing about it is that it seems like a finance-led 
project and probably should not be, cause actually it is about 
the patient outcomes and patient needs. (M1) 
 
Regarding the solution, one commissioner and one manager 
suggested changing the misleading name and thus re-attracting 
people’s attention to patient needs to facilitate the development 
of better mental health services. 
 
Obviously because of the financial implications, that is called 
“Payment by Results” that people tend to focus on the finance. 
(C2) 
We need to change the name, don’t we? (M1) 
 
The frontline clinicians regarded the current the MH PbR system 
as lacking sufficient attention to comprehensively measure 
quality. When referring to the quality measurements, indicators, 
such as the successful face-to-face contacts or even the 
payment by cluster and the PREM, were considered to focus 
mainly on outcomes and only present part of the overall quality 
of services. One manager argued that service should be defined 
by “quality” and “perceived quality”. Regarding the “perceived 
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quality”, they believed it should not be defined merely by service 
users, rather, it should also be defined by frontline clinicians. In 
other words, the behind the scene effort should also be taken 
into consideration. As one clinician suggested below, to avoid 
an over focus on results and thus a lack of attention on other 
aspects of service, more attention should be paid to improving 
the service delivery process. 
 
I think it is too concentrated on results. I think what people 
need to pay a bit more heat to is the quality of care that is 
provided. (S3) 
 
 
6.6.3.2  Focus on establishing an integrated care system 
In terms of providing better services to care users, it has been 
noted that the current policies in relation to discharging patients 
to primary care required a closer collaboration between primary 
and secondary care. According to the statement below, there 
are some grey areas between the two that need to be clarified 
for a better coordination. 
 
I think there is always going to be a disconnection between 
primary care and secondary care. … We do need to be more 
sophisticated to look at the differences between Clusters 3 and 
4. (M7)  
 
With the development of different treatment approaches, 
managers were planning to make more investment in the 
community, such as allocating more resources to community 
care in order to improve the efficiency of secondary services. In 
other words, the reforms brought by MH PbR would not only 
affect the NHS system, but also influence social care services. 
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One manager revealed that the changes in secondary care 
would have a broader impact on other services due to the heavy 
impact of the external factors and the close relationship 
between secondary care and primary care, as well as with social 
care.  
 
This impacts on other sectors by introducing these changes in 
secondary mental health care, because it cannot be seen as an 
isolation since there is always an impact on other areas. (M2) 
 
In this respect, the success of MH PbR not only depends upon 
the changes in secondary care, but also requires the 
development of primary care and social care in sync. The 
commissioners also suggested reallocating some resources to 
primary care in order to improve efficiency. Furthermore, they 
considered the establishment of an efficient mental healthcare 
system as the prerequisite for the accurate calculation of mental 
health care costs. Only when the integrated system is 
established, can commissioners be assured of the effectiveness 
of the payment.  
 
Under such circumstances, the commissioners suggested 
focusing on establishing an effective service provision system 
first and postponing the implementation of the payment system. 
 
 
6.6.4 Government support 
In reference to these difficulties, the participants requested for 
more support from the government regarding the establishment 
of national guidelines and the provision of more financial 
support. 
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Besides the frontline clinicians’ complaints about too many 
targets, the managers and commissioners were also concerned 
about getting too many orientations from the government 
without being provided a clear direction on how to conduct the 
project. The lack of national guidelines not only led to a low 
accuracy of clustering, but also resulted in large variations in 
treatments, which conflict with the original goal of implementing 
MH PbR.  
 
I think the problem in mental health is that it is the area 
probably with the least national guidance, national standards. 
So what happened is that massive of codes in the country and 
what you can get in one area can be completely different from 
the other, and it should not have been. (C1) 
 
Under such circumstances, participants from both the manager 
and the commissioner groups expected more useful information 
from the government to guide the implementation process. 
 
I think the biggest thing is that there should be more 
information coming down from the top on how we do this and 
sharing information. (C1) 
 
From a managerial perspective, one benefit of care pathways is 
the integration of the mental healthcare system. This indicates 
that the system would inevitably involve social care and it has 
to address social needs. However, the managers also noted that 
the relationship between secondary care and social care was not 
close and even disappearing, given the fact that social care had 
been pulled back to the centre and the Nottingham City Council 
was planning to cut investment in social care. 
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If you are looking at the delivery of the care pathway, along 
that care pathway is inevitably social care. … Ideally, you would 
have social working in multi-discipline teams working within 
secondary mental health care. But that kind of model is, 
unfortunately, disappearing as social work is pulled back to the 
centre. (M2) 
 
The commissioners were also concerned about the limited 
budget since the money saved from closing inpatient beds had 
not been used to invest community services, rather, it had been 
taken out.  
 
I think sometimes beds have been closed, and the money has 
just been taken out. (C1) 
 
 
This made the implementation more difficult since that the 
establishment of fundamental facilities requires a considerable 
amount of initial input. Consequently, the managers asked for 
more financial support from the government to establish an 
integrated mental health system and to facilitate the reforms in 
secondary care. 
 
Ideally, we need a bigger financial envelope. (M6) 
 
 
 
Summary 
Chapters 3 and 5 explored the fundamental theories behind PbR 
and the technical mechanism of MH PbR design, respectively. 
The preliminary findings suggested that the Quasi-market, the 
fundamental idea underpinning PbR, lacked feasibility in health 
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care services and that the MH PbR suffered from the mechanical 
flaws due to its failure to apply the standardisation principle. 
Based on those macro-level findings, semi-structured 
interviews were undertaken to investigate the micro-level 
issues surrounding the implementation of the MH PbR policy. 
Subject to the research questions, this chapter attempted to 
explore the current stage of implementing PbR in mental health 
and to identify the driving factors that have caused the delay of 
implementation by summarising and analysing the findings 
from 12 interviews.  
 
To facilitate a better understanding of the driving factors, this 
chapter depicted the background of the payment system reform, 
outlined the current stage of MH PbR implementation, evaluated 
the core elements of the MH PbR system, investigated the 
driving factors for the delay and proposed suggestions for 
improvement. The first two sections outlined the reasons for the 
reform from two aspects: the initial problems of the Block 
Contract and the theoretical benefits of MH PbR, particularly the 
transparent information system. By presenting the current 
stage of MH PbR implementation, Section 6.3 outlined the 
difficulties in applying the MH PbR system and the 
corresponding targets to daily clinical practice, which revealed 
the gaps between strategy and practice. To further investigate 
the reasons for the delayed implementation, particularly the 
reasons for frontline clinicians’ reluctance to engage, Sections 
6.4 and 6.5 looked at the MH PbR system itself and the external 
factors. The flaws in each sub-system, together with the lack of 
coordination among them, partly explained the frontline 
clinicians’ negative attitudes towards this project and thus 
causing the delay in putting it into practice. Accordingly, Section 
6.5 further summarised the driving factors into seven inter-
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linked aspects. The first three driving factors led to the frontline 
clinicians’ being reluctant to engage in the reform: the complex 
nature of mental disorders and the initial problems with the 
classification system made the classification system lack 
accuracy, and the inappropriately set targets brought heavy, but 
meaningless workload. This together with the information 
asymmetry, resulted in the “gaming” behaviours such as 
clinicians’ “game for workload”. The negative attitude towards 
change has also been noted as one supplementary reason for 
the delay. According to these factors, suggestions were 
proposed in the last section, although it was still too early to 
predict them.  
 
To verify the interview findings, the next chapter is organised in 
the same structure while paying greater attention to the detail 
information regarding the variations in perspectives among 
different interest groups. 
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7. The implementation of the MH PbR policy: 
Questionnaire results and discussion  
 
 
 
Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the semi-structured interviews and 
the online surveys were conducted to investigate the 
implementation process of the MH PbR policy. Regarding the 
relationship between these two methods, the interview method 
was set as the leading approach, while the online surveys were 
employed to verify and generalise the findings.  Referring to the 
findings presented in Chapter 6, the participants confirmed the 
delayed implementation of MH PbR and introduced the current 
implementation progress of the sub-systems, including the 
MHCT clustering, the HoNOS scales, the MHCT care pathways 
and the quality measures. Regarding the delay, the driving 
factors have been categorised into seven inter-linked aspects 
with variations in attitude found between different interest 
groups. In particular, the interview findings highlighted the 
splitting perspectives among different interest groups. In this 
respect, three versions of the questionnaire were designed 
specifically forcommissioners, managers and frontline clinicians, 
respectively, in order to verify and generalise the findings in 
relation to the implementation of MH PbR in practice, with 
particular attention paid to the splitting perspectives among the 
participants. IBM SPSS 20 was used to analyse the 
questionnaire data sorted by Microsoft Excel 2010. 
 
To better verify the findings from the semi-structured interviews, 
the questionnaire data were analysed and triangulated with the 
findings derived from the previous two-level theoretical analysis. 
In this regard, this chapter presents and discusses the 
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questionnaire results from four main aspects: 1) the 
background information regarding the demographic information 
and the current stage of  implementation; 2) the evaluation of 
the core components; 3) the perspectives on the driving factors 
and the participants’ general attitudes towards MH PbR; and 4) 
the suggestions for further development. 
 
 
 
7.1 General background of implementation 
This section provides general background information including 
the demographic information of participants, the collaboration 
between the participants and some factual information 
regarding the implementation progress. By introducing the 
background information of the participants, this section will 
facilitate a better understanding of the results derived from the 
statistical analysis, in particular, the results that indicate the 
splitting perspectives among the participants.  
 
 
7.1.1 Demographic information 
The 38-participant group comprises 14 managers, 20 frontline 
clinicians and 4 commissioners. Due to the difference in sample 
population between the three groups, nurses, clinical the 
managers and psychiatrists are the top three groups with the 
highest proportion of the sample population, respectively 
accounting for 43.1%, 21.6% and 13.7% of the total sample, 
as Figure 7-1 shows. Figures 7-2 and 7-3 depict the distribution 
of post in the first two groups: within the managerial group, 
over 73% are clinical the managers; amongst the frontline 
participants, nurses and psychiatrists together account for over 
90% of all participants. As a reflection of the limited number of 
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commissioning participants, two participants are financing 
officers and two are GP commissioners. 
 
 
Figure 7-1 Distribution of the participants’ posts 
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Figure 7-2 Distribution of the managerial posts 
 
 
 
Figure 7-3 Distribution of the frontline posts 
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As described in Chapter 6, the managers as a whole team have 
dual responsibilities: to collaborate with commissioners 
regarding financial and clinical issues and to direct frontline 
clinical practice. As Figure 7-4 shows, the collaboration between 
the commissioners and managers mainly involved multi-
disciplinary coordination and payment negotiation. The meeting 
frequency was normally less than 2-3 times/month, as shown 
in Table 7-1. For the managers who have no direct collaboration 
with commissioners, they took more responsibility for designing 
and providing the clinical strategy. Figure 7-5 explores the core 
elements/priority of the manager-frontline collaboration in daily 
practice. As it illustrates, the majority of both the managers 
(75.0%) and frontline clinicians (47.27%) attributed the direct 
clinical practice as the primary element of their daily 
collaboration. It shows that only a small amount of participants 
considered training as part of the collaboration, which shows 
agreement with the findings in Chapter 6 that revealed a lack 
of training at the frontline level. Regarding the meeting 
frequency between the managers and frontline clinicians, over 
45% of the participants had more than one meeting per week 
with their corresponding supervisors/supervisees. Over 80% of 
the participants had at least one meeting per month to discuss 
clinical issues. The meeting frequency is higher than that 
between the commissioners and managers, although without 
statistical significance.  
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Figure 7-4 Collaboration types between managers and commissioners 
 
 
 
 
Table 7-1  Meeting frequencies of the commissioner-manager collaboration 
and manager-frontline collaboration 
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Figure 7-5 Core elements of the manager-frontline collaboration 
 
 
 
 
7.1.2 Current implementation 
Table 7-2 introduces the implementation status of MH PbR. Over 
73% participants confirmed the dominant position of the Block 
Contract, which indicates the delayed implementation of MH 
PbR. However, over 57% of participants were aware of the 
political trend to implement PbR in mental health. According to 
the outcomes of the semi-structured interviews presented in 
Chapter 6, the care pathways have been developed for 
preliminary testing in a selection of pilot hospitals. Over 68% of 
participants confirmed that care pathways were being 
implemented, although without being officially established. For 
42% of the participants, at least some quality measurements 
were being used in their daily clinical practice. This echoes the 
findings in Chapter 6 indicating that the quality measurements 
such as CROM, PROM and PREM were under preliminary testing. 
Concerning the implementation of financial incentives, the 
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percentage of the participants who voted “yes” equals those 
who voted “no”. According to the information obtained from the 
semi-structured interviews, the CQUIN targets had been 
adopted as clinical targets with some financial incentives (2.5% 
of the total budget) attached. However, commissioners decided 
to cease paying CQUIN financial incentives in 2014/15, 
considering the financial support they had already provided. 
This decision may explain the equally splitting opinions in 
reference to the implementation status of financial incentives. 
 
Table 7-2 Current status of the implementation of MH PbR 
 
 
 
Table 7-3 below shows the current progress of implementing MH 
PbR. Over 89% of the participants confirmed the high 
percentage (>75%) of patients already clustered, which meets 
the government requirement regarding clustering every patient 
as described in Chapter 6. Subject to the target of discharging 
C1-C3 patients, the result shows high variation in the 
percentage of C1-C3 patients who have been discharged. The 
causal factor may be attributed to the variation among frontline 
professionals regarding service provision, especially considering 
the insufficient training as discussed in Chapter 6. This 
deduction may be verified by the corresponding interview 
findings where the managers noted a considerable number of 
patients being transferred from C3 to C4 rather than being 
discharged. Another possible reason may be the variation 
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among providers. Despite the difference-minimisation rule 
considered during the site selection process, service-user 
characteristics and service outcomes (this has been discussed 
in Chapter 4), the progress of implementation may still vary 
between these two hospitals. According to Figure 7-6, over 38% 
of the participants have never been to any training session. 
Amongst those who have attended training sessions, the 
majority (90.92%) have attended once or twice. This may imply 
that the insufficient training sessions failed to correct some 
frontline clinicians’ misunderstandings, which led to its failure 
to improve service quality by minimising variations in clinical 
practice (this will be discussed in Section 7.3.5).  
 
Table 7-3 Current progress of the implementation of MH PbR 
 
 
Figure 7-6 Number of training sessions attended by frontline clinicians  
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7.2 Sub-systems evaluation 
Referring to the findings derived from both the theoretical 
analysis and the semi-structured interviews, the MHCT, the 
HoNOS, the care pathways, the quality measurements and the 
IT system were seen as core elements within the MH PbR 
system, while the accuracy of the IT system largely is 
dependent upon the validity of the other four systems. 
Considering the differences in the profession, questions in 
relation to the detailed information about the MHCT, the HoNOS 
and the care pathways were only available to the managers and 
the frontline clinicians. In terms of the commissioners’ 
perspectives on the classification system and its corresponding 
care pathways, they were asked to express their perspectives 
at a general level. Questions exploring general issues, such as 
the validity and credibility of quality measurements, were asked 
to all participants. To verify the findings of the semi-structured 
interviews, this section evaluates the sub-systems from four 
main aspects: the MHCT, the HoNOS, the integration of the 
classification system and the quality measurements.  
 
 
7.2.1 The MHCT 
Drawing upon the findings from the interviews, the comparison 
between the MHCT and the DSM reflects the differences in the 
standpoints of providing healthcare services, which complies 
with the corresponding findings in Chapter 6. As Table 7-4 
displays, the majority of the participants (50.0%) regarded the 
MHCT as less valid than the DSM. A considerably large amount 
of participants had a “neutral” opinion (23.1%). This echoes the 
corresponding finding in Chapter 6: “there is no black and white, 
and it always comes with a compromise”. Similar to the 
interview findings, Figure 7-7 indicates that compared to the 
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manager group, there is a higher proportion of the frontline 
clinicians who disagreed with the statement “the MHCT is more 
valid than the DSM”. This shows agreement with the 
corresponding interview findings that the frontline clinicians 
were more likely to be concerned about the validity of the MHCT 
than the managers, whereas the managers were likely to value 
its advantages besides its initial drawbacks and thus preferred 
to answer “neutral”. In general, there is no significant difference 
(p= 0.51) in perspective between the managers and the 
frontline clinicians. 
 
Table 7-4 Comparison between the MHCT and the DSM 
 
 
 
Figure 7-7 Differences in perspectives on the validity of the MHCT between 
managers and frontline clinicians 
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The interview data indicated that for those who held negative 
views towards the MHCT, the poor within-group homogeneity 
and between-group heterogeneity were their major concern. In 
order to investigate the relationship between the two 
statements: “The MHCT is more useful than the DSM” and “the 
distinctions between neighbouring clusters are clear”, 
descriptive analysis and correlation analysis (Spearman non-
parametric analysis) were used for two purposes,: 1) to explore 
the participants’ opinions towards the clarity of the 
neighbouring clusters; and 2) to explore the correlation 
between the two variables. 
 
As Figure 7-8 below illustrates, splitting perspectives have been 
found towards this issue. Specifically, 40% of the participants 
selected “disagree” regarding the hypothesis: “The distinctions 
between neighbouring clusters are clear”, and while 43.3% of 
the participants agreed with the statement, no one strongly 
supported this claim. Unlike one corresponding finding in 
Chapter 6 stating that the managers were more likely to 
advocate the MHCT over the DSM, 46.15% of the managers 
considered the distinctions between neighbouring clusters not 
clear, compared with 38.4% who advocated it. This echoes 
another finding from Chapter 6 where managers noted the 
initial problems regarding the within-group homogeneity and 
the between-group heterogeneity. This in turn complies with the 
finding that the managers were more likely to weight more on 
its theoretical advantages in reference to connecting clinical 
activity and payment system. As one manager concluded in 
Chapter 6: “There is no absolute black and white. It always 
comes with a compromise.” By contrast, a considerable 
percentage of frontline clinicians considered the distinctions 
clear, which is consistent with one viewpoint observed in 
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Chapter 6 concerning the mismatch between the MHCT clusters 
and the HoNOS scores: the MHCT classification system is 
supposed to be objective while the HoNOS scores are 
subjectively given by clinicians. Supported by Spearman non-
parametric analysis, there is no significant correlation (p=0.113) 
between the validity of the MHCT and the clarity of distinctions. 
Therefore, it suggests that further investigation into the HoNOS 
and the interaction between the two is needed. 
 
 
Figure 7-8 Splitting perspectives on the distinctions of neighbouring clusters 
 
 
 
 
7.2.2 The HoNOS 
According to the findings derived from the interviews, the 
validity of the HoNOS scale in terms of accurately capturing 
patients’ symptoms and the collaboration between the HoNOS 
scores and the MHCT clusters are the two factors that 
significantly affect the validity and credibility of the classification 
system. The online surveys investigated the participants’ 
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perspectives towards two statements, including: “The HoNOS is 
well-designed” and “The HoNOS scores lead to correct clusters”. 
 
As Table 7-5 displays, in general, over 60% of the participants 
disagreed with the first statement that “The HoNOS is well-
designed regarding its validity and reliability”. However, the 
distributions of perspective differ between two groups. 38.5% 
of the managers considered the HoNOS well-designed whilst 
only 7.7% voted “strongly disagree”. By contrast, 64.7% of the 
frontline clinicians regarded the HoNOS as poorly designed, 
among whom nearly half held a strong negative opinion. This 
result shows agreement with the corresponding interview 
findings that revealed its limited coverage and historical 
problems. Although it has been revised by adding criteria to 
detect historical symptoms, the long formed viewpoint and the 
lack of guidance could explain why the frontline clinicians either 
disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement. When 
analysing this issue from a general perspective, the outcome 
that 38.5% of the managers considered the HoNOS well-
designed partly conforms to the findings discussed in Chapter 5, 
which revealed the splitting opinions towards the validity of the 
HoNOS. This also complies with the interview findings indicating 
that the validity was viewed as largely improved due to the 
refinement of the historical symptoms. 
 
Table 7-5 Perspectives on the validity of the HoNOS 
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Despite the splitting perspectives regarding the design of the 
HoNOS, the majority of the managers and frontline clinicians 
noted the poor collaboration between the HoNOS scores and the 
MHCT clusters. According to Table 7-5, 51.6% of the 
participants chose “disagree” while 25.8% even chose “strongly 
disagree”, compared to 3.2% who chose “agree” and no one 
chose “strongly agree”. By comparing the distribution of 
perspectives between the manager group and the frontline 
clinician group, the questionnaire data shows that among the 
participants who disagreed with the statement, there is a higher 
percentage of the frontline clinicians who voted “strongly 
disagree” (50%) than that of the managers (16.7%). In other 
words, compared to the managers, the frontline clinicians were 
more inclined to be concerned about the poor connection 
between the HoNOS scores and the MHCT clusters. This 
matches the corresponding findings from Chapter 6 which 
indicates that the frontline clinicians tended to have a deeper 
understanding of the initial problems resulting from allocating 
patients to particular clusters according to their MHCT/HoNOS 
scores. Regarding the perspectives on the MHCT, the HoNOS 
and the collaboration between the two in the manager group, 
the results indicate that the managers had splitting opinions 
regarding the validity of the MHCT and the HoNOS as two 
individual elements, but the majority (85%) were aware of the 
mismatches between the two. This complies with one finding 
discussed in Chapter 5 indicating that the HoNOS has 
considerably good validity in terms of comparing the changes in 
outcome at an individual level. Nevertheless, it does not serve 
the function of a rating scale that was expected as part of the 
MHCT classification system.   
 
In consideration of the commissioners’ understanding of the 
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classification system, they were asked about the validity of the 
MHCT in terms of accurately categorising patients as a 
classification system at a general level. 50% of the 
commissioners considered the MHCT incapable of accurately 
classifying mental health disorders. This outcome echoes the 
perspectives that the managers and frontline clinicians held 
towards the validity of the MHCT. It also conforms to the 
corresponding findings that the initial problems of the MHCT 
clusters, the HoNOS scales and the gaps between the two 
undermined the ability of the MHCT to accurately categorise 
patients as a classification system. 
 
 
7.2.3 The integration of the classification system 
As discussed in Chapter 6 and Section 7.1.2, the MHCT care 
pathways were still under preliminary testing without being 
officially invoked in daily clinical practice. Drawing upon the 
experiences of using the pilot care pathways up till now, the 
managers and frontline clinicians were asked to compare them 
with the NICE guidelines regarding its validity to predict target 
treatments for the patients in the corresponding clusters. The 
commissioners were asked about its validity to provide proper 
guidance at a general level. In the end, for the integration of a 
MHCT classification system, all participants were requested to 
express their opinions on the MHCT care pathways and the 
integrity of the system as a whole. 
 
According to Figure 7-9 below, the majority of participants 
answered “neutral”, which echoes the corresponding interview 
finding that both the MHCT care pathways and the NICE 
guidelines have their advantages as well as limitations. Slightly 
more participants preferred the NICE guidelines than those who 
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supported the MHCT care pathways. In particular, the results 
show that 11.76% of the frontline clinicians strongly disagreed 
with the statement. This reflects the splitting perspectives 
resulted from different considerations: from their perspectives, 
the NICE guidelines are more useful since they are based on the 
diagnosis that seeks the root problem of mental disorders. By 
contrast, 50% of the commissioners preferred the MHCT care 
pathways to the NICE guidelines, which reiterates their 
attention to its financial benefit regarding indicating resource 
allocation and, therefore, cost calculation. 
 
Figure 7-9 Comparison between the MHCT care pathways and the NICE 
guidelines 
 
 
Regarding the integration of these three elements (the HoNOS, 
the MHCT and the MHCT care pathways), Table 7-6 displays the 
participants’ viewpoints as an entire group, as well as three 
separate groups. As a whole group, a total of 50% of 
participants were concerned about the poor collaboration 
among these three elements, leaving 27.8% regarding it as 
neutral and the remaining 22.3% supporting it. Figure 7-10 
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shows the splitting perspectives among subgroups: the 
commissioners tended to be neutral while the managers and 
frontline clinicians held a more negative attitude, which 
conforms to the corresponding interview findings. One of the 
possible reasons may be the limited information available to the 
commissioners due to the incomplete system, which made them 
prefer to hold a more cautious and thus neutral opinion. By 
contrast, the clinical professionals, especially the frontline 
clinicians were more likely to note the discordances between 
these three elements. Compared to the managers, the frontline 
clinicians tended to hold a higher degree of concern about the 
interaction between these three elements, which is found in line 
with their perspectives on other issues in relation to the 
classification system as previously discussed. 
 
 
Table 7-6 Perspectives on the integration of the classification system 
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Figure 7-10 Perspectives on the integration of the HoNOS, the MHCT and the 
care pathways 
 
 
 
7.2.4 Quality measurements 
Findings from the interviews demonstrated the importance of a 
transparent information system to service/quality regulation. 
Nevertheless, Chapter 6 also raised questions about whether 
quality could be comprehensively and accurately measured and 
whether the currently established measurements can detect the 
“real” quality, complying with the corresponding argument 
discussed in Chapter 3. To explore the participants’ viewpoints 
towards the quality measurement system in theory and how 
these different measures work in practice, questions were asked 
in an order from more general to greater detail: 1) Should 
service quality be measured? 2) Can service quality be 
measured? 3) Can the PREM reflect service quality? 4) Can the 
HoNOS accurately present outcomes? 
 
Table 7-7 depicts the distribution of responses regarding the 
necessity and the feasibility of measuring service quality. A 
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majority of the participants considered it necessary to measure 
service quality. Particularly, 69.23% of the managers strongly 
supported quality measurements, which echoes the interview 
findings that the managers considered themselves 
disadvantaged under the Block Contract since they provided 
more and better service than they was required. This may also 
contribute to the explanation of the fact that the managers still 
advocated for MH PbR despite their awareness of the initial 
problems of the classification system and the side effects 
created by this project. From their perspective, the 
establishment of a transparent information system equipped 
with a comprehensive quality measurement system has the 
potential to facilitate an evidence-based health resource 
management. 
 
Table 7-7 Perspectives on quality measurements  
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Compared with the theory of measuring service quality, the 
opinions of measuring quality in practice were not as optimistic, 
although the majority of participants still advocated the 
statement: “Service quality can be accurately measured”, as 
shown in Figure 7-11. Comparing the perspectives by subgroup, 
the managerial side (including the managers and 
commissioners) was more likely to show confidence in quality 
measurement proxies. Whilst similar to the previous finding, the 
frontline clinicians tended to be more concerned about this 
system. The initial problems of the existing measures such as 
the HoNOS and the PREM might be the reasons that made them 
feel more conservative about the quality measurement system. 
For those who voted either “strongly disagree” or “disagree”, 
the theories in relation to quality measurement discussed in 
Chapter 3 may be one reason: it is difficult if not impossible to 
comprehensively and accurately measure the quality of the 
frontline practice. 
 
Figure 7-11 Perspectives on measuring quality in practice 
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In terms of the validity and reliability of the PREM, a significant 
within-group variation has been observed as shown in Figure 7-
12. According to Table 7-7 above, a total of 32.2% of the 
participants who had concerns about PREM, versus 39.3% who 
considered PREM’s outcomes able to reflect service quality, and 
the remaining 28.6% who held a neutral opinion. The splitting 
opinions match the findings in Chapter 6, according to which 
the clinicians, on the one hand, valued patients’ thoughts and 
regarded them as valid in evaluating clinical services, while on 
the other hand, they realised the gaps between the “good 
services” and patients’ subjective opinions.  
 
Figure 7-12 Perspectives on the validity and reliability of the PREM 
 
 
 
Similar to their opinion of the PREM, the participants tended to 
be negative towards the effectiveness of the HoNOS as an 
outcome measure, while splitting opinions have been noted in 
Figure 7-13. 53.9% of the managers regarded the HoNOS with 
low effectiveness for presenting patients’ outcomes. Similar to 
the managers, more frontline clinicians held a negative 
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viewpoint, although with larger variation in responses to the 
statement: “The HoNOS outcome measurement can effectively 
present outcomes”. The general preference matches the main 
finding against the HoNOS’s validity in Chapter 6 – the HoNOS 
lacks the ability to detect symptoms and to present outcomes 
due to its subjectivity, limited coverage, function as a general 
assessment and its historical problems. Nevertheless, as stated 
in Section 7.2.2, the improvement of the HoNOS makes it more 
valid and more credible, which may explain the responses 
allocated in the “agree” or even “strongly agree” categories.  
 
Figure 7-13 Perspectives on the validity of the HoNOS as an outcome 
measurement 
 
 
 
 
7.3 Driving factors 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the core objective of this thesis is to 
identify the driving factors that have caused the delay in 
implementing PbR in mental health. Drawing on the 
corresponding findings derived from the interviews, questions 
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were set to explore the participants’ perspectives on seven 
factors in relation to their impacts on the delayed 
implementation. These included the complex nature of mental 
disorders, the ideology of “standardisation” and the Quasi-
market, the initial drawbacks of the classification system, 
government policies, clinicians’ involvement, “gaming” 
behaviours and the experiences from acute services. Among 
these seven factors, six were asked to all participants, whilst 
the questions about clinicians’ involvement were set in a 
different way for the frontline clinicians from that for the other 
two subgroups.  
 
 
7.3.1 Complex nature of mental disorders 
As Figure 7-14 indicates, a large majority of participants (87.9% 
in total) attributed the complex nature of mental disorders as 
an important driving factor leading to the delayed 
implementation of MH PbR. Among the participants, more than 
half considered it crucial. This result confirms the finding from 
Chapter 6 where the complex nature of mental disorders was 
considered as the foundation of resource management and the 
following cost calculation. This also echoes the arguments in 
Chapters 3 and 5 that suggested the individualised needs for 
care resulting from the complex nature of mental disorders 
rejects the fundamental idea of commoditizing mental health 
services and therefore, the application of the “standardisation-
to the-average” principle. Figure 7-14 also indicates that the 
managers and frontline clinicians were more likely to regard it 
as a crucial reason than commissioners, which once again, 
reveals the gaps between theory and practice.  
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Figure 7-14 Impact of the nature of mental disorders on the delayed 
implementation of MH PbR 
 
 
 
7.3.2 The ideas behind MH PbR 
Table 7-8 below demonstrates the impacts of two fundamental 
ideas on the implementation of MH PbR from two levels: the 
feasibility of the general ideas underpinning the clinical system 
and the feasibility of MH PbR as a payment system underpinned 
by the Quasi-market theory. The outcomes reveal two general 
phenomena: on the one hand, these two factors were regarded 
as important to the delayed implementation, and on the other 
hand, rather than the previous findings according to which the 
frontline clinicians had more negative perspectives, the 
managers and commissioners expressed more concern about 
the ideas behind MH PbR. 
 
Regarding the impact of the ideology of clustering, the majority 
of participants (52.9%) regarded the clustering ideology as one 
of the reasons leading to the delayed implementation, as Table 
7-8 shows. This may be explained by one finding in Chapter 5: 
	 303	
the MHCT classification system is fundamentally flawed for not 
taking account of the possible interventions during the decision-
making process. The lack of fundamental validity has therefore 
been attributed as a factor that caused the delay. In light of the 
current progress of implementing MH PbR, the majority of 
participants (51.6%) believed that it has become a finance-led 
system, and it is the finance-led system that has hindered the 
implementation process. Similarly, the managers and 
commissioners tended to realise the problems of MH PbR in 
terms of being a finance-led system, which echoes the 
corresponding interview findings. This result complies with the 
arguments in Chapter 3 where the MHCT and the corresponding 
care pathways were developed to serve cost calculation rather 
than clinical practice, which had raised concerns about its ability 
in terms providing patient-centred care. 
 
In regard to the splitting perspectives between the 
administrative-level and the frontline-level participants, this 
could be explained by one finding from Chapter 6: the clinical 
and financial strategies were only discussed at the managerial 
level rather than including the front line, which led to frontline 
clinicians’ lack of comprehensive understanding of the ideas 
behind MH PbR. A viewpoint observed in the interviews could 
also explain this concept: frontline clinicians tend to focus on 
their duties regarding providing service to clients and, as a 
result, they are not likely to think about more general issues, 
such as ideology and finance-related issues. This explanation 
could be supported by the findings discussed in Section 7.3.3 in 
terms of their opinions on the particular objectives of the MHCT.   
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Table 7-8 Impacts of the clustering ideology and finance-led system on the 
delayed implementation of MH PbR 
 
 
 
7.3.3 Sub-systems 
Based upon the findings discussed in Section 7.2 which 
evaluated the validity of the sub-systems including the MHCT 
decision tree, the HoNOS scores and the MHCT care pathways, 
this section further explores the relationship between the 
development of these subsystems and the delayed 
implementation of the MH PbR policy.  
 
Table 7-9 displays the impacts of the MHCT and the HoNOS as 
two separate elements as well as an entire classification system 
on the delayed implementation of MH PbR. A total 67.7% of 
participants regarded the design of the MHCT clusters as having 
negative impacts on the implementation of MH PbR. Similarly, 
67.6% of participants chose either “important” or “very 
important” to describe the impacts of the poor-design of the 
HoNOS on the implementation of MH PbR. However, the 
distribution of responses varies. According to Table 7-9, among 
the participants who considered that the poor design of the 
MHCT had an impact on the delayed implementation of MH PbR, 
30.0% considered it of high importance. Among the participants 
who rated the design of the HoNOS as either “important” or 
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“very important”, there is a greater percentage of participants 
(40.3%) who rated the design of the HoNOS as “very important” 
to the delay. Mann-Whitney test confirms this result: the mean 
rank of rating for the HoNOS is higher than that for the MHCT. 
In other words, the initial problems of the design and application 
of the HoNOS have a greater impact on the delayed 
implementation of the MH PbR policy than those of the MHCT. 
This result also matches the corresponding findings discussed 
in both Section 7.2 and Chapter 6.  
 
Table 7-9 Impacts of the MHCT, the HoNOS and the entire classification 
system on  the delayed implementation of MH PbR 
 
 
 
Regarding the collaboration between these two elements, 64.7% 
of the participants rated the weak interaction between the MHCT 
clusters and the HoNOS scores as an either “important” or “very 
important” factor for the delay. Splitting opinions have been 
found although there is no significant difference found in the 
Chi-square test. As Figure 7-15 shows, divergent opinions have 
been found inside the commissioner group, which could be due 
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to their professions and also due to the lack of high-quality 
information. Another phenomenon worth discussing is the 
splitting opinions among the frontline clinicians, particularly the 
18.75% who selected “unknown”. This conforms to one finding 
from the interviews: due to the incomplete classification system 
and the inconsistent training, the HoNOS scores and the MHCT 
clusters were viewed as two separate issues to some frontline 
clinicians. Therefore, some of clinicians did not have a clear idea 
of how the MHCT and the HoNOS incorporate with each other. 
 
Figure 7-15 Impacts of the interaction between the MHCT and the HoNOS on 
the delayed implementation of MH PbR 
 
 
 
According to Table 7-10, 67.7% of the participants rated the 
impacts of the incomplete care pathways as an “important” or 
“very important” factor that affected the implementation of MH 
PbR. Compared with the splitting opinions in the commissioner 
group, a clear preference of “important” and “very important” 
has been found in the manager group and the frontline clinician 
group, since 78.6% of the managers and 62.2% of the frontline 
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clinicians expressed concerns. This result confirms the findings 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 indicating that the impact caused 
by the absence of care pathways depends upon the roles the 
care pathways play in the classification process. Drawing upon 
their professional experiences, the managers and frontline 
clinicians are more likely to appreciate the importance of the 
care pathways. According to the interview findings, due to the 
initial mismatches between the HoNOS and the MHCT clusters, 
some frontline clinicians’ preferred to rely on the possible 
treatment. This indicates the adverse impacts on the clustering 
process brought by the incomplete care pathway system, let 
alone its subsequent impacts on cost calculation and therefore 
the implementation process of the entire project.  
 
Table 7-10 Impacts of the incomplete care pathways and the incomplete IT 
system on the delayed implementation of MH PbR 
 
 
 
Similarly, the important role a transparent IT system plays 
demonstrates the adverse consequences that result from not 
having it properly established. In Table 7-10, a total of 64.7% 
of the participants considered it as an important factor that 
caused the delay in implementing the MH PbR policy. This result 
is in agreement with the corresponding findings from Section 
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7.2 and Chapter 6 which indicated that without a fully 
established clinical system supported by a well-designed 
information system, frontline clinicians can neither make an 
accurate classification, nor see the general picture of the new 
system as a whole. 
 
 
7.3.4 Government policies 
Inconsistent with the corresponding interview findings, the 
participants from all three interest groups expressed their 
concern about the intensively established government policies 
and regarded them as a driving factor for the delay. To test the 
influence of government policies as effective guidance and thus 
explore its impact on the development of MH PbR, Likert rating 
scales were used to test the clarity of government policies and 
their impacts on the delayed implementation of MH PbR.  
 
As Table 7-11 displays, the majority of participants (50.4%) 
considered government policies unclear. On the one hand, 
particularly stronger concerns have been found from the 
manager and the commissioner groups. This conforms to the 
corresponding finding in Chapter 6 arguing a lack of clear 
national guidelines to guide local activities. Figures in Table 7-
12 also underpin this finding by indicating a total of 47% of 
participants (particularly the managers and commissioners) 
attributed the unclear government policies as one of the driving 
factors. On the other hand, splitting viewpoints between the 
frontline clinicians have been noted. This may be explained by 
the findings from Chapter 6: the frontline clinicians focused 
more on their duties rather than thinking about the 
government’s general strategy. Policies became targets when 
they came down to the frontline, which (e.g. “clustering every 
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patient” and “having four successful contacts every day”), which 
were considered clear, however, not in a helpful way. This 
complies with frontline clinicians’ perspective of the impacts of 
workload on the delayed implementation of MH PbR. The 
questionnaire figures show that 75.0% of the frontline clinicians 
attributed the heavy workload as either an “important” or “very 
important” factor that adversely affected the application of PbR 
in mental health. This corresponds with the interview finding 
arguing that the increasing targets not only increased the 
frontline workload, some even conflicted with the clinical 
realities and thus threatened good quality care. 
 
Table 7-11 Perspectives on government policies 
 
 
Table 7-12 Impacts of government policies on the delayed implementation 
of MH PbR 
 
 
 
7.3.5 Clinicians’ involvement 
According to the findings in Chapter 6, the participants from all 
three groups were aware of clinicians’ lack of willingness to be 
involved in the reform. In order to explore the factors that 
caused frontline clinicians’ reluctance to engage, participants 
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were asked to rate the factors, which were identified from the 
interviews, according their importance to the delayed 
implementation. Factors, including “training lacks effectiveness” 
and “variation in skill among clinicians”, were available to 
participants from all three groups. In consideration of profession, 
the factor “clinicians’ lack of understanding” were only available 
to the participants from the manager and commissioner groups. 
Instead, the frontline clinicians were asked to rate the factor 
“mixed messages to the front line”, which is an explanation of 
frontline clinicians’ lack of understanding of the whole system, 
according to the interview findings. 
 
According to Table 7-13 below, it has been found that 
commissioners tended to answer either “not important” or 
“neutral” to all questions. By contrast, the managers and the 
frontline clinicians were more likely to hold similar viewpoint 
towards these three aspects. This shows agreement with the 
interview findings that demonstrated the fact that the 
importance of clinicians’ lack of understanding, variation in skills 
among clinicians and training’s lack of effectiveness resulted in 
frontline clinicians’ reluctance and their lack of ability to engage 
in the reform. Separating the inter-linked three aspects, 92.9% 
of the managers regarded clinicians’ lack of understanding as 
an important factor that affected their involvement and thus 
adversely affected the implementation of MH PbR. This matches 
one corresponding finding in Chapter 6 where the frontline 
clinicians mistook daily contacts as part of the targets of MH 
PbR, whereas it was the target for the current double-running 
system. From the perspective of frontline clinicians’, they 
attributed the mixed messages coming down to the frontline as 
an important factor given that 62.6% rated it as either 
“important” or “very important”. This result also matches the 
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corresponding finding from the interviews, which demonstrated 
the impacts of the mixed messages on frontline clinicians’ 
misunderstanding and even their negative attitudes.  
 
Regarding the causal relationship between the insufficient 
training and frontline clinicians’ lack of understanding discussed 
in Chapter 6, the figures in Table 7-13 confirm the insufficiency 
of training by showing that 92.9% of the managers and 68.8% 
of the frontline clinicians had serious concerns about the 
effectiveness of training sessions. This finding echoes one 
frontline clinician’s argument expressed in the interviews in 
terms of the training’s lack of flexibility in the training and the 
trainer’s lack of ability to solve the practical problems. For the 
managers, it reflects that the managerial level has realised the 
importance and urgency of conducting high-quality and 
targeting training, which is consistent with one commissioner’s 
observation that the managers had realised that training should 
be a rolling session to update information constantly, rather 
than the previously disjointed segments. Table 7-13 also 
confirms the variations in clinicians’ skills and, therefore, their 
impact on the delay: 93.8% of managers and 62.5% of frontline 
clinicians regarded it as a crucial factor for the delayed 
implementation.  
 
In conclusion, this section confirmed the corresponding 
interviews findings indicating that the mixed messages in terms 
of the policies and the targets coming down the frontline, the 
variation in clinical skills resulted from the complex nature of 
mental disorders, the lack of national guidelines and the lack of 
effective training sessions led to the frontline clinicians’ 
reluctance to engage in the implementation stage of the MH PbR 
policy.  
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Table 7-13 Perspectives on frontline clinicians’ involvement 
 
 
 
7.3.6 The “gaming” behaviours 
Similar to the c findings derived from the interviews discussed 
in Chapter 6, splitting opinions have been found regarding the 
impacts of “gaming” behaviours among the participants from 
these three groups. As Table 7-14 displays, 23.5% of the 
participants considered “gaming” behaviours as either “not 
important at all” or “not important” to the delayed 
implementation of MH PbR, 29.4% held a neutral opinion, 
leaving 35.3% considering these behaviours as an important 
factor. According to Figure 7-16, although the majority of the 
managers were concerned about the “gaming” behaviours, a 
high within-group variation has been found, given that 35.7% 
of the participants regarded it as either “not important at all” or 
“not important”. This echoes the corresponding interview 
findings indicating that on the one hand, some managers 
considered frontline clinicians as generally honest and not to be 
influenced by financial issues; whereas on the other hand, some 
managers noted the possible consequences brought about by 
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financial risks. Similarly, most frontline clinicians rated this 
factor as “neutral” but the percentage of the frontline clinicians 
who indicated as “not important” equals those who selected 
“important”. For those who selected “not important”, one fact 
observed from the interviews could explain this: frontline 
clinicians tended to score patients into lower cluster than they 
should have been due to their sympathy towards patients’ 
conditions rather than conducting “up-coding” according to the 
theoretical prediction. This also complies with the 
“professionalism” theory that appreciates the professional 
sense of value, which is to provide patient-centred care. For 
those who answered “important”, this could also be explained 
by the fact that all frontline clinicians in the interviews admitted 
the existence of “game for workload” due to the poorly set 
targets and the conflicts between policies and clinical activities. 
Regarding the commissioners’ perspectives, Table 7-14 shows 
the commissioners’ conservative concerns about “gaming” 
behaviours, which corresponds to what has been found in 
Chapter 6. 
 
 
Table 7-14 Impacts of “gaming” behaviours on the delayed implementation 
of MH PbR  
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Figure 7-16 Impacts of the “gaming” behaviours on the delayed 
implementation of MH PbR 
 
 
 
7.3.7 Experiences in acute services 
Figure 7-17 displays the opinions on the impact of the 
experiences in acute services on the delayed implementation of 
MH PbR. According to the findings in Chapter 6, some 
participants doubted the feasibility of MH PbR by questioning 
the outcomes from implementing it in acute services where it 
was supposed to fit most appropriately. Figure 7-17 shows that 
the majority of the participants regarded the experiences in 
acute services as an important factor that caused the delayed 
implementation of MH PbR. By comparing the responses by 
subgroups, the data shows that the managers and the frontline 
clinicians tended to be more concerned about the feasibility of 
applying PbR in mental health. This conforms to the 
corresponding findings in Chapter 6, which indicated that the 
managers and frontline clinicians had a deeper understanding 
of the complex nature of mental disorders and the difficulties in 
classifying patients due to the lack of laboratory tests. Since 
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they were aware of the differences in nature between mental 
health services and acute services, the lack of solid evidence in 
relation to the practical impacts of PbR on acute services may 
easily result in their lack of confidence in implementing it in 
mental health.  
 
Figure 7-17 Impact of experiences in acute services on the implementation 
of MH PbR 
 
 
 
 
 
7.4 General attitudes and suggestions 
According to the previous evaluations, participants were asked 
to express their general attitudes towards the implementation 
of PbR in mental health. To those who objected to the 
implementation, they were requested to attribute it to one 
reason that influenced their negative attitudes the most. Given 
the delayed status, the participants were also requested to rate 
approaches with potential to help improve the current system 
according to the findings in Chapters 5 and 6. In the end, the 
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participants were asked to list one most obvious benefit brought 
about by the implementation of MH PbR from their own 
perspectives.   
 
 
7.4.1 General attitudes towards the implementation of 
MH PbR 
Table 7-15 displays participants’ concerns about the feasibility 
of implementing PbR in mental health, with 44.4% of the 
participants showing objection to the implementation. However, 
splitting opinions have been found within all three subgroups. 
The distribution of responses of the frontline clinicians conforms 
to the corresponding interview findings that indicated their 
concern about the actual impacts on everyday clinical practice, 
particular in light of the current situation where frontline 
clinicians were required to achieve various targets, some of 
which were not considered clinically helpful. Similarly, the 
distribution of responses of the commissioners complies with 
the corresponding interview findings that some GP 
commissioners were found reluctant to engage in this reform 
due to their lack of understanding and general negative 
acceptance of change. Regarding the considerable percentage 
of the managers who agreed that MH PbR should be 
implemented, it corresponds to their positive attitude toward 
the prospect of MH PbR as expressed in the interviews. 
According to the findings from Chapter 6, the managers were 
the group of professionals who recognised the initial drawbacks 
of the Block Contract and the unfairness created by the lack of 
a transparent information system. Under such circumstances, 
they were more willing to embrace the reform, although they 
were also aware of the initial drawbacks of the MH PbR system.  
	 317	
Table 7-15 General attitudes towards the implementation of MH PbR 
 
 
 
As Table 7-16 below shows, objections towards the 
implementation mainly focused on three aspects: a finance and 
target led system, the complex nature of mental disorders and 
the clinical effectiveness of MH PbR, which echo the 
corresponding findings in Chapters 5 and 6. According to 
interview findings, a finance-led system was seen as an 
inevitable outcome of the implementation of MH PbR. 
Nevertheless, the commodification of mental health services 
was seen as having a high risk of compromising patients’ 
interests given the individualised symptoms and needs for care. 
In this situation, it makes sense for the frontline clinicians to be 
more concerned about the finance-led system underpinned by 
the Quasi-market. Thus, the questionnaire outcomes confirm 
the key players’ concern about the fundamental theory. 
According to Table 7-16, the complex nature of mental disorders 
was the second most-rated problem that led to the participants’ 
objection. This outcome also conforms to the corresponding 
findings in Chapters 3 and 5: the individualised symptoms and 
multiple alternative treatment approaches challenge the 
classification and standardisation of the corresponding 
treatment, thus making PbR less suitable for the mental health 
domain. In addition, 18.8% of the frontline clinicians regarded 
poor clinical effectiveness of MH PbR as another reason, which 
corresponds to the MHCT’s initial problems as discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6.  
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Table 7-16 Reasons for objecting to the implementation of MH PbR 
 
 
Regarding the unified perspective of the manager group, all 
managers indicated that they had “no objection” to the 
implementation of MH PbR. Considering their split opinions on 
whether they believed the implementation of MH PbR is feasible, 
(for which 6 out of 14 answered “no”), this outcome may be due 
to the balance between the attitude from a clinical perspective 
and that from the general picture. According to the findings 
from Chapters 5 and 6, the managers realised the existence of 
a “second-order effect” and the “be in PbR or less privileged”. 
Although PbR does not fit mental health well, it was both a 
political trend and their second best choice to have PbR in 
mental health to avoid further financial pressure. It once again 
reveals that the managers tended to weight more on the 
potential benefits resulting from a transparent information 
system, which was expected to facilitate better collective 
resource management. Meanwhile, this dilemma did not affect 
the commissioners’ and frontline clinicians’ concerns given their 
positions.  
 
 
7.4.2 Suggestions 
In order to improve the validity and feasibility of applying the 
PbR policy in mental health, the participants were asked to rank 
six suggested approaches, derived from both Chapters 5 and 6, 
according to their importance. After assigning 10 to the priority, 
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7 to  the second most important, 5 to the third most important, 
3 to the fourth most important, 1 to the fifth most important 
and 0 to the least important, the total value of each approach 
was calculated and ranked from the highest to the lowest. To 
minimise the errors generated from the process of evaluation, 
Kruskal-Wallis Test was adopted to double check the sequence 
of ranking. 
 
According to the evaluation of ranking, the effective sequence 
was considered to be the following:   
Action 1: “prioritising the development and application of care 
pathways”;  
Action 4: “publishing clear national guidelines and standards”;  
Action 2: “improving the clustering system”;  
Action 5: “defining more effective quality measure instruments”; 
Action 3: “improving training”;  
Action 6: “improving the collaboration between primary and 
secondary care”.  
 
However, as Table 7-17 shows, Kruskal-Wallis Test resulted in a 
slightly different ranking sequence as Action 1, Action 2, Action 
4, Action 5, Action 3 and Action 6. Taking these two outcomes 
into consideration, they both ranked Action 1: “prioritising the 
development and application of care pathways” as the priority, 
Action 5: “defining more effective quality measure instruments” 
as the 4th suggestion, Action 3: “improving training” as the 5th 
suggestion and Action 6: “improving the collaboration between 
primary and secondary care” as the least important suggestion, 
with Action 4 and Action 2 in the opposite positions. In regard 
to Action 1, it corresponds with the findings from Chapters 5 
and 6, in which the importance of care pathways was 
highlighted. Regarding Action 2 “improving clustering system” 
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and Action 4 “publishing clear national guidelines and 
standards”, the differences were caused by different analytical 
approaches. However, due to the difficulties in scaling the 
intervals between two grades, it was difficult to identify a better 
approach from these two. Since the allocations of responses are 
similar between these two actions (this is shown in Table 7-17), 
these two actions should therefore be considered equally 
important to the refinement of the MH PbR system at the current 
stage.  
 
Table 7-17 Ranking of the suggested actions 
   
 
 
7.4.3 General benefits 
Drawing upon the findings from Chapters 5 and 6, the 
questionnaire summaries six major benefits of MH PbR, 
including “standardised treatment”, “outcome and service 
measurements”, “better information system”, “the idea of cost-
efficiency”, “quality promotion mechanism” and “great 
understanding of variation”. Among these benefits, the 
participants were asked to vote for the most prominent one 
according to their own perspectives. According to Figure 7-18, 
“outcome and service measurement” and “quality promotion 
mechanism” are the two most rated factors. Table 7-18 further 
outlines the detailed information about the distribution of 
responses, according to which a significantly higher percentage 
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of the participants (41.2%) considered “outcome and service 
measurements” as the most obvious benefit reaped by the 
implementation of PbR in mental health. This echoes the 
corresponding findings from Chapter 6 in term of a better 
knowledge of service quality and therefore, the fairness of 
payment. In particular, 37.5% of the frontline clinicians were 
also pleased with the outcome measurements. This conforms to 
one interview finding that pointed to their awareness of the 
importance of having patient feedback, which can help clinicians 
adjust their clinical practice as well as serve as evidence in the 
negotiation with commissioners for patient-centred care. 
Therefore, this indicates that the arguments about the currently 
available quality measures only point to their lack of validity to 
represent a comprehensive view of “quality”, rather than 
indicating them invalid as individual measures. This result 
shows agreement with one manager’s opinion that a 
comprehensive measurement incorporates measurements from 
multiple dimensions to ensure patients receive appropriate care, 
while at the same time, appreciate the input of clinicians.  The 
second most rated benefit was “quality promotion mechanism”. 
The participants from all groups were pleased to see quality 
promotion, which matches the corresponding findings in 
Chapters 3 and 6 where the establishment of non-price 
competition incentivises providers to compete on quality, which 
had not been paid attention to under the Block Contract. This 
also explains the underpinning reason for managers’ advocacy 
of the transparent information system: the IT system under the 
new system was expected to facilitate the development of care 
pathways that would help to reduce the variation in clinical skills 
among frontline clinicians. The data, together with those from 
the quality measurement, were expected to facilitate providers’ 
management of health care services and resource allocation.  
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Figure 7-18 Perspectives on the most obvious benefit reaped by MH PbR 
 
 
Table 7-18 Perspectives on the most obvious benefit reaped by MH PbR 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
This chapter presented the data obtained from online surveys 
that aimed to verify the findings from the previous qualitative 
analysis, particularly the interview findings. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the design of the online surveys conformed to the 
logic sequence resulted from the semi-structured interviews. A 
total of 38 responses were considered valid after screening the 
original data according to different expectations/assumptions of 
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the specific knowledge. Analytical approaches, such as graphs, 
descriptive analysis, crosstabs, Spearman correlation test and 
Mann-Whitney non-parametric test, were adopted to analyse 
the questionnaire data. The outcomes were triangulated with 
the corresponding findings from Chapters 3, 5 and 6 and 
presented from four main aspects: the general background of 
implementation, the subsystem evaluation, the driving factors 
of delay and general attitude and suggestions.  
 
Section 7.1 outlined the Block Contract’s dominant position and 
some milestones of the implementation of the MHCT 
classification system. Section 7.2 evaluated the validity and 
reliability of the clinical classification system. The findings 
generally matched the corresponding findings derived from the 
interviews: the managers tended to note the advantages of 
MHCT classification regarding predicting resource allocation and 
costs although they realised the initial drawbacks while the 
frontline clinicians tended to hold negative opinions towards the 
subsystems as well as the collaboration between each, since 
their judgements were made mainly according to clinical efficacy. 
The splitting viewpoints towards the PREM and the HoNOS 
outcome scales generally conform to those obtained during the 
semi-structure interviews. Section 7.3 investigated the driving 
factors that caused the delay from seven main aspects, 
including the complex nature, ideas behind MH PbR, sub-
systems, government policies, clinicians’ participation, “gaming” 
behaviours and the experiences from acute services. The 
statistical analysis showed a high level of agreement with the 
corresponding findings in Chapter 6. In the end, Section 7.4 
reflected the variation in the general attitude towards 
implementing PbR in mental health: although a high percentage 
of participants held a negative attitude towards the 
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implementation, a considerable percentage of the managers 
regarded it as the right move. The primary suggestions were 
sorted by importance. The outcome echoed the findings in 
Chapter 6 by attributing the care pathways and the national 
guidelines to the two aspects awaiting more attention.  
 
Besides confirming the corresponding findings in Chapter 6, the 
major finding in this quantitative analysis was the splitting 
perspectives among different interest groups, or even within the 
same group. In particular, the splitting perspectives between 
the managerial group and the frontline group reflected the 
differences created by various standpoints, which also 
demonstrated the fact that one size does not fit all systems (this 
will be discussed in Section 8.3.2). The negative perspectives 
the frontline clinicians held pointed to the mismatch between 
the MH PbR project (including the classification system and the 
supporting policies) and the frontline realities. This highlighted 
the important role frontline clinicians play in the implementation 
stage while suggesting careful considerations of the trade-offs 
between political objectives and the inevitable consequences in 
practice (this will be discussed in Section 8.3.3). In general, the 
splitting perspectives not only reflected the variations in 
participants’ understanding at this early stage, but also 
indicated the information asymmetry that awaited more 
collaboration and communication.   
 
In the next chapter, the findings and insights gleaned from the 
four analytical chapters will be reviewed and discussed.  The 
triangulation of findings from different levels and angles will 
facilitate further discussion of the utility of this study concerning 
policy evaluation and future policy-making.  
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8. General discussion and conclusion 
 
 
Introduction  
As a policy evaluation, this study has focused on the evaluation 
of the driving factors that led to the delayed implementation of 
the PbR policy in mental health in England. Based upon the 
analysis of the fundamental theories, the theoretical mechanism 
and the practical issues surrounding the implementation of the 
policy, this study thereby argues that PbR, in general, is a 
system with more theoretical significance regarding the 
prospect of establishing a transparent information system and 
therefore, a fair payment system than a policy facilitating high-
quality clinical services and cost containment. Regarding the 
implementation of PbR in mental health, the fundamental flaws 
of the Quasi-market lead to a lack of validity and feasibility of 
the policy, which adversely affects the corresponding 
formulation and implementation of this misconceived policy. 
The difficulties become more prominent in light of the complex 
nature of mental disorders that compromises the validity and 
credibility of the clinical classification system, thus adversely 
affecting the accuracy of the tariff calculation. This study 
thereby argues that the fundamental problems of applying the 
Quasi-market theory, the conceptual and constructional flaws 
of the clinical classification system, together with negative 
external factors have hindered the implementation of PbR in 
mental health.  
 
This chapter reviews the findings and insights to facilitate 
further discussion regarding the relevance and utility of this 
study. This chapter is divided into six main sections. The first 
section summarises the findings gleaned from the four analytic 
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chapters by reviewing the research questions and therefore, 
presenting the main findings with respect to the current 
implementation of MH PbR and the driving factors responsible 
for the delayed status. The second section highlights the 
significance of the study by analysing its relationship with prior 
research conducted in this area. The subsequent two sections 
further demonstrate the implications of this study from different 
levels and angles for policy analysis and research design. The 
third section discusses the study’s insights and contributions to 
policy evaluation. Section 8.4 highlights the implications for 
research design, including the utility of the analytical framework 
and the GTM principles, respectively. In Section 8.5, the 
limitations of this study are discussed, which lead to 
implications for future research. Considering policy evaluation 
as a learning process, Section 8.6 further illustrates the 
contribution of the findings to future policy-making in the 
healthcare domain. This chapter concludes by summarising and 
reiterating the underpinning motivation, findings and 
contributions of this project. 
 
 
 
8.1 Summary of main findings 
This section serves as a brief summary of the research 
framework of this study. It revisits the research aim and 
questions, the latter is in turn considered by presenting the 
current stage of the implementation of PbR in mental health, 
outlining the major factors that have caused its delay, and 
simultaneously proposing suggestions for further improvement. 
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8.1.1 Research questions and design 
As a policy evaluation, this study aimed to evaluate the MH PbR 
policy from three stages, including its initiation, formulation and 
implementation. In regard to these three core stages in the 
policy-making process, this study thus set four research 
questions that guided the research conduction:  
 
1) What is the fundamental basis of PbR? Is it theoretically 
feasible to be implemented in healthcare services? 
 
2) To what extent is PbR theoretically valid regarding fulfilling 
the function of a clinical classification system as well as a 
payment system in mental health? 
 
3) What is the current stage of the implementation of PbR in 
mental health? 
 
4) What are the obstacles that have hindered its 
implementation in mental health? 
 
To answer these research questions, this study employed the 
“administrative anthropology” theory and therefore, conducted 
a three-step research, including theoretical analysis, semi-
structured interviews and online surveys. Theoretical analysis 
was adopted for evaluating the policy initiation and formulation 
(subject to research questions 1 and 2) whereas semi-
structured interviews and online surveys were used in the 
fieldwork investigating the implementation of this policy. For the 
empirical research, a series of semi-structured interviews were 
conducted between November 2013 and April 2014 at NHT, 
Nottingham City CCG and Nottinghamshire County CCG. Online 
surveys were carried out between June 2014 and September 
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2014 subject to the staff at the above three organisations as 
well as Derbyshire NHS Foundation Trust mainly for a 
confirmatory purpose. The subsequent sections summarise and 
present the principal findings derived from all three approaches 
in respect to the research questions.  
 
 
8.1.2 Main findings 
Through analysis of the underpinning theory of PbR, the Quasi-
market theory, this study found that MH PbR was poorly 
designed due to the fundamental conflicts between the market 
theory and the complex nature of health care, especially mental 
health services. Moreover, investigation of the theoretical 
validity of the MHCT classification system revealed that this 
classification system as a whole is fundamentally flawed and 
therefore, leads to constructional drawbacks as well as the 
inevitable difficulties in accurately classifying patients on the 
frontline. Both fundamental drawbacks and mechanical 
drawbacks influenced the implementation of the MH PbR policy. 
In this case, the following two subsections answer the above 
four research questions from two major aspects: the first 
subsection answers Question 3: “What is the current stage of 
the implementation of PbR in mental health?” and the second 
subsection summarises the fundamental drawbacks of this 
policy, the mechanical drawbacks of the classification system 
(Questions 1 and 2) and the practical obstacles, and attributes 
them to the “driving factors” behind the delayed implementation 
of MH PbR. Finally, the last subsection summarises suggestions 
for future improvement of the MH PbR policy, which were 
derived from the fieldwork results. 
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8.1.2.1 Current implementation 
The literature review in Chapter 2 indicated that the past two 
decades have witnessed a series of disjointed reforms in health 
care. Having experienced four major reorganisations, the NHS 
has currently moved towards a local-based health care system 
guided by the market mechanism that encourages supply-side 
competition. Particularly, the previous decade has witnessed the 
development of PbR; refining the classification and payment 
system and enlarging its coverage to mental health replacing 
the previous Block Contract (Department of Health, 2002b). 
Based upon this background information, this study attempted 
to investigate the policy implementation progress until 
September 2014, when the interviews and the online surveys 
were undertaken. In this respect, the expression “at that 
moment” refers to that particular point in time, namely 
September 2014. 
 
In the context of PbR being implemented in acute services since 
2003, it has subsequently become a political and realistic trend 
to replace the Block Contract with PbR in mental health. 
Nevertheless, despite the wide recognition of the drawbacks of 
the Block Contract, such as the lack of a transparent information 
system to support budget calculation and service monitoring, or 
even the “PbR or less privileged” pressure, this study found that 
the Block Contract is still widely used in mental health. The 
questionnaire findings revealed that over 73% of the 
participants confirmed it as the dominant contracting method in 
mental health. This demonstrates an agreement with the 
interview findings: although the commissioners and providers 
were working together to set up a transitional process leading 
to the MH PbR system, the delay in establishing a 
comprehensive classification system and therefore, the lack of 
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reliable data for tariff calculation determined the prevalent use 
of the Block Contract. This corresponds to the published report 
stating a delayed status of the implementation of MH PbR 
(Lintern, 2013). This study observed that to avoid financial risks 
posed by the incomplete system, the commissioners and 
managers adopted a more cautious double-running system to 
maintain contracting in a lump-sum format using OBDs and 
direct contacts as indicators while simultaneously monitoring 
clinical services using MH PbR indicators.   
 
As indicated in the interviews, within this transitional period, the 
emphasis was placed upon implementing the subsystems and 
collecting accurate data regarding the use of service, as well as 
refining the current classification system from the managerial 
level. The findings from both the interviews and the 
questionnaires outlined a number of milestones of the 
implementation process: under the pressure of deadline for 
contracting by MH PbR, over 75% of patients have been 
clustered by the MHCT, frontline clinicians were reviewing the 
patients in C1-C3, C7 and C11 in order to decide whether to 
upgrade or to discharge, while care pathways were in 
preliminary testing.   
 
Since the information collection is a bottom-up process, the 
involvement of frontline clinicians is vital to the implementation 
of the system as a whole. This study found that in relation to 
the new classification system, training sessions were being 
offered to frontline staff. The outcomes of the interviews and 
questionnaires indicated that half of the frontline staff had 
received one to two MH PbR training sessions. Only 
approximately 5% of the frontline clinicians have attended more 
than two sessions. Regarding this insufficient training, the 
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interview findings attributed the reason for this to the 
discontinuity of the training programme, due to the NHT’s lack 
of attention to the importance of training. Furthermore, with 
limited training provided, clinicians were assigned targets such 
as clustering every patient and reviewing previous clusters with 
no clinical meaning attached due to the lack of care pathways. 
In this context, frontline participants involved in the interviews 
confirmed their reluctance to engage with the new system, 
which has also been noted by both the commissioners and 
managers. The commissioners and managers, therefore, 
regarded it as the most obvious problem in the current 
implementation stage. 
 
 
8.1.2.2 Driving factors  
By summarising the findings from the theoretical analysis, 
interviews and online surveys, the delayed implementation of 
MH PbR can be attributed to eight major obstacles: 1) 
fundamental flaws of applying MH PbR; 2) the complex nature 
of mental disorders; 3) drawbacks of the MH PbR system; 4) 
intensively established policies; 5) frontline clinicians’ 
involvement; 6) “gaming” behaviours; 7) incomplete 
information system; and 8) negative attitudes towards change. 
 
 
1) Fundamental flaws of applying MH PbR 
The design of a PbR system is based upon the Quasi-market 
theory, which highlights the utility of the market mechanism in 
regard to controlling costs, increasing efficiency and improving 
quality through provider-side competition. It also assumes that 
the government has the power and skill to accurately regulate 
clinical behaviours and measure service quality.  
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Market theory is underpinned by the hypothesis that the service 
provision process can be standardised and the incurred costs 
can thus be standardised. However, the theoretical analysis 
identified the fundamental differences between healthcare 
services, especially mental health services, and typical products 
that can be produced on the streamline to be identical. By 
illustrating other conflicts between the healthcare system and 
preconditions of a typical market, Chapter 3 argued that a 
market competition principle is not suitable for health care 
services, especially mental health services, and that the effects 
of the non-price competition are limited in regards to cost 
containment.  
 
The investigation of the government’s ability to regulate 
revealed: 1) Concerning the individualised conditions and needs, 
it is difficult, even if not impossible, to standardise frontline 
practice; 2) Controlling costs may result in conflicts with good 
clinical practice, which is meant to only concern patients’ needs 
rather than costs; 3) Given the presence of information 
asymmetry as well as the limitation of profession, 
commissioners, who are non-clinical staff, are disadvantaged in 
regulating clinical behaviours and monitoring service quality.  
 
By rejecting the preconditions of the Quasi-market, Chapter 3 
pointed out that the Quasi-market theory does not fit healthcare 
services, especially mental health services. In other words, PbR 
is fundamentally flawed, which inevitably impeded the 
implementation of this policy. 
 
 
2) The complex nature of mental disorders 
Complying with the theoretical analysis, which pointed out the 
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radical differences between mental health services and ordinary 
merchandise, the empirical findings show that the complexity of 
mental health disorders is the factor that has been most highly 
rated by participants from all subgroups. The rating scale shows 
that clinical professionals are more likely to be concerned about 
this issue given its importance to the viability of measuring 
patients’ needs and thus managing interventions in a 
standardised way. This corresponds to the findings in Chapter 5, 
which have indicated that the individualised conditions, the 
intertwined relationship between the definition of “normal” and 
“abnormal”, together with multiple alternative interventions, 
made it difficult to standardise interventions due to the lack of 
clear evidence of efficacy. Drawing upon Lipsky’s (1980) street-
level bureaucracy discussed in Chapter 3, this study argued that 
this low degree of within-group homogeneity resulted in the 
difficulties in commodifying services into identical products.  
 
 
3) Drawbacks of the MH PbR system  
In reference to the drawbacks of the MH PbR system, this study 
found that the conceptual flaws of the MHCT regarding 
measuring needs and the initial functioning drawbacks of the 
HoNOS caused mismatches observed between the HoNOS 
scores and MHCT clusters when making clinical decisions. In 
terms of conceptual flaws, the findings in Chapter 5 argued that 
the care pathways were shoehorned into each cluster that 
indicated patients’ “needs” rather than being considered as the 
criteria for defining needs. The sequence revealed that it was 
not adequately assessing patients’ needs, which should be 
defined in conjunction with potentially available interventions 
(Wing et al., 1992). In this respect, the theoretical analysis in 
Chapter 5 attributed this finding as one important reason for 
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the low validity of the classification system. Furthermore, this 
was echoed by the questionnaire results, which revealed that 
over 71% of the participants regarded the clustering ideology 
as a factor that had caused the delayed implementation. This 
study detected the major constructional flaws of the MHCT as 
the low degree of within-group homogeneity and between-
group heterogeneity. Conflicting perspectives in respect to the 
validity of the HoNOS were noted from the questionnaire 
outcomes: the frontline clinicians were more likely to be 
concerned about its poor effectiveness whereas a considerable 
number of managers (38.5%) regarded it as a valid and reliable 
instrument. These findings are consistent with the findings of 
research by Lovaglio and Monzani (2011) regarding the 
existence of controversial perspectives about the validity of the 
HoNOS. McClelland et al. (2000) conclude the HoNOS offers 
good sensitivity, validity and clinical acceptability, whereas 
Brooks (2000) questions its validity by pointing out that the 
HoNOS scores do not comply with other existing, widely-used 
measurements. The relationship between the conflicting 
opinions in relation to the validity of the HoNOS and the 
convergent opinion of the poor validity of this classification 
system is evident: the HoNOS is a considerably valid measure 
regarding assessing changes in outcome at an individual level 
rather than facilitating a rigorous evaluation of one’s condition 
for a classification system. The original purpose of designing the 
HoNOS determines the gaps between the HoNOS scores and the 
MHCT clusters, which in turn devaluate the validity of the MHCT 
classification system as a whole. As a result of the lack of 
officially implemented care pathways, this study found that 
participants tended to hold conservative, negative attitudes 
towards the effectiveness of the MHCT care pathways, mainly 
considering its ideology of standardisation. In this respect, the 
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questionnaire outcomes observed a total of 50% of participants 
who disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that 
“The HoNOS, the MHCT and the MHCT care pathways work 
smoothly as a whole system”. With respect to the financial 
aspect, this study verified that the poor data quality caused the 
delayed implementation of the cost calculation system. However, 
despite its delayed implementation, the appropriateness of the 
tariff calculation mechanism was noted in this study given the 
low within-group homogeneity in terms of patients’ conditions 
and needs, which conforms to the findings of the Price 
Waterhouse Cooper’s (2012) report. Other side effects of setting 
the national tariffs at an average level of costs were noted as: 
1) the average cost based price encouraged providers to be 
“average” rather than improving performance; and 2) a higher 
possibility of “gaming” due to information asymmetry. Hence, 
this study argued that it is risky to apply the “standardisation-
to-the-average” principle in calculating nationally fixed prices in 
the absence of accurate data from the classification system. 
Consequently, the Block Contract emerges as a more suitable 
payment method for mental health services in this particular 
context. 
 
 
4) Intensively established policies 
This study noted the simultaneous implementation of a series 
of reform-related policies with various targets in this transitional 
period. Amongst these policies, some targets were seen as 
confusing. Some others like “discharge all C7 and C11 patients 
back to primary care” and “have four successful contacts every 
day” were even seen as inappropriately set or not applicable to 
practice. Therefore, 47% of the participants regarded it as 
either an “important” or “very important” factor that led to the 
	 336	
delay. Additionally, the interview findings indicated that the 
heavy, but not clinically appropriate paperwork took up time 
that could have been used to improve patient-centred services 
or develop new techniques. This is confirmed by the 
questionnaire data, which states that 75% of the frontline 
clinicians regarded the heavy workload as either an “important” 
or “very important” factor contributing to the delayed 
implementation. 
 
 
5) Frontline clinicians’ involvement 
The questionnaire data revealed the frontline clinicians’ 
negative attitudes towards the implementation of MH PbR and 
their corresponding unwillingness to engage in reform. The 
corresponding findings from the questionnaires confirmed 
clinicians’ unwillingness to engage by pointing to their negative 
perspectives on whether MH PbR should be implemented. 
Moreover, the interviews found that the idea of MH PbR conflicts 
with the idea of good practice. As concluded in Chapter 3, 
concerns were raised in regards to professionals being 
sufficiently professional to keep patients’ best interests in mind 
when taking financial issues into consideration. This concern 
became more evident when the validity and reliability of the 
classification system were brought into question. Regarding 
frontline clinicians’ lack of understanding, the questionnaire 
data showed that over 90% of the managers considered 
clinicians’ lack of understanding as either an important or very 
important factor for the delay.  This shows agreement with the 
corresponding interview finding that the frontline clinicians 
judged the effectiveness of a clinical system only by clinical 
validity and credibility in terms of facilitating quality services. 
Moreover, the insufficient training not only failed to help 
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frontline clinicians to better understand the policy as a whole 
but it also failed to reduce the significant variation in clinical skill 
among frontline clinicians, which is essential to better 
appreciate the classification mechanism. In this case, this study 
argued that the frontline clinicians judged the effects of MH PbR 
only from a clinical utility perspective, and lacked understanding 
of its administrative value in providing better management of 
health care resources.  
 
 
6) “Gaming” behaviours 
With findings derived from the interviews and the online surveys, 
the study found that “gaming” was not only a potential risk, but 
also an activity that existed in daily frontline practice, although 
not in the way predicted by previous studies according to 
economic theories. The lack of accurate quality measures, 
together with the information asymmetry, created the potential 
for providers to “game”, especially given the current heavy 
workload. As demonstrated by the questionnaire figures, 
patient-rated measures were seen as subjective, or even 
misleading, given that a considerable proportion of the 
participants (32.3%) were concerned about the validity of PREM 
as a proxy to reflect actual service quality. It was argued that 
the current quality measurement system functions more like a 
means that policymakers use to respond to public 
dissatisfaction rather than an effective clinical instrument at the 
current stage. Similarly, Lipsky’s (1980) theory argues that the 
actual performance of frontline activities is virtually impossible 
to measure. Therefore, this study attributed it as one reason for 
the current situation in which frontline clinicians “game” for less 
workload, although not for money. Under such circumstances, 
this study deduced that an outcome-oriented system easily 
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leads to such “gaming” behaviours.  
 
 
7) Incomplete IT system 
Considering the constructional problems of this classification 
system, the data collected in this manner failed to meet the 
fundamental assumption of the case-mix principle that patients 
in the same group share similar conditions and health care 
needs. Moreover, the study found that both the managers and 
frontline clinicians noted variation in clinicians’ ability to use the 
new classification system in an appropriate way, as over 70% 
of the participants rated it as either an “important” or “very 
important” factor in the delayed implementation. This study also 
found that the training sessions were discontinuous with several 
years’ gap before being re-launched. In light of the poor 
effectiveness of training sessions as shown by the questionnaire 
figures, they failed to improve data accuracy through providing 
support to improve frontline clinicians’ ability to use the new 
classification system.  
 
 
8) Negative attitudes towards change 
Besides the internal and external factors that raised concern 
about the validity and feasibility of implementing PbR in mental 
health, a natural opposition towards change was noted in this 
study. The interview findings also revealed GP commissioners’ 
reluctance to engage and attributed their natural opposition as 
part of the reasons for the delay.  
 
 
8.1.2.3 Suggestions for further improvement 
In this respect, this study concluded with six suggestions for the 
	 339	
further improvement of MH PbR. These suggestions were 
arranged in an order according to the level of urgency and 
importance, including prioritising improving and applying care 
pathways, improving the clustering system, publishing clear 
national directions and standards, defining more effective 
quality measurement instruments, improving training and 
improving integrated care. 
 
Both the commissioners and managers noted the potential 
financial risks created by moving to a cost-and-volume payment 
system. Nevertheless, at this stage, the interview findings 
indicated that more attention was paid to the change of the 
payment mechanism and therefore, the efficiency of service 
provision and targets rather than clinical services. Compared 
with the financial aspect, the theoretical benefits brought about 
by the establishment of a transparent information system in the 
clinical aspect were more prominent. Although moving to an 
evidence-based system was seen as a step in the right direction, 
the conceptual and constructional flaws of the classification 
system have been noted, which were believed to be the direct 
causal factors for the delayed implementation. Under such 
circumstances, the study suggested devoting more attention to 
refining the classification system in the clinical aspect and 
postponing the implementation of the payment system. 
 
Both theoretical and empirical findings argued that the absence 
of care pathways not only devalued the MHCT as a needs 
assessment instrument, but also reduced the accuracy of 
classification outcomes especially in a system with 
constructional flaws. The empirical findings corresponded with 
the theoretical analysis, confirming that the initial problems of 
the HoNOS and constructional drawbacks of the MHCT resulted 
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in gaps between the HoNOS scores and the corresponding 
clusters, particularly with the absence of care pathways. To 
improve the validity and reliability of MH PbR, study findings 
suggested prioritising the development of care pathways and 
further refining the MHCT classification system. 
 
As shown in both the interview and questionnaire findings, on 
the one hand, too many top-down policies made the frontline 
clinicians confused and stressed in daily practice. On the other 
hand, the frontline clinicians had not been provided with 
nationally standardised guidelines regarding how to cluster 
patients and what services should be provided. Therefore, the 
empirical findings revealed that the participants expected 
clearer and more supportive policies with viable targets 
attached and more quality measures to build a comprehensive 
quality measurement system that can facilitate clinical practice. 
The participants in the study expressed their expectations of 
governmental financial supports as the starting fund for 
essential elements, such as the information system.  
 
The interview outcomes reflected the managers’ and 
commissioners’ awareness of the importance of building a closer 
collaboration between managers and frontline clinicians by 
improving training sessions and involving frontline clinicians in 
the decision-making process. This study also noted the 
importance of establishing the purchaser-provider collaborative 
relationship to address the potential financial risks generated 
from the new payment system. Additionally, the interview 
findings echoed the corresponding findings from the theoretical 
analysis by arguing that the complex nature of mental disorders 
determined the focal point of mental health service as the 
process of knowing patients and their needs on an individual 
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basis. This study therefore, suggested the establishment of 
collaboration between primary and secondary services to 
establish an integrated service delivery structure. 
 
 
 
8.2 Relation to prior research 
As previously discussed in Chapter 3, the complex nature of 
mental disorders indicated that PbR was less suitable to mental 
health than acute services in which the classification system 
(HRG) has a comparatively high degree of within-group 
homogeneity and between-group heterogeneity. The findings 
from this study are consistent with the unsatisfactory outcomes 
of the implementation of PbR in acute services presented in 
Chapter 3. Based upon the experiences of implementing PbR in 
acute services, this section compares the research findings from 
this study with other studies subject to analysing the 
implementation of similar classification systems in mental 
health in other countries, due to the paucity of systematic 
evaluations on the impacts of PbR on mental health in England. 
 
It was found that it is feasible, though difficult, to manage 
mental health interventions in a standardised way, given the 
validity and credibility of the NFCAS. The transparent process of 
identifying patients’ problems and assessing needs according to 
the target interventions proved fruitful regarding providing 
comprehensive information and facilitating clinical decision-
making. Previous studies investigating the application of similar 
classification systems in mental health in other countries 
confirm the theoretical viability of applying the case-mix 
principle to classifying patients with mental disorders. In 
Australia and New Zealand, the classification system was 
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explored in categorising and managing case records without 
being subsequently implemented for payment purpose given 
their concern about the impacts of the case-mix mechanism on 
reducing cost variation (Mason and Goddard, 2009). This shows 
agreement with the theoretical analysis of this study arguing 
the validity of the attempt to use the standardisation principles 
to reduce cost variation. The classification system and the 
payment system have been applied in the Netherlands and 
Canada (Ontario). In the Netherlands, psychiatric medical 
services have been under the coverage of a DRG-based system 
since 2009, but the payment is only subject to first-year 
admissions (Mason and Goddard, 2009). In Canada, the System 
for the Classification of In-Patient Psychiatry (SCIPP) 
categorises mental health patients into seven super-clusters 
according to the intervention phases and the resource intensity 
(Murphy, 2008). However, for these four countries, few details 
of the systematic evaluation of the case-mix based systems 
have been identified. Therefore, the lack of long-term research 
has led to a lack of practical implications to the system as well 
as the policy. This demonstrates the contribution of this study – 
the introduction of the English experience in regards to the early 
outcomes of applying a DRG system in mental health. 
Additionally, the previous research outcomes reveal a vague 
impact of the case-mix principle on cost control, which echoes 
the findings from the studies evaluating the impacts of PbR in 
acute services.  
 
Regarding the early results of implementing PbR in mental 
health in England, Murphy (2014) evaluated the relevant 
policies regarding MH PbR in England by conducting interviews 
with nine trust managers and triangulating the interview 
findings with the relevant literature. In his study, the barriers to 
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implementing the policy were attributed to the inadequate time 
frame, inaccurate data, lack of quality training, poor reliability 
and variability of the MHCT, lack of care pathways and national 
guidance, insufficient IT system and changes in commissioning 
patterns. These findings show significant agreement with those 
of this study.  
 
However, Murphy’s (2014) study only adopted interviews, which 
makes the study suffer from a lack of comprehensiveness and 
generalizability. Therefore, it reflects the methodological 
significance of this study that considered splitting perspectives 
among different interest groups and employed questionnaires 
to generalise interview findings. Unlike Murphy’s (2014) study 
that only involved trust managers, this study sought different, 
or even conflicting, perspectives from three angles, including 
commissioners, managers and frontline clinicians, to expand the 
comprehensiveness of understanding. Furthermore, unlike 
Murphy’s (2014) empirical research that only relied upon 
interviews, online surveys were adopted in this study to verify 
and generalise the findings derived from the previous 
qualitative analysis. The questionnaire findings showed high 
agreement with the corresponding interview findings. The 
empirical findings were then confirmed as valid due to their 
compliance with the theoretical predictions. 
 
 
 
8.3 Implications for policy analysis 
By combining the findings from investigating the fundamental 
theories, evaluating the constructional mechanism and 
analysing the empirical evidence, this study develops three 
major implications for the policy analysis of the implementation 
	 344	
of MH PbR, including: policy should be evaluated in the context, 
one size does not fit all systems and objectives always come 
with trade-offs. 
 
 
8.3.1 Policy should be evaluated within the context 
As previously discussed, this study found that the fast changing 
policies with different targets hindered the implementation of 
PbR in mental health. This echoes Marshall et al.’s (2014) insight 
that points to three factors that determine the success of a 
policy, which includes the previous system it is to replace, the 
political context and other external factors. These three factors 
highlight the importance of contextualisation, whereas it is 
particularly the case in mental health (Walt et al., 2008). In this 
respect, this study argues that the feasibility and value of PbR 
should be evaluated within its context.   
 
 
8.3.1.1 The context is changing 
As illustrated in NHS England’s Five Year Forward View (NHS 
England, 2014), despite the fact that the kernel of NHS services, 
which is to provide quality and efficient health care, has not 
changed over the past decade, the outside world has changed. 
Whether PbR is feasible depends not only on its theoretical 
validity and credibility, but it also relies upon the current 
situation. This study considers it insufficient and inaccurate to 
predict the feasibility of implementing PbR in the current 
situation by merely considering the previous experiences of 
implementing it in acute services, especially considering the 
fundamental differences between the two. 
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There have been dramatic changes in the NHS since the “NHS 
Modernisation”, as demands have increased since people live 
longer, medical technology has developed, and new medical 
interventions have emerged. Among the changes, the most 
obvious one is the change of the government’s capacity to pay 
for services given the rising demands (NHS England, 2014). 
When PbR was first introduced in 2003, the reform took place 
in the context where a firm financial investment was made into 
the NHS. The government has ensured an average of 6.4% (in 
real terms) per year increase in funding for the NHS during the 
period between 2003/04 and 2007/08 (Harker, 2012) It was 
this funding that supported NHS to conduct a series of reforms 
surrounding the payment system. However, since 2009, the 
launch of the QIPP programme set a target to save up to £20bn 
by 2014-15 (National Audit Office, 2011), which later increased 
to £30bn by 2020 (NHS England, 2014). Although the final 
decision is to be made by the new Conservative government 
and may need to be adjusted, it signals the austerity that the 
current NHS is facing, particularly since the King’s Fund claims 
that there may be a “cliff edge” for some providers and this may 
lead to the shut down of A&E services (Appleby et al., 2014). In 
other words, there is a lack of current financial support 
compared to what was available in 2003/04.  
 
Additionally, inequalities have been noted between acute 
services and mental health services from interviewing the 
managers and commissioners. This is further supported by the 
figures indicating that mental health services receive only 13% 
of the NHS budget to address problems that account for 23% of 
the total impact of ill in the UK (All Party Parliamentary Group 
on Mental Health, 2015). Besides the fact that mental health 
services have always been underfunded in comparison with 
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acute services, research conducted by Community Care and 
BBC News revealed that NHS trusts’ income for mental health 
services has dropped by 8.25%, or approximately by £600m in 
real terms between from 2010 to 2015 (McNicoll, 2015). 
Moreover, according to BBC News, three-quarters of mental 
health trusts have predicted another 8% (in real terms) in 
income cuts in the next five years commencing in 2014/15 
(Hutchinson, 2015). By contrast, the past decade has witnessed 
a growing demand for mental health services (NHS England, 
2014). The number of people subject to Mental Health Act has 
increased by 32% since 2008/09 and by 6% since 2012/13 
(Care Quality Commission, 2015). Under great financial 
pressure, the NHS has acknowledged the unprecedented 
challenges brought by the change of context, which has 
required them to take action on three fronts, including demand, 
efficiency and funding simultaneously (NHS England, 2014). 
 
In this respect, this study points to the insufficiency or 
inappropriateness to predict the success of PbR in mental health 
based upon the experiences in acute services. In light of the 
constrained budget, this study questions whether it is realistic 
to develop and implement such a radical financial system reform 
in mental health (this will be discussed in Section 8.3.3.2). 
Whether it is feasible to achieve cost-saving, while 
simultaneously ensuring quality by implementing PbR in mental 
health, depends upon external factors. 
 
 
8.3.1.2 Feasibility depends upon the general 
environment 
This study found that the Coalition government failed to fulfil its 
original intentions, which include to stop top-down 
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reorganisation of the NHS (NHS England, 2014) and to 
promoted a market-like competition system (Secretary of State 
for Health, 2010). The Health and Social Care Act (Secretary of 
State for Health, 2012) reiterated the importance of applying 
the market mechanism in health care by adopting approaches 
such as privatisation. However, until now, the private sectors 
only earn a small amount of the NHS budget while the NHS 
slowly transforms into a more bureaucratic system.  
 
This study found the government’s top-down squeeze restricted 
the development of market competition and therefore, hindered 
it from serving its function regarding driving up efficiency. The 
fixed tariff is seen as a top-down price squeeze that resulted in 
intense financial risks for providers. Drawing upon the fact that 
the data used to calculate nationally-fixed tariffs are only 
derived from NHS providers without taking private providers 
into consideration (O'Reilly et al., 2012), the lack of accuracy 
and the variation in costs results in a considerable financial 
instability for the NHS providers. Hence, this leads to difficulties 
in getting private providers into the market considering the 
difficulties in making a profit. This corresponds to Krachler and 
Greer’s (2015) critiques about the uncertainties for private 
providers created by the price calculation together with its direct 
consequences. The interview outcomes comply with the 
theoretical evaluation since the commissioners admitted the 
collaborative relationship with NHS providers rather than a 
purchaser/supplier relationship in an ideal market. Without the 
provider-side competition, which is the fundamental 
assumption, MH PbR could not serve its incentivising function. 
 
Moreover, the government’s failure to depoliticise the market 
has also been noted as one reason that hindered the 
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implementation of MH PbR, especially in mental health. The 
findings in the interviews pointed to the risk of wasting 
resources, as a result of paying excessive attention to quality 
checking. Indeed, service quality should be monitored to be 
accountable to both commissioners and patients. However, 
greater attention has been paid to care regulation since Jeremy 
Hunt became Health Secretary (Ham et al., 2013). On the one 
hand, the overlapping responsibilities regarding regulating 
service quality have been noted between the CQC and the 
Monitor. On the other hand, less emphasis has been given to 
competition and patients’ choices as a direct consequence, 
which leads to the condition in which providers are under 
intense scrutiny, in addition to financial pressure.   
 
The financial burden has been further increased by the radical 
reorganisation of the NHS. The original intention of the Coalition 
government’s reform was to contain the large expenditure 
resulting in the miscellaneous governing bodies by simplifying 
the structure. However, Figure 8-1 compares the structure 
before and after the Coalition government came into power. 
Chapter 2 found an evident increase in the number of the NHS 
bureaucratic bodies after April 2013, from a total 162 bodies to 
244 bodies, including 4 regional offices, 27 local offices, 211 
CCGs and 1 NHS commissioning board (BBC, 2013). According 
to Figure 8-2, the example of the relationships among the 
health bodies in London is an epitome of the whole NHS, which 
indicates a complex and confusing bureaucratic structure (Ham 
et al., 2013). When it comes to Lind’s (2015) perspective, 
practice funding will suffer from the increase in management 
costs. In other words, the reorganisation has made the NHS 
more bureaucratic rather than creating a supportive 
environment for the provider-side competition.  
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Figure 8-1 Structures of the NHS before and after the Coalition government 
came into power 
 
 
 
Figure 8-2 Relationships among healthcare bodies in London 
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In this respect, there is neither intensive provider-side 
competition nor economic efficiency created by 
purchaser/provider relationships as the market theory predicts. 
Moreover, the tariff calculation mechanism creates entry 
barriers for third party providers. Therefore, the weak 
incentives to involve providers and the government’s political 
interventions make the system a more bureaucratic one rather 
than a proper market-oriented one. Rather than the political 
environment in the 2000s, under which the priorities were set 
as to promote the diversity of providers by a steady growth in 
funding, this study argues that the current situation is no longer 
a supportive environment for the development of MH PbR. 
However, besides the external constraints, whether PbR is 
worth implementing depends more upon the specific clinical 
context. This study argues that there is no one-size-fits-all 
system within the healthcare system, particularly within mental 
health services as discussed in next section. 
 
 
8.3.2 One size does not fit all systems 
Combining the development sequence of PbR in health care and 
the specific evaluation of PbR in mental health, this study found 
that one size does not fit all systems. PbR is only one of the 
tools responsible for promoting cost-effectiveness and quality 
improvement. As such, it functions well only in a certain 
environment rather than covering all aspects of service perfectly. 
This is supported by Appleby et al.’s (2012) research that 
attributes the complex nature of mental disorders and the 
unpredictability of disease progress to the factors that have 
caused difficulties in applying PbR in mental health.  
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As the interview findings indicated, one obvious reason for 
introducing PbR into mental health, a domain with much more 
challenges for PbR, is the “second-order” effect. In this respect, 
both the commissioners and managers noted the vulnerable 
situation for not being paid by PbR. Therefore, this study argues 
that the situation “being under PbR or in the “second-order” 
made PbR the second best choice for providers in mental health 
instead of an ideal payment system that fits in well. 
 
 
8.3.2.1 PbR faces more challenges in mental health  
This study demonstrated that mental health care is very 
different from other general health domains due to the nature 
of mental disorders. The latter emerges as rather complex in 
light of the variation in disease symptoms and treatment 
methods as well as the chronic characteristics that require 
complex multi-organisational co-operation. When it comes to 
the development sequence of PbR, it was firstly introduced to 
the elective inpatient care, given the existence of clear 
diagnostic markers and the high degree of within-group 
homogeneity. Thus the study argues that compared to acute 
illnesses, mental disorders are more complex and vague, which 
makes PbR less suitable to this arena. Moreover, compared with 
over 1,500 HRGs in acute services, there are only 21 clusters 
under the MHCT, which raises concern about the low within-
group homogeneity and therefore, the inevitable high variations 
in patient needs and interventions within one cluster. 
 
Additionally, this study also found that there is a high variation 
in interventions and clinical skills among different geographic 
areas or even among organisations within one area. Confirmed 
by Five Year Forward View (NHS England, 2014), there exist 
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variations in intervention and cost between areas, which 
indicates that England is too diverse for a “one-size-fits-all” 
system to apply in all locations. This is particularly the case for 
mental health due to the coexistence of other variations in the 
classification system and therefore, the cost calculation system. 
The interview findings confirmed this argument by reflecting the 
participants’ preference for having a locally negotiated price 
rather than national tariffs to avoid financial risks. 
 
Accordingly, this study shows that the complex nature of mental 
health services and the large variations in service provision 
brings challenges to the development of MH PbR as a policy, 
which was designed with an intention to stimulate efficiency and 
quality by nationally fixed tariffs and unified standards. In other 
words, the decision to replace the Block Contract with PbR in 
mental health emerges as more of a political financial 
consideration in lieu of one with much greater practical 
effectiveness. However, this study was also aware that this does 
not necessarily lead to “a thousand flowers bloom” situation. It 
is still important to have a standardised system to indicate 
evidence-based treatments (Miraldo et al., 2006). As such, this 
study argues that the move from the Block Contract to a more 
transparent system is one step in the right direction, although 
the initial problems need addressing, and a combination of the 
two is needed. 
 
 
8.3.2.2 The mental health payment system should be 
both standardised and flexible 
According to the research findings, the Block Contract is safer 
as a payment method regarding cost control and financial 
stability when compared to MH PbR at the current stage. 
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Nevertheless, the study also appreciates the indirect 
advantages brought by MH PbR to the clinical aspect: the 
transparent information system.  
 
This study reviewed the political intent to replace the Block 
Contract with PbR during the Modernisation, based upon which 
it attributed the establishment of evidence-based health care as 
the highlight of the NHS evolution. The interview findings 
comply with the theoretical evaluation that MH PbR helps to 
build a transparent information system in acute services, which 
is ultimately beneficial to good quality services. This 
corresponds to Marshall et al.’s (2014) report that the non-price 
mechanisms improve service quality regarding data collection, 
coding and reporting. The fieldwork findings showed that both 
the commissioners and providers regarded the transparent 
information system as the most obvious advantage of 
implementing PbR in mental health in light of the current 
absence of measurement instruments subject to both the 
demand side and the supply side. Underpinned by the NHS’s 
strategy (Department of Health, 2010a), this study found that 
the establishment of a standardised process was believed to be 
of theoretical benefit regarding promoting resource utility. 
Drawing on the evaluation of the NFCAS in Chapter 5 that 
indicates the feasibility of managing mental health services in a 
standardised way, this study argues that the case-mix principle 
is feasible and helpful to facilitate healthcare delivery in mental 
health and thus worth implementing, although the conceptual 
and constructional flaws of the current classification system 
await addressing. 
 
In summary, on the one hand, the PbR payment system offers 
the potential to fit acute services while simultaneously proving 
	 354	
less practical in relation to mental health, at least by the time 
this study took place. On the other hand, the Block Contract 
neither serves the purpose of creating a health care system that 
is sustainable nor it is aligned with the demands of today’s 
population. Therefore, this study proposes a mix of both the 
Block Contract and MH PbR: using the refined MHCT 
classification system to guide clinical services while keeping the 
Block Contract as the payment method. 
 
 
8.3.3 Consider trade-offs between objectives and the 
inevitable consequences 
Based upon the empirical findings, this study contends that one 
policy always comes with a compromise. In particular, by 
comparing the centralisation and decentralisation models, it 
shows that the top-down management and the bottom-up 
decision-making strategy have both pros and cons; the targets 
intended to help drive up efficiency turned out to be lacking 
feasibility; the reorganisation of the NHS and implementation of 
PbR intended to address austerity, but has raised concern about 
the increase in total costs; and the empowerment of patients’ 
rights raised some concern about the potential side-effects that 
devaluate its validity to accurately measure healthcare services. 
This shows agreement with Dunsire’s (1978) idea of “the 
implementation gap” that reveals the wide existence of gaps 
between theory and practice. Hence, this study demonstrates 
that it is important to consider trade-offs between objectives 
and the inevitable situations. 
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8.3.3.1 National guidelines vs. local autonomy 
Similar to the concern regarding the mismatches between 
nationally fixed tariffs and individual providers’ actual costs, the 
balance between the centralised guidelines and the local 
autonomy calls for attention.  
 
Chapter 2 reviewed the development of the NHS reforms and 
demonstrated the NHS’s oscillation between the centralised 
regulatory strategy and the decentralised regulatory strategy. 
By the time this study took place, the Coalition government had 
returned to the internal market with emphasis on local 
commissioning. The interview findings confirmed that contracts 
were set based upon local negotiation and the commissioners 
suspected the price would continue to be determined locally. 
However, the interview findings attributed the lack of centrally 
set guidance to one reason responsible for the low accuracy of 
data and the difficulties in commissioning. This study thereby 
points to the potential risk of a decline in quality resulting from 
the poor quality data derived from an inaccurate method of 
collection and calculation.  Specifically for some areas, a lack of 
support from accurate data, together with the local 
commissioners’ lack of capacity of commissioning, might lead to 
a situation that the locally negotiated prices are based upon 
poor data (not based upon the national pooled data) that do not 
reflect current or efficient costs, which risks a decline in service 
quality (Marshall et al., 2014).  
 
This study also appreciates the importance of the bottom-up 
management strategy, especially in a field where there exists 
significant geographic diversity. In this respect, this study 
highlights the importance of considering regional differences 
and thus providing localised mental health services. The 
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interview findings demonstrated two main reasons for frontline 
clinicians’ reluctance to engage, consisting of the gaps between 
policies and local realities and the intensively-changing policies. 
This shows agreement with the findings of Five Year Forward 
View (NHS England, 2014), which attributes the negative 
consequences of a highly-centralised national management 
strategy to a lack of local involvement and a lack of sensitivity 
to local circumstances.  
 
Under such circumstances, this study suggests a balance 
between top-down management and bottom-up decision-
making processes: the government provides general guidelines 
for local authorities’ reference simultaneously empowering local 
authorities to set rules according to local realities. This complies 
with the reform direction proposed in Five Year Forward View 
(NHS England, 2014).  
 
 
8.3.3.2 National targets vs. frontline realities 
This study found mismatches between targets and the frontline 
practice, according to which it argues that targets with good 
intentions may lead to a decline in service quality leaving 
patients to suffer the consequences.  
 
Besides the targets, such as “four successful contacts per day” 
for the double-running system, some targets set as preparatory 
work for the forthcoming PbR were regarded as lacking 
feasibility in daily practice. For instance, with the intention to 
improve efficiency to address the bed shortage in secondary 
care, frontline clinicians were required to review the patients in 
C1-C3, C7 and C11 in order to decide an upgrade or discharge. 
The interview findings pointed to two problems that make these 
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targets less feasible at the current stage: 1) the long stay 
patients have developed a dependency on the clinical staff and 
the system that had promised them a lifetime of care, which 
makes the discharge difficult and problematic given the 
importance of mutual trust between doctors and patients to 
mental health services; and 2) the fragmentated services 
between primary and secondary care impedes the delivery of 
integrated care. The splitting perspectives between the 
commissioners and frontline clinicians reflect the mismatches 
between the political intents and the practical realities. Moreover, 
this is not a single case during the implementation of PbR in 
mental health. Considering the fact that the mental health 
inpatient system was running over capacity, the interview data 
revealed that both the commissioners and managers regarded 
closing beds as a way to protect providers from deficits. This 
complies with the figure indicating there has been an 8% 
reduction of mental health beds since 2010 (O’Hara, 2015). 
However, this further intensifies the bed shortage in a context 
of increasing demands. A report from the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists (2014) presents the results derived from 
conducting a survey with 575 trainee psychiatrists. The report 
reveals that 80% of the participants have sent a patient outside 
the local area for a bed, and 28% have sent a critically unwell 
patient home because of the bed shortage. The Care Quality 
Commission (2015) echoes this by arguing that the delays in 
admission and the high level of occupancy negatively affect the 
quality of mental health services. Mark Winstanley, the chief 
executive of the charity Rethink Mental Illness, further discloses 
the fact that people choose to go to A&E when they are in a 
crisis as a means in response to the bed shortage in secondary 
mental health services (O’Hara, 2015). This, in turn, increases 
the burden to A&E as a collateral consequence. 
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Beyond mental health, there has been great concern about 
other targets during the implementation of PbR in acute services 
as well. As previously discussed, this study questions the extent 
to which the efficiency improvement could be attributed to the 
implementation of PbR in acute services given the external 
incentivising targets, such as maximum waiting times. In other 
words, the strength of the national targets has been credited to 
their effectiveness on efficiency promotion. This complies with 
Connolly et al.’s (2011) research comparing four countries in the 
UK (England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales) between 
1996 and 2006. However, distorted behaviours have been noted 
under such political pressure. As reported by the Telegraph 
(Donnelly, 2009), patients were forced to wait in ambulances 
outside the emergency department to meet the targets of 
treating patients within four hours.   
 
By noting the emergence of the “game for workload” behaviours, 
this study points to two side effects resulting from the 
mismatches between targets and frontline realities. Moreover, 
the “box-ticking” exercise does not only happen in the 
implementation of MH PbR, but it has also emerged during the 
implementation of CPA. Rogers and Pilgrim (2001) attest to the 
existence of the “box-ticking” behaviours by attributing it to a 
similar reason that there is a mismatch between the broad 
strategy and the vagaries of actual practice. These behaviours 
reveal that the mismatches have compromised service quality 
by creating the wrong attitude under political pressure. 
Furthermore, the excessive emphasis on efficiency goes against 
frontline professionals’ value, thus resulting in their reluctance 
to engage. In this respect, in recognition of the fact that the 
government’s political targets often concentrate on one area at 
the expense of others, this study calls for attention to these 
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unintended consequences to improve frontline clinical services 
rather than focusing on hitting targets. 
 
 
8.3.3.3 Cost saving objectives vs. initial instalment 
Chapter 2 discussed the reasons for the Coalition government’s 
return to market and privatisation by highlighting the significant 
financial risks and the increasing demands the government was 
facing. However, by taking account of the financial pressure, as 
well as the requirement of initial investment, this study reminds 
policymakers to make a cautious decision by considering 
additional costs alongside the implementation of MH PbR.  
 
By reviewing the development of PbR in acute services under 
the Labour government, this study revealed the significant costs 
resulted from the large-range reorganisation of the NHS, the 
initial instalment of the PbR system and the subsequent 
transaction costs. This conforms to Paton’s (2014) argument 
that the one-off and start-up costs are high for establishing a 
market in the previous four major reforms. This study revealed 
that it was this unprecedented level of governmental investment 
that facilitated the successful implementation of PbR in acute 
services. Nevertheless, it also found that these additional 
transaction costs were largely ignored in the previous studies 
that evaluated the impacts of PbR on acute services. The official 
estimate of the cost for the latest reform has reached £3bn 
since 2010 (Paton, 2014). This is consistent with Walshe’s (2010) 
estimation of the expense of the NHS reorganisation (between 
£2bn and £3bn). Notwithstanding the significant amount of 
investment in the NHS, the implementation of PbR in mental 
health has been delayed. Furthermore, by identifying the 
driving factors for its delay, this study argues that more 
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investment is needed for the development of the classification 
system and therefore the project as a whole. 
 
This study demonstrated that the complex nature of mental 
disorders determines the difficulties in developing a valid 
integrated clinical classification system. The interview findings 
highlighted that some subsystems, such as the HoNOS and the 
quality measures, need further testing and refinement. The 
development, test and refinement of the system in turn requires 
greater start-up financial input. The establishment of external 
support systems, such as quality monitoring and IT system, also 
require a considerable investment. Even after establishing the 
MH PbR payment system, the complex transaction costs derived 
from data collection, commissioning, monitoring and 
enforcement have been estimated (in 2005) as £40m to £60m 
a year (Marshall et al., 2014). All of these estimations contribute 
to the fact that the development of MH PbR as a part of the 
further reform, requires more financial input than what has 
been invested in acute services, which conflicts with the political 
intent to cut total expenditure in this area.   
 
It is also worth noting that the amount of the expenses used for 
the NHS reforms becomes more significant when compared to 
the total limited budget. Figure 8-3 displays the total health 
expenditure as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) across 
all seven G7 countries and the average of 34 OECD countries 
between 2000 and 2013. As the figure displays, despite the 
Labour government’s significant investment in the 
Modernisation of the NHS, the British government had been 
spending the least on health care as a share of its GDP among 
the G7 countries. It had also been lower than the OCED average 
level in this period. Furthermore, the expenditure has started to 
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drop after it peaked in 2009 when the QIPP was released. Based 
upon Five Year Forward View (NHS England, 2014), Shaw (2015) 
points to a continuing drop to under 7% by 2021, which is also 
seen as miserly when compared to the EU average. 
 
 
Figure 8-3 British healthcare spending compared to G7 countries and the 
OECD average (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2015) 
 
 
 
Therefore, this study questions the political decision to conduct 
a radical financial reform in mental health, which requires a 
significance amount of investment under such a limited budget 
for health care. It raises questions about whether there is a 
more cost-effective way to increase the utility of the limited 
budget, particularly considering the lack of solid evidence of the 
impact of PbR in acute services. In this regard, this study 
suggests that additional costs should be considered alongside 
the potential efficiency gains from implementing PbR in mental 
health, particularly considering a more complex system it 
targets in a context of austerity. 
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8.3.3.4 Patient choices vs. quality improvement 
This study found that devolving power to patients failed to serve 
its theoretical intention to promote service quality, considering 
the conflicting interests of clients, purchasers and providers, in 
addition to some patients’ lack of ability to make rational choices.  
 
According to the theoretical analysis in Chapter 2, another 
fundamental assumption of the market theory is that clients 
have comprehensive information regarding products and thus 
can make rational decisions considering both quality and price. 
Nevertheless, in health care, patients act as service users to 
choose services according to their best interests, while 
commissioners act as purchasers to buy a service on behalf of 
patients. According to Fotaki et al.’s (2008) report, patients are 
more willing to rely on a trusted practitioner to choose the 
organisation and the treatment on their behalf. However, 
conflicting goals have been noted between patients and 
commissioners, since commissioners focus on maximising the 
utility of resources at a general level, while patients consider 
receiving best-individualised treatments as the priority. It 
corresponds to Dixon et al.’s (2011) perspective that agents 
acting on behalf of patients have not been effective when 
considering patient preference and price separately. Moreover, 
in contrast to the precondition of the market mechanism that a 
wide range of providers compete for purchasers’ contracts as 
discussed in Chapter 3, the interview findings presented a 
collaborative relationship between commissioners and NHS 
providers in mental health. In other words, even if 
commissioners take patients’ best interests as the priority, they 
are not able to use the economic mechanism to choose the 
providers with higher quality. Thus this contradicts the 
presumption of Money Follows the Patient (Secretary of State 
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for Health, 2002) that requires a sufficient amount of candidate 
providers. Moreover, the interview findings indicated that the 
information asymmetry between providers and commissioners 
make it difficult for commissioners to accurately evaluate 
healthcare services and thus make rational decisions, which 
shows agreement with the findings of Greener’s (2002) 
research. The difficulties in evaluating service quality further 
increases the risk of compromising patients’ interests under 
financial pressure. As concluded in Chapter 3, the fundamental 
idea behind PbR risks a decline in quality since it has been 
brought into question whether professionals are professional 
enough to maintain patients’ best interests when taking 
financial issues into consideration, especially under the current 
austerity. Under such circumstances, this study concludes that 
the patient-commissioner relationship, the current purchaser-
provider relationship in mental health services, together with 
the initial flaws of MH PbR, have impeded Money Follows the 
Patient (Secretary of State for Health, 2002) from performing 
its function as an incentive for improving service quality.    
 
Moreover, this study considered the relationship between 
patients’ opinions and their best interests, according to which 
the study questions to what extent patients’ opinions should be 
valued. The interview findings confirm that participants from all 
three interest groups valued patients’ opinions by indicating the 
importance to understand patients’ feelings in mental health 
services. However, this study also notes the concerns about the 
validity of patients’ opinions given the special nature of mental 
disorders: there are always some patients who do not want to 
be treated with mental health services, while others would 
overestimate their severity and thus require excessive care 
which is not the standardised interventions. This study thereby 
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draws attention to the gap between patients’ opinions and their 
real needs, particularly in mental health. 
 
In this respect, this study reveals the biases of patient opinion 
and thus suggests taking account of both the objectives of 
devolving rights to patients and the inevitable consequences of 
doing so.     
 
 
 
8.4  Implications of the research design 
Besides the implications for policy analysis as discussed above, 
the research design and the adoption of the GTM principles also 
have proved fruitful. The adoption of “administrative 
anthropology” as the analytical framework has yielded a multi-
angle perspective towards the MH PbR policy in terms of its 
initiation, formulation and implementation. In the fieldwork 
stage, the employment of the GTM principles has harvested rich 
information in relation to the implementation of the MH PbR 
policy. In this regard, the subsequent subsections discuss the 
utility of the research design.   
 
 
8.4.1 The utility of the analytical framework 
This study utilised Glennerster et al.’s (1983) “administrative 
anthropology” as the analytical framework. Hogwood and Gunn 
(1984) highlight the importance of understanding policy-making 
as a learning process and appreciating each stage of the process 
when conducting policy evaluation. Referring to the previous 
research, Hunter and Wistow’s (1987) study pays more 
attention to the initiation and formulation stages of the policy-
making process whereas Lipsky’s (1980) “street-level 
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bureaucracy” theory appreciates the importance of frontline 
situations to implementing a specific policy. Therefore, to 
evaluate the MH PbR scheme in a comprehensive way, this study 
investigated the initiation, formulation and implementation 
stages using a combination of forward-mapping and backward-
mapping approaches. This also conforms to Hogwood and 
Gunn’s (1984) categorisation of the general reasons for the 
failure of a particular policy – bad policy, bad execution and bad 
luck. 
 
By looking at the fundamental theory, the Quasi-market, the 
findings have served two major functions. Firstly, they 
demonstrated the political intents behind PbR, which facilitate 
the following comparison between the political intents and the 
frontline realities. Secondly, the findings demonstrated the 
fundamental flaws underpinning the policy, which indicated the 
insufficient understanding of the problems to be solved and the 
over-optimism of the cure. Therefore, the evaluation of the 
underpinning theories suggests that the PbR policy is poorly 
designed at the fundamental level.  
 
The theoretical evaluation recontextualised PbR in mental 
health by concerning the concept and construction of the 
classification system. The analysis findings demonstrated its 
failure to serve the purpose of accurately assessing patients’ 
needs for care to ensure the within-group homogeneity and 
between-group heterogeneity of the classification system. The 
initial problems of the MHCT and the HoNOS together with gaps 
between the two indicated a low validity and reliability of the 
derived frontline data. The theoretical flaws of the cost 
calculation mechanism revealed its inability to serve the initial 
intentions to save costs and increase efficiency. This in turn 
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reflected the system designer’s failure to accurately translate 
the general intents into workable forms. In this regard, the 
evaluation of the application of the 
commodification/standardisation of mental health services 
indicates the MH PbR policy is poorly formulated. 
 
The fieldwork findings showed agreement with the arguments 
from the theoretical evaluation. The findings, on the one hand, 
discussed the practical obstacles in executing the classification 
system in mental health and, on the other hand, outlined the 
external constraints that adversely affected its implementation, 
which could be attributed to “bad luck” according to Hogwood 
and Gunn’s theory (1984). The empirical evidence revealed the 
gaps between the political intents and the frontline realities, 
which highlighted the importance of field-level workers to policy 
delivery, as well as the importance of the political context in 
which frontline staff operate. 
 
The combination of forward-mapping and backward-mapping 
approaches has offered a multi-level and multi-angle 
investigation of the process whereby the political intents were 
translated into clinical outputs through the formulation and 
implementation of the MH PbR scheme (Hunter and Wistow, 
1987). By exploring the policy-making and service-delivery 
process, this study has identified the variables and factors that 
have hindered the implementation from three different levels, 
facilitating the understanding of the gaps between the initial 
intents and the practical outputs. Besides analysing the 
drawbacks of this particular system, this study has also 
highlighted the impacts of the central-local collaboration upon 
MH PbR in general, which may contribute to the future policy 
evaluation.  
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8.4.2 The utility of GTM principles 
The study applied the principle of Grounded Theory 
Methodology in conducting and analysing the semi-structured 
interviews, the primary approach for the fieldwork. In light of 
the previous theoretical analysis of the initiation and 
formulation of the MH PbR policies, some key issues were 
identified in a top-down order in advance to guide the design of 
interview structure. Nevertheless, although the analytical model 
could not be called “pure” GTM, it employed the principles of 
GTM, including bottom-up concepts construction, constant 
comparison, theoretical sampling and memo writing. Open 
questions were adopted to encourage participants to express 
their perspectives freely in order to assist in the generation of 
new concepts. The application of the principle of Plan-Do-Check-
Adjust (PDCA) loop in conducting interviews reflected a flexible 
bottom-up data collection process, which provided sufficient 
information from the individual participants to foster a deep 
understanding of their perspectives.  
 
The GTM principles were utilised in the bottom-up process of 
data analysis. Since the interviews targeted key participants 
from three different interest groups, the process of breaking 
transcripts into nodes and subsequently merging nodes into 
concepts facilitated both a vertical and horizontal comparison of 
data. Themes generated from the collected data guided 
adjustments to the content of the subsequent interviews, 
although the general structure remained unchanged. The 
themes were further tested in the subsequent interviews 
according to the PDCA principle. Given the bottom-up nature, 
the codes, or even concepts, arranged at the beginning may not 
be accurate or making sense, therefore, the constant 
comparison between results and new findings intra- and inter- 
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transcripts served as a backtracking mechanism to ensure the 
validity of the interview contents and findings. In particular, 
regarding the comparison of the perspectives of participants 
from different interest groups, the different, or even conflicting, 
perspectives enlarged the comprehensiveness of findings 
subject to a specific objective. 
 
The bottom-up data analysis followed the evidence-based 
principle. The relationship between codes and the 
corresponding concepts in addition to the theories, provided a 
transparent way of illustrating how theories were generated, 
making the findings more valid and reliable. Drawing upon the 
nature of the NHS ethics requirements, it was not viable to 
conduct a “pure” GTM study that would have allowed for a more 
flexible information collection process and deeper 
understanding. However, the combination of top-down 
theoretical analysis and bottom-up interview analysis has 
proved fruitful in terms of expanding the practical knowledge in 
relation to the target issues, which is more efficient under tight 
time constraints. 
 
 
 
8.5 Limitations and future implications 
In this section, the limitations and future implications of the 
study are discussed from four main aspects: the imperfection of 
the research design, the limited sample selection, the limited 
generalizability and implications for future research. 
 
 
8.5.1 The imperfection of the research design 
Mixed methods were employed in this study, combining both 
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qualitative and quantitative approaches. Within the three-step 
investigation, the theoretical analysis and the semi-structured 
interviews were employed in the first two stages, whereas the 
quantitative approach of using online surveys was adopted in 
the last phase mainly for a confirmatory purpose. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, the benefit of employing triangulation is to 
compensate for the defects of each single method by counter-
balancing the strength of the other in order to achieve 
intensiveness (in-depth findings derived from qualitative 
methods) and extensiveness (generalisable outcomes derived 
from quantitative methods) (Jick, 1979). In health care, the 
statistical analyses of experiments or secondary data are the 
methods most prevalently adopted to identify the statistical 
relationship between variables, or explore the determining 
factors and the way they influence the variables (Fossey et al., 
2002). However, due to the delayed status and the lack of 
sufficient data, it was not feasible to conduct statistical analysis 
of medical records or finance-related data. In this respect, the 
study was not able to evaluate the impacts of PbR on cost, 
volume and quality in a direct way. Rather, impacts on cost and 
quality have been mainly evaluated based upon rating scales 
according to participants’ own subjective value systems.  
 
Indeed, the ideal way to precisely quantify outcomes is to 
conduct a longitudinal analysis comparing the differences in cost, 
volume and quality before- and after- implementing MH PbR. 
Nevertheless, the systematic analysis of a particular policy 
requires a collective assessment of policymaking outcomes, 
which can only emerge over an extended period (Schön and 
Rein, 1994). As discussed in Chapter 2, the past decade has 
witnessed four radical reforms in health care. One of the 
reasons for the frontline clinicians’ reluctance to engage in the 
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implementation of MH PbR has been attributed to the quick 
disappearance of policies. This study pointed to the fact that 
there are many policies disappearing before they had an impact 
on healthcare services. Williams et al. (2002) attribute one of 
the reasons that evaluations are often ignored by policymakers 
to the desynchronisation between policy-making and evaluation. 
As Hogwood and Gunn (1984) suggest, the appropriateness of 
a methodology is determined by the purpose of the evaluation. 
In this respect, this study serves as a real-time evaluation to 
present early outcomes of the implementation of PbR in mental 
health and therefore, offers the corresponding suggestions for 
the incremental adjustment subject to the mechanical flaws of 
the system. The evaluation this study conducted in the early 
stage may provide implications for future rigorous statistical 
analysis when high-quality data is available. The comparison 
awaits the full implementation of the payment system and the 
establishment of a comprehensive quality measurement system.  
 
 
8.5.2 Limited sample selection 
This study involved 12 participants for the semi-structured 
interviews and 51 participants (38 were considered valid after 
screening the responses) for the online surveys. Regarding the 
interviews, as Ellis (2010) reveals, the sample of the interview 
has to be small, or analysis could turn out to be cumbersome, 
especially with the snowball-sampling principle. In this respect, 
the small sample has inevitably affected the representativeness 
of the study, given the requirement of depth. Additionally, 
considering the current condition that PbR has not been officially 
implemented in mental health as of yet, it is a comparatively 
less-explored area. The nature of mental disorders, together 
with the newly established classification system, increased the 
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complexity of the study, especially considering the lack of 
sufficient training at the current stage. It therefore, restricted 
the entire sample population, which refers to those highly-
professionalised with a deep understanding of the new system. 
Moreover, the research subjects, including commissioners, 
hospital managers and frontline clinicians, have busy schedules 
due to the demands of their professions. These factors impeded 
the study from obtaining a larger sample.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, without access to the sample 
population, randomised sampling was not an option. In this 
respect, the only viable way was to apply a stratified snowball 
sampling method to obtain access through contact with the 
participants previously engaged in the semi-structured 
interviews. Despite setting the form of the survey as an online 
questionnaire rather than posted questionnaire considering the 
low-response rate of posted questionnaire, the sample of online 
surveys was small. Given the complexity of the research topic, 
the questionnaire results found that some key participants, 
especially GP commissioners and frontline clinicians, lacked a 
deep understanding of MH PbR implementation, which was 
reflected in the missing values and “not known” options. In this 
regard, this study noted that those key players with brief or 
even little understanding of this system are more likely to ignore 
the email invitation at the time they received it, which in turn 
limits the number of response. Therefore, subsequent studies 
may obtain a larger sample when MH PbR is fully implemented, 
and key players will be more likely to have a deeper 
understanding of MH PbR.    
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8.5.3 Limited generalizability 
The depth of the study limited the amount of the engaged 
participants and thus hindered the representatives of the study. 
To increase the number of responses, Derbyshire NHS FT was 
set as the fourth research site in addition to the three 
institutions in Nottinghamshire. The reason for choosing 
Derbyshire NHS Foundation Trust was the consideration of 
comparability. In light of the existence of geographical and 
organisational variations in performance discussed in Chapter 2, 
comparability is important to the validity and reliability of survey 
outcomes. Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire share similar 
geographic characteristics regarding health conditions, risk 
factors and the level of mental illness of their local populations. 
The treatment and the corresponding outcomes provided by the 
trusts within these two neighbouring areas are similar and at 
the average level of trusts throughout England. In this respect, 
the survey outcomes were considered able to represent the 
current condition of Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. In other 
words, the findings were not able to represent the current 
condition in other areas of England, particularly in a general 
context of power devolution according to which actions such as 
contract negotiation and care pathways are undertaken locally. 
Generalizability would be increased if permission to conduct a 
nation-wide online survey and the access to contact appropriate 
participants could be granted. However, since research 
permission was signed by each organisation, under the pressure 
of the time constraint, the study was designed to focus on 
investigating the current implementation in Nottinghamshire as 
a case study rather than seeking nation-wide generalizability. In 
this respect, the study provided implications for future 
investigations on a nation-wide level. 
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8.5.4 Implications for future research 
For now, the available evidence indicates that the government 
tends to replace the market with the integrated service 
management while continuing to devolve power to local 
authorities (NHS England, 2014), although detailed reform 
strategy still awaits further information. As previously discussed, 
this study suggests a rigorous evaluation of new policies/targets 
beforehand and a cautious consideration of any further reform 
to avoid destabilising the NHS. In this respect, alongside the 
implementation of support policies, such as reorganisation, 
further devolution and reallocation of the resources and 
responsibilities, more research is needed on the application of 
PbR in mental health, considering the current political context.  
 
The devolution of power to local authorities may further reduce 
the theoretical significance of MH PbR regarding facilitating 
collective data management by applying the nationally set 
tariffs and standards. How the government will balance between 
localised management and nationwide standardised services 
(equality) awaits further investigation. Further study may reap 
different findings regarding issues such as how and to what 
extent the establishment of new policies will affect the 
implementation of MH PbR; how and to what extent the 
combination of the health budget and the social care budget will 
affect the payment system; whether the local-based 
management will lead to a “thousand flowers bloom” situation 
or whether the integrated care will promote further 
standardisation of mental health services; whether and how the 
refined MH PbR will help to control costs, improve efficiency and 
quality in the new political context; and how and to what extent 
granting power to GPs and patients will help improve mental 
health services.  
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8.6  Implications for future policy development 
By considering policy-making as a learning process and 
appreciating the utility of policy evaluation for providing 
implications for future policy-making (Hogwood and Gunn, 
1984), the findings gleaned from the three-stage investigation, 
particularly those derived from the interviews, served to inform 
further messages in regard to the general lessons from 
launching the MH PbR policy. Despite recognising that the 
process of decision-making is a rapidly changing, flexible and 
chaotic process (John, 2012), there are at least two general 
lessons for developing a more realistic policy, which include: the 
policy-making process should be consistent, and policy should 
be tested first. 
 
 
8.6.1 Policy should be consistent  
This study revealed that the disjointed reforms with 
continuously changing policies not only slowed down the 
development of healthcare services, but also, more importantly, 
they destabilised the NHS and reduced the confidence of 
frontline staff. As illustrated in Chapter 2, the Thatcher and 
Major government adopted a decentralisation strategy to 
encourage provider-side competition under the Internal Market. 
The establishment of “modernisation of the NHS” implies that 
everything in the previous reform was of dubious value (Pilgrim 
and Ramon, 2009). In this respect, the Blair government took 
a third way to build an evidence-based health care system 
relying on centralised management supported by steady 
investment. However, the Liberalisation of the NHS returned to 
the Internal Market logic by regarding the centralised 
managerial strategy no longer suitable for a system under 
financial pressure. This study noted that these reforms came 
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with four reorganisations and intensively changing policies. The 
establishment of the GP fundholder strategy was abolished 
under the Blair government and PCGs were replaced by PCTs. 
The star-rating system aiming to reward Foundation Trusts was 
abandoned only six years after it was introduced at the 
beginning of the Modernisation. Despite the commitment the 
Tory party made the decision to not initiate another radical 
reform prior to the election (Timmins, 2012), the Coalition 
government returned to the “market”: abolished the 
miscellaneous arm’s-length sectors and replaced PCTs with 
CCGs to promote the provider-side competition. However, this 
study recognised a lack of hard evidence to support the 
Coalition government’s turning back to the market besides the 
significant financial investment put into these radical 
reorganisations. This shows agreement with Hood’s (2011) 
argument regarding the absence of compelling evidence 
indicating the relationship between returning to the market and 
the improvement of outcomes. Again, the recently released 
policies have dropped the idea of competition and refocused on 
providing integrated care (Monitor, 2014, 2015). 
 
This interview findings revealed that the fast-changing political 
strategies brought different and fast changing policies/targets 
to the frontline. Given the lack of sufficient and up-to-date 
training, the fast-changing policies resulted in two main adverse 
outcomes.  On the one hand, policies/targets were implemented 
before being tested.  Among them some policies, such as 
completing four successful contacts every day and discharging 
all C7 and C11 patients back to primary care, did not comply 
with clinical realities and therefore, created a heavy burden for 
frontline clinicians. On the other hand, policies had disappeared 
before they came into effect. As a result, frontline clinicians 
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wasted time completing paperwork that finally turned out to be 
meaningless. Consequently, this has resulted in an increasing 
workload brought about by fast-changing reforms, which took 
up time that could have been spent on treating patients or 
improving professional skills. This weakened their willingness to 
be involved in another radical reform, especially considering the 
significant gap between theory and practice. This finding 
conforms to Ham et al.’s (2013) study regarding the distraction 
of attention that should have been paid to quality improvement 
as an inevitable adverse consequence of reorganising the NHS 
on such a frequent basis.  
 
Therefore, this study argues that the oscillation between 
hierarchy and market led to disjointed reforms with fast 
changing policies that hindered the development of the 
healthcare system. This is particularly damaging given the 
current context of austerity in which the government may not 
be able to afford another radical reform. As Lindblom and 
Woodhouse (1993) suggest, policymakers should make 
incremental adjustments to the existing policies based upon 
sufficient foreknowledge of the context rather than taking a 
giant step into an unknown future. In this respect, this study 
suggests ceasing the permanent NHS revolution and focusing 
on refining the existing healthcare system.  
 
 
8.6.2 Policy should be tested first 
The interview findings revealed the existence of a cautious 
attitude from both the commissioner and the provider sides 
towards this newly developed system upon considering the 
constructional flaws of the subsystems. It has been observed 
that the providers had an impression that policymakers were 
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making decisions based on gut feelings with a lack of sense of 
the practical reality, which complies with O’Hara’s (2015) 
perspective. Relevant policies such as choosing the HoNOS as 
the standardised measurement to assess every patient, filling 
complex checklists as mandatory work subject to every patient 
and discharging all C11 patients from secondary care, were 
seen as more harmful than beneficial. This study noted that the 
care pathways and quality measurements were under 
preliminary testing, which was seen as helpful regarding 
discovering problems and making targeting revisions. However, 
the interview findings indicated the absence of strict tests: RCT 
is the only known method that could effectively evaluate the 
validity and reliability of one intervention/measurement in the 
healthcare domain, however, there often lack rigorously 
designed RCTs in mental health. This study therefore, argues 
that the government was too optimistic about the 
implementation of PbR in mental health with insufficient 
consideration of the undesirable, but inevitable consequences 
based upon the arguments, or even complaints, from the 
frontline. The inadequate understanding of the problems to be 
solved and the over-optimism of the cure resulted in the lack of 
theoretical validity of the policy, which indicated its inevitable 
failure to deliver the intended outputs (Bardach, 1977). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the success of implementing PbR in 
mental health also relies upon external support settings, which 
also require tests. It has been noted that the government tends 
to design policies and conduct reforms before carrying out 
rigorous pilot tests to evaluate their validity and feasibility 
(Public Administration Select Committee, 2009). According to 
Walshe (2010), the reform of replacing PCTs with CCGs has not 
been piloted. The assumption that the NHS would save more 
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than 45% of the management costs by abolishing PCTs and 
SHAs was not seen as a result derived from a rigorous 
evaluation. The results of the NHS Confederation’s (2011) 
interview study indicated that by then, less than 20% trusts had 
undertaken clustering, and more than 80% trusts could not 
meet the 2011 deadline for clustering all service users into 
diagnostic categories. Besides testing clinical service quality 
using a rigorous assessment, this study appreciates the 
importance of having valid and reliable inspection approaches. 
Only when the validity and utility of the inspection and 
regulation approaches are evaluated and confirmed, can the 
government have a clear understanding of the extent to which 
one policy contributes to improving service quality and what the 
unintended consequence may be. This complies with Lindblom 
and Woodhouse’s (1993) idea about the importance of having 
sufficient knowledge of the practical experiences in addition to 
future consequences. 
 
 
8.7  Conclusion 
There has been a historical split between acute services and 
mental health services regarding the nature of illness and the 
methods of providing treatment. The complex nature of mental 
disorders also determines the difficulties in accurately predicting 
interventions and therefore, the corresponding costs, which 
makes a DRG system less suitable for mental health. As a result, 
most developed countries have applied DRGs systems in acute 
services, but only a few have developed DRGs systems to 
manage mental health services. For countries such as Australia 
and New Zealand, although the governments have developed 
DRGs systems to classify mental illness, the payment systems 
are deliberately separated from the classification system due to 
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concerns over the potential financial risks resulting from poor 
data. In consideration of the lack of empirical evidence 
regarding the implementation of a DRGs system in mental 
health, this study set out to explore the English experience by 
unveiling some early outcomes of applying the PbR policy in 
mental health. 
 
Since MH PbR has only been partly invoked as a classification 
system with the price calculation system under development, 
there was a lack of sufficient investigation to rigorously examine 
either the current problems of implementing MH PbR as a whole 
scheme in mental health or PbR’s general impacts on this area. 
Moreover, there was a lack of compelling evidence of the 
impacts of PbR on cost, efficiency and quality, even in acute 
services where PbR fits most appropriately. Therefore, this 
study raised concern about the validity and feasibility of PbR 
itself, which further increased when taking account of the 
complex nature of mental disorders and the current climate of 
austerity. In consideration of the incomplete MH PbR system 
that hindered the use of longitudinal comparisons, this study 
mainly relied on qualitative approaches to investigate the 
driving factors that have caused the delay. 
 
This study employed mixed methods to present multi-level and 
multi-angle perspectives on issues surrounding the design and 
implementation of PbR in mental health. The literature review 
provided background information regarding the development of 
PbR in the general context of a series of NHS reforms and thus 
outlined the research aim. The following theoretical analysis 
focused on evaluating the fundamental theories behind PbR at 
the macro level from which the research questions were derived. 
A three-step analysis was carried out to provide multi-angle 
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perspectives regarding issues surrounding MH PbR at the micro 
level. The outcomes were categorised and analysed separately 
in each chapter. Based upon the findings, the values and flaws 
of applying PbR in mental health, together with the significance 
of this study, were further discussed in this chapter. 
 
 
8.7.1 Formulation of research objectives 
Chapter 2 provided background information surrounding the 
development of PbR as a new payment mechanism replacing 
the previous Block Contract. It indicated that PbR is based upon 
the Quasi-market theory that employs the non-price 
competition mechanism to promote efficiency and quality, while 
using governmental power to oversee healthcare services. The 
introduction of four radical reforms indicated the disjointed 
policies, based upon which this study highlighted the 
importance of political context to the implementation of MH PbR. 
The introduction of the implementation process outlined the two 
core elements of PbR, which include the clinical classification 
system and the tariff calculation system. At the end of this 
chapter, the status quo of the delayed implementation of MH 
PbR is outlined, which indicated the research aim of 
investigating the driving factors for the delay. 
 
Based upon the background information, Chapter 3 evaluated 
the application of the Quasi-market in healthcare services, 
particularly in mental health, by referring to fundamental 
theories such as professionalism and street-level bureaucracy. 
The theoretical analysis demonstrated that the Quasi-market 
failed to achieve the intended goals at the macro level, due to 
the fundamental conflicts between healthcare services, 
especially mental health services, and ordinary merchandise, 
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which in turn facilitated the formulation of research questions. 
The analysis also served to inform key objectives, such as the 
standardisation of tariff calculation, the standardisation of 
services, professionals’ value systems and information 
asymmetry.  
 
 
8.7.2 Research design and methodology 
This study employed mixed methods, mainly relying upon 
qualitative approaches to triangulate the driving factors for the 
delay in policy implementation in an indirect way. The three-
step analysis consisted of the theoretical evaluation of 
conceptual and constructional flaws of MH PbR, the semi-
structured interviews exploring the participants’ perspectives on 
the design of MH PbR and the relevant external factors from 
different angles, with the online surveys aiming to verify and 
complete interview findings. The top-down theoretical 
evaluation shed light upon the research direction and identified 
relevant key objectives for further exploration conducted by in-
depth interviews. The adoption of the GTM principles in the 
interview data analysis enabled a flexible generation of concepts 
in a bottom-up order under a broad framework set by the prior 
theoretical evaluation. The online surveys were conducted to 
verify the findings from previous theoretical analysis and 
interview analysis.  
 
 
8.7.3 Investigation of the research objectives 
Serving as a bridge between the fundamental theories 
underpinning PbR and the practical problems occurring during 
its implementation, Chapter 5 contextualised PbR in mental 
health services and thus investigated the feasibility and impacts 
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of applying the standardisation principle in the clinical 
classification system and the tariff calculation system, 
respectively. This chapter developed two findings: it is feasible, 
though difficult, to manage mental health services in a 
standardised way; and MH PbR failed to serve its purpose due 
to the conceptual drawbacks of the classification system and 
consequently, the constructional drawbacks of case 
classification and cost calculation. The top-down evaluation 
indicated that the MH PbR policy was poorly formulated. This 
shed light upon the subsequent fieldwork that focused on 
investigating the implementation of MH PbR.  
 
Chapters 6 and 7 presented early outcomes of the 
implementation of this policy derived from the semi-structured 
interviews and data derived from statistical analysis, 
respectively. The semi-structured interviews allowed 
participants from different interest groups to express their 
perspectives that facilitated furthering understanding from 
different angles. The questionnaire outcomes mainly served the 
purpose of verifying and completing the findings from the semi-
structured interviews. In addition, Chapter 7 discussed the 
questionnaire outcomes by triangulated them with the 
corresponding findings derived from the previous qualitative 
approaches in order to increase the validity and reliability of the 
research findings. The empirical findings revealed the conflicting 
perspectives between the administrative-level participants and 
the frontline participants, which complies with Lipsky’s (1980) 
“street-level bureaucracy” theory. It was noted that the 
administrative level participants held more optimistic 
perspectives on MH PbR given its utility as a governing 
instrument for collective case management, while the frontline 
participants were more concerned about its validity and utility 
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in everyday clinical practice. Regarding the research questions, 
the interview findings presented the current stage of the 
implementation of MH PbR by outlining how it affected the 
participants’ daily work, while the questionnaire outcomes 
illustrated the extent of the impact of MH PbR. Subject to the 
research questions, the empirical findings outlined that the 
initial problems of the classification system, the complex nature 
of mental disorders, the intensively established policies, the 
frontline clinicians’ involvement, the “gaming” behaviours, the 
delayed IT system and the negative attitude towards change 
emerged as factors responsible for the delayed implementation 
of MH PbR. The questionnaire outcomes revealed differences in 
the degree of importance and urgency of suggestions derived 
from the interview findings, indicating their descending order: 
“prioritising improving and applying care pathways”, “improving 
clustering system”, “publishing clear national direction and 
standards”, “defining more effective quality measure 
instruments”, “improving training” and “improving the integrity 
of care”. In particular, the analysis demonstrated the reasons 
that caused frontline clinicians’ reluctance to participate and the 
collateral obstacles which resulted from their relunctance. As an 
independent evaluation, these findings highlighted the 
necessity to address the conflicts between policies and frontline 
realities and reiterated the importance to prioritise frontline 
staff in policy-making.   
 
 
8.7.4 Key findings and implications 
In the current stage, this study considered the English 
government’s attempt to implement a DRG system in mental 
health failed to achieve its intended goals. By combining the 
findings from the two-level theoretical analysis and the two-step 
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empirical research, this study developed three main 
implications in regard to the implementation of PbR in mental 
health, as Figure 8-4 displays.  
 
Figure 8-4 Summary of the implications for the MH PbR policy 
 
 
 
This study implied that policy should be evaluated within 
context by attributing the fundamental problem of 
implementing PbR in mental health to the changes in the 
financial and political environment. By comparing the financial 
contexts for the implementation of PbR in acute services and 
mental health services, this study pointed to the 
inappropriateness of predicting the implementation process 
merely according to its implementation in acute services. This 
simultaneously indicated that the current financial situation 
cannot afford such a radical reorganisation surrounding MH PbR. 
By comparing the NHS structure before and after the 
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Liberalisation of the NHS, this study revealed that the NHS 
becomes a more bureaucratic organisation rather than a 
market-oriented one, which leads to the government’s failure to 
create a well-functioning Quasi-market for the development of 
MH PbR.  
 
Regarding the second implication, this study argued that one 
size does not fit all systems by summarising the findings subject 
to the design of MH PbR in the formulation stage. The 
comparison was carried out between mental health services and 
acute settings in terms of the nature of services and the political 
context. The findings indicated that while PbR may fit acute 
services, it is potentially harmful to mental health, particularly 
in financial aspects at the current stage. Regarding mental 
health services, the study appreciated the feasibility of 
standardising treatments subject to patients’ needs for care to 
a certain extent. By identifying the initial drawback of the Block 
Contract, the study illustrated that neither the Block Contract 
nor PbR is sufficient to achieve goals in both clinical and financial 
aspects. According to the current situation, the study suggested 
a combination of the two: on the one hand to employ MH PbR 
as a classification system that manages mental health services 
in a relatively standardised way, whilst on the other hand to 
keep the Block Contract as the payment method to avoid 
financial risks. 
 
Regarding the third implication, this study outlined the side 
effects alongside the establishment of the MH PbR policy, 
according to which the study called for attention to the trade-
offs between the objectives and the inevitable consequences. 
The comparison between national guidelines and local 
autonomy indicated the importance of balancing between top-
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down and bottom-up managerial approaches. The mismatches 
between the national targets and the frontline realities revealed 
the drawbacks of the top-down management and thus called for 
further refinement of the targets. Based upon the argument of 
the changing context for the implementation of PbR in mental 
health, this study revealed the importance of sufficient financial 
investment to the success of the implementation and 
simultaneously pointed to the current austerity. By highlighting 
the conflicts between the two, this study reminded policymakers 
to make a cautious decision by considering additional costs 
brought alongside the implementation of PbR in mental health. 
By outlining the biases in patient opinion, this study suggested 
policymakers take account of both the objectives of devolving 
rights to patients and the inevitable consequences in light of the 
differences between patient-centred care and high 
quality/efficient services.     
 
As an independent evaluation, this study used MH PbR as an 
epitome to understand the policy-making process and, 
therefore, offered implications for the future policy-making. This 
study found that the frequent change in structure and policy not 
only slowed down the development of healthcare services but 
also confused frontline clinicians, thus reducing their confidence 
in any future reforms. This study attempted to demonstrate that 
whether to adopt the hierarchy or the market-like bottom-up 
regulatory strategy depends upon the general environment. 
However, the only clear opinion is that the government should 
cease keeping reorganising the NHS, which would not only 
increase financial pressure, but also destabilise the system and 
undermine service quality. Besides the fact that policies tended 
to disappear before they had yielded any positive impact upon 
service delivery, some conflicted with the practical realities or 
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even harmed the quality of clinical services. This study thereby 
highlighted the importance of piloting policies and adjusting 
them according to clinical reality. In this regard, this study 
finally proposed two suggestions for the further development of 
policies: the policy-making process should be consistent rather 
than disjointed, and policies should be tested prior to formal 
implementation.  
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Appendix 1: Interview structures 
 
 
Commissioners: 
1. Could you please describe your current role?  
2. What is your general understanding of the implementation of PbR? Is it 
well designed or poorly designed? 
3. Do you prefer the Block Contract or PbR? Why? 
4. What is the current stage of commissioning PbR? Has there by any change 
in the interaction with providers? Would it be better or worse when PbR is 
fully implemented? 
5. Has there been any change in the payment calculation mechanism? How 
do you negotiate with providers at the current stage? 
6. How is service quality being measured? To what extent are these quality 
measurements related to the commissioning decisions? 
7. How does PbR impact healthcare costs, volume and quality? How to define 
“quality”? 
8. What is your perspective of the “Gaming” behaviours? 
9. From your perspective, what are the driving factors for the delayed 
implementation of PbR?  
10. How do you think these barriers might be overcome  
11. From your perspective, should PbR be implemented in mental health? 
 
 
 
Hospital managers: 
1. Could you please describe your current role? 
2. Could you please describe your responsibilities in the collaboration with 
commissioners and frontline clinicians, respectively?  
3. What is your broad understanding of PbR? Is it well designed or poorly 
designed? 
4. Do you prefer the Block Contract or PbR? Why? 
5. What is the current stage of implementing PbR? Has there by any change 
in the interaction with providers? Would it be better or worse when PbR is 
fully implemented? 
6. Has there been any change in the way you collaborate with commissioners? 
7. Has there been any change in the way you collaborate with frontline 
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clinicians?  
8. Is there any other change brought by PbR in your daily work? 
9. How is service quality being measured? To what extent are these quality 
measurements related to the commissioning decisions? 
10.  What is your perspective of the clustering system by comparing the 
MHCT to the ICD/DSM? 
11. What is your perspective of the HoNOS and the collaboration between it 
and the MHCT? 
12. How does PbR impact healthcare costs, volume and quality? How to 
define “quality”? 
13. What is your perspective of the “‘gaming” behaviours? 
14. From your perspective, what are the driving factors for the delayed 
implementation of PbR? 
15. How do you think these barriers might be overcome? 
16. From your perspective, should PbR be implemented in mental health? 
 
 
 
Frontline clinicians: 
1. Could you please describe your current role? 
2. Please could you describe your responsibilities in the collaboration with 
your line managers? 
3. What is your broad understanding of PbR? Is it well designed or poorly 
designed? 
4. What is the current stage of the implementation of PbR in daily clinical 
practice? 
5. To what extent do you feel PbR has changed the way you conduct clinical 
practice? 
6. Has PbR changed the way you collaborate with managers and colleagues? 
7. What is your perspective of the clustering system by comparing the MHCT 
to the ICD/DSM? 
8. What is your perspective of the HoNOS and the collaboration between it 
and the MHCT? 
9. From your perspective, to what extent do you think PbR is an effective 
way to improve health quality? How to define “quality”? 
10. What is your perspective of the “‘gaming” behaviours? 
11. From your perspective, what are the driving factors for the delayed 
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implementation of PbR? 
12. How do you think these barriers might be overcome? 
13. From your perspective, should PbR be implemented in mental health? 
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire structures 
 
Commissioners: 
 
 
Part 1: General questions: 
1. How do you describe your current post? 
A. Financing Officer 
B. Contracting Officer 
C. GP Commissioner 
D. Head of Commissioning 
E. Other (please specify) 
 
2. Which option could best describe your major responsibilities in terms of 
collaborating with the providers: 
1) Collaboration type:   
A. Payment negotiation 
B. Clinical practice monitor 
C. Multi-disciplinary coordination 
D. No direct collaboration 
 
2) Meeting frequency:  
A. >=1/week 
B. 2-3/month 
C. 1/month 
D. <1/month 
E. N/A 
 
 
Part 2: Current stage of implementation 
3. In order to describe the current stage of the implementation of PbR in 
the trust that you contract with, please tick the box of the following 
checklist: 
 Yes No Not known 
Currently under the Block Contract    
The deadline for Moving to PbR has been 
settled 
   
Financial incentives have been employed    
Care pathways have been implemented    
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4. In order to describe the current progress of PbR implementation in the 
trust that you contract with, please tick the box of the following checklist: 
 <50% 50%-75% >75% Not known 
Patients have been clustered     
Cluster 1-3 & C11patients discharged     
Training sessions provided to frontline 
staff 
    
Data collection completed     
 
 
5. In terms of you understanding of key elements in the PbR system, to 
what extent do you agree with the following statement? (1-5: strongly 
disagree - strongly agree) 
 1 2 3 4 5 Not 
known 
The Mental Health Clustering Tool (MHCT) 
is able to predict the standardised 
interventions and resource allocation. 
      
The MHCT care pathways provide proper 
guidance and enable the cost calculation. 
      
The HoNOS, The MHCT and the MHCT care 
pathways work smoothly as a whole 
system. 
      
Service quality SHOULD be properly 
measured. 
      
Service quality CAN be properly 
measured. 
      
The Patient-Rated Experience 
Measurement (PREM) is reliable. 
      
The HoNOS outcome measures can 
accurately represent patients’ outcomes. 
      
The IT system is accurate and 
transparent. 
      
The commissioners and providers are in 
close collaboration. 
      
The current monitor mechanism can 
effectively prevent “gaming” behaviours 
from happening. 
      
Government policies are clear.       
Government policies are able to guide 
local commissioning activity. 
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Part 3: Driving factors for the delay 
6. How would you rate the following factors according to the impact on the 
delayed implementation of PbR in mental health? (1-5: not important at 
all – very important) 
 1 2 3 4 5 Not 
known 
Complex nature of mental disorders       
The ideology of clustering       
A finance-led, target-driven system       
Poor design of the MHCT       
Poor design of the HoNOS       
Credibility of the interaction between 
the HoNOS and the MHCT 
      
Incomplete care pathways       
Incomplete IT system       
Clinicians’ lack of understanding       
Variations in clinical skills       
Training lack of effectiveness       
“Gaming” behaviours (up-coding)       
Government policies       
Experiences from acute services       
Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
Part 4: General attitudes 
7. Overall, do you think PbR should be implemented in mental health? 
A. Yes (skip to Q9) 
B. Hard to Say 
C. No  
 
8. Which option can best describe the reason for your objection to the 
implementation of PbR? 
A. Finance and target-led system 
B. The ideology of clustering 
C. Complex nature of mental disorders 
D. Mix of all above 
E. Other (please specify) 
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9. Please rate the order in which the following actions should be carried out 
to improve the system. (1-5: should be implemented first – implemented 
last) 
 Prioritising the improvement and application of the care pathways 
 Improving the clustering system (unbundling the HoNOS from 
the MHCT/add more measures for clustering) 
 Improving training  
 Publishing clear national guidelines and standards 
 Defining more effective quality measurement instruments 
 
 
10. What do you think is the most obvious benefit brought by PbR? 
A. Standardised treatments 
B. Outcome and service measurements 
C. More efficient IT system 
D. The idea of cost-efficiency 
E. Quality promotion mechanism 
F. Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
	 417	
Managers:  
 
Part 1: General questions: 
1. How do you describe your current post? 
A. Financial manager 
B. Clinical manager 
C. PbR trainer 
D. Interim manager 
E. Other (please specify) 
 
2. Which option could best describe your major responsibilities in terms of 
collaborating with the commissioners: 
1) Collaboration type:   
A. Payment negotiation 
B. Clinical strategy design 
C. Multi-disciplinary coordination 
D. No direct collaboration 
 
2) Meeting frequency:  
A. >=1/week 
B. 2-3/month 
C. 1/month 
D. <1/month 
E. N/A 
 
3. Which option could best describe your major responsibilities in the 
collaboration with the frontline clinicians: 
1) Collaboration type:   
A. Direct daily clinical practice 
B. Provide standardised training 
C. Manage from a strategic level 
D. No direct collaboration 
 
2) Meeting frequency:  
A. >=1/week 
B. 2-3/month 
C. 1/month 
D. <1/month 
E. N/A 
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Part 2: Current stage of implementation 
4. In order to describe the current stage of PbR implementation in your 
organisation, please tick the box of the following checklist: 
 Yes No Not 
known 
Currently under the Block contract    
The deadline for Moving to PbR has been 
settled 
   
The MHCT care pathways have been 
implemented 
   
Quality measurements (other than the 
HoNOS outcome measurement) have been 
implemented 
   
 
 
5. In order to describe the current progress of PbR implementation in your 
organisation, please tick the box of the following checklist: 
 <50% 50%-75% >75% Not known 
Patients have been clustered     
Cluster 1-3 patients have been discharged     
Training sessions provided to frontline staff     
PbR related data collection is completed     
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6. In terms of the effectiveness of key elements in PbR, to what extent do 
you agree with the following statements? (1-5: strongly disagree - 
strongly agree) 
 1 2 3 4 5 Not 
known 
The MHCT is more useful than the DSM 
system. 
      
Distinctions between neighbouring 
clusters are clear. 
      
The HoNOS is well designed and able to 
detect patients’ needs. 
      
The HoNOS scores always lead to the 
correct clusters. 
      
The MHCT care pathways provide better 
guidance than the NICE guidelines. 
      
The HoNOS, the MHCT and the MHCT 
care pathways work smoothly as a whole 
system. 
      
Service quality SHOULD be properly 
measured. 
      
Service quality CAN be properly 
measured. 
      
Patient rated measures can accurately 
reflect service quality. 
      
The HoNOS outcome measures can 
accurately represent patients’ outcomes. 
      
Government policies are clear.        
Government policies are able to guide 
local commissioning activity. 
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Part 3: Driving factors for the delay 
7. How would you rate the following factors according to the impact on the 
delayed implementation of PbR in mental health? (1-5: not important at 
all – very important) 
 1 2 3 4 5 Not 
known 
Complex nature of mental disorders       
The ideology of clustering       
A finance-led, target-driven system       
Design of the MHCT       
Design of the HoNOS       
Credibility of the interaction between 
the HoNOS and the MHCT 
      
Incomplete care pathways       
Incomplete IT system       
Frontline clinicians’ lack of 
understanding 
      
Variations in clinical skills       
Training lack of effectiveness       
“Gaming” behaviours (up-coding)       
Government policies       
Experiences from acute services       
Other (please specify) 
 
 
Part 4: General attitudes 
8. Overall, do you think PbR should be implemented in mental health? 
A. Yes (skip to Q10) 
B. Hard to Say 
C. No  
 
9. Which option can best describe the reason for your objection to the 
implementation of PbR? 
A. Finance and target-led system 
B. The ideology of clustering 
C. Complex nature of mental disorders 
D. Mix of all above 
E. Other (please specify) 
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10. Please rate the order in which the following actions should be carried out 
to improve the system. (1-5: should be implemented first – implemented 
last) 
 Prioritising the improvement and application of the care pathways 
 Improving the clustering system (unbundling the HoNOS from the 
MHCT/add more measures for clustering) 
 Improving training  
 Publishing clear national guidelines and standards 
 Defining more effective quality measurement instruments 
 
 
11. What do you think is the most obvious benefit brought by PbR? 
A. Standardised treatments 
B. Outcome and service measurements 
C. More efficient IT system 
D. The idea of cost-efficiency 
E. Quality promotion mechanism 
F. Other (please specify) 
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Frontline clinicians:  
 
 
Part 1: General questions: 
1. How do you describe your current post? 
A. Psychiatrist 
B. Psychologist 
C. Occupational Therapist 
D. Nurse 
E. Social Worker 
F. Other (please specify) 
 
2. Which option could best describe your major responsibilities in terms of 
collaborating with your line managers: 
1) Collaboration type:   
A. Quality check 
B. Activity quantity check 
C. Clinical strategy development 
D. Quality and activity quantity check 
E. Quality check and clinical development 
F. Activity quantity check and clinical development 
G. All of above 
 
2) Meeting frequency:  
A. >=1/week 
B. 2-3/month 
C. 1/month 
D. <1/month 
E. N/A 
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Part 2: Current stage of the implementation of PbR 
3. In order to describe the current stage of PbR implementation in your 
organisation, please tick the box of the following checklist: 
 Yes No Not 
known 
Currently under the Block Contract    
The MHCT care pathways have been 
implemented 
   
Quality measurements (other than the 
HoNOS outcome measurement) have been 
implemented 
   
 
 
4. In order to describe your daily activity related to the implementation of 
PbR, please select the most suitable one in each option list: 
1) How many contacts are you required to have in one day? 
A. <=2/day 
B. 3-4/day 
C. >4/day 
D. No specified requirement 
 
2) How many PbR training sessions have you attended? 
A. 0 
B. 1-2 
C. 3-4 
D. 5-6 
E. >6 
 
5. How long do you normally spend on paperwork in one day? 
A. <30mins/day 
B. 30mins-1hour/day 
C. 1hour-2hours/day 
D. >2hours/day 
 
 
6. To what extent are you confident that the Mental Health Clustering Tool 
(MHCT) reflects clinical activity? 
A. <50% 
B. 50%-75% 
C. >75% 
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D. Not known 
 
7. In terms of the effectiveness of key elements in PbR, to what extent do 
you agree with the following statements? (1-5: strongly disagree - 
strongly agree) 
 1 2 3 4 5 Not 
known 
The MHCT is more useful than the DSM 
system. 
      
Distinctions between neighbouring clusters 
are clear. 
      
The HoNOS is well designed and able to 
identify patients’ needs. 
      
The HoNOS scores always lead to the 
correct clusters. 
      
The MHCT care pathways provide better 
guidance than the NICE guidelines. 
     
The HoNOS, the MHCT and the MHCT care 
pathways work smoothly as a whole 
system. 
      
Service quality SHOULD be properly 
measured. 
      
Service quality CAN be properly measured.       
Patient rated measurements can accurately 
reflect service quality. 
      
The HoNOS outcome measures can 
accurately represent patients’ outcomes. 
      
Government policies are clear.       
Government policies are able to guide local 
commissioning activity. 
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Part 3: Driving factors for the delay 
8. How would you rate the following factors according to the impact on the 
delayed implementation of PbR in mental health? (1-5: not important at 
all – very important) 
 1 2 3 4 5 Not 
known 
Complex nature of mental disorders       
The ideology of clustering       
A finance-led, target-driven system       
Design of the MHCT       
Design of the HoNOS       
Credibility of the interaction between 
the HoNOS and the MHCT 
      
Incomplete care pathways       
Incomplete information system       
Mixed messages regarding the 
implementation of  PbR 
      
Variations in clinicians’ abilities       
Training effectiveness       
“Gaming” behaviours (e.g. up-coding)       
Government policies       
Heavy workload       
Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
Part 4: General attitudes 
9. Overall, do you think PbR should be implemented in mental health? 
A. Yes (skip to Q11) 
B. Hard to Say 
C. No  
 
10. Which option can best describe the reason for your objection to the 
implementation of PbR? 
A. Finance and target-led system 
B. The ideology of clustering 
C. Complex nature of mental disorders 
D. Mix of all above 
E. Other (please specify) 
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11. Please rate the order in which the following actions should be carried out 
to improve the system. (1-5: should be implemented first – 
implemented last) 
 Prioritising the improvement and application of the care pathways 
 Improving the clustering system (unbundling the HoNOS from the 
MHCT/add more measures for clustering) 
 Improving training  
 Publishing clear national guidelines and standards 
 Defining more effective quality measurement instruments 
 
 
12. What do you think is the most obvious benefit brought by PbR? 
A. Standardised treatments 
B. Outcome and service measurements 
C. More efficient IT system 
D. The idea of cost-efficiency 
E. Quality promotion mechanism 
F. Other (please specify) 
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